Makers of Modern India

by Ramachandra Guha

  It is strange that as soon as some people put themselves outside their own country, they become screaming imperialists. If the right is conceded to nations to thrust progress forcibly down the throats of other nations, why were not the British welcomed as torchbearers of progress in India? But the defenders of the Chinese civilizers of Tibet will be the first to disown any such sacrilegious thought. They might, however, be thrown into real confusion if the Russians or the Chinese were to take it into their heads to march upon India to save her from ‘foreign imperialists’ and lead her to progress!

  Secondly, the question may be asked what is progress. To some, industrialization, rising production statistics, communes, Sputniks … might mean progress. There is another view that regards progress in terms of humanity—the growth of human freedom, the decline of selfishness and cruelty, the spread of tolerance and cooperation, and so on. For me Stalin was no improvement on the Czar and all the Sputniks of Russia leave me cold when I know that a sensitive and honest writer, Pasternak, the first literary genius in Russia since Gorki, is condemned raucously by so-called men of letters who have not even read the offending work. From the point of view of the progress of man, as distinct from the progress of things, Russia appears to me to be living in the Dark Ages.

  It was hoped that China’s ancient civilization would prevent that great country from being plunged into the same darkness, but Tibet has shown that the sun of humanity is as much under eclipse in Peking as it is in Moscow.

  Apart from the progress of things, importance is attached to change of institutions. Destruction of temporal and spiritual feudalism might be considered to be an advance, but when that is replaced by a still more severe feudalism of Party and Bureaucracy, I for one am not prepared to call it an advance, far less a revolution. The yoke of the native medievalism was surely going to be put down sooner or later. But who can tell when the foreign yoke of communist medievalism will be overthrown? Who can tell when Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania will be free? And Hungary and the rest of them?

  The question that I wish to consider finally is one that is on everyone’s lips now; how can Tibet be saved? He would be a bold person who would venture to suggest a definite answer. A few considerations may, however, be advanced.

  There is one thing of which I am absolutely clear: the need to create a powerful world opinion on this question. The Tibet situation should be presented to the world in all its naked reality. No attempt should be made for reasons of diplomacy to play down, cover up, belittle or misrepresent what is happening in Tibet. Diplomacy has a vast deal to answer for in history, and I do fervently hope that diplomacy, like the cold war, is kept out of the issue. The broad facts of the Tibet situation are clear. Those facts must be broadcast, and on their basis a strong and united world opinion must be created against Chinese aggression and for Tibetan independence.

  Let no one cry ‘cold war’ at this. This is not a part of Bloc politics. This is a fight for the Rights of Man. Did anyone think that the world-wide condemnation of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt was a part of the cold war?

  The Government of India is committed to the formula of Tibetan Autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. That formula is in ruins … But nevertheless this whole question will have to be reconsidered sooner rather than later. What happens when the autonomy of a country (or a region for that matter) is destroyed? What happens when that autonomy is not restored? What happens, in short, when aggression takes place and succeeds? It would not do to evade these questions. Till these questions are answered, there is no hope of the Government of India discovering the next step. Paralysis of action in a fast-developing situation may be dangerous …

  It will be recalled that when the Chinese aggression began in 1950, the Tibetan Government had moved the United Nations. The El Salvadorean delegate had formally called on the UN to condemn China for her ‘unprovoked aggression’ against Tibet, and had proposed the creation of a special committee to study what measures could be taken by the General Assembly to assist Tibet. The matter went to the Assembly’s Steering Committee which, on the strength of the assurances of India’s representative, decided to shelve the Tibetan complaint indefinitely.

  The full facts of that affair and of our part in it have not been made public and I cannot say where the matter stands now according to the workings of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it seems to be utterly wrong that such an important event as the suppression of the freedom of a nation should take place and the world organization should not even take notice of it. It is not that the mere raising of an issue in the United Nations means that a solution will be found. We have some experience of the working of that august body ourselves. But, after all is said and done, the UN is the only organization the human family has that gives some guarantee that the world will not be converted into a jungle where the strong will eat up the weak. I have no doubt there will be many constitutional barriers and such things as vetoes in the way of the Tibet issue entering the portals of the UN. But if rules and procedures and technicalities stand in the way of international justice, it is not the latter but the former that should suffer. In whichever form the Tibet question is presented to the UN, I have no doubt that the Afro-Asian bloc must present a common front. This is the least that the countries of Asia and Africa must do to defend the right of small nations to freedom and also to assure against the danger to their own freedom from both the old and new imperialism.

  It is not for me to advise the Tibetans. There is one thought, however, which I cannot help expressing. Tibet, being a devoutly Bud[d]hist country, could perhaps have turned its moment of tragedy into one of profound victory—if it could have turned to the Compassionate One and met hate with love, oppression with suffering, violence with non-violence. May be, even then Tibet would have been destroyed, but not the soul of Tibet, not the Religion of the Bud[d]ha.

  Then, is Tibet lost for ever? No, a thousand times no. Tibet will not die because there is no death for the human spirit. Communism will not succeed because man will not be slave for ever. Tyrannies have come and gone and Caesars and Czars and dictators. But the spirit of man goes on for ever. Tibet will be resurrected.

