a tragedy portraying the fratricidal struggles between the sons of Oedi-
pus, Eteocles and Polynices. In it, Polynices was shown to be more sym-
pathetic than he typically was, and he expressed the hardships of exile.
There he was, an exile who waged war against his country in order to
enable his return. Right away, this Polynices made people think of Al-
cibiades. It is even one of the reasons cited for mounting the play just
after 411.
In fact, critics used anything and everything to make a connection be-
tween Polynices and Alcibiades! The mares on Polynices’s shield; Alcibi-
ades’s stable of racehorses! And so on. I raised serious questions about these
136 Chapter
8
interpretations thirty years ago. 17 Possibly, in this or that detail, one can fi nd a more or less deliberate connection; but that is not the meaning of the play.
The meaning of the play is the clash of ambitions, and how these imperil the
city. It is Polynices’s desire for power that leads him to attack his country and
leads Etiocles to declare that he is ready to sacrifi ce everything for that sover-
eignty. And in order to highlight the seriousness of such attitudes, Euripides
contrasts both with the young Menoeceus, ready to die for his homeland.
Indeed, this had a ring of truth! And the recent events described here
suffi ce to justify the necessity and urgency expressed by the speaker in
Euripides’s play. He agrees with Thucydides’s verdict, explaining Athens’
problems of personal ambition. Even better: Thucydides points above all
to the role of personal ambitions in the years of crisis that Athens had just
experienced. About the troubles of 411, he writes: “Most of them were
driven by private ambitions” (8.89.3). If indeed Euripides’s tragedy was
about Alcibiades, it was not in the small external details comparing him
with Polynices; rather it was in the degree to which he too had put the
interests of the state after his own, like Oedipus’s two sons.
Moreover, the verdict in the play is not only like that of Thucydides, but
also like that of Plato in the Gorgias , where he describes another man of am-
bition, as direct and fi rm as Eteocles, Callicles. Callicles believes fi rmly that
might makes right. He is obviously not Alcibiades, although men like Al-
cibiades help us picture him. 18 He is, however, the symbol of that crisis that Alcibiades helped spark, and of all the comparable crises that have ignited
in history whenever a democracy went through moments of upheaval. Our
own is no exception. The tragedy of Phoenician Women , born in such cir-
cumstances, is a plea for civic-mindedness, something we all need to exhibit.
Against the competition between ambitious men, it calls for reconcili-
ation and agreement. Those are words for the order of the moderate de-
mocracy that followed the regime of the Four Hundred. But was there a
complete return to peace? Alcibiades must have doubted it because when
his goal—return to Athens—was fi nally within reach, he did not return,
but, having grown prudent, waited.
17. “Les Phéniciennes d’Euripide ou l’actualité dans la tragédie grecque,” a speech given at the Fourth International Congress of Classical Studies (Philadelphia, 1964) and published in Revue de Philologie (1965): 28–47.
18. See below, chapter 12.
Second Interlude
Alcibiades between Two Historians
The most recent events described here correspond to the fi nal pages of
Thucydides’s work. That work was supposed to have continued to the end
of the war, a fact to which Thucydides himself frequently alludes. How-
ever, the work ends abruptly in the fall of 411.
After that, Xenophon picks up the narrative. Although it is clear that
Xenophon wished to continue the unfi nished work, his account is quite
different. He includes only that which directly concerns the war, without
going into motives and calculation, without any effort to draw out or
suggest political lessons. As a result, there is a disjunction, even in more
modern accounts relating to this period.
The change in tone draws our attention to an important point: when
Thucydides and Xenophon talk about Alcibiades, they are speaking about
someone who was a contemporary, who came from the same milieu, both po-
litical and intellectual, someone with whom they were certainly acquainted.
Coming back to my preceding chapters, I need now to make this point:
the question of Alcibiades’s relationship to Thucydides is one that has
138 Second
Interlude
drawn considerable attention, and for good reason; it bears quite directly
on the structure of Thucydides’s history.
Considering how well-informed Thucydides seems to be in regard to all
those secret—and destined to remain secret—plots, many have speculated
that there were personal contacts between Alcibiades and Thucydides. 1
Furthermore, some scholars have attempted to distinguish, in book 8,
those passages that relayed information that came directly from Alcibi-
ades and those that did not, as a way of tracing the history of the compo-
sition of the book by identifying which chapters preceded or followed a
meeting between the two men, a meeting during which Alcibiades might
have divulged detailed information.
We will not drag the reader into these scholarly debates. It seems impos-
sible to say, even of secret meetings, that “only” Alcibiades could have re-
vealed the tone of these discussions. There were then, as there always will be,
leaks: well-informed friends, gossips, both dubious and reliable. In any case,
Thucydides had, as he says, numerous and different sources of information.
