personal ambition appeared in one of Pericles’s successors, or in some of
24. This is largely what K. Dover says in the historical commentary on book 8, which includes references to other critical works.
25. In this, at least, Phrynichus may have achieved his aim, as Westlake says in the Journal of Hellenic Studies (1956): 99–104.
In
Asia
Minor 121
his successors; the phrase he used was more general: “With his successors
it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at
supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to
the whims of the multitude.” And later: “Nor did they fi nally succumb
till they fell victims of their own internal disorders.” These words are not
about an individual; they apply to the spirit of the time. 26
Why? Thucydides suggests the lack of an undisputed leader. But there
are other reasons we might add.
First, perhaps, there was a contagion. It is obvious that, in this impas-
sioned confl ict, the anger of one man led the next one, out of fear, to
take extreme measures, without a thought for the common good. Alcibi-
ades’s treachery arose when his enemies condemned him to death. Phry-
nichos betrayed because Alcibiades might have condemned him to die.
The tactics became increasingly devious because everyone was caught
up in a pitiless struggle. In a different sphere, it is the same: if one side
resorts to fi nancial irregularities, the other side tends to do the same.
It is never by accident when scandals and suspicious deaths suddenly
multiply on all sides. It is not a good sign; and the Athenian example is
there to remind us.
It may also be—and Thucydides implies as much—that when a people
are accustomed to being all-powerful, selfi sh ambitions arise. To please
them, promises are made, and as soon as interest wanes, the normal reac-
tion is to want to “change the constitution”—not for the good of the state,
but for the good of those individuals or groups who are worried about
maintaining their positions. Alcibiades called for an oligarchic revolution;
it was the democrats who brought him back. And Phrynichus, who op-
posed him, became an active member of the oligarchy. What could be
worse for a country than these abrupt shifts, especially when they occur
in the middle of a war?
In fact, these personal confl icts and battles between political sides led,
in the terrible year 411, to a revolution and almost civil war—all just when
Athens was threatened from all sides. Who caused these confl icts, which
were up to now latent and under control, to break out into the open? It
wasn’t the war and the disaster it caused. It was Alcibiades, driven by his
demand for a regime change.
26. 2.65.10, 12; see above, chapter 3.
122 Chapter
7
As so often in this story, this demand did not achieve what he wanted;
but it did propel Athens into events for which, in the end, he bore
responsibility.
And once more that devilish man, having sown the seeds of drama,
emerged on top. His return to Athens loomed on the horizon.
8
With the Athenians on Samos
It is a curious paradox: Alcibiades had forced the adoption of oligarchy,
ending nearly a century of democracy, and once under way, the plot grew
and took shape. In the end, like a spark that is transmitted along the length
of a wire before igniting a remote explosion, the oligarchy was fi rmly es-
tablished without Alcibiades and in opposition to him. This was at no cost
to him, however. Athens, under the oligarchy, opposed him, but the Athe-
nians on Samos, who remained faithful to the democracy, trusted him.
This complete reversal of the situation cries out for explanation.
As we have noted, 1 the oligarchs of Samos had sent, against the advice of Phrynichus, a delegation to Athens to lay the groundwork for regime
change and to recall Alcibiades. The leader of the delegation was one
Pisander. Typical of the political mores of the time, Pisander had previ-
ously been a democrat; and he had been one of those investigating the
1. See above, chapter 7.
124 Chapter
8
affair of the herms, facts that should have made him an unlikely advocate
of oligarchy or of Alcibiades! Nevertheless, an advocate he was, and an
eloquent one. Despite the various public hostilities that were breaking out
in Athens (coming sometimes from democrats, sometimes from religious
groups, and sometimes from people who simply did not trust Alcibiades),
Pisander went to the people and addressed each one of the main oppo-
nents individually:
“In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their
own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the King
and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians had
none left, had he any hope of saving the state unless someone could induce
the King to come over to their side?” Upon their replying that they had not,
he then plainly said to them: “This we cannot have unless we have a more
moderate form of government, 2 and put the offi ces into fewer hands, and so gain the King’s confi dence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades who is the only
man living who can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the form of
its government, is for the moment the most pressing question as we can al-
ways change afterwards whatever we do not like.”
There are two important points here.
The fi rst, obviously, is the role as a man of destiny Alcibiades has man-
aged to assume. This is because he is thought to direct Tissaphernes in all
things (he is, in fact, the king’s favorite), the one holding the purse strings,
and the only one capable of assuring victory to one side or the other; he
was thus able to set a high price for his collaboration. The exile of yester-
day has become Athens’ only hope. He played his hand well.
