The Life of Alcibiades

by Jacqueline de Romilly

  categorical on this point.

  The following actions of Alcibiades will show him using tactics still

  more dubious, to the point that they perplex historians even today.

  It is quite an extraordinary episode. Thucydides has left a detailed, but

  perplexing, account. One is left with a sense of intrigues so subtle that

  they make it diffi cult to distinguish truth from falsehood.

  The people of Argos had sent their representatives. At the same time,

  an embassy arrived from Sparta composed of friends of Athens. They

  were sent in haste with a twofold mission: to prevent any alliance between

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  Argos and Athens, and to do their best to resolve the problems of the res-

  titutions important to Athens. They were received by the Council of Five

  Hundred and declared that they were authorized to settle the restitutions

  once and for all. Thucydides tells us that Alcibiades, fearing a settlement,

  devised a strategy. This was no small thing: “He persuaded the Spartans

  by a solemn assurance that if they would say nothing of their full powers

  in the Assembly, he would give back Pylos to them (himself, the present

  opponent of its restitution, engaging to obtain this from the Athenians)

  and would settle the other points at issue.” 5

  This was a bizarre arrangement. Even more bizarre was the meekness

  of the Spartans who agreed to it. Before the people in the Assembly, they

  contradicted what they had said in the Council, and in so doing lost all

  credibility. The people lost patience; and when Alcibiades bitterly attacked

  Sparta, the Assembly was all set to conclude an alliance with Argos.

  But as luck would have it, there was an earthquake. Even in that enlight-

  ened century, Athenians always respected what they took to be divine signs

  (at times someone might allege a dubious earthquake to cause the suspen-

  sion of the Assembly); the Assembly was adjourned until the next day.

  With that, Nicias took the matter into his own hands and tried to con-

  vince the Assembly that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta (Nicias

  among them) and that the Spartans then needed to clarify their inten-

  tions, remembering that Athens had not (or not yet) made an alliance

  with Argos.

  It was a last resort and it failed. Nicias managed to get some of what

  he wanted but not enough. The result: the Athenian people, furious, con-

  cluded without delay two peace treaties and an alliance with Argos and

  its allies, Elis and Mantinea. Corinth did not join. But this was quite a tri-

  umph for Alcibiades. A personal triumph. In the following spring he was

  a general and led a military expedition to the Peloponnese, organizing the

  alliance and having fortifi cations built wherever he could.

  These are the facts as related by Thucydides. However, the report has

  been the source of some misgivings. There are good historians who have

  wondered if Thucydides has misrepresented the facts and perhaps rushed

  to judge Alcibiades’s actions too harshly. In addition, some have cited the

  unfi nished state of book 5 of his work.

  5 . Thucydides 5.45.2.

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  What to believe? Alcibiades gives the Spartans this ridiculous advice

  and they listen to him? Don’t they realize they will lose all credibility

  by one day saying one thing and something else the next? What do they

  expect? They know that Alcibiades did not like them, that he had never

  wanted peace or an alliance with them. How did they not mistrust him?

  Not only did they not suspect him, but after being duped completely, they

  held no grudge against him. Later, when he had to fl ee Athens, he went to

  Sparta! Better still, he was welcomed there by a certain Endios, with whom

  he was united by strict bonds of hospitality between their two families. 6

  And Endios was one of those very same ambassadors who were duped

  by Alcibiades’s ploy to secure the alliance with Argos. How could the man

  have forgiven such cruel treachery? No, this story is not plausible.

  There have been efforts to correct Thucydides. 7 Some have suggested that the Spartans never really had full authority (later, Nicias too failed

  to reach agreement) and that Alcibiades had simply forced them to admit

  that publicly. We acknowledge that here Thucydides casually adopted a

  version of the events unfavorable to Alcibiades and incoherent as well.

  The problem is that this kind of unfairness on the part of Thucydides

  and this hostility toward Alcibiades are not found elsewhere in the work—

  nor, for that matter, is such a casual approach. This anomaly would re-

  quire positing an evolution of his feelings about Alcibiades that does not

  match any reconstruction of the development of this work.

  It is true that book 5 is not one of Thucydides’s best, far from it. There

  is confusion about the years when the war is interrupted or when the story

  moves faster than in other sections of the work. There are problems with

  his depiction of conspiracies, and his refusal to deal with internal politics

  creates real diffi culties. That is all true. But these explanations for the

  weaknesses and ambiguities in the text do not mean we should reject his

  version of the facts for the sake of psychological rationalism. Rather, the

  very ambiguity we feel reading this account may reveal something about

  the character of Alcibiades.

  Let us take a closer look at these ambiguities that might allow us to

  correct the most accurate of historians. We say that it is implausible that

  the Spartans would have been persuaded by Alcibiades to change their

  6 . Thucydides 8.6.3. See chapter 1.

  7 . J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 89–95.

