by Ami Pedahzur
The first stage of the prisoner exchange was carried out successfully in January 2004. In the second stage of the deal, Israel was supposed to release the remainder of the Lebanese prisoners, including Samir Kuntar, who was seventeen years old in April 1979 when he infiltrated the shore of Nahariya, leading a cell of PLF activists. After a long night of murder, during which Kuntar and his cohorts slaughtered twenty-eight-year-old Danny Haran and his four-year-old daughter Einat, as well as two Israeli policemen, Kuntar was caught and later sentenced to four life sentences. Over the years, Kuntar had become an important symbol in Lebanon, and Hezbollah had been hankering after his release in order to lionize him and add glory to the organization. In exchange for Kuntar, Hezbollah representatives promised to provide Israel with authoritative information on Ron Arad’s fate. During the second-stage negotiations, Israel demanded credible information on Ron Arad, before releasing the Lebanese prisoners. Hezbollah refused, and contacts between the two sides were suspended. Two years later, Hassan Nasrallah claimed that Ron Arad was “dead and lost,” and that if the organization had had any information on Arad it would have used it to close the deal with Israel and bring about the release of Lebanese prisoners jailed in Israel.5
THE ISRAELI INVASION
Hezbollah’s successes in its negotiations with Israel were not lost on the Palestinians. On June 25, 2006, eight men from Hamas, the Army of Islam, and the Popular Resistance Committees penetrated an IDF outpost near Kerem Shalom, close to the border with the Gaza Strip. The men, armed with antitank missiles, hand grenades, and light firearms, split into three groups. One force attacked an armored personnel carrier, while the second stormed an IDF position and attacked the three soldiers manning it. The third group assailed a Merkava III tank from the 188th Armored Brigade with missiles and grenades. Two of the four-member crew, Commander Hanan Barak and driver Pavel Slotzker, were killed instantly, and the other two were wounded. The attackers took Gilad Shalit, one of the soldiers, hostage and quickly led him to the border fence. They blasted a hole in the fence using explosives they had brought with them and then disappeared. Israel responded with a massive assault against infrastructure targets in the Gaza Strip and an extensive wave of arrests of senior Hamas activists. Even so, neither the bombardment nor the arrests precipitated the release of the abducted soldier.6
On July 12, an army patrol consisting of two armored Humvees carrying seven reserve soldiers set off on a routine patrol along Israel’s border fence with Lebanon near the rural community of Zar’it. At about 9:00 a.m., Hezbollah began shelling IDF positions along the border. Using the commotion caused by the heavy mortar fire as cover, Hezbollah set up an ambush for the patrol vehicles. As the latter approached, the guerillas launched rocket-propelled grenades at the Humvees. Three soldiers were killed in the attack and four others were wounded. The attackers took two of the wounded, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, to the Lebanese side of the border. Similar to the abduction in October 2000, long moments passed before news of the kidnapping reached the IDF regional division headquarters. In a desperate attempt to stop the kidnappers, a tank was sent in pursuit of the Hezbollah men. The tank was soon damaged by an antitank mine, and all four of its crewmembers were killed. Infantry soldiers dispatched to assist in the pursuit remained behind with the burning tank to protect it, thus frustrating any chances of stopping the kidnappers, who disappeared on the roads leading into southern Lebanon.7
This kidnapping operation prompted the Israeli government to make a swift decision and immediately embark on a military campaign in Lebanon that became known as the Second Lebanon War. While regular forces were involved in widespread aerial and ground strikes, Israeli special forces sought to obtain information on the kidnapped soldiers as well as the location of missile launchers. They encountered great difficulties, primarily because of the disparity between the relatively low operational capabilities of the Palestinian forces they confronted during the Al-Aqsa intifada and the much more sophisticated operational capabilities of the Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Thus, Israeli elite forces failed to make the required adjustments, as demonstrated by the following events, which unfolded on July 19.
Toward nighttime on that day, a force from Sayeret Maglan took position near the village of Marun A-Ras in order to prepare for its mission: to locate and disable Hezbollah launchers in the area. The Israeli soldiers first came across a system of Hezbollah underground fortifications that seemed to be deserted. While trying to breach the steel doors of the bunkers with the inadequate tools they had in their possession, they were attacked in a surprise ambush by Hezbollah fighters, who killed two of their men almost immediately. As the morning hours arrived, the fierce battle continued, and the Maglan men were not able to retreat to Israeli territory. Forces from the Egoz Unit, which were deployed nearby on the Israeli side of the border, rushed in to assist them. Anticipating the ploy, Hezbollah fighters armed with guns and antitank rockets attacked the Egoz troopers just a few minutes after they crossed the border. Five Egoz men were killed, and many others were injured. The battle continued and the gunfire was so heavy that only the next day were the bodies of the IDF fatalities recovered from the battleground.8
In addition, Israel decided during this war once again to undertake abductions of its own for bargaining power. This time the IDF’s attempts to kidnap Hezbollah activists were even less successful than in the past. During Operation Sharp and Smooth, Sayeret Matkal and Shaldag commandos infiltrated the city of Baalbek. While the Sayeret men took over the local hospital, which also served as Hezbollah headquarters, the Shaldag unit made their way to the town’s Sheikh Habib quarter, where senior Hezbollah members lived. Once there, they took five men hostage, one of whom bore the same name as the organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Shortly thereafter, though, he was released along with the others when it turned out they were not affiliated with the organization. On August 4, Israel again tried to kidnap Hezbollah high-ranking officers without too much success. A Shayetet 13 force infiltrated the Lebanese coastal city of Tyre from the sea and took control of a five-story building where the Hezbollah men were supposed to reside. The latter however refused to surrender and, during the fight, seven Hezbollah operatives were killed and eight Shayetet men were injured. The Hezbollah officers escaped.9
