the possibilities for resistance were also well grounded. Thucydides would
not have put such emphasis on this episode had he not seen it as a warn-
ing, one that went unheeded by Athens in 415.
The result? At Gela, Hermocrates was heard. The cities came to an
agreement. They informed the Athenian leaders, who could only approve,
and depart.
On their return to Athens, however, they were exiled and fi ned “for
having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So
thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the Athenians that noth-
ing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible
and what was impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate, it
mattered not. The reason for this was their general extraordinary success,
which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.” 10
This account of the fi rst expedition ended as it began, returning to
the idea that beyond an interest in Sicily’s rich agriculture, there was one
driving force always at work: 11 inherent in Athenian imperialism was the need to expand.
At fi rst Athens’ empire emerged spontaneously and naturally. With its
fl eet, Athens had played an important role in the war against the barbar-
ians. And afterward, Athens retained prominence among its allies, many
8. 4.60.1. The “natural” hostility refers to that between races, Ionian and Dorian.
Thucydides always insists on the fact that the hostility, though real, served more as a pretext than an actual reason, and counted for less than the interplay of fear and ambition.
9. 4.61.3.
10. 4.65.
11. Thucydides’s words echoed other passages used elsewhere to characterize Athenian
ambition.
The
Grand
Design 59
of whom preferred to pay tribute money rather than resist Athenian ac-
tions. The result: Athens grew stronger. In a short time, most of its al-
lies became subjects. Whenever one of them sought to defect, its inferior
strength forced it fi nally to submit; then it was reduced further. At the be-
ginning of the Peloponnesian War Athens thus commanded, with varying
degrees of obedience, almost all the islanders; and it was constantly alert
to retain their respect. Pericles knew this: he had said to the Athenians,
speaking of the empire, that they could never recede: “For what you hold
is . . . a tyranny; to take it was perhaps wrong, but to let it go is unsafe”
(2.63.2). That was just the weapon Sparta used against Athens, encourag-
ing defections everywhere. And that is why Athens, afraid of defections,
became increasingly repressive.
But Pericles was not talking about conquest. On the contrary, he had
warned the Athenians, promising them victory, but on one condition: that
“you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the con-
duct of the war, and will abstain from willfully involving yourselves in
other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the
enemy’s devices” (1.144.1). He knew that temptation. He knew, as the
Athenian delegates explained in book 1, that an envied power always tried
to strengthen itself. And he knew the Athenian character: “addicted to in-
novation and their designs are characterized by swiftness,” “adventurous
beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger
they are sanguine.” 12 He did not trust them.
Pericles, however, had been dead for some fi fteen years. During that
time, Athenian imperialism, though checked somewhat by the war, had
strengthened and hardened. And at that time, people thought the war was
over.
What an opportunity for Alcibiades. He was the great man of the mo-
ment, with his Olympic victories. He wanted even more glory. He wanted
to surpass Themistocles. He became excited about the idea of an expedi-
tion to the west, a great expedition, giving Athens a new far-off fi eld of
domination with infi nite possibilities. His ideas resonated in an Athens
captivated by glory and adventure. The young people joined him, but they
12. These passages parallel those between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, offered
by the Corinthians in 1.70.2; the preceding idea resumes the Athenians’ line of argument in 1.75–76.
60 Chapter
4
were not alone. Plutarch offers a vivid description of the many Athenians
who, “in the wrestling schools and alcoves . . . could commonly be seen
sitting and mapping out the shape of Sicily and the position of Libya and
Carthage.” 13 The mention of Libya and Carthage here is important, and we will come back to it. These fantasies became part of a popular day-dream. For or against, everyone was talking about the possibility of an
expedition and became fascinated by the distant island. In Euripides’s Tro-
jan Women , a play written at just this time, the poet sharply condemned
offensive wars; and even in that play there is a reference to Sicily: “the
land of Etna” is among the places to which the captive women imagine
being sent. 14
This curiosity implies a lot of discussion certainly; but for most people
it was linked to a strong desire to go to Sicily. Thucydides says as much,
and states the reasons for it, in the explanations he offers for the vote that
determined the decision. It refl ected the many animating desires at work:
“Everyone fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that
they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at
all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime
of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and the soldiery was
to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a
never ending fund of pay for the future” (6.24.3). For Alcibiades, beyond
such material benefi ts was glory! The glory of bringing Athens its greatest
conquest, of leading and conquering and forever eclipsing all the others.