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  declaration; and that it was not realistic for them later to forgive his

  treachery. But are we confi dent that Alcibiades should have been judged

  according to the norms of the time?

  No one can claim that Alcibiades, as persuasive, attractive, brilliant,

  daring, and deceptive as one could be, was incapable of pulling the wool

  over the eyes of the Spartans. Who would claim that, even after the Spar-

  tans’ failure in Athens, he could not blame circumstances, say that his

  advice was good but that he had some bad luck or awkwardness, that

  he had done everything possible, etc.? The Spartans badly wanted to

  get Pylos back, territory that Athens still held and had used for years

  to foment uprisings against Sparta. Whenever someone wants something

  badly enough, he will follow risky advice and allow himself to be fooled.

  Alcibiades told the Spartans, as reported in Plutarch 14.8–10 (and as is

  generally accepted), that the Assembly would be more demanding and

  impassioned than the Council if they acknowledged that they had full

  authority. He also told the Spartans that if they were to resolve their other

  issues, that would compromise the return of Pylos. And he could always

  fi nd other arguments. Don’t forget, after all, the Athenian talent for the

  art of persuasion—and don’t forget that adversary of Pericles who claimed

  that if Pericles were defeated in battle, he could convince the Athenians<
br />
  that he had actually won. Alcibiades had far fewer scruples and far greater

  audacity than his famous mentor . . .

  Often in textual or literary criticism, an unjustifi ed accusation draws

  attention to an original feature that is ultimately revealing. The same may

  be true for historical criticism that rests only on plausibility; it draws

  attention to what the narrative presents as implausible but true, to the

  extraordinary and unique. It is entirely possible that Thucydides, who

  did not like going into anecdotal detail involving individual actions, al-

  lowed himself this carefully wrought account to highlight, from the start,

  the amazing methods Alcibiades used for successfully deceiving everyone

  around him. Incredible? Oh yes. Alcibiades was unlike anyone else.

  Moreover, his ties with Endios were very tight: remember that En-

  dios’s father was named Alcibiades. It is not necessary to imagine, as one

  scholar does, 8 some kind of secret pact between the two men; ties such as theirs could pass as the surest guarantee. Of course Endios could trust this

  8 . R. B. Kebrick, in Mnemosyne, 1976.

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  young man: his family’s relationships alone would have been as convinc-

  ing as Alcibiades’s well-known verbal skills.

  We need not conclude that the story lacks credibility, that we should

  therefore dismiss it; we should rather conclude that the story, while not

  widely known, shows just what Alcibiades was able to do.

  And it is so very revealing! His fi rst public act led straight to the heart

  of conspiracy and manipulation, where the double game is king. Alcibi-

  ades’s early success in politics was amazing, based on a lack of scruples

  that would remain his trademark to the end.

  The result of these events would fi rst confi rm Alcibiades’s success, then

  quickly reveal its weakness.

  The Argive alliance had the problem of involving Athens in the upheav-

  als in the Peloponnese. Argos had a dispute with Epidaurus (which Alcibi-

  ades may have imagined adding to the newly formed group): there were

  troop movements, expeditions, and diplomatic campaigns; Athens risked

  fi nding itself again fi ghting Sparta, with nothing to gain from it. Then, as

  the quarrels dragged on, it became evident that the situation was not at all

  stable, either in Athens or in Argos.

  Athenians were soon unhappy to see events in the Peloponnese going

  nowhere and changing abruptly: in 418, Alcibiades was not reelected

  general, whereas Nicias was. Alcibiades was not entirely moved aside.

  Thucydides tells us that he became an ambassador (5.61.2), but his popu-

  larity declined. This sequence shows just how damaging such shifts in di-

  rection are. Any policy needs to be allowed some continuity and goodwill.

  Nicias felt no need to support allies he had never sought and who opposed

  those with whom he had worked to build good relations. In the course

  of these campaigns, the Athenian troops are too few in number, and too

  slow. In the battle at Mantinea, the one great battle of those years, the

  Athenian contingent comprised just a thousand hoplites and three hun-

  dred cavalry, while Thucydides calls the overall forces “by far the fi nest

  Hellenic army ever yet brought together” (5.60.3). The Athenians must

  have realized this because a new contingent of one thousand men came,

  after the battle, to join those already gathered (75.5). The quarrel between

  Nicias and Alcibiades, and the Athenian hesitations, following fi rst one

  leader and then the other, had become a source of weakness. There may

  also have been a price to pay for an alliance just barely concluded through

  manipulations and misunderstandings.

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  Debut 47

  Still more serious was the fact that Argos was neither more stable nor

  more secure. Again, there had been vacillation, and divisions remained.

