Fighting to the End

by C Christine Fair

  Pakistan was … almost losing its ideology in the very act of trying to fulfill it. … Iqbal, one of the main creators of our ideology, had taken pains to define it in very clear terms: “In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it. It is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. … The State from the Islamic standpoint is an endeavor to transform these ideals into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization.” It is this sort of human organization which Pakistan aspires to become and one of my endeavors is to clear at least a part of the way by liberating the basic concept of our ideology from the dust of vagueness and ambiguities it has accumulated over the years (Khan 1960, 547–548, emphasis added).

  The tenor and content of the article demonstrate the extent to which Ayub, his secular credentials notwithstanding, was willing to mobilize Islam in the name of protecting the nation.

  The same article also attests to Ayub’s immodest goals. He believed that his “revolution” could resolve Pakistan’s foundational contradictions:

  [Until the] advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani, for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name. … Prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional, territorial and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan (Khan 1960, 549).

  It is clear from both Ayub’s autobiography and the Foreign Affairs essay that among the key elements of his conceptualization both of the ideology of Pakistan and of Pakistani nationalism were “Pan-Islamic aspirations and fear of Hindu and Indian domination” (Haqqani 2005, 42). In Friends not Masters he argues that the cause of Pakistan’s most significant problems is India’s “inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign independent State. The Indian attitude can only be explained in pathological terms. The Indian leaders have a deep hatred for the Muslims. … From the beginning, India was determined to make things difficult for us” (M.A. Khan 2006, 135).

  Later in the same volume, Ayub, describing India’s posited hegemonic impulses, its implacable hostility to Pakistan, and the intolerance of the Hindu priestly caste, the Brahmins, contends:

  India was not content with her present sphere of influence and she knew that Pakistan had the will and the capacity to frustrate her expansionist designs. She wanted to browbeat us into subservience. All we wanted was to live as equal and honourable neighbors, but to that India would never agree. It was Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance that had forced us to seek a homeland of our own where we could order our life according to our thinking and faith. … There was [a] fundamental opposition between the ideologies of India and Pakistan (M.A. Khan 2006, 194–195).

  Ayub’s writings evince a belief that, should Pakistan’s ideology fail, Pakistan would also fail. To ensure the success of this ideology, and thus of Pakistan, then, his government had to actively promote it and secure its legitimacy within Pakistan. This required the government to mobilize the same kinds of tools other states employ to socialize their citizens, such as public school curricula, print media, radio, and television. Ayub’s government used these instruments to restrict public debate about the nature of the Pakistani state and its ideology. Under Ayub, “Pakistan began the process of official myth-creation in earnest. A large central bureaucracy was created to manufacture an ideology for Pakistan, one that glorified the army as the state’s key institution” (Cohen 2004, 67).

  There were several dimensions to this effort. While the remainder of this chapter focuses on how the military formulated and instrumentalized the so-called ideology of Pakistan, it is important to note that Ayub’s government engaged the entire apparatus of the state to consolidate and protect Pakistan’s ideology. Pakistan’s educational system became an obvious tool of Ayub’s government, and it remains an important means of propagating and protecting the ideology of the state. During his tenure, Ayub laid the foundations of Pakistan’s current national educational system. His government undertook a massive review of educational policy, the results of which were compiled in 1959 in the Sharif Commission report. Reflecting Ayub’s revolutionary mission, the commission’s recommendations were aimed at developing a national consciousness along the lines of Ayub’s ideology (Saigol 2003).

  The Sharif Commission report had two overarching goals: achieving national integration and homogenization; and modernizing Pakistan’s economy and society. “Consistent with the premise of the two-nation theory,” the commission invoked religion “for the purpose of national integration. Since religion seemed to be the only common thread tying the different regions to each other, it was deployed as a strategy for national unification” (Saigol 2003, 5–6). The report also established a textbook board, whose primary task has since been to ensure that the country’s textbooks align with the government’s policies (Lall 2008). As has been described in depth elsewhere (see, e.g., Ahmed 2004; Aziz 1998; Lall 2008; Nayyar and Salim 2003), this curriculum offered—and continues to offer—deeply problematic histories of Islam in the region and xenophobic characterizations of India and Hindus and has over time come to emphasize Sunni Islam, to the exclusion of other Muslims and non-Muslims. Both “curricula and textbooks were standardized, presenting a version of history that linked Pakistan’s emergence to Islam’s arrival in the subcontinent instead. … Muslim conquerors were glorified, Hindu-Muslim relations were painted as intrinsically hostile” (Haqqani 2005, 40).

  Although Ayub’s government focused on the educational sector, he also mobilized other state apparatuses. The Ministry of Information and Bureau of National Reconstruction ensured that radio, television, magazines, books, newspapers, and films reflected the same message as the school system. By doing so, Ayub’s regime was able to disseminate his ideology among adults, who were outside the direct reach of the school system (Cohen 2004; Haqqani 2005).

