The Life of Alcibiades
Page 16
and Athens lost. The history of this battle as told in Thucydides is full
of vigor and emotion. The result was that the Athenians could not get
away; they retreated in chaos and were massacred or taken prisoner, some
under an agreement, others with none. Demosthenes, taken prisoner, was
condemned to death. Nicias, who had once been a friend of Sparta, gave
himself up to Gylippus. He met the same fate. The suffering of the Athe-
nian prisoners in the quarries of Syracuse is well known. Of the great
invasion, nothing was left. Thucydides has the last word: “This was the
21. Translation by R. Lattimore (New York, 1963).
100 Chapter
6
greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hel-
lenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to
the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they
suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total de-
struction, their fl eet, their army—everything was destroyed, and few out
of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily.” 22
All this time Alcibiades, who had called for the expedition and had,
two years earlier, commanded it, was in Sparta, no doubt proud of the
plan he had given it. “Beaten at all points and altogether.” He, the mas-
termind, was content.
His second piece of advice also contributed to the war’s outcome in no
small measure, at least indirectly; its consequences extended beyond the
period of the Sicilian expedition.
Back when the expedition was still being planned, Nicias had pointed
out that there was danger in leaving for Sicily when peace was not yet secure
in Greece itself: Alcibiades’s second bit of advice had the effect of restarting
the war, in a way that was particularly dangerous for Athens. Alcibiades ad-
vised the Spartans to foment war in Greece to prevent Athens from sending
reinforcements to Sicily, and to seize a fort in Attica near Athens, at Decelea.
Decelea was twenty kilometers north of Athens on the road to Boeotia.
You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are al-
ways most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced
in the present war: the fortifi cation in question, while it benefi ts you, will
create diffi culties for your adversaries, many of which I shall pass over and
shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will
most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians
will at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium,
of their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above
all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they
lose their awe of Athens and see you addressing yourselves with vigor to this
war. (6.91.6–7)
This was to conceive a direct strike against Athens; in a very modern fash-
ion, Alcibiades was calculating all the economic and fi nancial aspects: loss
22. End of book 7.87.5.
Exile 101
of land, of small industry and mining, revenue paid by allies. And he had
chosen the most propitious strategic location.
In fact, fortifying a position within enemy territory was one of the
modes of action considered in time of war. Pericles had talked about it
when preparing for the war; he had reassured the Athenians on this sub-
ject by showing that an important position could only be taken with great
diffi culty, and that a simple position did less harm than Athens could ac-
complish with its navy, as the navy gave it the ability to retaliate much
more effectively. 23 It was in fact Athens that, in 424, had established a fort at Pylos in the Peloponnese, 24 leading to the most serious harm to Sparta.
That installation at Pylos was the object of multiple confl icts during the
Peace of Nicias: Sparta demanded that the fort be returned; and Athens
turned a deaf ear. Now the situation was reversed: this matter concerned
a Spartan fort in the middle of Attica.
There had been some talk of this before the peace, but without specif-
ics. Now, Alcibiades’s advice would prove remarkable.
The Lacedaemonians were tempted but wary, and did not take the advice
right away. But when they learned that Athens was going to send reinforce-
ments to Sicily, they decided, under pressure from their allies, the time had
come to act. They had had enough of the Athenians’ threats, of their refusal
to return Pylos; and since the Spartans were now fi ghting in Sicily, they had
to follow logic. One whole winter was spent in preparations; then, in the
spring of 413, they invaded Attica and began fortifying Decelea as planned. 25
The fortifi cations were completed during the summer; a garrison followed.
This occupation would continue throughout the war that had resumed—the
war that was sometimes called the “war of Decelea” (413–404).
This move was disastrous for Athens: it was exactly as Alcibiades
had said it would be. Thucydides says that it “caused great harm to the
Athenians.” 26 He says that they were “deprived of their whole country”
(7.27.5). More than twenty thousand slaves and many artisans deserted,
herds were lost, and horses lamed. Crops coming from Euboea had to
make costly detours. And Athens lived constantly under threat: “Instead
23. 1.142.4.
24. This was the whole of Navarino: the episode occupies the beginning of Thucydides’s
book 4.
25. 7.19.1.
26. 7.27.3.
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6
of a city, it became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were
worn out by having to keep guard on the fortifi cations, during the day by
turns, by night altogether, the cavalry excepted, at the different military
posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had
two wars at once.” (7.28.1–3).