  During one of the fi rst Spartan attacks, two Argives (one of whom was

  a proxenus of Sparta) acting privately went to King Agis, who was com-

  manding the Lacedaemonian army, and convinced him to withdraw. Their

  initiative did initially turn out well for them. But then others furthered

  their effort, and soon Argos seemed ready to surrender to Sparta. When

  the aforementioned Athenian reinforcements arrived, the Argives refused

  to allow them into the city, fearing that doing so would cause a break

  with Sparta. According to Thucydides, “their plan was to make a treaty

  with the Spartans fi rst, follow it with an alliance, and after this to fall

  on the popular party” (5.76.2). Sparta offered proposals for agreement.

  Discussions followed (which included Alcibiades, who just happened to

  be there). In a nice reversal, the friends of Sparta prevailed. The Argives

  dropped their alliance with Elis and Mantinea. They dropped their alli-

  ance with Athens. They concluded a peace treaty and an alliance with

  Sparta. And voilà , there they are hand in hand with Sparta. The democ-

  racy was immediately overthrown and an oligarchy favorable to the Spar-

  tans was established in Argos.

  It is easy to see just how fragile the situation was, and how uncertain

  its success.

  Was it then a failure? Not really. The specifi cs matter for understanding

  Alcibiades’s life. Democracy was soon reestablished in Argos and a new

  treaty was concluded between Athens and Argos at the end of the summer

  of 417. There were various maneuvers on one side and another, including

  a small naval expedition from Athens to Argos, leading to the deportation

  of a certain number of oligarchs. In short, order was reestablished. Argos

  remained a faithful ally of Athens to the end. It sent contingents for the

  Sicilian expedition, as did Mantinea. 9 The presence of those troops greatly enhanced Alcibiades’s prestige, and his enemies dared not attack him,

  fearing, as Thucydides says, that the people might protect him “because it

  was thanks to him that the Argives and some of the Mantineans joined the

  expedition.” 10 Still later, while Alcibiades was at the head of the Athenian 9

  . Thucydides 6.43.1, 7.26.1: 500 Argives, plus 250 Mantineans and mercenaries.

  10 . 6.29.3. For the offer of service to the democrats at Samos, see 8.86.8–9. Argos will offer temporary asylum to Alcibiades (Isocrates 16.8–9).

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  forces installed at Samos, which maintained a democratic regime, Argive

  delegates came to offer assistance to that democracy. Despite a few close

  calls, 11 the Argive alliance and the Argive democracy endured.

  However, this success, though it matters, was not the success Alcibi-

  ades had hoped for. The Argive alliance had not served as the lever for

  an action against Sparta in the Peloponnese. And throughout the period

  when hope for such action was at play, the alliance proved to be fragile,

  shaky, and of little use.

  Alcibiades was not entirely responsible for this problem. Divisions

  within Athens and Argos rendered political activity incoherent and uncer-

  tain. This is one of those cases that reveal the extent to which any state,

  divided internally, proves itself weak and insecure in all external political<
br />
  efforts. Contemporary European politics offers similar examples.

  Overall, this great project and its disturbances shed light on two facts

  about the literary and political history of the time: the fi rst concerns

  Thucydides’s history; the second, events that followed in Athens and led

  to a verdict of ostracism.

  Today, when we speak of the “Peloponnesian War” we are talking about

  Thucydides’s account of the war between Athens and its allies and Sparta

  and its allies, between 431 and 404 BCE. It ended in the total defeat of

  Athens: it lost its empire, was occupied, and saw its walls destroyed. But

  there had been a peace in 421, that famous “Peace of Nicias,” just de-

  scribed. So people often speak of a fi rst war, sometimes called “the war

  of Archidamus” or the “ten-year war” (431–421). Separately, there fol-

  lowed Athens’ Sicilian expedition, and then a new war between Sparta

  and Athens. Thucydides’s originality lies in his having perceived that in

  fact there had been a single war and that the years following the Peace

  of Nicias—years of clashes, confl icts, contests—had really been just a pa-

  renthesis. He explains his view in his “second preface” in book 5, chap-

  ters 25 and 26: “Only a mistake in judgment can object to including the

  interval of treaty in the war. Looked at in the light of the facts, it can-

  not, it will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, as neither

  11. At one time there was talk of an antidemocratic plot at Argos fomented by friends of Alcibiades (6.61.3). Was that true? Probably not. For a harsh judgment of Argive politics, see E. F. Bloedow, in Klio (1991): 49–65.

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  Debut 49

  party either gave or got back all that they had agreed” (5.26.2). His

  analysis continues: solid, clear, original. The thesis has been widely ac-

  cepted ever since: the Peace of Nicias was not a true peace. Had the inter-

  val been shorter, others might have been able to group together the two

  wars. However, given a seven-year break, Thucydides’s insight is origi-

  nal and penetrating.

  The picture we have just drawn of the vagaries and reversals in the

  Argive alliance clearly shows the artifi cial and unstable nature of the

  peace that prevailed at that time. From this perspective, we see clearly