The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism

by Ami Pedahzur

  The decision to assign operations demanding less specialization, such as the detection and capture of certain objectives or eliminating terrorist cells, to elite military units requires attention. It is true that the skills developed by special-forces soldiers who excel in microwarfare are quite suitable to such operations. At issue, however, is the logic of sending a fighter who has undergone extensive training in areas such as technological intelligence, targeting laser markers, or dangerous assaults on enemy ports to arrest terrorist suspects in the West Bank. One argument is that there is simply no alternative. The volume of terrorist incidents necessitates the participation of all units trained in thwarting operations. Another argument, also with a degree of logic, insists that participation in such operations helps keep the soldiers in top combat form. Both arguments deserve review. The training of small units designated for specific missions costs Israel extensive financial resources. Having soldiers from these groups participate in operations that members of more conventional military units could perform with equal or more success is a decision to be made only after careful consideration.

  The answer to the first argument can be found in the fact that the IDF has been quite flexible in responding to the special situations that have continually arisen. For example, during the first intifada, Duvdevan, Shimshon, and Yamas were already active in their original forms; that is to say, these mistaarvim units were carrying out complicated arrests within Palestinian cities and refugee camps. Regular Border Police companies also joined them, and an armored infantry unit was formed with the principal mission of carrying out routine security activities in the occupied territories. With the escalation of the conflict, however, the trend was reversed. Instead of training additional personnel for these tasks, large infantry and armored forces were allocated from both the regular and reserve armies for policing activities in the occupied territories. The fact that during this period the IDF was also occupying the security zone in southern Lebanon created a situation in which most fighting forces were confined to regular security tasks and had less time to train for warfare and specialized activities.5

  The second intifada, which was much more violent than the first, made the issue even more critical. This time detainees were not young people flying Palestinian flags or spraying slogans in the streets. Now the IDF was being called upon to allocate forces for street battles in the middle of highly populated urban centers. The units that had operated during the previous decade, especially Shimshon, had been disbanded after the signing of the Oslo Accords, and the void they left had to be filled. Egoz, which was left without a purpose after the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, was added on to Duvdevan and Yamas, which had maintained their operational skills throughout this period. The Egoz Unit’s soldiers had to transfer their specialized skills in antiguerilla warfare to a new front: the open areas and traffic arteries of the West Bank. Although they were quite successful in their combat relocation to the West Bank, it came at the price of having to sacrifice some of their specific counterguerrilla skills, and it also hindered their preparedness to operate on the Lebanese front when it became necessary.6

  No less problematic was the situation of Shayetet 13. During the second intifada, the Shayetet soldiers were assigned two main types of missions. The first had to do with raids from or at sea. The operation that received the most attention in the media was Noah’s Ark, the January 3, 2002, capture of Karine A, a ship carrying weapons from Iran to the Palestinians. In the early morning hours of that day, while the ship was sailing in the southern part of the Red Sea between Saudi Arabia and Sudan, a few IAF helicopters escorted by F-15 aircraft drew near the ship. Before any of the ship’s crewmembers understood what the situation was, Shayetet 13 fighters suddenly appeared from the helicopters and were swung down by ropes to the ship’s upper deck. In less than eight minutes they overpowered the crew, which did not resist. Following the exposure of a huge arsenal of weapons concealed in the ship, they sailed it to Eilat, arriving at the Israeli port on the following day.7

