The Cases That Haunt Us

by Mark Olshaker

It is also possible that one or more doors had been left unlocked. This was a low-crime area, and the Ramseys sometimes did leave doors unlocked when they were not at home. This was also true of ground-floor windows. During a search on the morning of December 26, a police officer reportedly found the door on the south side of the house unlocked.

  3.If neither of the Ramseys killed JonBenet and the real killer is still out there, why hasn’t he been caught and why hasn’t there been any evidence of his subsequentwork?

  First of all, this was not the work of a serial killer. This is not someone who killed for the fulfillment and satisfaction of exerting manipulation, domination, and control over a victim of opportunity. This was an inexperienced, mission-oriented offender. So there is no particular reason to believe he would repeat the same signature crime over and over.

  And it is unfortunately true that many homicides go unsolved, particularly in jurisdictions without a lot of experience working them. On December 21, 1997, almost exactly a year after JonBenet’s murder, Susannah Chase, a University of Colorado student, was murdered in downtown Boulder. Like the Ramsey murder, Boulder PD has been unable to solve this one. Where is that killer?

  4.If JonBenet’s body was discovered on December 26, 1996, but the Ramseyschose to mark the date of death on her tombstone as December 25, doesn’t that implyspecific knowledge that only the killer would have?

  That’s apparently what the police believed. Having dealt with many bereaved families of murder victims, I think the use of this date as a “clue” is ridiculous.

  Parents will always search for some meaning or significance out of the tragedy of their child’s death. Christmas Day had a happy and symbolic significance to the Ramseys. If they didn’t actually know whether JonBenet died before or after midnight, it was perfectly natural that they would choose the date that had the most meaning to them. On one level, I believe choosing this date was an attempt to remind people of the presence of evil in the midst of innocence and joy.

  5.Would an intruder risk this much time in the house?

  Certain types of intruders would. In 1988, my unit worked a kidnapping case in Jackson, Mississippi. On July 26, Annie Laurie Hearin, seventy-two years of age, in poor health and the wife of Robert M. Hearin, one of the state’s wealthiest men, was abducted from their elegant Georgian home in a well-to-do neighborhood in broad daylight. Only about an hour window of opportunity existed between the time Mrs. Hearin’s brunch guests left at 3:30 P.M. and her husband returned home at 4:30. Nothing in Annie Hearin’s background or lifestyle suggested her as a target, yet the UNSUB was willing to go to great risk to get to her. Clearly, this was not a victim of opportunity.

  There was a ransom note, as bizarre in its way as the Ramsey note. It was typed on an old typewriter and referenced School Pictures, a company that Robert Hearin had controlled, although it was only a small part of his holdings. The note also listed twelve individuals who had been franchise owners of the company and directed Hearin to “Put these people back in the shape they was in before they got mixed up with School Pictures.” So the UNSUB was someone who felt he, and School Pictures, had been wronged by Robert Hearin.

  Bill Hagmaier, who, by the time of the Ramsey case, headed up CASKU, the FBI’s Child Abduction and Serial Killer Unit, the successor to my Investigative Support Unit, took on the profile of the UNSUB and put in his usual first-rate effort. As I recall from our case consultation discussions, he defined Mrs. Hearin as a symbolic victim and the offender as mission-oriented, with a strong commitment, even though the crime was crudely planned and somewhat impulsive and high risk. He believed the residence was probably surveilled ahead of time and that the UNSUB had most likely been inside before, either through legitimate or illegitimate means. Despite the ransom note, Hagmaier believed the motive was primarily anger rather than material gain.

  Working from the profile, the ransom note, and such leads as the fact that a white van with Florida plates had been observed on several occasions near the crime scene, investigators identified a prime suspect. Newton Alfred Winn, one of the individuals listed in the ransom note, lived in Florida and was losing virtually everything he had as the result of a lawsuit over School Pictures. At Winn’s home, police found a typewriter that appeared to be linked to the note, and a map of Jackson, with the Hearins’ neighborhood circled. Winn was convicted of extortion, conspiracy to kidnap, and perjury and sentenced to nineteen years.

  But like the Ramsey case, this one continues to haunt me. Annie Laurie Hearin was never found and no one has ever been charged with her murder. Her husband, Robert, died two years after her disappearance of a heart attack. But there are enough similarities between the two cases, particularly in the astuteness of Bill’s profile, to open our minds to the possibilities in the Ramsey case.

  SUMMING UP

  Actually, there is no way to sum up a case like this. I don’t claim to know who did it; I only think I have a pretty good idea who didn’t do it, and that is what I’ve tried to present.

  Having said that, though, it would be ducking the issue if I did not at least present a theory of what might have happened.

  The behavioral evidence I have discerned and the forensic evidence I have seen and read, plus what has been conveyed to me by Lou Smit, lead me to believe that JonBenet Ramsey’s killer was a white male, relatively young, who had a personal grudge against John Ramsey and intended to carry it out by defiling and robbing him of the most valuable thing in the world to him.

