The Life of Alcibiades

by Jacqueline de Romilly

  And his actions during the past few years would have been cause for even

  greater hostility. But timidity was hardly in his nature. It is pleasing to

  imagine the sharp eye of the leader, verifying that his allies were nearby.

  After that, self-confi dent man that he was, he would not have been sur-

  prised by the triumph he had so ardently prepared for and orchestrated.

  If it was necessary to show his fears, his great risk, it was only in order to

  make his success appear all the greater. No one moved. No one protested.

  In spite of everything, his return was an absolute and unqualifi ed triumph.

  The triumph itself was amazing.

  It has impressed thinkers for centuries. Mably, for example, wrote with

  great effect in his Observations sur l’histoire de la Grèce (1766): “The

  people, not knowing whom to trust, fl ew before him and idolized him,

  because they had persecuted him.”

  True, in history there have been other glorious heroes who returned

  victorious. Everyone in France rushed out to see De Gaulle, if only from

  afar. We wept with emotion celebrating on the Champs-Élysées, French

  once again. We would have voted for everything to say thank you to the

  man who, just the day before, had been a rebel. But wait! The hero we

  celebrated had not been condemned by a popular tribunal. He had never

  betrayed his country. He had not gone to seek Hitler’s help in defeating

  France. He had not gone to the United States to urge Americans to join the

  Germans . . . Surely there has never been a more stunning shift in popular

  opinion than was shown in the triumphal return of Alcibiades who, only

  fi ve years earlier, was still fi ghting against Athens. The people must have

  been crazy! Alcibiades must have been a genius!

  It must be added that while Alcibiades was received as a savior, Athens

  was in no way saved. Plutarch presents a whole scenario about the re-

  morse the Athenians must have felt at the time of Alcibiades’s return when

  they thought about all they had suffered as a result of sending him away;

  and they were delighted by all the benefi ts that already he had brought

  to them: “And yet now Alcibiades had taken these wretched, dejected

  remnants and resurrected the city to such an extent that not only had he

  restored its mastery of the seas, but on land he had also enabled it to con-

  quer its enemies all over the world” (32.4).

  This euphoric picture was far from accurate. Alcibiades had brought

  back some victories, on the coast of the Bosphorus, and brought some

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  allies back to Athens’ side. But the war was still going on. The Persians

  were still helping Sparta, and, in the middle of Attica, enemy forces con-

  tinued to occupy Decelea, blockading everything and causing the Athe-

  nians serious economic hardship—yet another humiliation.

  Then Alcibiades had a stroke of audacity and genius that amazes us today.

  To understand the context, remember that the Mysteries of Eleusis are

  celebrated once a year, and that it was the custom for Athenians to go there

  in a ceremonial procession. It took place in September. It was a civic cel-

  ebration, comparable to the Panathenaean or Dionysian festivals. But after

  the occupation of Decelea, the procession could not follow the usual route

  in safety. Eleusis was west of Athens, Decelea was north; but the enemy

  could invade and cut off the route. As a result, participants had been reach-

  ing Eleusis unceremoniously by sea. The new route meant forgoing certain

  rituals; it had been customary to stop en route and make sacrifi ces.

  This affair involved Alcibiades in two ways: his condemnation had

  taken place precisely because he had mocked the mysteries; and the sanc-

  tions against him had been imposed by those who were responsible for pro-

  tecting them. Moreover, the occupation of Decelea was his fault: it was he

  who had advised the Lacedaemonians to take it and everyone knew that.

  Hence the idea for this act embodying all his bravado, his fl air for the

  daring gesture, and above all his acute sense of how to please the crowd.

  It was now May; the mysteries were to be celebrated in the fall. In the

  meantime, he was leading the war effort; he had to act, to fi ght, to win

  victories. No! He waited until September. He wanted to restore the pro-

  cession under his personal protection.

  Plutarch says:

  It therefore struck Alcibiades as a good idea, bearing in mind how it would

  enhance not only his piety in the eyes of the gods, but also his reputation

  among men, to restore the traditional form to the rites, by having his infan-

  try escort and guard the ceremony past the enemy. This, he thought, would

  either thoroughly embarrass and humiliate Agis, if the king chose to do

  nothing, or would enable him to fi ght a sacred battle, with the approval of

  the gods, in a supremely holy and crucial cause, and to do so within sight of

  his native city, with all his fellow citizens there to witness his courage. (34.5)

  Plutarch was a very religious man who lacked the words to express the

  emotion and admiration this effort inspired. The Athenians themselves

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  were moved. Alcibiades had gone from desecrater to the most honored

  at the ceremonies. He who had been so loudly condemned for playing

  the hierophant was now the one who received the titles and highest hon-

  ors at the celebration of the mysteries: he was named mystagogue and

  hierophant.

  Meanwhile, the enemy never budged. People were afraid of him: he

  was invincible.