  While Ayub may have been the first army chief to advocate a role for the Pakistan Army in defending Pakistan’s ideological as well as physical frontiers, he was not the last. Zia contended that the “preservation of [the] ideology and the Islamic character of the country was. … as important as the security of the country’s geographic boundaries” (Rizvi 2000b, 256). Equally noteworthy is the wording of the referendum on his rule that Zia put before the Pakistani electorate. Voters were asked whether they

  endorse the process initiated by General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) and for the preservation of the Ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people, and in case of answer “Yes,” General Muhammad Ziaul Haq shall be deemed to have been duly elected President of Pakistan for a term of five years from the day of the first meeting of the Houses of Parliament in joint sitting (Pakistan Supreme Court, 2002).

  Zia’s approach to managing Islam, however, differed sharply from that of Ayub. Whereas Ayub sought to co-opt Sufi shrines and circumscribe the power of the pirs associated with them while limiting the political inputs of the ulema, Zia did not feel the need to associate his regime with Sufi Islam. During his period, he increased the direct participation of the ulema parties and involved the
m in the functions of the state. Whereas Ayub reappropriated the Urs festival of the saint associated with the shrine to promote modernizing programs, Zia gave these events considerably less promotion. (Note that Z. A. Bhutto adopted a very similar strategy to shrine management as Ayub before him.) While Zia was associated with attempting to reinstate “the original Islamic social order that prevailed at the time of the Prophet Mohammad,” his government did not entirely disavow Sufi saints and shrines (Ewing 1983, 263), but instead redeployed the identity of saints as models of piety. Zia continued the policy initiated by Ayub of turning “shrines into multifunctional religious and social welfare centers administered by the Auqaf Department,” which represented the state (264).

  President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, despite the praise he received for his ostensible personal secularism, also made use of Islam during his tenure. As with Zia’s government, the ulema figured prominently. The bloc of Islamist parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), constituted the opposition party of choice during his tenure at the center. The MMA formed the provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province, since renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and formed a coalition with Musharraf’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam Group) (PML-Q), in Balochistan. In his famed speech as army chief on September 19, 2001, Musharraf explained to Pakistan’s citizens why he had agreed to support the United States in its war efforts in Afghanistan; he made ample reference to Islam. It is instructive to reproduce parts of this speech to understand the ways he mobilized Islam as the cornerstone of the state:

  Our forces are on full alert and ready for a do or die mission. In this situation if we make the wrong decisions it can be very bad for us. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth [sic] our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam. … It’s not a question of bravery or cowardice. But bravery without thinking is stupidity. Allah has said that he who has ‘hikmat’ has a huge blessing. We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary. … Some ‘ulema’ are trying to react on pure emotions. I want to remind them of Islam’s early history. They moved from Mecca to Medina (hijrat). Was this (God forbid) cowardice? This was wisdom to save Islam. … Then when the Jews saw that Islam was getting stronger they started to conspire against the Muslims. When the Prophet (PBUH) saw this happening he signed a no war pact with his enemies in Mecca. I want to remind you of that pact. At the end of the pact, where his signature was required, the Meccans demanded that he cannot sign it as “Prophet Mohammed.” The Prophet (PBUH) agreed. … The Prophet explained later that its [sic] best for Islam, and it’s the right thing to do. And time proved him right. Six months later there was a war with the Jews and the Meccans did not support the Jews and the Muslim forces won. And some time after that Mecca also fell to Islamic mujahideen. … At this time, we have [to] make sure that our enemies do not succeed in their designs to harm us. Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is damaged, Islam will be damaged (Musharraf 2006).

  Thus, Musharraf argued that by acting to secure core state interests he was advancing the interests of Islam itself.

  Despite some obvious similarities to the ways Zia and even Ayub used Islam to defend their actions, Musharraf’s approach was also uniquely his own. This can be seen from the referendum he put before the people in 2002. In Musharraf’s yes/no referendum question, he asked voters: “Do you want to elect President Musharraf as President of Pakistan for the next five years for: survival of local government system; restoration of democracy; continuity and stability of reforms; eradication of extremism and sectarianism, and the accomplishment of the Quaid-i-Azam’s [Jinnah’s] concept?” (Rouse 2002). To the casual observer, this question appears to lack Zia’s cynical manipulation of Islam, and indeed Musharraf’s instrumentalization of Islam is subtler than that of Zia. Nonetheless, Musharraf equated support for his government with support for accomplishing the Quaid-i-Azam’s concept, which is an allusion to the two-nation theory and the protection of Islam as Pakistan’s ideology.

