The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism

by Ami Pedahzur

  In 1945, the Shai special forces broadened their range of activities. The organization began to gather intelligence from “open” (unrestricted) sources. At the top of its list were the media. It began conducting basic research on demographic and economic trends as well as the customs and conventions of the Palestinian populace. Equal importance was devoted to laying down the infrastructure for the development of signal intelligence (SIGINT) departments. Although Shai activities were still relatively limited, its technical department and the Haganah signal services engaged in the wiretapping of British and Palestinian communication networks. With the assistance of cryptographic experts, they intercepted British Army communications and decrypted its codes.6

  THE UN PARTITION RESOLUTION

  On November 30, 1947, one day after the United Nations General Assembly voted to approve the partition of Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs, three Palestinians ambushed a Jewish bus traveling from Netanya to Jerusalem. When the bus passed by the airport near Lod, it came under a hail of bullets, and five passengers were killed. During the following weeks, the attacks spread to Jewish neighborhoods in mixed towns and cities such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. The most notable attack in the port city of Haifa took place on December 30, 1947, when thirty-nine Jewish laborers were massacred at the city’s oil refineries. In Jerusalem the most prominent attack occurred four and a half months later, on April 13, 1948, when a medical convoy consisting of a military armored truck, ambulances, and several cars was attacked on its way to Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. As the convoy drove near the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, militants lying in ambush detonated electric mines that had been planted on the road. Some of the cars flipped over from the explosions, and immediately after, shots were fired and grenades were thrown at the convoy. Seven hours after the battle initially broke out, the gunfire finally ceased. Seventy-eight of the convoy passengers, including doctors, nurses, and employees of the Hebrew University were killed, many of them burned alive inside the cars.7

  These larger-scale operations demonstrated to the Shai that while the Yishuv was improving its intelligence and operational faculties, the military capabilities of the Palestinians had also advanced dramatically. Even though local cells executed many of the attacks, once again there was evidence of an external guiding hand. This was in effect the Supreme Arab Committee, which was reorganizing under the leadership of the mufti who had returned from exile. The Supreme Committee opposed the UN decision on the partition and sought to undermine it by activating militias composed of local paramilitary units and led by the mufti’s cousin, Abdel-Kader al-Husseini. Another important organization was the Arab Salvation Army, which numbered more than three thousand volunteers from various Arab countries who were deployed to Palestine under the leadership of Fawzi Al-Qawuqji, a Lebanese-born Arab nationalist who had received his military training at the Military College in Istanbul. He participated in the Syrian rebellion against the French in 1932 and in 1948 was appointed commander of the Arab Salvation Army. The army was established by the Arab League in order to seize control of Palestine after the withdrawal of the British and thus prevent the Jews or the Supreme Arab Committee from taking command of the area.8

  Despite severe attacks, the Yishuv intelligence units were much more prepared than they had been a decade earlier. Informant networks recruited by Shai from the various echelons of Palestinian society provided the intelligence agency with vital strategic information. For example, Shai recruited one of the senior clerks from the Supreme Arab Committee, who, when learning of the military actions planned by the committee in response to the UN partition decision, passed them on to his operators. In another example, a Shai agent relayed information about Arabs in Tsefat who were planning to dig a tunnel into the Jewish market center. This information was one of the leading factors in the state leadership’s decision to conquer the city. The Shai technical department exhibited impressive capabilities in intercepting transmissions between Palestinian forces and those of other Arab countries, as well as among the different arms of the Palestinians forces inside Palestine. Members of the unit discovered that Husseini’s people were using a telephone cable from Palestine to Cairo that was laid near the fields of the Jewish agriculture school Mikveh Israel. In a secret operation, they connected eavesdropping devices to the cable, enabling Shai to listen in on the talks between Husseini’s commanders and the Egyptian military command. In another case, Shai officer Tuvia Lishansky attached an eavesdropping device to the telephone cable that ran between Al-Qawuqji’s headquarters in Jaba village and his forces in northern Palestine. With this device, they discovered that an attack was planned for February 1948 on Kibbutz Tirat-Zvi. This information helped the Haganah repel the Palestinian attack.