  The success went almost too far: amidst all the joy and hopes that his

  return had aroused, some of the old political quarrels were beginning to

  appear: everyone wanted to talk to him, to use him. Diodorus tells us how

  the poor saw in him “their best friend and the man most capable of re-

  lieving their misery with a political revolution.” 17 Plutarch even says that the men of the people would have proposed that he become tyrant “as a

  way of reaching a place where the envy of others could have no effect on

  him, where he could do away with decrees and laws and the idle chatter-

  ers who were ruining the city, and so act and administer the city’s affairs

  without fear of the informers.” Strange fate for a man who, only a few

  years earlier, had been attacked and exiled because he was suspected of

  aspiring to tyranny, to hear it suggested that he should now agree to it. In

  the enthusiasm of the moment, he might have done so. But he did not. The

  months that followed show that he governed as the ruler, but according to

  the rules of the democracy. 18

  Actually, all these different ideas were an indication of trouble in the

  political life of Athens: they show that political quarrels and passions were

  simmering beneath the appearance of a newfound unanimity.

  But for the moment, these efforts were just fl atteries; the ideas and

  suggestions were a testament to the huge success Alcibiades had made of

  his return. The hopes of everyone were on him: they saw only him, they

  depended on him alone. He was the man of destiny,


  It can be risky to inherit such a role. History, even recent history, has seen

  a man of destiny end up in a withdrawal tainted with bitterness. It has also

  17. Diodorus 13.68.

  18. Taken from texts of decrees found in stone. These are offi cial decrees, in which we see him proposing measures of tolerance toward those cities and peoples who return to the Athenian side (J. Hatzfeld cites IG I2 116 and 117).

  A

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  happened that unexpected returns that began with fanfare were cut short:

  the return from the island of Elba lasted one hundred days.

  Alcibiades had everyone on his side: the people, religion and those who

  were connected to it, and patriots who were expecting victory. He was like

  a god, adored by all.

  But he needed victories—at any cost and quickly. Triumphs follow vic-

  tories; they also require them.

  10

  Slightly More Than

  One Hundred Days

  He needed victories; but these would not be easily won.

  There were, in particular, two new circumstances to be considered, and

  both were unfavorable.

  The fi rst was the presence of a new and remarkably able leader on the

  Lacedaemonian side, Lysander—the same one who had fi nally secured the

  Spartan victory and stopped Athens, an individual so signifi cant that Plu-

  tarch ranked him among his great men and wrote a biography about him.

  Of all the different kings or leaders of the army that Sparta had during the

  war, he is the only one for whom this is true. He is ranked with the Roman

  Sulla. He was ambitious, authoritarian, and uncompromised. These two

  equally competent and powerful men, Lysander and Alcibiades, resembled

  each other in seeming to take up all the room. It was said of Lysander

  that Greece could not support two like him. The same had been said of

  Alcibiades. And Plutarch takes pains to distinguish between the harshness

  of Lysander and the arrogance of Alcibiades. 1 The fact is that these two 1. Plutarch, Lysander 19.5–6.

  Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 155

  were worthy adversaries. One modern historian has written: “Lysander,

  the Alcibiades of the Eurotas.” 2

  This is when they come face to face. Alcibiades returns to Athens in

  407. In the spring of that year, Lysander is sent to lead the enemy fl eet.

  It is a critical moment; he must stop the fl eet commanded by Alcibiades.

  Lysander, moreover, had money. The other new development was that

  Persia decided to support Sparta. All the procrastination and scheming of

  the satraps had ended: the king of Persia sent his own son, Cyrus (who is

  not to be confused with the great Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Em-

  pire and the hero of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia ). 3 His mission was clear: he carried a letter from the king, the text of which is preserved in Xenophon,

  naming him caranus , or absolute leader of all the forces of Asia Minor.

  His fi rst move was to have Pharnabazus detain an Athenian ambassa-

  dor; he had left before Alcibiades’s return to Athens and did not return

  for three years. 4 This fi rst move by Cyrus was one sign; the second was more serious. Lysander had scarcely assumed command when he sought

  out Cyrus and obtained from him very generous promises of support for

  the Peloponnesian soldiers. Cyrus responded that not only were these the

  instructions from his father, but that he himself, far from being of a dif-

  ferent opinion, would do everything he could. He had come with fi ve

  hundred talents, and if that did not suffi ce, he would use his own fortune,

  beyond what his father had given him; “and if this too should prove in-

  adequate, he would go so far as to break up the throne whereon he sat,

  which was of silver and gold.” 5 This sounds very much like the promises that Tissaphernes had made, according to what Alcibiades told the Athenians on Samos; 6 but this time the words were coming from Cyrus, and the promises would be kept. In addition, the money was going to Sparta

  and not Athens.