  Musharraf assigned himself the grand task of reconfiguring this ideology to best suit his vision of the state, which echoed the similar visions of Ayub and Zia. In 2004, before the opening of the annual meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which was to be held in Islamabad, he unveiled his platform of Enlightened Moderation. He subsequently published an editorial called “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation” in the Washington Post, Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly. The editorial and the concept was covered extensively in the Pakistani media. In this piece he ascribed Muslims’ involvement with terrorism to economic and political oppression. He suggested Enlightened Moderation as a way of addressing this very real problem, describing it as “… a win for all—for both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. It is a two-pronged strategy. The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The second is for the West, and the United States in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world” (Musharraf 2004).

  While Musharraf sustained some criticism for conceding Muslim involvement in terrorism and for what some saw as his naive belief that the United States and other Western nations would actually seek to resolve political disputes in the Muslim world with political, social, and economic justice, he earned accolades in the United States and beyond (Bano 2004).

  Musharraf also garnered support abroad and among liberals at home for denouncing some groups of Islamist militants as terrorists. Unfortunately, his policies belied his public statements. He still adhered to a belief in good Islamist militants (freedom fighters or mujahideen) such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban, and his government continued to support them and took umbrage at the suggestion that these groups were terrorist organizations. Under Musharraf, Pakistan negotiated several peace deals with the Islamist militants who were coalescing under the banner of the Pakistan Taliban, and he increasingly relied on Islamist politics to temper civil–military conflict (International Crisis Group 2003, 2006b; Nasr 2004). These policies contrasted with his government’s generally supportive role in US efforts to contain al-Qaeda. Indeed, al-Qaeda made several attempts to kill Musharraf, among other military leaders.

  Prior to stepping down as army chief, Musharraf promoted Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of ISI, to full general and made him the vice chief of army staff and thus Musharraf’s selected successor as army chief. Musharraf ceded the post of army chief in November 2007. While a new parliament and prime minister was voted into power as a consequence of the March 2008 general elections, Musharraf remained as president until fresh presidential elections were held in August 2008. While Pakistan has nominally remained under civilian control since the restoration of democracy in 2008, Kayani has continued to play an important role in manipulating domestic politics in the country. Amid some controversy, in July 2010 he received an unprecedented three-year term extension. While Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani announced the news, analysts of Pakistani civil military affairs widely understood the move to have been self-initiated or, worse, initiated by those in Washington, DC (Nawaz 2010).

  Kayani, like many of his predecessors, often references the so-called ideology of Pakistan and the importance of protecting it. For instance, in May 2012 he invoked the concept while addressing a Rawalpindi audience consisting of military brass, Pakistani ministers, foreign defense attachés, and the relatives of Pakistan’s slain soldiers on the occasion of Youm-e-Shuhada (Day of Martyrs): “I am hopeful that we will emerge from this stage victorious with the help and prayers of the nation. We would be successful when we have a strong belief in the ideology of Pakistan. Any doubt about this ideology would weaken the country” (Daily Times 2012a). On August 14, 2011, addressing crowds assembled at Pakistan’s Milit
ary Academy in Kakul for the annual Azadi Parade (to celebrate independence), Kayani explained:

  14th August 1947 was a historic day for the Muslims of the Subcontinent. This day is testimony to the indomitable will of the Muslims to establish a separate homeland under the inspiring leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Let us, on this day, humbly thank Allah Almighty. Let us pray together that He gives us strength and wisdom to preserve and protect the ideology, solidarity, integrity and a bright future for Pakistan. We must stay committed to the ideals of Pakistan and remain ever ready to protect our motherland. I have no doubt that the challenges we face today, will only strengthen our resolve. Ladies and Gentlemen! The basis of our existence is the ‘Ideology of Pakistan.’ Therefore, each one of us must endeavour to pass it on to the future generations. We have a firm belief that by following the golden principles of Islam, we shall progress and win a respectable place in the comity of nations. We should never forget that Islam is the religion of peace. This great religion is the bond that binds us together and should not in any way divide us. (COAS 2011).

  Given the army’s ongoing struggle against Islamist violence, Kayani, like Musharraf before him, must strike a balance between reinforcing Islam as the “ideology of Pakistan” as a unifying force while rejecting Islamist terrorism. This is a more difficult line to walk than it may appear at first blush. As I show in subsequent chapters, the army’s publications frequently deploy the concept of jihad both to describe the country’s struggle with India and to cast this contest within a larger context of Islam’s greatest battles against the nefarious designs of nonbelievers. How can the Pakistani state expect its citizens to sustain support for some notions of state-supported jihad while denouncing other self-proclaimed jihadi groups for committing what the state believes is terrorism? This is all the more difficult when one appreciates the degree to which the “good jihadis” and the “terrorists” are comingled within groups and within specific operations.