The other point concerns the way Pisander glides smoothly along the
path to oligarchy. The word is never spoken. He refers to a “more moder-
ate” politics, which is always the tone taken by a reactionary party; and
he speaks of putting responsibility in fewer hands, which was the agenda
of this particular group of Athenians. Such a program could cover a whole
range of outcomes.
Twice Athens would experience brief oligarchies. The one established
in 411, following the events we have just seen, was a true oligarchy. It
2. Meaning, of course, closer to oligarchy. The full quotation is from 8.53.2–3.
With the Athenians on Samos 125
has been called the government of the Four Hundred because the demo-
cratic council, formed of fi ve hundred individuals chosen at random, was,
among other measures, replaced by a council of four hundred selected by
vote of cooptation by the membership, starting with fi ve of the presidents. 3
The second oligarchy, established after the defeat of Athens and under
enemy occupation, is called the regime of the Thirty, or the Thirty Ty-
rants, because power was placed in the hands of thirty individuals. In bot
h
cases, the regimes were harsh, allowing for arbitrary arrests and execu-
tions, with no legal recourse.
In both cases, however, an internal opposition appeared, in the name
of “moderate democracy.”
The supporters of this opposition called for an assembly. They acknowl-
edged that this would be weaker than in the past, but would offer freedom
of expression and discussion. They were successful for a time in 411, and
Thucydides approved of the government of that time, as representing bal-
ance. The “more moderate” politics that Pisander had argued for could
include either of these two regimes. And it is what allowed Pisander to
convince the Athenians. Moreover, he left the door open, suggesting that
the change could be provisional.
This is how reactionary governments are established: following a de-
feat in war, disguised as moderation, in the name of moral recovery. We
have seen examples in the not too distant past.
Athens was thus persuaded to support this agenda of public safety. And
it sent Pisander with ten other delegates to negotiate, in Asia Minor, with
“Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.”
Such deceit! Negotiations went badly. And Alcibiades was the fi rst one re-
sponsible for the bad outcome.
Powerful he was: he spoke in the name of Tissaphernes. But his de-
mands were catastrophic. During three successive meetings, he wanted
for the king all of Ionia, then the neighboring islands, and then the right
to build a fl eet that would be free to act on the king’s behalf on the en-
tire coast of Asia Minor! These were demands that for decades Athenian
3. In addition, the serving magistrates were dismissed and their pay suppressed. These decisions were taken by an extraordinary assembly that met, not on the Pnyx, but at Colonus, outside the city (8.67.2–3).
126 Chapter
8
traditions had refused as unacceptable and offensive. 4 Naturally, the Athenians refused and departed, convinced that Alcibiades had duped them.
Another bizarre story. What explains Alcibiades’s attitude? True, he
was simply the mouthpiece of Tissaphernes and had no choice about the
conditions that were set. But he agreed to them, and Thucydides fi nds that
he was partly responsible. The explanation is frankly complicated and not
very convincing. Alcibiades would have realized that Tissaphernes, faith-
ful to the policy of disruption that he himself had fi rst espoused, would not
accept the alliance with Athens; moreover, he wanted the refusal to come
from Athens, in order to avoid looking bad: “While Alcibiades, who now
saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any terms, wished
the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes,
but that after the latter had been persuaded and was willing to join them,
they had not conceded enough to him” (8.56.3). That explanation might
have been convincing if Alcibiades had actually maintained his credibility,
if he had left the doors open and accommodation of perspectives possible.
The account does not suggest any such thing.
So? Are we to think that in this business Alcibiades was a passive in-
strument in the hands of a Tissaphernes who was more stubborn than he
had thought?
Perhaps we need not assume as much: after all, nothing had made Al-
cibiades put himself forward in that role. In fact, considering everything
that followed the events, another explanation comes to mind—purely
hypothetical, it is true, but that conforms with the thinking of the man
and is able to fi t nicely with Thucydides’s explanation. Yes, Alcibiades
had wanted the break to come from the Athenians (and had hoped it
would come sooner); but he may also have been looking further, and, after
launching the effort for oligarchy, wondered if it was not better to wait
and see how things turned out. He was certainly aware that Pisander was
an unreliable ally, and that he had had serious diffi culties in Athens. He
must have known as well that Samos, at the time zealous for the oligarchy,
also included people on the other side. Using these problems as an oppor-
tunity to take a step back, it is possible he did not do everything he could
to satisfy the Athenian delegates.
