Ultimately, he won the support of the army; when they came together
in the assembly, all voted to recall Alcibiades and guaranteed his safety.
Thrasybulus went to Tissaphernes to bring him back. Thrasybulus was,
as Thucydides explains, “convinced that their only chance of salvation lay
in [Alcibiades’s] bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to
themselves” (8.81.1).
Here is Alcibiades, brokering the deal, and fi nally returning, if not to
Athens itself, at least to one of the two Athens, the democratic Athens on
Samos. What he had proposed to the oligarchs, he accomplished with the
democrats. This latest reversal deserves admiration. First, there had been
the agreement tying the oligarchy to Alcibiades; after the break, there was
the oligarchy without Alcibiades and on Samos, the democracy; there was
oligarchy without Alcibiades at Athens, democracy with Alcibiades on
Samos. One need not be a political genius to realize that the democracy
with Alcibiades would be the stronger of the two, and that the govern-
ment of the Four Hundred would soon be overturned.
And meanwhile, Alcibiades returns to Athenian politics with strength
and confi dence.
First, his initial communications: to appeal to the people, he evoked his
exile; and then, of course, he made promises. Thucydides emphasizes all
his promises:
Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such extravagant promises as
the following: that Tissaphernes had solemnly assured him that if he could
only trust the Athenians they should never want for supplies while he had
anything left, no, not even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, 8
and that he would bring the Phoenician fl eet now at Aspendus to the Athe-
nians instead of to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athe-
nians if Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them. 9
8. In Xenophon, Cyrus the Younger uses an analogous expression ( Hellenica 1.5.3: “He would demolish the very throne on which he sat, made of silver and gold”). As we would say,
“He would give him the shirt off his back.” His text uses the oriental expressions.
9. 8.81.3. Aspendus is in Pamphylia, in southern Asia Minor.
130 Chapter
8
Given all this, is it surprising that the army made him general and put him
in charge of their duties? They were happy and hopeful; they would be
victorious. Alcibiades would take care of everything!
Thucydides rightly calls this boasting, as we have seen nothing in Tis-
saphernes’s inclinations that backs up these exaggerated statements, these
oaths, this conviction. But for Alcibiades, the time for persuasion was now
or never. And the Athenians, beset with problems, slipped easily back into
what was always their natural characteristic. The Corinthians noted it
in book 1 of Thucydides, specifi cally optimism: this meant having “high
hopes” or “cheerful hopes”—in Greek, euelpides , the name Aristophanes
gave one of the characters in his comedy the Birds . “They are,” according
to the Corinthians, “adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond
their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine.” 10 They were convinced
that they would succeed easily in everything, with Tissaphernes’s help.
Seen in this way, their enthusiasm was once again evidence of Alcibi-
ades’s charm, of his ability to persuade, and of the amazing aura sur-
rounding this person who was otherwise so disturbing.
Alcibiades was not one of those demagogues who will say anything to
please people. His fi rst move was the mark of perceptive conviction.
In their newfound confi dence, forgetting the dangers of warfare, the
soldiers on Samos were ready to head for Piraeus and defeat the oligarchy.
Despite their resolve, Alcibiades strongly opposed this. They had put him
in charge of the war: he was going to take care of the war, and go straight
to Tissaphernes. And so he did. Once again, his side avoided civil war as
well as certain defeat in the war against Sparta.
That was not all. When, later, the delegates of the Four Hundred (always
late!) arrived on Samos, appearing calm and peaceful, the soldiers of Samos
grew enraged, seized once again with the desire to head for Athens, aban-
doning Ionia to the enemy. Once again, Alcibiades intervened, and with the
same effect. Thucydides emphasizes that he did the state a great service:
At that moment, when no other man would have been able to hold back the
multitude, he put a stop to the intended expedition, and rebuked and turned
aside the resentment felt, on personal grounds, against the envoys; he dis-
missed them with an answer from himself, to the effect that he did not object
10. 1.70.3.
With the Athenians on Samos 131
to the government of the Five Thousand, 11 but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed and the Council of the Five Hundred reinstated in
power. (8.86.5–6)
He ended the pursuit of hostilities and brought the two sides to an
agreement.
By his actions, Alcibiades avoided disaster. He also brought nearer
the outcome that would soon triumph over the Four Hundred: that is, a
moderate democracy and balance of the two extremes. Above all, he was
fi nally speaking as a leader.
One may fi nd this sort of doublet in the history surprising, and surpris-
ing also to see Thucydides so much more emphatic on the second occasion
than on the fi rst. It should not concern us. The fi rst case involved vague
efforts; on the second occasion, the delegates of the Four Hundred were
there, anger was at fever pitch. The crisis was much more serious. It was
also the occasion of clear leadership and of a more specifi c policy. This
is why Thucydides insists, in a phrase whose very words have been con-
tested, writing: “Now it was that Alcibiades for the fi rst time [or “the fi rst
one, at this moment”] 12 did the state a great service, and one of the most outstanding kind.”