Conquest? Oh, yes, that is the right word. It marks a departure from
everything that went before. However, there are two qualifi cations. First,
for the Greeks of that time, conquest did not have its modern meaning.
Greeks never imagined making such distant territory part of their country:
the idea of the city and the size of the city made that impossible. Thus, it
was a matter of imposing authority, of ruling and protecting the interests
of Athens, commanding respect and material assistance. But even in that
form, the idea of conquest was never offi cially sanctioned. The goal of
the expedition was, more modestly, to aid the people of Segesta who were
13. Plutarch, Alcibiades 17; see also Nicias 12. The source appears to have been the historian Timaeus (fourth century BCE).
14. Euripides, Trojan Women 220. This locale does not fi gure among the usual lists of possible places of exile.
The
Grand
Design 61
being threatened by Selinunte, and, if possible, to reestablish the Leontines
who had been forced out by Syracuse. Another goal was, according to
charmingly vague wording, “to order all other matters in Sicily as they
should deem best for the interests of Athens” (
6.8.2).
This nice euphemism fooled no one, and Thucydides was careful to
make the facts clear: his account of the expedition began by recalling the
importance of the island and the history of its cities. Then he went on:
“Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily,
and such is the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now
bent upon invading, being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole,
although they had also the specious design of aiding their kindred and other
allies on the island” (6.6.1). “Conquering the whole” (τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι): the
words are clear. Later, speaking of Nicias (who opposed the expedition): he
“thought that the state was not well-advised, but upon a slight and specious
pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter
to achieve” (6.8.4; the word he used was ephiesthai, “to covet a good”).
That was indeed an ambitious plan. And yet beyond this one, Alcibi-
ades was secretly planning another, even more grandiose, that he would
not reveal to Athens and that became known only much later. Behind his
ostensible goal was his desire to conquer the island; but behind this plan,
in his cheerful ambition, fl oated the “greater plan.” Unlike those Rus-
sian dolls that contain smaller and smaller dolls, Alcibiades’s ambition
revealed ever more immense intentions.
First, though, he had to obtain approval by the Assembly of the people
for his expedition, the Sicilian expedition.
This was monumental: Athens was betting its future. Thucydides’s work
devotes two whole books to the expedition, omitting nothing in order to
bring that decision to life and to make us understand the stakes.
At fi rst, everything was simple; the project was quickly approved. The
situation had been similar in 427: an ally, Segesta, had requested Athens’
aid; it had offered money (managing, with a little sleight of hand, to ap-
pear richer than it was), and the Assembly had approved sending sixty
ships under the command of three men given full authority: Alcibiades,
Nicias, and Lamachus.
It was settled. But Nicias, seeing clearly the dangers that lay behind the
overly broad and vague objectives, was appalled by the risks Athens was
62 Chapter
4
taking. He used a subsequent session of the Assembly, supposedly to deal
with armaments, to raise the question of the whole affair once more.
This was irregular, and he knew it. 15 In a fi tting fi nal effort, he appealed to the president of the gathering in moving terms: “If you are afraid to
move the question again, consider that a violation of the law cannot with
so many abettors, incur any charge, that you will be the physician of your
misguided city, and that the virtue of men in offi ce is briefl y this, to do
their country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they
can avoid” (6.14).
In these fi nal words, we hear an echo of the Hippocratic oath. One can
only be touched by the nobility of this appeal and by the pathos that it
gives the situation. The pathos is all the more touching for the reader who
knows the disastrous failure that results from the expedition, and how
hard Nicias tried to prevent it. However, apart from the pathos, Nicias’s
appeal helps us understand two things. It shows fi rst how skillfully Alcibi-
ades had proceeded, taking Nicias and his friends by surprise and obtain-
ing a vote the scope of which he never revealed. Moreover, it shows that
this time Alcibiades would have the strength of his conviction; he would
have to go to the heart of the matter.
Thucydides provided the two main speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades,
followed by Nicias’s fi nal pitch (6.8–24). These are of course not the exact
words of the actual speeches, but even so, one feels that the speakers are pres-
ent, not only from the arguments that each would advance, but also from the
two personalities, from their tones, their temperaments, and their aspirations.