4. This is found in the discussions over the “peace of Callias” that was meant to protect the Greeks from the barbarians.
With the Athenians on Samos 127
Actually, this man who was so adept at persuasion also knew some-
thing even more problematic, namely, how to use his ability to annoy
others. Few politicians today can do it. But there have been a few, and
famous ones.
In any case, whether the fault of Tissaphernes or his own, everything
failed. And the results seemed as bad as they could possibly be for Alcibi-
ades. Tissaphernes once again sided with the Peloponnesians; he concluded
a new treaty with them, promising subsidies and ships. Moreover, Samos,
welcoming Pisander, embraced the oligarchy and pushed Alcibiades aside.
Pisander’s delegation, returning to Athens, overthrew the democracy in the
cities it passed, even before achieving the same result in Athens, where his
friends were already working hard. They had even resorted to violence:
Androcles, Alcibiades’s old foe, was assassinated by the conspirators for
being an enemy of Alcibiades; the conspirators did not yet know that Al-
cibiades would not be recalled! The oligarchy was established without him.
What hope was there for this new government except to make a treaty
with Sparta?
“They also sent to Agis, the Spartan king at Decelea, to say that they
desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed
to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant Peo-
ple.” 5 Agis, seeing the city subject to such chaos, declined to make a treaty.
The Athenians insisted: their only hope was to stop the war. Without Al-
cibiades, they were forced to accept defeat, and end it.
That might have happened, but it did not: another reversal was at
work. And Alcibiades, once again, was front and center.
The reversal began with Samos.
Samos had fi rst embarked on oligarchy. There were attacks. Hyper-
bolus, the democrat whom Alcibiades had struck with ostracism, was
assassinated. Androcles in Athens, Hyperbolus in Samos: Alcibiades’s en-
emies fell, as though at random. But this disorder brought consequences.
The generals, who were inclined to oppose oligarchy, were warned, as
were those men known to be most opposed to the movement. These in-
dividuals in turn worked with the soldiers. On the appointed day, when
the partisans of the oligarchy were going to attack on a larger scale, they
5. 8.70.2.
128 Chapter
8
ran into an organized resistance and were beaten. The two sides made
peace—under the democracy.
These supporters of democracy, while triumphant, were unaware of the
situation in Athens. They wanted to inform the city of their victory and
send delegates aboard the Paralus, an elite state ship that had contributed
to their success. That was a mistake: some were arreste
d or killed. Their
leader was able to escape and returned to Samos immediately. There,
he brought news from Athens, “exaggerating everything,” according to
Thucydides. He painted a terrible picture of the tyranny reigning there;
the outrage was so great that fi ghting was about to break out.
But order returned. Henceforth there were two Athens: the govern-
ment in Athens, oligarchic, and that in Samos, democratic. It was settled:
everyone in the army, whether oligarchic or democratic, swore “to ac-
cept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively the war
against the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred and
to hold no communication with them.” 6
Henceforth Samos, or rather the Athenians on Samos, considered
themselves independent. The true Athens was at Samos. And in order to
say that the city of Athens was no longer with them, the Athenians on
Samos said that she was “detached,” using the word that was normal for
designating allies who defected. 7
We have known, in recent history, such schisms. France had a govern-
ment in Vichy, and one in London. But differences spring to mind. Neither
of the two Athens was occupied by an enemy or had fl ed abroad. The
break was entirely among Athenians and Athenians alone. Moreover, it
was much deeper than we can imagine, a time when everything that hap-
pened was due to distance and the time needed for communication. Today,
events would have taken a very different course with the telephone, radio,
television. There can be very few examples of a rupture affecting such a
small city and installing two enemy factions so far apart.
The rupture was conceived by Alcibiades. It would change the course
of his life.
Among the Athenian leaders on Samos committed to pursuing the war,
some clearly wished to recall Alcibiades—among them, Thrasybulus, one
6. 8.75.2. Today we would say they broke off diplomatic relations.
7. 8.76.3. Aphestēken.
With the Athenians on Samos 129
of the principal authors of the effort to support the democracy. At the
time, he was trierarch. This powerful man would later be credited with
the triumph of democracy after the second oligarchy, at the end of the war,
and would then preside over the reunifi cation of Athens.
The Life of Alcibiades Page 19
