Pentagon Papers

by Neil Sheehan

  1. Major air deployment to the area.

  2. Furnishing U.S. air cover for GVN MAROPS.

  ((2)) 3. ((Be required to resume)) Resuming destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. If attacked, these would be an alternative basis for reprisals, and should be considered primarily in this light.

  ((5)) 4. ((Be prepared to evacuate)) Evacuation of U.S. dependents.

  ((3)) 5. U.S. low-level reconnaissance into the DRV.

  ((4)) 6. GVN/((LAO/))U.S. air strikes across the border ((s)), initially against the infiltration routes and installations and then against other targets south of the 19th parallel. NOTE

  The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend immediate initiation of sharply intensified military pressures against the DRV, starting with a sharp and early attack in force on the DRV, subsequent to brief operations in Laos and U.S. low-level reconnaissance north of the boundary to divert DRV attention prior to the attack in force. This program would be designed to destroy in the first three days Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, other airfields, and major POL facilities, clearly to establish the fact that the U.S. intends to use military force to the full limits of what military force can contribute to achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia, and to afford the GVN respite by curtailing DRV assistance to and direction of the Viet Cong. The follow-on-military program—involving armed reconnaissance of infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes on infiltration targets in the DRV, and then progressive strikes throughout North Vietnam—could be suspended short of full destruction of the DRV if our objectives were earlier achieved. The military program would be conducted rather swiftly, but the tempo could be adjusted as needed to contribute to achieving our objectives.

  # 89

  Account of Taylor’s Meeting with Saigon Generals on Unrest

  Excerpts from Saigon airgram to the State Department, Dec. 24, 1964, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. Ambassador Taylor and his deputy, U. Alexis Johnson, met with the so-called Young Turk leaders, among them Generals Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Chanh Thi and an Admiral identified as Cang.

  . . . AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland’s dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn’t understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for this group? Do you have a spokesman?

  GENERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak English. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night.

  We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity. . . . But still there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence.

  Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he had received from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Prime Minister to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council unanimously recommended be retired in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces.

  GENERAL THIEU: The HNC cannot be bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.

  GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. It does not want to fight the Communists.

  It has been rumored that our action of last night was an intrigue of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we seek to retire these generals? Because they had their chance and did badly. . . .

  Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the HNC, bad politicians, bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We must put the trouble-making organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay in office.

  After we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference, we would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable government. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed.

  We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian government clean house. If we have achieved it, fine. We are now ready to go back to our units.

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But first, would any of the other officers wish to speak?

  ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country.

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a military coup that has destroyed the government-making process that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.

  You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power. You are up to your neck in politics.

  Your statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee. The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but this recognition is something that you could withdraw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to power. . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces? General Khanh?

  GENERAL KY: Yes, sir . . .

  GENERAL THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should be noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been impressed by the high quality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was being formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for some of them now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so? . . .

  GENERAL KY: Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the military going back into the government right away. People will say it is a military coup.

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: (together) People will say it anyway . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with National Assembly . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC . . .

  GENERAL THIEU: What kind of concession does Huong want from us?

  Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.

  GENERAL KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk.

  GENERAL THIEU: After al
l, we did not arrest all the members of the HNC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled residence . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the government will have to issue a communique.

  GENERAL THIEU: We will still have a press conference this afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did.

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the U.S. side. I don’t know whether we will continue to support you after this. Why don’t you tell your friends before you act? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake . . .

  AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn’t this have been put off a day or two? . . .

  In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess.

  Chapter 7

  The Launching of the Ground War:

  March-July, 1965

  Highlights of the Period: March-July, 1965

  Within a month of the start of Operation Rolling Thunder, the Pentagon study says, the Johnson Administration had made the first of the decisions that were to lead, in the next months, to American assumption of the major burden of the ground war in South Vietnam.

  Here, in chronological order, are highlights of these months:

  MARCH 1965

  The first “Rolling Thunder” air strike hit an ammunition depot and a naval base. Two Marine batallions were deployed in Vietnam.

  APRIL 1965

  The President approved an 18,000-20,000-man increase in “military support forces” and “a change of mission” for the marines “to permit their more active use . . .” Memo noted his desire for “all possible precautions” against “premature publicity” and to “minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy.”

  John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, urged that the 173rd Airborne Brigade also be deployed.

  Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor called this “hasty and ill-conceived.”

  The conferees at a Honolulu strategy meeting agreed to urge an increase in U.S. troops to 82,000.

  George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, proposed that the U.S. “cut its losses” and withdraw instead, the study says.

  MAY 1965

  The Vietcong “summer offensive” began, the analyst says. There were about 200 Marine casualties during April and May.

  JUNE 1965

  Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander in Vietnam, said the U.S. must “reinforce our efforts . . . as rapidly as practical.” He asked for a total of 44 battalions.

  The State Department announced that U.S. troops were “available for combat support.”