Reconstructing the development of book 8 from this is not easy to do. The
book is unfi nished. It is also imperfect. Unlike the other books, it includes
no speeches. The composition is awkward: there are numerous fl ashbacks,
some clearly consistent and others more or less obscure. Are these faults? He
chose to narrate a war, in sequence, without addressing internal affairs. Then
comes a phase of the war where key events took place far away, where inter-
nal affairs determined everything, where attention had to be given not only
to Sparta and Athens but to Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and to the two
opposing “cities” of Athens. A clear, linear account became impossible, espe-
cially for one who grasped all the intricacies connecting the various causes.
The problem of evidence may have played a part. We have a sense of new evi-
dence that may explain some of the details of the work. Some passages may
have been written following more detailed information. Some of that came,
possibly, straight from Alcibiades. There is just too much conjecture in all of
this for me to lead the reader into the story of these relationships, of meetings
between these two men, 2 and the reconstruction of his composition.
1. See E. Delebecque, Thucydide et Alcibiade, Faculté d’Aix-en-Provence (Ophrys, 1965), 245 pages; and P. A. Brunt, “Thucydides and Alcibiades,” Revue des études grecques 65
(1952): 59–96.
2. This meeting would have occurred, according to E. Delebecque, in 406–405 in Thrace.
A
lcibiades would have started the whole affair: “The individual set out with a mission and found its author” (169).
Alcibiades between Two Historians 139
This ongoing debate aside, it is important to remember two facts that
are beyond question.
First, there may be debates about Thucydides’s information, but we
cannot determine the hypothetical infl uence of his personal contacts by
the degree of sympathy found in the account.
Throughout his work, Thucydides marvels at the qualities of intelli-
gence Alcibiades demonstrates. And he emphasizes throughout the work
that the essential objective of his schemes is always self-interest. This
level of lucidity and Thucydides’s sense of the nuances preclude his being
strictly dependent on privileged—and biased—information.
Moreover, the inconsistency of details that some have noticed, and that we
have tried to explain by the nature of events, may be related to the evolution
of politics itself. In Athenian politics, Alcibiades introduces an era of plots,
betrayals, secret negotiations, and the lies of propaganda. He was not alone
in these practices; they were widespread—and Thucydides says so. Certainly,
if politics takes such a turn, the historian can no longer precisely follow; ev-
erything will depend on the quality of his information, on his ability to detect
lies and fabrications. He can no longer report as clearly or as confi dently.
That is not Thucydides’s fault. It is, quite simply, Alcibiades’s fault.
Xenophon, too, was close to Alcibiades; he belonged to the group of
Socrates’s disciples, and he was interested in politics. However, he was not
so curious to know why things happened. From him we have, above all,
the facts—at times sharp and brilliant, but broken up with silences and, in
some way, laid bare. Thucydides gave us his analysis, sometimes arguable.
Xenophon left to the modern reader the work of analyzing, of explaining,
of grasping the underlying reasons for events.
Moreover, the facts themselves, as we have said, contain silences. A
simple detail will serve as an example: there is not a word in Xenophon’s
Hellenica about the death of Alcibiades, although it plays an important
part in book 1 and at the beginning of book 2, and although his death
was both dramatic and linked to the politics of several of the responsible
parties at the time.
Because of this disparity in his account, it has sometimes been thought
that documentation was its cause; and some have even thought that Xeno-
phon was in possession of Thucydides’s incomplete notes. 3 That, however, is strictly hypothetical, and there is no support for it.
3. E. Delebecque, Vie de Xenophon, 44.
140 Second
Interlude
For the most part, Xenophon does not appear eager to truly judge Al-
cibiades. His relationship to Socrates seems to have interested Xenophon
less than his relationship to Plato. He is sometimes moved to present a ver-
sion of the facts favorable to Alcibiades, 4 but he never speaks of him with any warmth or interest. He was most likely inclined to reject a man who,
brilliant though he was, represented, along with the oligarch Critias, the
bad disciple. 5 This point of view is still not as marked in the Hellenica as it will be later. It is clear, though, that between the virtuous military man
Xenophon and the brilliant adventurer that Alcibiades always remained,
there would not have been much sympathy.
Although, like Alcibiades, Xenophon would be exiled and welcomed
in Sparta, that had not yet happened at the time he began writing the Hel-
lenica . The differences in the manner of their exile and friendship with
Sparta are an indication of their vast differences in temperament.
The reader of Thucydides is surprised that the historian knows so
much; and it is diffi cult not to cite his enlightening and probing analyses.
Reading Xenophon, however, one is surprised by how little he says; his
account is like a bright light shone one moment on a scene before moving
on the next moment, leaving all in darkness. It becomes necessary often to
fi ll in the picture from other sources, often later ones.