  A Fair Deal for Kashmir

  Consistent with his concern for small minorities at the edge of large nation-states, Jayaprakash Narayan believed that India had to be more respectful of the rights of the residents of the disputed Kashmir Valley. What follows is from a press statement on the question, issued by Narayan in Calcutta in December 1964.3

  The question we must squarely face is whether constitutional integration of Kashmir with India is more important in the national interest than friendship with Pakistan and justice to the people of the Valley of Srinagar. Legal technicalities will not provide the answer. What is needed is a mature and realistic reckoning. As far as I can see, the disadvantages of the present policy far outweigh the advantages.

  Let me take up first the issue of justice to the people of the Valley. There has been no credible proof yet that they have freely accepted the legal fact of accession. Constitutional integration has little meaning in the absence of emotional integration. In this age and time, it is impossible to hold down by force any sizeable population permanently. If we continue to do it, we cannot look the world straight in the face and talk of democracy and justice and peace. Nor, on account of the historical circumstances, can we take shelter behind the internationally recognized limitations of the right to self-determination. Perhaps the most harmful consequences of the policy of forcible integration would be the death-knell of Indian secularism and enthronement of aggressive Hindu communalism. That communalism is bound in the end to turn upon the Hindu community itself and destroy it.

  As for friendship with Pakistan, let us calculatedly determine how dearly we need that friendship. No country can afford to buy friendship at any cost. So let there be a reckoning of gains and losses. First of all, let us be mature enough to understand that if we persist in our present Kashmir policy, there can be no friendship with Pa
kistan. The leaders of that country have not left us in any doubt on that score. If we disbelieve them, we shall have only ourselves to blame.

  Here is the pricing of Indo-Pak friendship as it appears to me. First, if Pakistan turns hostile, as I fear it would if we persist in the policy of full constitutional integration, the defence of the country would become a hundred-fold more difficult. Certain parts of it, such as Assam, NEFA and Nagaland would be next to impossible to defend. Indo-Pak amity on the other hand would automatically result in large scale dis-engagement, thus strengthening considerably our defence capability. Our communications too would be automatically strengthened tenfold. As far as the defence of Ladakh, I am sure any amicable settlement of the Kashmir issue would make a provision for it.

  Second, both history and geography destined the sub-continent of India to play a key role in South and South-East Asia. But as long as India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads, India’s, as also Pakistan’s capacity to manoeuvre in this area—remains drastically restricted. No initiative taken by India can have the same value and attraction for the countries of this region unless India and Pakistan moved jointly. At present, they cancel out each other, creating a power vacuum that no one but China can fill efficiently.

  Third, what is true of the South-East Asia region is very largely true of the world. India’s posture on the world stage is very considerably determined by her obsession with Kashmir and her consequent relations with Pakistan. In the Afro-Asia world, this quarrel between the two big Asian countries has cost both heavily in prestige and influence and diplomatic effectiveness.

  Fourth, there is the vast economic harm the quarrel is causing both countries. It is beyond doubt that the development of each would have been much faster had there been cooperation between them in the economic field.

  The last and in some way the most disastrous consequence of the quarrel is its human and moral cost and the alienation of peoples that it threatens to bring about. If the quarrel continues, Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan would continue to live under the shadow of suspicion and suffer severe spiritual unrest. The danger of communal rioting would be ever present. These conditions would be sure to cause mass human degradation on both sides. The political division of the sub-continent cannot hide the fact that the peoples of India and Pakistan are really one people. This is not the first time that India has been divided politically. But there had always been a feeling of oneness and identity among the people divided between kingdoms and republics. Today, the Bengalis of the West and East are one people, irrespective of region; so are the Punjabis. In like manner, the Bengalis and Punjabis and Sindhis and Pathans and Jats and Rajputs and others of both countries make up one single Indian people, who are distinct from all other peoples of the world. States are passing shows, but the people are eternal. Therefore, I would consider this alienation of the people of India and Pakistan from one another to be the most disastrous consequence of the present quarrel.

  This briefly is the balance-sheet as I see it. Let logic and reason rather than childish emotion guide the debate and the ultimate decision.

  I am aware that settlement of the Kashmir issue would not in itself mean establishment of firm Indo-Pak friendship, but it would certainly remove the greatest obstacle on the way and create the necessary psychological conditions. I am also aware that friendship is not one-sided. But I am convinced that friendship is as precious for Pakistan as for India and they will be found to be as keen for it as we persuade ourselves to be.

  A last word to the leaders of the government. At this critical moment in the country’s life, it is their duty to lead and not to be led. The crippling fear of public opinion and party rank and file is only a reflection of the leadership’s own weakness and division. It is for the leaders to shape public opinion and educate the backbenchers. If they fail in this, they will do disservice to the country in this hour of decision.