  The second type of operations to which Shayetet 13 soldiers were assigned involved the detention of wanted suspects during complex land operations. While Shayetet 13 soldiers are considered the most professional of the IDF elite units for missions of the first type, their skills in carrying out land operations in the West Bank are not necessarily better than those of other units. The decision to supplement the special forces operating in the West Bank with Shayetet 13 was made by the commander of the Israeli Navy, Yedidya Yaari. When he first took up this position, Yaari introduced an approach according to which “enemy ports had become less relevant and the commandos needed to be retrained to work in the alleys of the Casbah.” According to Yaari, the intensive microwarfare exercises the naval commandos undergo in their training made them ideal for the new front. This approach was supported by the Shayetet commander, Erez Zuckerman, who had helped to form the Egoz Unit and had functioned as its first commander. In order to integrate Shayetet 13 soldiers into operations in the occupied territories while limiting the impairment of their seaborne capabilities, the unit was divided into task forces. While soldiers who were trained in commando warfare were sent on land missions, their comrades who were more experienced in naval missions were left to train at the unit’s base at Atlit. Indeed, the Shayetet enjoyed many operational successes. Furthermore, the fruitful collaboration of naval commandos with the army opened new opportunities for promotion for many of the Shayetet officers within the ranks of the army. However, veteran naval commandos were not happy with the decision. They warned that the “alleys of the Casbah” were not the natural arena for naval commando operations, and their participation in such missions impaired the readiness of the unit to carry out tasks for which it was established.8

  The effect of switching units from training for war to training for counter-terrorism was even more dramatic. Soldiers in the Maglan reconnaissance unit specialize in antitank weaponry. The unit was formed in the mid-1980s and in its early days consisted of soldiers from other elite forces. After a period of structuring, applicants begin to go through its long training regime. Like Sayeret Matkal trainees, Maglan soldiers become highly skilled at land navigation and surveillance. Because their area of expertise is primarily required during wartime, a decision was made to engage these soldiers during low-intensity periods of warfare as “terrorist hunters.” The unit developed capabilities that allowed its soldiers to translate GSS-relayed intelligence information into operational programs in a very brief time, sometimes no more than two hours.

  Maglan fighters are highly skilled at detaining suspects and carrying out eliminations under difficult conditions. They may be transported to their destinations by helicopter and generally accomplish their missions in a very short time. During the first days of the Second Lebanon War, the consequences of Maglan as well as other special forces spending so much of their time in the territories of the Palestinian Authority were painfully felt. The units, trained for the Palestinian front, found themselves unprepared for the environs and challenges of southern Lebanon. The Hezbollah operated from well-fortified buildings that bore little resemblance to the hiding places of the Palestinian fighters. The Hezbollah’s weaponry, especially antitank rockets, came as a surprise to the soldiers.9

  Even the infantry reconnaissance units, whose main tasks were gathering tactical intelligence and leading their brigades into battle, underwent dramatic changes. During the 1970s, these reconnaissance units, especially Sayeret Golani, would be used as local backup forces in case of terrorist attacks, securing the area until Sayeret Matkal could arrive. From the 1990s, they were given a similar role, usually backing up special operations, especially complex detention operations carried out by elite units, by securing the area and preventing cells of Palestinian fighters from coming in to help their comrades. Reconnaissance units were also allocated to carry out detention operations that did not demand special assault or microwarfare capabilities. In other instances, they were required to c
arry out decoy operations; that is, they would patrol areas used as bases for Palestinian fighters to try to draw them into attacking the force and revealing themselves. The deployment of the special forces in counterterrorism operations in the West Bank led to new rivalries and reignited old ones.10

  THE KIDNAPPING OF ELIYAHU GUREL

  Even the most ancient battle among the elite takeover units came back to life during that period. Over the years, the number of hostage-taking incidents had diminished, and it seemed that the question of the adoption of the Horev Commission recommendations was no longer relevant. The abduction of taxi driver Eliyahu Gurel on Friday, July 11, 2003, was thus surprising. At 5:00 p.m. on that day, Gurel picked up four passengers—two young men, a young woman, and a girl—who requested that he take them to Jerusalem from the Ben-Gurion Airport. Near Pisgat Zeev, one of the men took out a knife and held it to Gurel’s throat. Gurel did not resist and followed instructions to turn the car in the direction of the Beit Hanina village. At this point the woman and girl left the group, and the three men began walking in the direction of Ramallah, where the kidnappers led Gurel to an abandoned factory in Beitunia. After a worried call from Gurel’s wife, the police had already begun to search for him. After his taxi was found in the Ramallah area, the Palestinian Authority security forces were also informed. Around noon on Saturday, Gurel called home from his cell phone and said that he had been taken hostage. Representatives of the General Staff negotiating team who were waiting at his house began a dialogue with the kidnappers. The latter’s first demand was the immediate release of two thousand prisoners.