Moreover, he included personal attacks. Nicias attacked Alcibiades for
his youth and his ambition. He did not mince words: “And if there be
any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to
make the expedition, merely for ends of his own—especially if he is still
too young to command—who seeks to be admired for the stud of horses,
but on account of heavy expenses hopes for some profi t from his appoint-
ment, do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendor at his
country’s risk, but remember that such persons injure the public fortune
15. There was one recent precedent: in 428, Athenians voted for the brutal suppres-
sion of Mytilene; the next day, with the verdict weighing on them, the Assembly recon-
vened and reversed the decision. The reversal was immediate, called for by the majority
of citizens (3.36.5).
The
Grand
Design 63
while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance,
and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand” (6.12.2).
These young people are described as having come at the summons of
that very individual. And as we have previously shown, Alcibiades was
proud to claim to represent the young. 16 Then turning, like Nicias, to an example borrowed from medicine (in this case, a balanced diet), he
spoke for a harmonious combination of young and old. He had noth-
ing but scorn for Nicias’s criticisms and his “battle between young and
old”; but he allowed his scorn to come across without slipping into actual
insolence.
Similarly, he acknowledged the stable of racehorses and his Olympic
victories. What is more, he started with that. As shown in chapter 2,
he boasted that the prestige he brought to the city had strengthened it
abroad. He even provided a glimpse into that confi dent pride when he
stated: “Nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position should
refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his
misfortunes all to himself” (6.16.4). That astonishing Alcibiades! Daring
to speak in that way before the people! Yes, he admitted to being fi rst,
superior to all. And he admitted that this renown aroused jealousy one
minute and admiration the next.
This is all about Alcibiades—his life, athletic victories, and awareness
of his superiority. But we cannot help remarking that there is some cor-
respondence between Alcibiades’s pride and that of Athens, between the
ambition of the man and the imperialism of the city.
It was Pericles who said, according to Thucydides, “Hatred and un-
popularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired
to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it
for the highest objects. Hatred also is short lived; but that which makes
the splendor of the present and the glory of the future remains for ever
unforgotten” (2.64.5). That was the air Alcibiades breathed, and he ap-
plied that spirit to his own life. He was, as an individual, the image of
Athens.
This is clearly why, during t
he rest of his speech, he is the bold defender
of Athenian imperialism.
16 . See above, chapter 1.
64 Chapter
4
Nicias of course stood for consideration of the chances of success and
risks of failure. Alcibiades knew his case and argued with precision. Thus,
the reader is presented with the same clear picture of the whole argument
that the Assembly once had.
First the risks: Nicias emphasized them strongly. The peace was not
secure; the treaty included several areas of arbitration, and all the allies of
Sparta had not ratifi ed it; Sparta herself had been humiliated and would
seize the opportunity to reverse the situation. It was thus absurd to leave
in Greece itself so many enemies and to go looking for others whom Ath-
ens could never truly master even if it were victorious. Syracuse’s rule
in Sicily was not a danger for Athens. 17 Athens should consolidate her empire in those places where it was still fragile and rebuild her strength,
weakened by war and the plague. And he appealed for prudence, recalling
the famous maxim about “how rarely success is gained by wishing and
how often by forecast” (6.13.1).
Nicias lays out the problems and speaks as a man of experience. Alcibi-
ades is going to answer with vigor, and he speaks with confi dence.
In his analysis of the facts, he has some reasons. He recalls that, thanks
to the Argive alliance and despite the Spartan victory at Mantinea, Athens
has nothing to fear from the Lacedaemonians: “They have never since
fully recovered confi dence” (6.16.6). As for the cities in Sicily, they con-
sist of heterogeneous and weak people who would be unable to form a
real union; moreover, we can rely on the barbarians there. Then, with
regard to Sparta, he returns to the theory so dear to Pericles, saying that
at the very worst the Lacedaemonians could invade Attica, “but they can
never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that
is a match for them” (6.17.8). He addresses every detail. Most of all he
explains—and this is the point of the speech—that this expedition, if we
can do it, is inscribed in the great tradition of Athens. There we have him,
Alcibiades arguing loud and clear for imperialism. For him, imperialism
means progress, action, moving ahead.
The Life of Alcibiades Page 10