This is when Diodorus Siculus emerges, the historian who offers scant
analysis but who has read a great deal and consulted authors no longer
available to us, such as Ephorus. Here, at the end of the work, we fre-
quently fi nd different versions; details will become vague. When we move
from Thucydides to Xenophon, we must proceed with caution, feeling our
way, even regarding factual details.
4. See below, for example, chapter 9.
5. Below, chapter 12.
9
A Triumphal Return
It took him four years to get back. Four years of fi ghting and winning.
The fi rst endeavor, however, barely succeeded. Our bold hero, still
hopeful about his standing with Tissaphernes, decided to go fi nd him,
as an Athenian leader and no longer an exile. He arrived proudly with a
single ship, bearing gifts of hospitality, in the manner of someone ready
to meet an equal. Tissaphernes did not adopt this tone toward him: he
had Alcibiades arrested and imprisoned at Sardis, “saying that the king
ordered him to make war upon the Athenians.” 1 This was not for long: a month later Alcibiades escaped. Of his escape, Plutarch tells us that he
“spread the lie that it was Tissaphernes himself who let him go.” What a
world! Either Alcibiades was once again telling lies to look good, or else
Tissaphernes was playing both sides in order to attempt to reconcile with
Sparta without completely breaking with Athens. Such were the methods.
1. Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.9; Plutarch (27.7) says Tissaphernes thought that would satisfy the complaints of the Lacedaemonians.
142 Chapter
9
They are exactly the unscrupulous methods of the oriental dictators that
shocked the Greek mind. One thing was certain, however. Alcibiades
could no longer claim to be the one who could bring the king’s silver to
Athens thanks to his privileged position with Tissaphernes. This episode
would also delay his return to Athens; he would have to fi nd other argu-
ments, another way to press his case.
He found them in a series of victories, both taking place on the coast of
the Hellespont and in the straits. The victories were not his alone, but he
was on hand and he was the one most often taking the most active role.
We last saw the Peloponnesian and Athenian armies heading up to the
Hellespont, with Alcibiades to join them soon. They are next found camped
on the two banks of the straits of the Hellespont: the Peloponnesians on
the southern side, bordering Phrygia, the Athenians on the north, border-
ing the Chersonese. The fi rst are at Abydos, the second at Sestos.
We cannot go into the details of the military operations. We can, how-
ever, list the principal battles. Thucydides described the fi rst one: the bat-
tle of Cynossema, a victory for the Athenians. Thucydides says that they
would soon get over the feeling of inferiority they had following the disas-
ter in Sicily and various other losses. They took more than twenty enemy
ships, and their hopes were
rising.
Alcibiades had at that time not yet arrived. But he came soon after with
eighteen ships; and he arrived just as an even battle began between the
two fl eets. His intervention changed everything; the Peloponnesians had
to retreat to Abydos. The Athenians took back the ships they had lost at
Cynossema and, Xenophon says, seized thirty of the enemy ships.
Flush with this success—and with a momentary respite—the Athenian
leaders prepared: each of them went off to neighboring cities and islands
in search of money and ships, Alcibiades as well as the others.
There followed another battle, and then another victory, at Cyzicus, on
the southern side of the Propontis. Xenophon says that this victory was
largely the work of Alcibiades. We are told that the Peloponnesian leader
Mindarus and the satrap Pharnabazus were both at Cyzicus. Alcibiades
called the soldiers together and delivered a speech of courage and bold-
ness recognized, in our own day, as Churchillian. He exhorted them to
fi ght on the sea, on the land, and against the walls in front of them: “For
we,” he said, “have no money, but the enemy have an abundance of it
from the king” (1.1.14). The severity of these statements is colored by
A
Triumphal
Return 143
the memory of only a few months earlier when Alcibiades was promising
the Athenians that they would have, thanks to him, all the king’s money.
Alcibiades could always make a case even in failure . . .
Added to that, in the midst of battle, he had the qualities of a good gen-
eral. He was able to maintain absolute secrecy. Then, when the time came,
he attacked one morning despite a torrential downpour, punctuated by
thunder, when there was almost no visibility. No time to go out, let alone
wage battle! But this weather not only failed to stop him, it helped him: he
was able to cut off passage to sixty enemy ships that were maneuvering far
from port. These ships were heading for land. He followed them, ordered
his men to disembark; they fought. The leader of the Peloponnesians was
killed and all their ships either seized or burned. The next day, Alcibiades
invaded the city. He stayed there three weeks and extorted a large pay-
ment. Cyzicus was on the south bank, the bank of the satrap. It was a
The Life of Alcibiades Page 21