  On that same day, Shirin Halil, the woman from the taxi, was apprehended in Lod. She gave information about the kidnappers and a general description of the area where Gurel was being held, although she did not know the exact location since he was taken from one hiding place to another every few hours. On Tuesday, the GSS discovered that two of the cell members, Ramez Rimawi and Ahmed Hajaj, had left their hideout and had arrived at the Kalandia Checkpoint near Jerusalem. After a short consultation with Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, Deputy Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, and senior GSS officers, it was decided to detain them immediately. The mission was given to Yamam, backed up by the Duvdevan Unit. During the operation, Rimawi was slightly injured in his leg. Immediately after being detained, the two were interrogated and revealed detailed information about Gurel’s location and the identity of his guards. In the evening hours, Sayeret Matkal troops stormed the abandoned building in Beitunia. They overpowered Samir Rimawi and another kidnapper, who were armed only with knives, and found Gurel safe and sound. Even though the collaborative efforts of the two units had been successful, Yamam fighters were once again incensed. They had been deployed to make the arrest, a mission not within their primary expertise, but were not assigned to carry out the rescue. Again, a less suitable force had been awarded their job.11

  THE ESCALATION OF THE ASSASSINATIONS

  Despite the massive military effort in the West Bank, the IDF could not smother the flames of the intifada. Ariel Sharon, this time as prime minister, allowed the GSS to reintroduce Israel’s trademark policy in the realm of counterterrorism: assassinations. This time the tactic was ratcheted up a notch and at the same time given a new, more sterile name—“focused preventions,” which is closer to the Hebrew original than the more common English term “targeted killings” or, simply, “assassinations.” In addition to the new name, the targets, techniques, and frequency of attacks changed. The willingness of the Ariel Sharon administration to increase the use of this method led GSS and Aman think-tank teams to attempt to define criteria that would justify targeting a certain individual. Among others, one drafted document states that assassination is a tool of self-defense designed to stop a terrorist attack that has entered the execution stage when there is no other way to stop it. In contradiction to the Israeli government’s approach in the 1970s and the X Commission, the team stressed that assassinations must not become a tool for avenging a target’s past deeds. Words, however, are one thing and actions another. As time passed, the aims of the targeted killings assumed a character very similar to that of the assassinations perpetrated by Israel in the past.

  The desire of policymakers to take action in response to suicide attacks led them to instruct the security establishment to seek out available targets (see table 8.1). The potential involvement of assassination targets in a future attack on Israel or in the planning of terrorist activities was not a decisive factor in declaring a verdict against them. The escalation of this type of incident was quite dramatic, even in comparison to the days of the X Commission. Now it was no longer necessary to hold quasi-judicial proceedings in order to “convict” a candidate for assassination. The prime minister and the head of the GSS made the decision.12

  The target of one of the first assassinations in the second intifada was Raed Karmi, a senior Tanzim activist and officer in the Palestinian General Intelligence. Right from the outbreak of the events, the defense establishment gathered intelligence information on Karmi’s extensive involvement in attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. Among others, he had planned the murder of two Tel Aviv restaurateurs, Etgar Zeituni and Moti Dayan, in Tulkarm on January 23, 2001. He was also behind the assassination attempt on IAF Colonel Natan Barak. The aura of the combat warrior attached to Karmi in the Palestinian street sent the Israeli military into a spin. Senior IDF officers felt they had a score to settle with the man and vowed not to rest until he was dealt with. On January 14, 2002, Karmi was walking from his house to visit his mistress on a route that passed close to a concrete wall. A UAV circling in the skies of Tulkarm transmitted an electronic signal that detonated a powerful bomb planted behind the wall. Karmi was killed instantly. The assassination led to the collapse of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. After the fact, Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer said that Karmi’s elimination was “the biggest mistake we made.”13