  Lysander was in the same position with Cyrus that Alcibiades had been

  in with Tissaphernes: he fl attered him, he charmed him. Plutarch writes, in

  the Life of Lysander, that by criticizing Tissaphernes, and by other means,

  2. G. Glotz, Histoire grecque, 2nd ed., 3:113–14.

  3. This is the Cyrus we meet in Xenophon’s Anabasis, in events somewhat later.

  4. Xenophon 1.4.3–7.

  5. Xenophon 1.5.3.

  6. See above, chapter 8.

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  “Lysander made himself agreeable, and by the submissive deference of his

  conversation, above all else, he won the heart of the young prince, and

  roused him to prosecute the war with vigor.” 7

  It was just like Alcibiades’s seduction of Tissaphernes. Even the role of

  the garden was repeated! Xenophon, in Oeconomicus , describes how the

  king brought Lysander into his garden at Sardis. And Lysander gushed

  with admiration: “Cyrus, I really do admire all these lovely things, but

  I am far more impressed with your agent’s skill.” His words delighted

  Cyrus, who replied: “Well, Lysander, the whole of the measurement and

  arrangement is my own work, and I did some of the planting myself.” 8

  Lysander was duly impressed by this. He quickly concluded that the king

  owed his happiness to his virtue! This edifying exchange apparently took

  place later. But it reveals the tone and underlines in a striking way the

  historical repetitions and reversals.

  Nevertheless, while he waited, Lysander had his feet on the ground.

  He asked the young king for increased pay for his soldiers: he asked for

  one Attic drachma per man, which was double the Athenian salary. Cyrus

  answered that the norm was half a drachma. Lysander was quiet; then,

  needing to respond, he asked for one obol more 9 and got it. This amount was still greater than the Athenian rate: four obols to three. And Cyrus

  paid one month in advance.

  This agreement was disastrous for Athens, which sent an embassy via

  Tissaphernes. This embassy, despite the support that Tissaphernes had ap-

  parently promised, was not even received.

  A leader, and money: that changed everything, and did not make Al-

  cibiades’s task any easier.

  These circumstances forced him to take a variety of steps that were not

  in his nature but that became necessary, such as pillaging and requisitions.

  At this point we are told that he had to leave for Caria “to levy money.”

  Another source says he “sailed off to get money.” 10

  One incident illustrating his action was the attack against the city of

  Cyme, despite its being an Athenian ally. His demands there enraged the

  7. Plutarch, Lysander 4.3.

  8. Xenophon, Oeconomicus 4.21–25.

  9. One drachma equals six obols.

  10. Plutarch 35.4.

  Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 157

  inhabitants and unsettled his troops a bit. 11 Incidents like these were held against him; they represent legitimate complaints, and they would be exploited and used against him when the situation grew worse.

  In addition, his troops, poorly paid, grew more and more undisci-

  plined, the political upheavals having helped reduce the authority of their

  leaders. Alcibiades
hardly had the time to change this.

  However, he had to act. As usual, he was ready.

  Having just returned from winning victories in the Hellespont, he

  chose now to attack in Ionia. He left Athens in October 407, with three

  hundred ships. Plutarch says that the most powerful citizens, worried once

  again about him, made every effort “to hurry him off on his expedition as

  quickly as possible” (35.1). The point of this is important, a reminder that

  the slightest failure risked reviving old animosities.

  From the beginning, things did not go well. On the way to Ionia he

  stopped at Andros, which had defected from Athens and was being held by

  a very small occupying force. He disembarked and won a victory, but he did

  not take the town. He left twenty ships behind to continue the operation; he

  had not fully succeeded. Moreover, he had reduced the size of his own fl eet.

  Sailing on, he arrived at Samos, the large and secure Athenian base.

  He was joined there by his colleague Thrasybulus on his way back from

  Thrace, where he had won victories. Both had to act, and quickly.

  The Peloponnesian fl eet was just across from Samos, at Ephesus: it was

  being repaired thanks to the generosity of Cyrus. Would Alcibiades attack?

  He went by, with most of the fl eet, to Notium, on the continent, a little

  north of Ephesus. 12 From there he could watch the Peloponnesian fl eet.

  And it would be easy for Thrasybulus, who had gone north to attack Pho-

  caea, to get to Notium. Alcibiades could safely join him in Phocaea. Every-

  thing seemed well planned. Alcibiades would not be going farther; he left

  his ships at Notium and put the fl eet under the command of someone else.

  At this point something paradoxical, almost unbelievable, happened:

  Alcibiades was not there, but he had given orders to avoid engaging the

  11. The episode is squeezed into the account of Diodorus, who we know follows Epho-

  rus, who was himself originally from Cyme. See also Cornelius Nepos 7.1–2. Regarding the sequence of Alcibiades’s travels, the sources disagree.

  12. Diodorus 13.71.

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  10

  enemy. Despite this, there was a battle, a defeat. It was a defeat that would

  lead to his downfall once and for all.

  Of course it was partly his own fault. As commander of the fl eet he

  was authorized to designate a replacement. But he had made a choice that