17. Because, he said, “one empire would scarcely attack another” (6.11.3). The point was that they would have exposed themselves to the same enmities as Athens. The argument had merit; but Syracuse as the ruler in Sicily would be a danger to Athens in other ways than as a military threat.
The
Grand
Design 65
If we can do it, why balk when an ally appeals for help? “It is thus that
empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a
constant readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that in-
vite assistance” (6.18.2). That is the tradition of the origins—the tradition
that inspires the patriotic plays of the fi rst years of the war, like Euripides’s
Heraclides , and will later inspire the hymns of Athens. Like them, Alcibi-
ades speaks of “our fathers.” And recalling their past, he shames those
who hesitate, reminding them that the Athenians of those days had to
deal not only with the hostility of Sparta but with that of Persia as well;
that did not prevent them from acting, from sending their aid wherever it
was needed.
By evoking those traditions, Alcibiades was himself charged up, and he
charged up his listeners. But he soon went beyond tradition with a more
audacious and original argument.
He said that Athens had no choice! Resuming, and altering a bit, Peri-
cles’s theory, he held that the very existence of the empire required mul-
tiple interventions: “Moreover, we cannot fi x the exact point at which
our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not
be content with retaining what we have but must scheme to extend it for,
if we cease to rule others, we shall be in danger of being ruled ourselves”
(6.18.3).
The reference to Pericles is clear. But Pericles said that they could not
renounce the empire, abandon it, or let it go; he was not speaking of con-
quests. After him, Cleon had taken from similar circumstances the idea
that it was necessary to show determination in repressions. This is a new
idea: Athens cannot reject . . . conquest.
This touches on the very principle that always leads the conqueror to
go farther, with all the risks that entails. From Alexander the Great to
Napoleon and even Hitler, all by different means, we fi nd the same idea.
But no one ever expressed it so forcefully as did Alcibiades in Thucydides,
particularly as justifi cation and rule of conduct.
In his eyes, it is not even a question strictly about the empire: it is a rule
of life with universal value. Alcibiades is the fi rst theoretician of activism
for its own sake. The clarity of his thought sparkled like a diamond: “And
that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself
out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give
it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word
66 Chapter
4
but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature
could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting
such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one’s character and
institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as
one can” (6.18.6–7).
These words are the words of Thucydides. What Alcibiades really said,
we do not know. But there can be no doubt: this bold philosophy, pro-
claimed boldly, was his. Even if he did not put it in these words or on that
day, the words express his thinking.
It is easy to imagine him expressing these thoughts with a look of
scorn for the timid wisdom of Nicias. One can imagine the enthusiasm
of the young people, drinking in these words, and perhaps some worry
among their elders, recalling the time of Pericles and the idealism of that
time.
But there must have been some who saw the weakness of the argument,
for it only took a little refl ection. Action, great! But what action? Going
forward is good, but in what direction? And how far? The empire was
being watched everywhere: the situation did not allow for weakness, but
it also had to avoid failures. The conquest of Sicily could prove a failure,
and a huge failure. If there were some people who had to know that, they
were a minority.
The Assembly, in fact, having listened to Alcibiades, “was more com-
mitted to the expedition than ever.” Nicias saw that. And then came an
episode almost as comic in its irony as the ostracism.
Nicias made one last effort: he said that the enterprise would be dif-
fi cult, that the cities of Sicily were strong, that they might join forces, that
the distance was great, and that there would have to be a huge force . . .
He was hoping to discourage the Athenians, but just the opposite resulted;
everyone was excited, and the idea of a huge force reassured them. They
asked Nicias how big he thought they needed. He hesitated, talked about
at least one hundred ships, enumerated weapons of every kind. Nothing
daunted the Athenians: if that is what it would take, that was what would
be provided. They voted for everything that was wanted, and gave full
authority to the generals to do their best . . .
What a meeting! Alcibiades had fi rst called for approval of twenty
ships. Nicias had protested. And now they are going to send a hundred
ships. Alcibiades had never hoped for so much.
The
Grand
Design 67
On the day of departure, there were even more forces than planned. It was
an extraordinary day; Thucydides describes it with equally exceptional
emphasis. Never had such a huge expedition set off for such a distant lo-
cation. Everyone’s excitement was great.