  Carefully planned assassinations were not the only feature of the increasing aggressiveness of the Israeli response at that point. Reprisal actions were also not a thing of the past. In the evening hours of February 19, 2002, two Palestinian National Security Forces activists, Shadi Saida and Dawoud Haj, arrived at the IDF checkpoint at Ein Ariq, west of Ramallah. They got out of the taxi that had transported them, and under cover of darkness they approached the soldiers manning the checkpoint. They opened fire. Three soldiers were killed and a fourth was wounded, but the attackers had not finished. They broke into a trailer where three off-duty soldiers were resting and killed them, too. Israel responded that very night. A Sayeret Yael force, on its way to arrest some Palestinians wanted for interrogation by the GSS, was notified that their mission had been cancelled and that they were to return to their base immediately. Two hours later they received their new orders. One of the commandos later recalled the events of that night:

  TABLE 8.1 PROMINENT TARGETED KILLINGS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

  Source: NSSC Dataset on Targeted Killings, www.nscc.haifa.ac.il.

  When we arrived at base, our unit commander ran off to the headquarters and when he returned he called us for a briefing. He said: “Six of our soldiers from the Engineering Corps have been killed at the checkpoint and we are going out on a retaliation operation. We are going to kill Palestinian policemen at a checkpoint to avenge the blood of our six soldiers that they killed.” An eye for an eye. That was the feeling. They told us that this was a revenge operation and that we were going to take a life for a life at another three or four checkpoints. And no more. Everyone was excited about the idea of going out to kill people. We were pleased. Since the Intifada began we hadn’t had the opportunity to do something with “honor.” None of us had notches on our weapons.14

  The soldiers reached the checkpoint of the Palestinian Police outside Deir es-Sudan, not far from the Israeli settlement of Halamish. The Sayeret soldiers spread out and lay in wait for the policemen, who were in one of the v
illage houses. Three Palestinians who came out were killed in the first burst of gunfire. At the very same time, three teams of the paratrooper elite reconnaissance unit also attacked Palestinian police checkpoints near Nablus. The fact that the police manning those checkpoints had maintained a good working relationship with their Israeli colleagues did not help them. When the sun rose the following morning, eighteen Palestinian policemen lay dead alongside various checkpoints in the West Bank. Recalled one IDF officer five years later,That period was rife with terrorism and violent attacks against the armed forces. The army did not have clear targets for responses. The targeted killings [method] had not reached its current level. The IDF’s special forces units were inactive. The IDF felt that its hands were tied. A decision was made to switch to the offensive, mainly due to the frustration of the army in face of the Palestinian attacks. Since we regarded the PNA as being involved in terrorism, it became a legitimate target. After an incident like Ein Ariq, we had to respond. A targeted killing can take hours [to plan]. The checkpoints were opportune targets. They were objectives that we could attack within two or three hours. It was a case of the ideal versus reality.”15

  The next milestone was Operation Defensive Shield, which was conducted between March 29, 2002, and April 21, 2002. During this operation, IDF forces occupied all major Palestinian cities and villages in the West Bank, arresting more than 4,200 Palestinians. The operation began as a response to the Passover Massacre at the Park Hotel in Netanya on March 27, 2002. During this operation, the IDF reoccupied cities and refugee camps in the West Bank, which facilitated the partial rehabilitation of the HUMINT infrastructure, but at the heavy price of ruling with an iron fist. The operation also exemplified the difficulties an established regular army unit must confront when fighting clandestine small violent groups that are fortified inside dense urban areas. In Jenin, for example, the Palestinian fighters booby-trapped the entire refugee camp while ambushing the IDF soldiers inside the camp’s narrow alleys. Thus, the IDF advance was slow and was accompanied by a relatively large number of casualties. On April 9, thirteen soldiers died in an ambush resulting from several demolition charges that were set off simultaneously. Subsequently, the IDF decided to destroy any building in Jenin that was suspected of providing a hiding place for Palestinian forces. Although the IDF succeeded in renewing their military presence in the Palestinian population centers, the operation actually heightened the motivation of terrorist cells to act, and it also created fertile ground for the expansion of the ranks of these groups.16