According to the text one chooses, the emphasis of the judgment is dif-
ferent: if Thucydides is believed to have written that Alcibiades served the
city of Athens “for the fi rst time,” the criticism of Alcibiades is strong; if,
on the other hand, he wrote that at that time Alcibiades was “the fi rst”
to render service, the praise is unreserved. Whichever reading is chosen,
Thucydides is emphatic about the role Alcibiades played on this occasion.
It is actually moving to see the return of a responsible leader, one
adopting the tone of Pericles. Thucydides praised Pericles for knowing
how to rein in a mob: “Whenever he saw them unseasonably and inso-
lently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm.” In short, he
was reasonable when they were irrational. For once Alcibiades imitated
Pericles’s example.
11. These Five Thousand are the Assembly that the oligarchs had promised to install—an
assembly smaller than in the past and based on census classes.
12. 8.86.4. Instead of prōton (“for the fi rst time”), most manuscripts have prōtos (“the fi rst”). Most recently, we have agreed with the reading prōton, with Classen, and against Schwartz, Hude,
Delebecque. The distinction is not important for the issue here.
132 Chapter
8
His attitude bore fruit.
It was particularly effective in Athens itself, where some resistance was
growing, encouraged by “the power of Alcibiades at Samos, and their
own conviction that the oligarchy was unstable” (8.89.4). Theramenes,
the leader of the moderates, triumphed. There were riots, fears about an
enemy action; a battle took place very near Euboea, and led to the loss of
that island for Athens. However, despite some panic, the moderates were
successful. The leaders of the oligarchy withdrew to Decelea. A moderate
democracy was established. And without delay, there was a vote to recall
Alcibiades!
The gamble had paid off—on the condition that the war also was
won. Here it is worthwhile to consider how our hero managed to con-
vey the sense that he brought a dowry in the form of an alliance with
Tissaphernes.
There was much talk throughout this whole period about the famous
fl eet that Tissaphernes was building in Phoenicia and that would change
the war between Sparta and Athens. In Thucydides’s work, it was an
issue from the moment Alcibiades went to live with the satrap: Alcibiades
advised him against giving supremacy to Sparta by sending “the Phoeni-
cian fl eet which he was equipping” (8.46.1). It is a simple reference, but
it is apparent that the arrival of these ships must have been hoped for,
promised, discussed, expected for a long time. It depended on Tissapher-
nes but also on the king, as Phoenicia did not belong to the satrapy of
Tissaphernes.
When Alcibiades went to the Athenians on Samos, this fl eet had still
not arrived; but it seemed ready and to be already en route; without hesi-
tation, Alcibiades promised that it would come to help, not the Pelopon-
nesians, but the Athenians: “that he would bring the Phoenician fl eet now
at Aspendus to the Athenians” (8.81.3).
On this subject, however, Tissaphernes wanted to maintain equal bal-
ance, knowing that the Spartans were upset: he “prepared to go to the
Phoenician fl eet at Aspendus, and invited Lichas [the Spartan] to go with
him” (8.87.1).
Will he give the fl eet to Sparta? Does he want to? That would be bad
for Alcibiades; but Thucydides acknowledges that this is not certain:
“It is not easy to ascertain with what intention he went to Aspendus
and did not bring the fleet after all.” He says that there were exactly
With the Athenians on Samos 133
147 ships. 13 They would have changed everything. But they never arrived. Did Tissaphernes wish to use the two camps without helping either? Was he just
pretending, in order to please Sparta? Was money an issue? Thucydides leans
toward the former and suggests that the satrap’s long absence was bound
to prolong the status quo and cause delay. It may also be that developing
problems within the Persian Empire had been one more reason not to send
the fl eet. 14 In any case, the ships that were so long expected never appeared.
Tissaphernes made excuses: he did not bring the fl eet because it wasn’t
as big as was expected . . . just words, nothing else.
Alcibiades knew how important all this was for him: he never hesitated!
Learning that Tissaphernes was going to Aspendus, he set sail there as well,
with thirteen ships. At this time, at the moment of departure, he makes
the second promise to the Athenians on Samos: he says he will “do a great
and certain service . . . as he would either bring the Phoenician fl eet to the
Athenians, or at all events prevent its joining the Peloponnesians” (8.88.1).
