Animals and Women Feminist The

by Carol J Adams

  Although holy hunters are more likely to call the ethic of the holy hunt “ bio centric, ” it seems more accurate to describe this code of ethics as necro centric. It is death, not life, that is seen to connect the hunter with other living beings. And it is death, not life, that elicits feelings of reverence and respect.

  Many feminists have emphasized the importance of the act of attention in helping to determine proper ethical conduct and thought. 38 According to Iris Murdoch:

  If we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on and how imperceptibly it builds up values round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. (37)

  Morality, for Murdoch, is far from the rational control of an inherently aggressive will. When one directs a “ patient, loving regard ” upon a “ person, a thing, a situation, ” according to Murdoch, the will is presented not as “ unimpeded movement, ” but rather as “ something very much more like obedience ” (40).

  According to Josephine Donovan, “ women ’ s relational culture of caring and attentive love ” provides the basis for a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals (375). This caring, attentive love does not command us not to kill animals; rather, as Donovan argues, “ We should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals because they do not want to be so treated, and we know that. If we listen, we can hear them ” (375).

  Although the holy hunters would claim that their act of attention is, in fact, an expression of an attentive, caring love, the meditative state that they describe is so diffuse as to be incapable of making crucial distinctions in the real world. The world of the holy hunters blurs over glaring differences. Theirs is a world in which death is equated with life, eating an animal is an “ act of love, ” and taking an animal ’ s life is a “ gift. ” Thus Richard Nelson claims that “ there is very little difference between moments when I only watch an animal and moments when I am hunting — they are part of the same thing, in the sense of a complete focus of mind ” (Exploring the Near, 37). Similarly, Paul Shepard argues that he sees no difference between eating a vegetable and eating an animal. If these writers were truly attending to nature, however, they would discover that there is, indeed, an enormous difference between these activities. It is the difference of a sentient life.

  This inability to attend to the actual experience of individual animals is characteristic of all three categories of hunters, as well as the environmental movement and environmental philosophy as a whole. All three categories of hunters employ ethical discourse as a means of shielding the hunter from the actual experience of the animal he kills, and as a means of renouncing personal responsibility. 39 The focus of the hunter is on his own interior mental state. As long as his mental attitude is said to conform to a particular ethical code, his violent behavior is thought to be legitimized. The emphasis on the instinctual (sexual) nature of hunting functions to further remove the hunters ’ conduct from ethical reproach, since hunting is seen as a natural and elementary drive. 40 The ethical discourse thus functions as a “ decoy, ” focusing attention not on the state of the animal who is about to be killed, but rather on the hunter. What the holist and holy hunters see as a “ reciprocal ” activity is, in reality, a unidirectional morality in which the hunter formulates and follows his own moral directives. For all three hunters, the animal is reduced to an object, a symbol against which the hunter seeks to establish his masculine selfhood and moral worth.

  Thus, despite the genuine variations in the conduct and discourse of the three categories of hunters, in the end, the differences among the three are less significant than the common ground that they share. All three partake of the quest to establish masculine identity in opposition to the natural world.

  Conclusion

  Ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood (1991, 1993) has criticized deep ecologists for advocating an expanded sense of identification that is too large and abstract to accommodate the more contextual ties of kinship connection as well as the relevant differences among living beings. Holy hunters represent a good example of the dangers that this form of identification entails. Although holy hunters claim to identify with the animal they kill, this identification is so abstract as to be meaningless. Although all three categories of hunters emphasize the keen sense of alertness and attention that characterizes the state of mind of the hunter, it is clear that the hunter is not alert enough to notice the true state of the animal he is about to kill. As Roger King has argued, “ hunters are not truly alert to animals. They do not see the animal in their immediate context, but rather as abstracted from her or his relation to others ” (83). If holy hunters were truly attending to nature, it would not be possible to rationalize the death of an animal as freely “ given ” out of “ compassion ” for the hunter. They would see in the hunted animal ’ s eyes not “ compassion ” for the hunter, but rather terror and fright. They would see, in short, that nonhuman animals value their lives no less than do the holy hunters themselves.

  We live in a violent culture. If we are to change this state of affairs, we must begin to name the violence that exists as well as identify its psychological roots. It is necessary to recognize that the perpetrators of violence throughout the world are, by and large, men, and the victims of this violence are primarily women and the natural world. Language often obscures this reality. Crimes against women are classed as “ homicides, ” and crimes against nature have no name at all. A first step in bringing the reality of gender-specific violence to the fore would, therefore, be to name these forms of violence. Violence against women should be named not homicide, but femicide, and violence against nature should have its own name, perhaps biocide. Both expressions of violence, however, must be recognized as products of a single frame of mind, namely, the masculinist mind which sees women and nature as objects to be manipulated, managed, and controlled in an attempt to establish masculine self-identity and worth. The happy, holist, and holy hunters are multiple expressions of the same theme, a trinitarian manifestation of the single “ God ” : the masculine self.