  Senior Shai officials who received information on the tension between the Supreme Arab Committee and the Salvation Army also engaged in attempts to divide and conquer. They negotiated with the heads of both organizations and took advantage of the rift to further the Yishuv’s interests. In a meeting on April 1, 1948, in the village of Nur A-Shams near Tulkarm, Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon, a senior Shai officer, met with Fawzi Al-Qawuqji and convinced him not to take part in the fighting that had broken out between the Haganah and Husseini’s army. The Shai also kept channels of communication open with the Mandate authorities. In February 27, 1948, the Shai received information that Abdel-Kader Husseini’s men had prepared huge explosive devices in Bir Zeit that were to be installed on two stolen military trucks and blown up on King George Street in Jerusalem. Chaim Herzog, the Shai liaison officer to the British forces in Jerusalem, communicated this information to the Mandate authorities. Two days later, Mandate intelligence agents returned his favor by informing him of the Palestinian intention to blow up a building at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on Mount Scopus.9

  Along with the intelligence-gathering divisions that they developed, the heads of Shai also took advantage of the Shahar Unit from the Palmach. Fighters from this elite undercover unit were trained to infiltrate and blend in completely with the Arab population—a process called histaarevut, a neologism made up of two Hebrew words meaning “to disguise oneself” and “to become Arab”—in order to collect information and engage in special clandestine operations. The members of this unit, known as mistaarvim, were the sons of families that had immigrated to Israel from North African or Middle Eastern countries and who had grown up near Arab neighborhoods and had a good command of the Palestinian dialect. Before seeing action, the recruits underwent a demanding preparation course. They were trained as commando fighters and were proficient in sabotage, sharpshooting, and communications. In addition, they would learn Islamic cultural codes, the lifestyles of Palestinians in the cities and villages, and the customs that set apart various Arab communities all over the country.

  From their base, nestled in Kibbutz Alonim in the Jezreel Valley, small teams of fighters dressed up as Arabs would set out on missions in Jewish-Arab mixed cities such as Haifa and Jaffa, as well as remote villages and Palestinian cities in the West Bank, including Nablus and Hebron. The reputation gained by the Shahar troops among the Haganah and Palmach led the higher command of these organizations to dispatch them on special missions in neighboring Arab countries. Although most of these missions were devoted to gathering intelligence, in some cases they were also asked to carry out attacks on Arab leaders.

  Sheikh Nimer Al-Hatib of Haifa was the target of one of these operations. In February 1948, a cell from the Shahar Unit was sent to execute this charismatic preacher. However, the protective shield around the sheikh called for a change of plans. One week later, members of the unit sat in a car waiting for the sheikh’s entourage, which was just returning from a visit in Damascus. In the neighborhood of Kiryat Motzkin, the convoy was identified, and a vehicle whose function was to slow down the preacher’s car shot after him. A few minutes later, another car joined the chase. The sheikh was able to observe the second car only when it pulled alongside his own car. Several seconds later,
shots rang out from the same car, and four bullets struck his body, severely injuring the sheikh and putting him out of political action.10

  THE FORMATION OF THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

  Immediately after Israel’s declaration as an independent state on May 14, 1948, Shai faced a new challenge. The combined attack of the Arab armies on the fledgling state made quality military intelligence an essential priority and sidelined the preoccupation with Palestinian attacks.11 The fighting between the Israel Defense Forces and the Arab armies continued for almost a year, concluding in the Rhodes Armistice of 1949. Israel and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq signed this agreement, which established the borders of Israel.