Well done, Alcibiades! His fi rst promise had been to procure the Phoene-
cian fl eet for Athens. But he must have known, or guessed, that it would
not be easy and that he risked a confrontation with Tissaphernes, who had
made up his mind. So? He would turn to his advantage what was, in fact, his
failure: he would take credit for having prevented the fl eet from joining the
Spartan side. This would be an easier result to obtain. It might even help him
with the Spartans: since Alcibades had followed Tissaphernes, Sparta would
be inclined to think that Tissaphernes had listened to him, and was deal-
ing with Athens. As Thucydides explains it, Alcibiades wanted to “compro-
mise [Tissaphernes] as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians
through his apparent friendship with himself and the Athenians, and thus in
a manner to oblige him to join their side” (8.88.1). In all of this there was a
great deal of plotting and calculation and pressure about a fl eet that played a
leading role by its absence! The consequences were not minor. Sparta began
to doubt the ships would ever arrive and began dealing with the other sa-
trap, Pharnabazus. The absence of the fl eet was to Alcibiades’s credit.
In fact, it is uncertain whether he ever went to Aspendus. Thucydides
has him going to the southern part of Asia Minor, to Phaselis and to
13. Isocrates says 90, Plutarch says 150, and Diodorus says 300. These may refl ect the difference between the number expected and the actual number; Thucydides’s number is, in any case, the most precise.
14. Hatzfeld, 252–53.
134 Chapter
8
Caunus, and later returning “from Phaselis and Caunus.” 15 He may have done no more than shown himself, and watched from a distance. But it
was enough. He returned to Samos, having prevented the ships from going
to the Peloponnesians and obtaining this result: “He had made Tissapher-
nes more friendly to the Athenians than before” (8.108.1).
Pure legend? Or the most adroit intervention anyone could have ex-
pected? The art of personal propaganda began right here, with a dazzling
success that has defi ed criticism ever since.
What we might call “the meeting at Aspendus” remains the greatest
example of the art of making the most of the most diffi cult situations.
Alcibiades, however, was not satisfi ed with this savvy diplomatic move.
While the other Athenian leaders on Samos had started fi ghting in the
environs of Chios, here is Alcibiades, barely returned to Samos, departing
with some twenty ships: he is going to Halicarnassus to demand money
and then to fortify the island of Cos opposite it. The money was needed to
meet the costs of the war. As for Cos, it needed to hold up against Caria.
Once this business was taken care of, he too departed for northern Asia
Minor, where the Peloponnesian fl eet had preceded him and the Athenians
of Samos. Soon Tissaphernes himself would return, fi rst to his own terri-
tory and then to the Hellespont: the battle was moved to the straits.
The result was that the reinforcements Alcibiades brought contributed
to a sizable victory. He served his recovered homeland well.
Is that the correct word? Recovered? The vote to recall Alcibiades had
occurred while he was busy at Aspendus. He could go back. This is the
summer of 411. Was he going to go back?
The dates surprise us. He did not return to Athens for four years, in the
summer of 407.
Why the gap? Why the delay? Out of caution, a
pparently.
The situation was not yet stable anywhere.
It was not stable in Athens.
16 The city had just experienced the
trauma of revolution. It was living under a mixed regime, brand new,
15. 8.88, 108.1.
16. His recall is surrounded by vagueness. Critias, the future member of the oligarchy of the Thirty, boasted of having proposed the decree (Plutarch 33.2). But the decision is attributed to the initiative of Theramenes (Diodorus 13.38), and many modern scholars have the effective date of the decree later, in 408.
With the Athenians on Samos 135
and was soon to revert to democracy and a rebirth of the infl uence of
demagogues—such as Cleophon, who represented radical democracy, the
side of the old enemies of Alcibiades, Hyperbolus and Androcles. Alcibi-
ades was still mistrusted by some democrats for having earlier offered
to return to Athens only if there were oligarchy. In order to fi ght this
faction, Alcibiades’s friends would have to do some groundwork. Alcibi-
ades, who was in command of a part of the Athenian army, could only
return as an elected general, his position recognized. They were far from
achieving that. He had gained enough experience and wisdom to know
that perfectly well.
In addition, the war itself was far from settled. Alcibiades had helped;
he had boasted of his importance. But he had not yet provided a single
decisive victory. His relations with Tissaphernes were complex and not
secure. Militarily, the war was not lost, but it was stalled. He was still
largely responsible for the disaster in Sicily, as well as for the occupa-
tion of Decelea in Attica, and for the Peloponnesian successes in an Ionia
where serious defections had occurred. It would require more than the
absence of the Phoenician fl eet for him to return as a savior.
In four years, four long years, he had to accomplish this transforma-
tion. But after all he had achieved, how could he fail?
The long-term goal was Athens. But it could only be achieved after
much work from afar.
Before taking up that work, we should spend a moment on the story as
portrayed in the theater. We have already referred to the treatment of the
Sicilian expedition in Euripides’s tragedies. At the very time Athens was
watching these events unfold, Euripides presented Phoenician Women ,
The Life of Alcibiades Page 20