Alcibiades had aimed well and accurately. It is not surprising that bit-
terness against him endured. During a trial after his death, Lysias wrote:
“The son of Alcibiades, who had helped the Lacedaemonians fortify De-
celea . . .” Other problems would follow, with the third counsel Alcibiades
gave the Spartans. 27 But this was still painful, and with reason.
We can understand, in weighing the consequences of these fi rst two
recommendations, that Alcibiades had given Sparta great service. Having
once been a great man in Athens, he had become a great man in Sparta.
The Athenian disaster in Sicily had hardly ended when Alcibiades gave
Sparta his third counsel, worth as much as his previous counsels com-
bined: complete the destruction of Athens by causing the loss of the Ionian
allies, the backbone of the empire.
But before tracking that course, it is useful for us to look ahead a few
months: we fi nd that the “great man” of Sparta has run into a few ob-
stacles, just like those of the great Athenian. Another scandal! This one,
despite everything else, will weaken his situation.
Had he really wanted, as a phrase quoted in Plutarch suggests, descen-
dants who would be kin
gs of Sparta? In any case, he seduced the wife of
King Agis, 28 and gave her a child; he was seen leaving the queen’s chamber during an earthquake. 29 Plutarch, having trouble understanding a text of Xenophon, is a bit unclear about this business of the nocturnal fl ight and
the earthquake. One thing is clear, however: the scandal became public.
It would matter later in the history of Sparta, for this son, named Leoty-
chidas, would run into opposition from those who faulted his illegitimate
27. See chapter 7.
28. Despite the surveillance the ephors were supposed to exercise, if we believe what
Socrates says (to Alcibiades, in fact) in Plato’s Alcibiades 121b.
29. See Hatzfeld, Revue des études anciennes (1933): 387–95.
Exile 103
birth. Xenophon relates the whole story in Hellenica (beginning at 3.3.2).
Leotychidas was supposed to yield to Agesilaus. Some modern histori-
ans have tried, in vain, to argue that the whole affair was simply gossip
spread to remove this son from the royal succession. There has been an
abundance of articles and conferences about this question of paternity in
recent decades. 30 The sheer number of these proves the absence of any hard evidence. The least one can say is that the story was acknowledged
by everyone in antiquity and, moreover, does not come as a surprise. Al-
cibiades played the perfect Spartan, but he remained Alcibiades, always
as seductive and imprudent as ever and, apparently, always just as devoid
of scruples.
I like the similarities that sometimes appear between the past and our
own time. Here, just by being himself, Alcibiades has outdone himself.
Nevertheless, he had become such a valuable ally that at least offi cially,
the king did not protest. Alcibiades suffered no direct consequences. Un-
abashed, he continued to refi ne his fi nal plan—one that would dictate the
new turn taken in the war.
30. See the preface. After the suspicions of Beloch and Niese, the fi rst important critique was that of M. Luria in Klio (1927): 404–20. See also Westlake in 1938 and Littman in 1969.
Most historians, however, accept the facts (among others, Ferguson, Ehrenberg, Glotz, and Hatzfeld).
7
In Asia Minor
Following the disaster of the Sicilian expedition, Athens’ empire was badly
shaken. The empire represented its power; now Athens had been shown to
be weak. Very quickly, the effects were felt in Ionia, in the islands close to
Asia Minor, and in the Greek cities of Asia Minor.
This was a key region for Greece because, in general, Asia Minor was
part of Persia, and an old rivalry existed between the two peoples. The
Persian Wars had started with an uprising in these countries against Per-
sia, an uprising Athens had supported. After the Greek victory, the islands
and the cities of the region were included among the allies of Athens; and
among the allies, they represented some of the richest peoples. The large
islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, the famous city of Miletus, and other
cities, like Abydos to the north and Halicarnassus to the south, together
constituted a symbol of the Greek presence in Asia Minor and the real
power of the Athenian Empire. Just as the Persian Wars had established
their independence from Persia, the defeat Athens suffered risked weaken-
ing its authority in this region. We know how strongly the Athenians had
In
Asia
Minor 105
reacted to the defection of the Mytilenians, on the island of Lesbos, and
how harshly they had wanted to punish them.
The risk was greater because the Persian power was close by, watching
for signs of weakness. Persia was always there.
During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had, from the beginning,
thought about an alliance with that side; it knew the barbarians
wanted to destroy Athens. The king of Sparta, Archidamus, had said
that Sparta needed to form alliances “either Greek or barbarian.” He
even specifi ed that when threatened, one could, without reproach,
“for safety, seek help not only from Greeks but even barbarians.”