  On the basis of consultations in June 1948 with Reuven Shiloah, the prime minister’s advisor for intelligence affairs, who later also founded Mossad, and Chaim Herzog, former head of intelligence for the Haganah, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to create three intelligence institutions. Isser Beeri, who had been the chief of Shai, was assigned to head the military intelligence branch, known as Aman. The functions of this organization were to compile intelligence on the armies of Arab countries and maintain internal military security. Isser Harel, head of the Tel Aviv district of Shai, was appointed in charge of the Internal Security Services (later to become known as the Shin Bet), which dealt with gathering information within the sovereign territory of the State of Israel and counterespionage. These two institutions, with lieutenant colonels as their commanders, were subordinated to the IDF. Then, at the end of the 1948 war, the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. Its aim was to collect information outside Israel. Boris Guriel, the head of the political department of the Haganah, was appointed as head of the new Political Department, but he also continued to report to Shiloah.12

  Toward the end of 1949, Ben-Gurion decided to institute the first structural reform of the Israeli intelligence community. One of the main reasons for this decision was the ongoing struggle for authority among its various arms. Reuven Shiloah understood that these tensions were detrimental to the effective functioning of the intelligence community and proposed that there be an overriding institution to coordinate intelligence services and security. In April 1949, the Varash—Committee of the Heads of Services—was formed. For its first convention on April 8, the heads of the various intelligence arms and the commissioner of the Israeli police force, Yehezkel Sahar, were all summoned. Varash had no clear mandate, though, and its activities soon tapered off. In July 1949, Shiloah suggested to Ben-Gurion that an institution should be created and called the Central Agency for Intelligence and Security Problems, whose chief would also be advisor to the prime minister on intelligence affairs. The principal aim of the planned organization was to avert jurisdictional rivalry among the intelligence departments, in particular between Aman and the Political Department. However, the very debate over its proposed establishment was cause for discontent, as Chaim Herzog from Aman and Isser Harel from the Shin Bet made clear to all.13

  On December 13, 1949, Ben-Gurion took the matter into his own hands. He assigned Shiloah to establish and head the organization. Shiloah and his people were consequently attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of their critical functions was to set up a unit for collecting intelligence beyond Israel’s borders. Until that point, the activities of the various intelligence organizations were not geographically limited, so that all of them—and particularly Aman—maintained independent information-gathering networks outside of Israel. The small unit, whose very creation provoked strong objections from both Aman and the Political Department, provided the infrastructure for the future founding of the Central Institute for Intelligence and Security—the full name of the initial version of Mossad. The unit’s activities gained momentum between 1952 and 1963, when Isser Harel, who also headed Shin Bet, was appointed to command the organization. Harel received full support from Ben-Gurion to fashion the structure of the services in accordance with his activist vision and was placed in charge of the Security Services.14

  MECHANISMS OF CONTROL OVER PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

  In its first few years, the State of Israel embarked on a rapid process of establishing sovereignty. At the same time the Palestinians underwent a severe battering politically, economically, and militarily. About half of the Palestinians—over 700,000 men and women who had lived in the territory now declared part of the sovereign State of Israel—were exiled or fled, becoming refugees in the countries bordering Israel. The local political elites found haven in Arab countries, while the Supreme Arab Committee foundered once more. Palestinian refugees on both sides of the border had family ties to one another and were united in their frustration over the results of the war. Still, despite their outrage, the disintegration of their political leadership and the urgent need to cope with the new reality prevented any immediate formation of an organized opposition movement, much to the relief of the Israeli intelligence. A Palestinian Shai informant summed up the situation in these words: “The refugees are in a terrible state and living in dire poverty; [they are] paying no attention to politics and do not care whether they are ruled by King Abdullah or have their own government.”15

  It was not only their dismal economic situation and the deterioration of their political leadership that prevented the Palestinians from pursuing their political struggle. In 1949 the Israeli government announced the institution of martial law in three major areas of the state: the Galilee, the “Little Triangle” in the eastern Sharon plain, and the Negev. The military administration served as a means of monitoring Palestinian Israeli citizens, whom the defense establishment perceived as a potential fifth column. For the Shin Bet, which adopted the operating methods of its predecessor, the Shai, the evolving situation was almost ideal. Thanks to the strict dictates of the military administration, the local Shin Bet handler could virtually control the everyday lives of the region’s residents, who were subject to his authority. If he so desired, he could assist them by granting work permits and travel and business licenses; if not, he could withhold these “kindnesses.” In exchange, the residents were required to provide information. The names of those who refused to collaborate were added to the list of Palestinians classified as subversive and anti-Israeli. This was a highly effective tool for recruiting informants, mainly among Arab civil servants, who knew that if their names were included in the list, they risked the loss of their livelihoods.