  The Question of Nagaland

  In 1964–65 Jayaprakash Narayan was part of a three-member peace mission to the troubled state of Nagaland, in the north-east of India. A large section of the Nagas were unreconciled to being part of the Indian Union; they wanted a sovereign nation of their own. Through the 1950s, a bloody war raged between the Indian Army and the Naga insurgents. In 1964 the Baptist Church (to which most Nagas owed allegiance) was instrumental in bringing about a ceasefire. Talks between the Government of India and the rebels commenced. The peace mission of which Narayan was part was also the church’s initiative. On 30 January 1965—the anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination—Narayan delivered a lecture in his hometown, Patna, on the conflict in Nagaland. This was later expanded and published as a booklet in Hindi, from which the following excerpts are taken. First, Narayan explains why the Nagas have never been part of the Indian cultural mainstream.4

  Travel to the remotest corners of India, and you will find things that are linked to our epics and scriptures. The Pandavas are said to have taken refuge in so many places one visits. Or that Bhim, Arjun, or Ramchandra came there. So many habitations are named after our sages and saints … When we speak of the unity of India, we do not really mean its political unity. China may be defined by a certain political unity, but India is marked on the other hand by a cultural unity. In the past, what we now know as India was never under a single state or political unit. This was not the case in the time of the Mauryas or of the Guptas …

  However, Nagaland was never part of this broader Indian culture. Call it a misfortune or an ‘accident of history’! In NEFA5 we find some Buddhist communities … In Manipur the followers of [the Vaishnava saint] Chaitanya Mahaprabhu settled and made the people Vaishnavites. They use the Bengali script there … Among them there are Brahmins, Kshatriyas and other castes.

  But only Nagaland has stayed aloof from Indian culture and civilization … As a consequence, the Nagas do not really feel Indian. Even those Nagas who live in India and participate in Indian politics, do not have the sentiment of being Indian. One Naga leader, who is a Member of Parliament, once told me: ‘No Naga considers himself an Indian.’ … However, this is not a sentiment that we should fear, or dismiss as anti-patriotic. The truth is that the people of India have never ventured into these areas. The British did not permit us to go there. At the risk of our lives we could have gone there, but we didn’t. We did not go to Nagaland to promote our religions, or our culture, or indeed to do social service. It was in about the year 1870 that the British gradually established their rule over the Nagas. But even as late as 1947 there were parts of the Naga Hills that were under no administration at all. Even the British had not made their presence felt there. On the one hand it was in a corner of the sub-continent and on the other it was lonely and remote, a wilderness. This may be the reason why the people of India never reached Nagaland.

  I am acquainting you with these facts so that you may understand why this movement began in Nagaland saying we are different from India. The Nagas say that they are not hostile to India, merely different—and hence they demand a separate nation. Now many people are suspicious of the Christian faith. They think that Christian preachers may have spread this sentiment of separatism among the Nagas. But this is not so. They were of a different culture and ethnicity; although the British could have tried to bring them slowly into India. The British did not allow Hindus to enter this territory, but they allowed the Christian missionaries. Some were Welsh Baptists, others American Baptists. I am of the view that if Roman Catholics or priests from the Church of England had gone to Nagaland, perhaps the sentiment of separation may have diminished. The missionaries who went there did not intensify this feeling, nor did they reduce it—that was not their focus anyway …

  Second, Narayan explains why the Nagas can live freely and honourably under the Indian Constitution.

  … From the time that talks commenced with leaders of the Naga ‘underground’ I have been urging them to remain within the Union of India … I kept on telling the Nagas that there is no need for you to dema
nd a separate nation, since you can be fully free within India. There is a great difference between your situation under British colonial rule and your status as a part of independent and democratic India. Then you were subjugated, indeed all of India was subjugated. Now you are free, just as all of India is free. Now every citizen of India is free and equal. Which alien power is now ruling over Assam? Who is ruling over Bengal? Or over Bihar? Is it India? India is constituted by joining all these provinces together. These states have collectively created a Central Government and allocated it certain rights. If these states were to now say that we want a particular right back the Centre will have to return it. After all, it is the representatives of these states who sit in the Parliament in Delhi. So if they choose to decide that certain rights must be with them, then they can take them back. It is the Members of Parliament from the states who decide which rights shall be with the Centre, and which will not. In any case, this giving up of certain rights to the Centre is not done to permit India to subjugate the provinces, but rather, to safeguard the Union of India.

  Take the army. That there should be a separate army for Bihar, and another one for Bengal, this will not be appropriate. If there is a dispute between Bihar and Bengal—say with regard to whether a particular district belongs to one or the other—then if there were separate armies for each state they would go to war. It is to prevent this that we have a single army. This would have soldiers from all the states, Bihar, Bengal, Assam. Issues such as defence and foreign affairs must be the responsibility of the Centre. That Bihar forge a relationship with America and that Bengal do so with another country, this should not happen. This is why the relations with other countries are best dealt with by the Centre. In the same manner, the country must have a single currency. If Bihar had its own currency, and Bengal its own too, imagine what confusion would arise. However, all the other subjects, such as irrigation, education, etc., must be within the control of the states. The situation today is such that without assistance from the Centre the states are not able to function. For schools, etc., the Centre has to give them money. If, however, they think they have the capacity to handle them, then the states can take full responsibility for these subjects.