At dawn on the appointed day the men who were to embark went
down to Piraeus. Everyone went with them. “With them also went the
whole population, one may say, of the city, both citizens and foreign-
ers, the inhabitants of the country each escorting those that belonged to
them, their friends, their relatives or their sons, with hope and lamenta-
tion upon their way as they thought of the conquests which they hoped
to make . . . although the strength of the armament, and the profuse pro-
vision which they observed in every department, was a sight that could
not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd,
they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief”
(6.30.2–31.1).
There were sixty light ships, forty troop transports. Each one had cost
a lot, each competing with the others; the departure had become a kind
of festival.
When everyone had boarded, the trumpet sounded for silence. And
there were prayers, offered as on all ships at such times, but this time
there were libations for everyone, soldiers and offi cers, in cups of gold and
silver. When the hymn ended, the immense fl eet set off, “sailing out in a
column then raced each other as far as Aegina” (32.2).
Alcibiades of course was on his ship. He had armed himself splen-
didly. 18 This was his expedition, his plan. He was bound for glory.<
br />
Let’s not think just yet about the fate of this fl eet, leaving Athens with
such high hopes. When he describes the splendid departure, Thucydides,
though, is thinking about its fate; and he sets up the contrast that appears
at the end of book 7 with the tragic end of this expeditionary force. Then
the difference will be clear. Everyone will refl ect on it, “especially when
they contrasted the splendor and glory of their setting out with the humili-
ation in which it had ended. For this was by far the greatest reverse that
ever befell a Hellenic army” (7.75.6–7).
18. Plutarch 16.1. But Plutarch doesn’t mention that the bed set up for him on his trireme was made specifi cally for this occasion. Alcibiades did things well.
68 Chapter
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That unprecedented fl eet. It was, for its day, “an invincible armada.”
Alcibiades had no suspicion of this dark ending. He did have personal
concerns and reasons to worry, as we will discover in the next chapter. But
he must have believed that his dream was soon to be realized.
At Corcyra (today Corfu) he was supposed to join the rest of his army:
when all the forces had gathered, there would be, not one hundred, but
134 triremes, plus two large ships from Rhodes as well as fi ve thousand
infantry, cavalry, archers, and supply units.
With that, he would conquer Sicily.
And perhaps even more.
Yes, even more. He had not said so, but things must have come out. Later,
he would reveal the truth to the Spartans: the huge plan was part of an
even larger picture that gave shape to the most extreme ambition.
It suffi ces for us to listen to what Thucydides has Alcibiades say at the
time, giving the impression of a door opening to an unforeseen prospective:
We sailed to Sicily fi rst to conquer, if possible, the Sicilians, and after them
the Italians also, and fi nally to assail the empire and city of Carthage. In the
event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack the
Peloponnesus, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately ac-
quired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such
as the Iberians and others in those countries, recognized as the most war-
like known, and building numerous triremes in addition to those which we
had already (timber being plentiful in Italy); and with this fl eet blockading
the Peloponnesus from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, and
taking some of the cities by storm, and besieging others, we hoped without
diffi culty to defeat them completely and after this to rule the whole of the
Hellenic world. (6.90.2–3)
The aspiration was majestic, coherent, and specifi c. Alcibiades went on to
say that they would have taken silver and crops from the annexed territo-
ries in the west; everything had been foreseen. The Mediterranean would
become Athenian. 19
19. He said “the whole of the Hellenic world” specifi cally to indicate to the Spartans that they too, in turn, would have been subjugated. However, the prior subjugation of Carthage suggests that the domination was not only Hellenic.
The
Grand
Design 69
We now understand why people were drawing on the ground the out-
lines of Sicily and the position of Carthage and Libya. 20 The grand plan, mostly a secret one, was not actually an invention meant to frighten the
Spartans, and a failure to take it seriously is to misunderstand Alcibiades’s
personality. The fact is, he was not kidding. Thucydides openly recognized
by name the existence of the grand plan; it comes in book 6, chapter 15.2,
when Alcibiades speaks out in favor of the expedition. He says that Al-
cibiades boasted that he would “reduce Sicily and Carthage.” This helps
us make sense of a phrase in his speech, as it has come down to us; in it,
Alcibiades describes the advantages of the expedition and ends by saying,
“At the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may,
of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or
in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves
and our allies” (6.18.4). The phrase “as we very easily may” is the grand
plan. While the speech says no more about it, many people must have
understood it.