  Ecofeminism is still in the process of forging connections between feminism and the environmental movement. If ecofeminism is to rise to the challenge of its potential, it must begin to move beyond abstract statements concerning ethical conduct and thought. We have seen that it is not sufficient to rely on abstract language such as “ holism, ” “ biocentrism, ” or even “ reverence ” and “ respect. ” We must begin to say what we mean by these words. When we speak of reverence and respect, we must ask “ what precisely do we mean? ” An emphasis on a spiritual sense of connection is, indeed, a praiseworthy goal. But a spiritual sense of connection must translate into genuine caring behavior for other living beings. Caring for other living beings cannot be conducted in the privacy of one ’ s interior psychic state. It must take into account a genuine recognition of the response of the one we are caring for. 41 Saying a prayer before you kill an animal is no more acceptable than saying a prayer before a rape. It is our actions, more than our state of mind, that are crucial in the realm of ethical conduct. If these actions flow only from a mentally constructed desire, they cannot take into account the needs of all parties in question. Moral actions must flow not only from the capacity to perceive our interconnection with others, but also from our ability to acknowledge — to morally attend to — the plight of other living beings as separate and distinct from our own needs and desires.

  Environmental philosophy and the environmental movement as a whole have failed to incorporate a genuine concern for individual beings. Currently, no major environmental organization is willing to express opposition to hunting, and none takes a position on eating meat. 42 But until the environmental movement and environmental philosophy develop a concern for individual beings, they will be living in the shadow of their violent past. Hunters currently kill more than 200 million animals every year. They cripple, harass, and orphan millions more. An ecofeminist ethic must depl
ore this, along with all other expressions of violence. It must seek to sever the connections that historically have bound the environmental movement to a practice of violence. An ecofeminist ethic must help us to realize that, since we do not need to hunt or eat meat for survival, we should do neither. Rather, we should all engage in a genuine celebration which recognizes that the best gift that we can offer to and receive from animals is their continued lives.

  * * *

  8. The glorification of a return to the "primitive" first emerged as a common theme in the nineteenth century in the wake of Darwinian science. Men expressed a concern that they had become overly civilized and had lost contact with their "animal instincts" and "primitive needs." Citing the scientific evidence for humanity ’ s animal nature, men increasingly spoke of their need to express their animal instincts and animal energy. Interestingly, according to Anthony Rotundo, the call for a "return to the primitive" was not directed at (or advocated by) women, whose only "primitive instinct" continued to be viewed as their maternal drive (see 227 – 32). At heart, the glorification of these animal instincts entailed a glorification of the male sexual drive. For further elaboration of the nineteenth-century glorification of the primitive, and its connection to male sexuality, see Anthony Rotundo.

  9. Due to the careless use of the word "man," it is difficult to determine whether many of these writers intended to include women in the notion of "human being."

  10. The characterization of hunting as an instinctive activity comparable to the sexual drive is found not only among hunters but among a wide variety of academic writers as well. See, for example, Washburn and Lancaster, Menninger, Ardrey, and Tiger and Fox. More recently, see the philosophers Holmes Rolston and Ann Causey.

  11. Without speculating as to its basis in biology or socialization, one can acknowledge that emphasis on the importance of orgasm as the ultimate goal in sex is particularly characteristic of men. Evidence for this belief is cited in The Hite Report on Male Sexuality . Based on a survey of 7,000 men from throughout the United States, Hite found that "Most men who responded felt that male orgasm is the point of sex and intercourse" (468).

  12. The idea is not that every hunt must end in the kill, nor every sexual act end in orgasm (see, for example, Randall Eaton, Zen and the Art , 48). Many hunters, in fact, appear to experience great exuberance on an occasion when they choose not to kill an animal. Nonetheless, the pursuit of the animal, like the pursuit of orgasm, always remains the original intent.

  13. Lest there be any question as to why I was enrolled in a hunter safety training class, let me explain that in 1989 a lottery had been declared in California, the winners of which would be given the "privilege" of killing some of the remaining mountain lions. At the time, a number of animal liberation activists, including myself, entered the lottery in order to qualify for the privilege of not using our winning number to kill. To do this, it was necessary to obtain a hunting license, and in order to obtain a license, we were required to take a class in hunter safety training.

  14. Although Christians for many centuries have supported wars and condoned the hunting and torture of animals, there has also been an ascetic tradition within Christianity that has maintained that these activities are inappropriate for holy men. It is interesting to note that countless stories proliferated throughout the middle ages of heroic saints who intercepted the arrows of hunters before they "penetrated" the animal ’ s flesh. On a symbolic level, the saints appear to be engaging in a form of "coitus interruptus," shielding the animal from the arrows of death. According to Keith Thomas, "The medieval church had deemed [hunting] a carnal diversion, unsuitable for clergymen, and had (rather ineffectually) forbidden it to those in holy orders" (160). As with sexuality, the Church ’ s prohibition was not intended to imply that hunting was at all times a moral evil. Just as sex was considered tolerable for those not in holy orders (as long as little or no pleasure was derived from the act), so too, hunting was considered acceptable for the laity, as long as it was undertaken for utilitarian purposes (i.e., procuring meat or killing "pests"). The intent was to prohibit all carnal sources of pleasure, whether they were derived from violence or from sex. (For a critique of the Church ’ s denigration of both women and sexual pleasure, see Uta Ranke-Heinemann.)