  I believe he entered the house while the family was out, either through the basement window well or with a key, bringing with him a stun gun, a roll of duct tape, and a spool of cord. His intention was to incapacitate JonBenet, abduct her, and molest her. This was a personal-cause crime rather than a criminal enterprise. The ransom consideration was secondary and may not even have occurred to the UNSUB until he was in the house. This could account for the note’s being written on Patsy’s pad, and this could account for the $118,000 figure. That is, he had no real intention of collecting so low a sum; he was just trying to make a point.

  Or maybe he brought a briefer ransom note with him, but when he had the time, he altered his plan and wrote a note on the Ramseys’ own paper that was lying out on the counter, getting out more of his anger and resentment. How bad or insulting would this look for the Ramseys?

  The high risk for the intruder would have been mitigated by the complexity of the physical layout of the house. He could have hidden out in the basement, which he would have illuminated with the flashlight he brought, getting familiar with the warren of rooms.

  The UNSUB stole up to JonBenet’s bedroom after her parents were upstairs asleep, incapacitated her with an Air Taser stun gun, which would not make a loud noise when fired, taped her mouth, and carried her down to the basement, which he had already checked out, and where he used Patsy’s paintbrush handle and his own cord to form a garrote around the child’s neck. He also bound her hands tightly. Whether he intended to or not, his tightening of the neck ligature either killed her or nearly did so. When he realized what he had done, he panicked and finished off the job with a blow to her head. Then, instead of removing her from the house, he fled in panic.

  This is only one possibility. Another would be that this actually was an intended kidnapping, planned by one or more teens or young adults who had been inside the Ramsey house and had seen John’s pay stubs. Maybe they were friends of one of JonBenet’s baby-sitters, workmen, or friends of friends; that’s just a guess. But to a teen, $118,000 would be a lot of money. He would also be so unsophisticated as to have no idea how difficult it is to pull off a kidnapping, even the kidnapping of a six-year-old girl.

  He would be bold and foolhardy enough to enter the house and wait there, during which time he could have written the ransom note he forgot to bring with him. In this case, both the stun gun and the garrote may have been instruments of control rather than torture. The digital penetration of the child’s vagina would have represented the young
man’s casual sexual experimentation while he had the opportunity. This type of behavior would not be rare. Again, when he realized he had killed or nearly killed his victim, he would have panicked and fled.

  Normally, a teen or group of teens will fold like a house of cards when confronted by investigators. But if the heat was never on him because of the focus on the Ramseys, he may have been able to slide under the radar.

  The fact remains, I’m not sure who killed JonBenet Ramsey, and the fact that her killer has not been found and charged represents a terrible injustice. That injustice will only be compounded if the wrong people are accused.

  I always said that having a child murdered was the worst possible thing that could happen to a person. I guess I was wrong. Having that happen and then being blamed for it is even worse.

  CHAPTER SEVEN

  PERSPECTIVES

  In examining the themes these cases share to figure out what continues to haunt us about them, one idea that comes to mind is that of “archetype” or “icon.” From lurking evil to the inner workings of family, from celebrity and its implications to the mystical and arcane, from sexual obsession to the corruption of innocence, each of these cases, as we’ve seen, represents an archetype we can all understand. Each of these cases represents the dark side of something potent and elemental. That’s why they’re fascinating.

  But they’re also important and instructive. Because while they give us a window onto the human condition, these cases also show us what can happen when we’re not prepared to deal with them.

  Each of these cases suffered from serious investigative difficulties, errors, irregularities, or other problems. In the Whitechapel murders, the investigators didn’t yet understand what they were dealing with. In the Borden slayings, they were hamstrung by societal stereotypes about women and class. In the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, well-meaning and sympathetic officials lost control and let the connection to the kidnapper slip away from them. In the Christine Schultz and JonBenet Ramsey murders, the crime scenes and evidence were compromised from the get-go and the investigations stymied by departments with questionable agendas. With the Boston Strangler, a confession provided a simple, quick “solution” that ultimately proved unsatisfying and unconvincing.

  These cases are also representative of much larger issues in crime solving and criminal justice. So what can be done?

  Several things, I think.

  We’ve made a lot of progress in the century-plus that this book spans, and as we’ve said, we think we could help solve some of these cases that haunt us if they were presented to us today. We have techniques, abilities, and understanding we didn’t have back then, whether we’re talking about the 1880s or the 1980s. DNA analysis, medical examination, computers, preservation of evidence, laser enhancement, modern psychology, profiling, interview techniques, threat assessment, and other fundamentals of investigation are just a few of these. And yet even as you read this, several thousand unidentified dead are lying in the nation’s morgues. In 1960, the clearance rate for homicide was around 91 percent. Now, due to factors such as proliferation of “stranger” murders (that is, offenders and victims unknown to one another), it’s around 65 percent.

  Unless we actually use what we’ve got and learn how to consistently manage investigations in a uniform and competent way, all of the modern developments and improvements are going to be meaningless. If you have excellent techniques for hair and fiber analysis but adulterate the crime scene before the evidence team arrives, you’ve got nothing. If you can identify murder weapons from bullet markings but don’t determine who was in possession of the weapon, you’ve got nothing. If DNA evidence can determine which specific individual in the entire world was at a scene but your chain of custody is called into question, you’ve got nothing. We could go on and on with examples.