Can we even imagine the consequences had the plan succeeded? The
unifi cation of Greece, under the rule of Athens, the unifi cation of the Med-
iterranean, having become a Greek sea. That would have changed the
history of the world.
Of course, hearing these words and knowing the disaster that the ex-
pedition would become, we cannot help thinking of La Fontaine’s fable
“The Milkmaid and the Pot of Milk”; and we think also about the lesson
there. 21 Still, it must be said, the dream was not an impossibility. Neither was starting with the conquest of Sicily. With the audacity and intelligence
of Alcibiades, with all his forces . . . who knows? No one can say for
certain, because nothing happened as intended. At the very moment of
the triumphant and fl amboyant departure, Alcibiades must have begun to
worry. If not, he should have, because a dark cloud began to take shape:
into the grand plan there suddenly arose the taint of scandal—that of the
“affairs.”
20. Mentioned earlier in this chapter.
21. You would understand if you knew La Fontaine. My apologies to young readers for
this reference to knowledge so out of date.
5
The Scandals
When the fl eet sailed with great fanfare for Sicily, Alcibiades must have
briefl y forgotten his worries in the hope of future glory. But he had wor-
ries, and they were well-founded. Because two grave matters had just
erupted in Athens, between when the expedition had been approved and
the day of departure.
On a beautiful morning, possibly June 8 according to scholars’ esti-
mates, it was discovered that all the herms in the city (or all but one) 1 had
been mutilated. Thucydides says modestly “in front,” but it was clearly
the phalluses adorning these rather rough images that were affected. These
herms were simplifi ed statues of the god Hermes, or rather busts placed on
rectangular pillars that marked boundaries and doorways of both private
homes and sanctuaries. They appealed to the god for protection; they had
religious signifi cance.
1. The herm of the tribe Aigeis was spared. It was claimed that Andocides was responsible (see his On the Mysteries, 62).
The
Scandals 71
But now they had been mutilated: all of them. Emotions were high,
and this was the beginning of one of the most serious and complicated
incidents in Athenian history. We know a lot about it because many au-
thors have written about it. Among them, of course, was Thucydides, but
another one was directly involved in the events and was even charged with
the crime: the orator Andocides, who described it all in two speeches that
have been preserved. 2
Why was this affair so upsetting? To understand that, we must remem-
ber how strong religious traditions remained in the Athenian democracy.
All political
activity was conducted with prayers, sacrifi ces, and libations.
Anything that might indicate divine will was taken as a sign, from an
earthquake to a mere sneeze; the rationalism of sophists and intellectuals
was too recent to have penetrated to most people. This fact can be seen
in the pains Pericles took to explain that a boar with only one horn was
an anomaly but not a prophecy, or that an eclipse could be explained sci-
entifi cally. Moreover, belief in hereditary curses continued to be an issue.
Just before the Peloponnesian War, Lacedaemonians and Athenians ar-
gued about removing citizens because of hereditary curses. In such an
atmosphere, it is easy to understand that a deliberate offense to a guard-
ian spirit might terrify people, as much for its audacity as for its future
consequences.
Again we ask: Why? The fact that such a blow had struck all the
herms implied intention. It was too widespread for anyone to think that
there were just a few overexcited or inebriated young people. There was
more to it. It was the sign of a plot, one all the more alarming for having
been carried out in secret. Had the conspirators sought to create a bond
among themselves by committing a sacrilege together, to hide another
move? But what conspirators? And what move? An air of panic swept
through the city. Something sinister was believed to be threatening the
democracy.
That democracy of which the Athenians were so proud had never, in
spite of its greatness, lived without anxiety. It constantly feared subversive
elements. And there was even a judicial procedure, specifi c and dubious,
called eisangelia , allowing any citizen to bring to trial anyone suspected
2. The speech On His Return (speech 2) dates from 410 or 407, and the speech On the Mysteries from 399 (the incident itself took place in 415).
72 Chapter
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of acting against the democracy. The defi nition of such activity was very
broad and these trials were held frequently.
Clearly, one of their fears was that people would band together to bring
about a less democratic regime, one that was openly oligarchic. There
were indeed such people. Moreover, there was a way for these groups to
form. There were quite a few hetaereiai , 3 groups of friends or companions that brought together men with shared views, who could support
The Life of Alcibiades Page 11