And sweeping away other considerations was the fact that Persia was
rich. Moreover, at the beginning of the war, the Lacedaemonians had
wanted to send an embassy into Asia, to the king, to try to persuade
him to provide support and to fi ght at their side. The embassy never
arrived, and nothing changed. But in this matter as well, one could
expect to see new initiatives arise at the fi rst opportunity presented by
a weakened Athens.
The opportunity was not long in coming. As soon as the disaster in Sic-
ily became known, defections of Greek cities took place one by one, and
negotiations between Sparta and the Persian satraps began.
In Sparta there was one person who knew better than anyone else what
these defections meant to Athens, and how much Athens feared an alli-
ance between Sparta and Persia.
This person had every reason to encourage Sparta, and to show it the
price of these two means for destroying Athenian power. That was, of
course, Alcibiades. The strategy in Ionia was his third counsel.
Later, we will admire the perfect geographic scope of Alcibiades’s
movement from one end of Greece to the other. First, departing from
Athens to conquer far-off Sicily to build Athens’ empire. Exiled follow-
ing the “affairs,” he returned to Greece itself, to Sparta. From there he
launched, and launched Sparta, to the extreme east of this world, into
Asia Minor, in order to destroy Athens’ empire. No one could have
known at that time (except he himself—who knows?) that his path
would lead him back to Athens, where he would return in triumph as
a savior.
Every move he made along the length of this path was masterful, en-
hanced by a lack of scruples that surprised no one.
106 Chapter
7
Things were not easy at fi rst.
It is true that the defections of the islands and the cities of Asia Minor
began quickly. No one still believed in the power of Athens. Thucydides
even says that the subjects of Athens thought it could not hold for even
one summer. 1 Euboea was the fi rst to begin discussions with King Agis of Sparta (he was occupying Decelea in Attica) to prepare for joining the
Spartan side. Then it was Lesbos that spoke with Agis. Chios also brought
a request to Sparta. In that sphere, everything was going according to Al-
cibiades’s wishes. The situation was less clear between Persia and Sparta
because disagreements intruded.
The Persian king—“the King,” as he was known—ruled through his
satraps, governors of vast provinces. Two of these satraps also considered
approaching Sparta. Their reasons were the same: the authority Athens
exercised over the islands and cities of Asia Minor prevented them from
raising tribute money for the king; but the king expected them to pay. It
would therefore be profi table to help Sparta force the Athenians out. The
two satraps in question who played a major role in the history of this period
were Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, on whom Ionia depended; and Pharn-
abazus, satrap of Dascylium, north of Asia Mino
r, on whom the Hellespont
depended. After the Sicilian disaster, Tissaphernes reached an agreement
with the people of Chios, who wanted to defect immediately; and he sent an
embassy to Sparta. Pharnabazus sent another at around the same time. Tis-
saphernes requested Peloponnesian assistance in his region and announced
that he was ready to accept troops; Pharnabazus asked for help in the Helles-
pont, and his representatives had brought money. A choice had to be made!
In Sparta now there were two points of view that corresponded to a
latent quarrel between the powerful King Agis and Alcibiades’s faithful
friend Endios, who was ephor that year. Ephors were high elected magis-
trates; they exercised a sovereign authority that was often superior to that
of kings, whom they were responsible for overseeing. This could lead to
competing for infl uence.
At fi rst both parties agreed to take the side of Tissaphernes. That was
also what Alcibiades wanted. He had personal relationships in Ionia.
Ephesus and Chios had participated in the festivals celebrating his Olym-
pic victories and he had, Thucydides says, “friends among the leading men
1. 8.2.2.
In
Asia
Minor 107
of the Milesians.” 2 King Agis accepted this principle; the expedition was
organized. Alcibiades himself would be part of it.
Therein lay the problem. The Athenians, more resolved than anyone
had thought, succeeded in blocking the fi rst ships of the Peloponnesian
fl eet in a small port in the vicinity of Corinth. That was a bad start. The
Lacedaemonians were discouraged: ready to give up the effort, they de-
cided not to send the ships that were to follow (the ships Alcibiades was to
accompany); they even recalled the ships that had already sailed.
Then Alcibiades intervenes in earnest. Thucydides’s text describes his
resolve as well as his sense of intrigue:
Alcibiades again persuaded Endios and the other ephors to persevere in the
expedition, saying that the voyage would be made before the Chians heard
of the fl eet’s misfortune, and that as soon as he set foot in Ionia, he should,
by assuring them of the weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of Sparta,
have no diffi culty in persuading the cities to revolt as they would readily be-