  This supervisory mechanism of the military administration and the Shin Bet also served to drive a wedge among the different factions of Palestinian Israeli citizens. A few religious and ethnic groups, such as the Druze and the Circassians, enjoyed preferential treatment, while others, and mainly the large Muslim minority, were relegated to the margins of the public sphere. Furthermore, the security establishment’s tight control over Arab politics was instrumental in the formation of Arab Zionist parties whose lists of candidates for the Knesset were determined by the Shin Bet and dominant Mapai party in consultation with the heads of the extended family clans. The alternative for those Palestinians who declined to be a part of these institutions, which were devoid of political content and at best represented clan interests, was to join the Communist Party, which was associated with the Soviet Union and subject to the close supervision of the Shin Bet. The Shin Bet’s policy toward Palestinian Israeli citizens, which to a large extent was reminiscent of operational methods used by internal intelligence services in authoritarian countries, yielded results. Israeli intelligence succeeded in uncovering a number of local organized initiatives in the early formation stages and prevented them from developing into any type of threat.16

  FIRST INDICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM DOCTRINE

  Unlike the Palestinians who remained in Israel and who maintained the clan structure so familiar to the Shin Bet, the scattered refugees had to build their social frameworks anew. The forced uprooting from their homes and the refugee state in which they found themselves
laid the ground for political turmoil. Palestinian political structures that began to develop outside of Israel’s borders compelled intelligence organizations to invest much greater efforts abroad than locally. The biggest challenge was posed by groups of fedayeen organized and run by the intelligence services of supportive Arab countries, most notably Egypt. In the 1950s they infiltrated Israeli borders in order to attack isolated settlements and ambush vehicles on the roads. The Israeli leadership was forced to formulate a counterterrorism doctrine and instructed military intelligence to find ways for coping with the challenge.17

  Toward the end of July 1953, as the initial signs of the escalation of fedayeen terrorist attacks appeared (see figure 1.1), the IDF created its first counterterrorism force—Unit 101. The decision to form this unit was essentially unplanned. Mishael Shacham, commander of the IDF Jerusalem Division, wished to settle a score with Mustafa Samueli, a resident of the village of Nabi Samuel who was alleged to be one of the most active fedayeen in the region. Shacham appealed to the commanders of the Paratroopers and Givati infantry brigades to take on the assignment of infiltrating the village and striking Samueli; however, both commanders rejected his request. On the other hand, Shacham’s subordinate, Major Ariel Sharon, who at the time was studying Middle Eastern history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, reacted more favorably. The twenty-five-year-old Sharon collected seven of his friends, all of them highly experienced infantry combatants, and in the dark of night led them to Samueli’s house and planted an explosive device. Although the blast caused minimal damage to Samueli’s house and obliged the force to withdraw quickly from the waking village, Shacham realized the significant potential of dispatching a small commando unit to perform such raids. The idea he proposed to Chief of Staff Mordechai Maklef was to form an elite unit whose fighters would raid concentrations of civilians and military personnel in the areas where infiltrators came from. They would quickly cross the border into Jordan or Egypt, strike the targets, and disappear as if they never had been there. Maklef gave his approval to the establishment of such a unit, much to the dismay of the head of the IDF Operations Division, Moshe Dayan, who objected to the general idea that the IDF activate commando units whose goal was retaliatory attacks. Regardless, on August 5, 1953, the directive to establish the unit was issued.