  The first major ground action by U.S. forces took place northwest of Saigon.

  Gen. Westmoreland, in reply to the Joint Chiefs, made a “big pitch . . . for a free hand to maneuver the troops around . . .” the analyst says.

  Ambassador Taylor “confirms the seriousness of the military situation” and the “very tenuous hold” of the new government, the study goes on.

  General Westmoreland was given the authority to use U.S. forces in battle when necessary “to strengthen” South Vietnamese forces.

  Mr. Ball, the analyst writes, opposed the increase in ground troops, saying it gave “absolutely no assurance” of success and risked a “costly and indeterminate struggle.” He urged a “base defense and reserve” strategy “while the stage was being set for withdrawal.”

  William P. Bundy, the history says, urged the President to avoid the “ultimate aspects” of both the Ball and Westmoreland proposals. He said that U.S. troops should be limited to a supporting, “reserve reaction” role.

  JULY 1965

  The President initially approved the deployment of 34 battalions, about 100,000 men; 44 battalions were finally agreed to, for a total of 193,887 troops.

  The history says this decision was “perceived as a threshhold—entrance in Asian land war . . .”

  By the end of the year, the history notes, U.S. forces in South Vietnam totaled 184,314.

  Chapter 7

  The Launching of the Ground War: March–July, 1965

  —BY NEIL SHEEHAN

  President Johnson decided on April 1, 1965, to use American ground troops for offensive action in South Vietnam because the Administration had discovered that its long-planned bombing of North Vietnam—which had just begun—was not going to stave off collapse in the South, the Pentagon’s study of the Vietnam war discloses. He ordered that the decision be kept secret.

  “The fact that this departure from a long-held policy had momentous implications was well recognized by the Administration leadership,” the Pentagon analyst writes, alluding to the policy axiom since the Korean conflict that another land war in Asia should be avoided.

  Although the President’s decision was a “pivotal” change, the study declares, “Mr. Johnson was greatly concerned that the step be given as little prominence as possible.”

  The decision was embodied in National Security Action Memorandum 328, on April 6, which included the following paragraphs:

  “5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

  “6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

  “7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.”

  The paragraph stating the President’s concern about publicity gave stringent orders in writing to members of the National Security Council:

  “11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President’s desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.” [See Document #98.]

  The period of increasing ground-combat involvement is shown in the Pentagon papers to be the third major phase of President Johnson’s commitment to South Vietnam. This period forms another section of the presentation of those papers by The New York Times.

  In the spring of 1965, the study discloses, the Johnson Administration pinned its hopes on air assaults against the North to break the enemy’s will and persuade Hanoi to stop the Vietcong insurgency in the South. The air assaults began on a sustained basis on March 2.

  “Once set in motion, however, the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi’s backbone, as well as the willingness of Hanoi’s allies, particularly the Soviet Union, to work toward compromise,” the study continues.

  “Official hopes were high that the Rolling Thunder program would rapidly convince Hanoi that it should agree to negotiate a settlement to the war in the South. After a month of bombing with no response from the North Vietnamese, optimism began to wane,” the study remarks.

  “The U.S. was presented essentially with two options: (1) to withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves, or (2) to commit ground forces in pursuit of its objectives. A third option, that of drastically increasing the scope and scale of the bombing, was rejected because of the concomitant high risk of inviting Chinese intervention.”

  And so within a month, the account continues, with the Administration recognizing that the bombing would not wor
k quickly enough, the crucial decision was made to put the two Marine battalions already in South Vietnam on the offensive. The 3,500 marines had landed at Danang on March 8—bringing the total United States force in South Vietnam to 27,000—with their mission restricted to the static defense of the Danang airfield.

  As a result of the President’s wish to keep the shift of mission from defense to offense imperceptible to the public, the April 1 decision received no publicity “until it crept out almost by accident in a State Department release on 8 June,” in the words of the Pentagon study.

  The day before, the hastily improvised static security and enclave strategies of the spring were overtaken by a request from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Saigon, for nearly 200,000 troops. He wanted these forces, the Pentagon study relates, to hold off defeat long enough to make possible a further build-up of American troops.

  “Swiftly and in an atmosphere of crisis,” the study says, President Johnson gave his approval to General Westmoreland’s request a little more than a month later, in mid-July. And once again, the study adds Mr. Johnson concealed his decision.

  New Warnings of Failure

  Before the opening of the air war in the spring warnings were sounded high in the Administration that it would not succeed. Now there were warnings that a ground war in the South might prove fruitless. The warnings came not only from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, long known as a dissenter on Vietnam, but also from John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, who felt the actions planned were not strong enough.

  On April 2 Mr. McCone circulated a memorandum within the National Security Council asserting that unless the United States was willing to bomb the North “with minimum restraint” to break Hanoi’s will, it was unwise to commit ground troops to battle.

  “In effect,” he said, “we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting ourselves.” [See Document #97.]