  Notes

  I would like to thank Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan, Clare Fischer, Greta Gaard, Dena Jones Jolma, Suzanne Kappeler, Ann Kheel, Martha Ellen Stortz, and especially Linda Vance for valuable criticisms and suggestions. Previous versions of this article were presented at the conference on Violence and Human Coexistence, Montreal, 13 – 17 July 1992; the Pacific meeting of the Society for Women in Philosophy, Sonoma State College, Rohnert Park, California, 9 November 1992; the Western Chapter Conference of the American Academy of Religion, California State University, Fullerton, 18 – 20 March 1993; the conference on Social Perspectives on Women and Ecology, sponsored by the Institute for Social Ecology, Plainfield, Vermont, 29 July – 3 August 1994; and the Ninth Annual International Compassionate Living Festival, coordinated by the Culture and Animals Foundation, Raleigh, North Carolina, 30 September – 2 October 1994.

  1. I am employing the term "environmental philosophy" in a somewhat loose sense, so as to include a large body of nature writers who have engaged in philosophical speculation. Historically many nature writers have sought to generalize from their personal experiences in nature, so it is often difficult to distinguish their writings from more formalistic expressions of philosophy. Many of the writers I examine in this essay fall into this hybrid category, being both nature writer and philosopher.

  2. Although ecofeminists are among those who have demonstrated an interest in native cultures, most do not appear to be endorsing hunting as an exemplary practice for our modern culture. In addition, most are not hunters themselves, as are many of the advocates of the "exemplary hunt." See, for example, Merchant; on a related theme, see Warren ’ s use of an example of animal sacrifice from a native culture as an illustration of a purportedly sound environmental consciousness (1990).

  3. It could be argued, for example, that the hostile and the hired hunters saw the eradication of predators as part of an ethical quest to "civilize" the land. This pioneer ethos valued "brute," unrestrained physical valor vis- à -vis the animal world. As Catherine Albanese writes of the legendary Davy Crockett, he "could outsavage any savage in hunt or fight. Indeed . . . he and his foes still acted like animals as they fought" (74). Coming before the era of "bag limits," Davy Crockett could also boast that he had killed 105 bears in the space of one year. The heroic ethic of these early pioneers, however, clearly differs from the ethic of the hunters in this study, both in its lack of the notion of self-restraint and in its lack of any connection to environmental thought.

  4. This is not to say that factors comparable to the ones to be examined here were not also operative in native hunting practices. For example, it appears that the activity of hunting in native cultures also typically is tied to notions of masculine self-identity. Richard Nelson contends that multiple motivations seem to be operative in the hunting practices of the cultures he studied. In his words, "The Eskimo and Athabaskan Indians experience great pleasure and something akin to adventure — if not adventure itself — as an integral element of hunting. While a prime motive is to provide food, it ’ s extremely difficult to sort out and rank the motivations in something so emotionally bound as hunting" (quoted in Paul, 176). Interestingly, Nelson goes on to make an analogy with the sexual drive, which he claims is motivated both by the urge to reproduce as well as the desire for pleasure. Although it would be interesting to undertake a study of the ways in which native hunting practices conformed to or differed from the typology under investigation, this is not within the scope of the present study.

  5. Portions of my analysis of hunting in this article are drawn from my "Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology." For other feminist critiques of hunting, see Abbot, Adams, Clifton, Collard, and Holliday.

  6. A
ccording to a national survey published by the U.S. Department of Interior, in 1991 only 1 percent of females in the U.S. population of those sixteen years and older "enjoyed hunting." Of the 14.1 million people who hunted in 1991, 92 percent (13 million) were men and 8 percent (1.1 million) were women (36).

  7. A related question that is raised but not developed here is whether all traditional (Western) ethical discourse is premised upon male psychosexual development.

  15. According to historian Thomas Macaulay, the Puritans ’ concern was directed not at the pain inflicted upon the animal, but rather at the pleasure experienced by the participants in such violent sports (quoted in Thomas, p. 157). Keith Thomas suggests that part of the reason for the aversion to blood sports appears to have derived from the belief that by experiencing pleasure through the infliction of violence, one reduced oneself to the level of "beasts." The Puritans believed that the violence found in the natural world was a result of the Fall and was evidence of "Man ’ s" sin, and thus should be viewed not as a source of enjoyment, but rather as something to mourn (Thomas, 157).

  28. For a speculative discussion of the origins of myth and religion as responses to feelings of guilt experienced by hunters, see Abbot.

  29. The practice of invoking the myths and cultural practices of native cultures to give moral support to practices within our current culture is an increasingly common phenomenon. Thus, many people cite the example of native cultures to defend their habit of meat-eating. The act of wrenching a narrative out of the context of one culture and grafting it onto another is not only disrespectful and self-serving, it is an act of violence in its own right. On the subject of "truncated narratives," see my "From Heroic to Holistic Ethics." For a discussion of appropriate criteria for evaluating the development and use of narrative, see Linda Vance, "Beyond Just-So Stories," in this volume.