  I speak all over the country on criminology and related subjects. When I address and meet with victims’ groups, people always come up to me and describe absolutely heinous crimes that I’ve never heard of. And if I haven’t, who else has outside the immediate circle of those affected? With such serial killers as John Wayne Gacy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and Joel Rifkin, the dead had piled up before authorities even knew there was a problem. There are not only more violent crimes than there used to be, but increasingly they’re committed by “strangers”—someone who doesn’t know and has no personal grudge against the victim . . . the victim of opportunity. And that kind of homicide gives us big problems.

  The point is, we’ve got to use what we’ve got, better and more efficiently than we’re doing now.

  In 1985, I attended a ribbon-cutting ceremony at Quantico for the FBI’s new VICAP: the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program. Attorney General William French Smith and Bureau director William Webster attended. VICAP is a computer database listing in-depth particulars of predatory crimes. It was intended that when one of the more than seventeen thousand law enforcement agencies in this country had a violent predatory case—a potential serial murder or rape, for example—the case would be entered into the computer by filling out a carefully constructed questionnaire, and then VICAP would be able to provide them with the experience of anyone else in the country who had similar evidence or clues. It was a tremendous idea, coming originally from former LAPD homicide detective Pierce Brooks.

  But while the profiling program quickly got on its feet and established itself, VICAP faltered and stumbled. By the time I retired from the Bureau in 1995, only a few thousand cases had been entered. The local agencies just didn’t want to go through the trouble, particularly if not everyone else was doing it. Meanwhile, the Canadians have studied our system, instituted their own, and run with it. The difference? Participation by Canadian forces is mandated. Anyone who doesn’t use it risks losing government funding. It does no good to have a sophisticated national resource like this unless everyone participates.

  As anyone who’s read Mark’s and my recent novel, Broken Wings, knows, for a long time I’ve been advocating the creation of a “flying squad.” This would be a team of specialists in all areas of criminal investigation—detectives, profilers, medical examiners, crime scene technicians, ballistics, hair, fiber, and blood-spatter experts, forensic anthropologists and entomologists, whatever is needed—who could quickly get to a major crime scene anywhere in the United States in their own well-equipped plane and work the case while it is still fresh and uncorrupted. They wouldn’t all have to be Bureau people, either. I would make it like the military’s Delta Force, taking the best people from whichever agency or service could provide them.

  I also advocate the establishment of an independent national laboratory for processing evidence, separate from the FBI and other federal agencies, whose scientists would be the best and whose reports would be reliable and unassailable. One of the issues we’ve seen in some of our haunting cases is that we really don’t know whose facts or whose evidence to believe. For example, was rail sixteen a legitimate piece of the Lindbergh kidnapping ladder or was it planted by overeager police officers? Was Elizabeth Short cut in two while she was still alive or after death? This lab could go a long way toward restoring the credibility of evidence in criminal investigations and prosecutions.

  In the meantime, states can do some things on their own. A lot of times, a local police department’s or prosecutor’s office’s chief problem is that it can’t or won’t communicate, either with the victims of a crime, the public in general, or other departments. I think this could be greatly ameliorated if each state would set up a major-crimes task force. Some have already done so, and the results have been impressive.

  Such a group would hold regular meetings with representatives of individual police and sheriff ’s departments and state investigative and lab facilities. They’d hear formal presentations on various aspects of forensic science and discuss both hot and cold cases. The critical consideration is that each official, detective, or investigator anywhere in the state would know what resources were available and how they cou
ld be used. This would avoid a Ramsey-type situation in that a local department without necessary resources or experience would have both the means and, just as important, the self-assurance to quickly call on the best help available.

  While the FBI hasn’t enjoyed the success I would have liked to see on VICAP, a major, nearly incalculable contribution has been made with the National Academy program. Chiefs, division heads, and senior officers and detectives of local and regional agencies are brought to Quantico for intensive training, orientation, and familiarity with the latest trends and techniques of law enforcement. Not only does the National Academy give its graduate fellows a deeper understanding and wider perspective, it also creates an informal network of people around the country and the world who know each other and can call on each other when the need arises.

  Some of my greatest successes have come about because the local officials who called in my unit had become familiar with us through participation in the National Academy. The 1985 investigation of the Shari Faye Smith and Debra May Helmick murders in South Carolina I alluded to in the previous chapter were examples of what can happen when profiling and related services are married to superior local police work to catch a serial killer before he can go any further in his devastation. And I’ve often said that one of the key reasons for this was because the two outstanding officers in charge, Sheriff Jim Metts and Undersheriff Lew McCarty, were both National Academy graduates. Metts understood that by calling us in, he was not displaying weakness or uncertainty, but strength and commitment to putting together the best team he could to protect his community. And for that reason he, McCarty, Rochester police captain Lynde Johnson, and so many others like them will always be heroes and role models in my book.

  There are other lessons and commonalities in these cases that I hope come through.