The overall picture of activation of special forces reveals that those operations, which were highly publicized in the Israeli media, succeeded somewhat in lightening the spirits of the Israeli public, as at least some Israel leaders had intended; yet Israel actually continued to endanger its elite units in operations that seldom suited their qualifications and whose strategic benefits were questionable. This was in particular displayed in an operation that was executed four days after the war had ended and UN Security Council decision 1701 was affirmed. On the night of August 18—19, IAF CH-53 Sikorsky helicopters set down two Jeeps and about a dozen Sayeret Matkal soldiers wearing Lebanese army uniforms near the village of Boday, not far from the city of Baalbek. Their mission was to infiltrate the Hezbollah headquarters in the village for intelligence-gathering purposes and if possible kidnap organization operatives. But, after discovering that the headquarters had already been evacuated, they decided to double back to their meeting point. They did not take a different route as a precaution in the event that a villager might notify Hezbollah of their presence. This is apparently what happened, and the consequences were fatal. Hezbollah forces set up several roadblocks in the vicinity. When the Sayeret Matkal team reached one of these posts, they pretended that they belonged to the Lebanese Army, but their disguise was discovered almost immediately. During the fight that broke out, the unit lost a veteran, heavily decorated officer, Lieutenant Colonel Emanuel Moreno; another officer was seriously injured.10
Israel’s and Hezbollah’s kidnappings and retaliations illustrate one of the major pitfalls encountered by Israeli civilian and military leaders. Israel has repeatedly declared that it will not negotiate with terrorists; yet, like other
countries, it has found it impossible to stick to that statement. In addition to their commitment to Israeli soldiers and civilians, as well as the desire to see captives safe in the arms of their loved ones, Israeli prime ministers have invested great efforts on the hostages’ behalf. They are usually under tremendous pressure from the families of the hostages and public opinion, and politicians are extremely sensitive to such pressures. The problem is that the public is fickle. Along with the intense pressures it applies in order to obtain the hostages’ release, the public equally objects to paying an excessive ransom for them—particularly when it concerns the release of security prisoners.11
Policymakers have chosen the military course as an elegant way around this predicament. If this course does not lead to any new information, at least Israel’s leaders broadcast a decisive message to the public concerning their commitment “to bring the boys home,” even if by means of very risky commando operations that are purposely leaked to the media. The problem is that, thus far, such military actions and kidnappings have not achieved the desired results—quite the opposite. They have caused Israel to be viewed as a paper tiger, increased the motivation among anti-Israel militant groups to abduct more soldiers and civilians, and heightened the risk to soldiers in elite units who are sent to the enemy’s home front on hostage-taking operations.
Furthermore, for the first time in its history, in this war, the Israeli heartland sustained a devastating rocket offensive for over a month. More than 3,970 missiles landed in cities, small settlements, and army bases in the north of Israel. Despite the intensive efforts of the IAF and ground forces to reduce its operational and launching capabilities, Hezbollah continued its artillery strikes until the final hours of the war, firing off an average of two hundred missiles per day. The consequences were unprecedented. Forty-four Israeli citizens died, and more than two thousand were injured. In addition, more than 300,000 residents left their homes in the bombarded areas and sought alternative dwellings in their relatives’ homes or at hotels.
The financial consequences were no less severe. For more than a month, industry in northern Israel was almost totally inoperative, and tourism halted. The total costs for the Israel economy were estimated at around $4 billion. In the face of such consequences, it comes as no surprise to find the following statement in the Winograd Commission’s report: “No level of public support during the time of a military crisis can justify unctuous behavior when the political leaders need to decide whether to embark on a war or other military actions.”12
CHAPTER TEN
FIGHTING THE TERRORISM PLAGUE
SINCE THE DAY OF its Declaration of Independence in 1948, Israel has been plagued by terrorism. Though it never declared war on terror or even developed a coherent doctrine for coping with the challenge, both policymakers and the heads of the security establishment have perceived terrorism as an act of war and have thus continuously applied the war model as the major route of response. Despite a few periods of decline, over the years the threat of terrorism has not diminished. It has actually become increasingly more acute and lethal (figure 10.1). Moreover, Israel’s main successes in reducing the threat of terrorism cannot be attributed to the war model but to the few times in which the defensive model was applied. Terrorism should thus not be considered an act of war but a psychological tactic used by paramilitary groups. Furthermore, terrorism can rarely be considered a threat to the state’s national security. In most cases, its main effect is a sense of insecurity within the civilian population.
It has been argued that sovereign states suffer from an inherent difficulty in their attempt to cope with this amorphous threat.1 Yet terrorists suffer from their own limitations. Most prominently, unlike threats that are posed by other states, the physical damage that terrorists can cause is limited. The only times when terrorism can turn into a national threat, if we exclude the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which have not so far been proven as effective tools in the hands of terrorists, is when an intelligence organization and the armed forces put the struggle against terrorism at the top of their agendas and act accordingly. This is tantamount to undermining the state’s national-security interest in favor of the struggle against a secondary threat. The war model for countering terrorism is flawed not only because it undermines civil liberties, as many have argued in the past,2 but also because it is simply unsuitable for the challenge of terrorism and causes the security establishment to deviate from dealing with other, more imminent threats.
So why has Israel stuck to this model and actually pressured its security establishment to offer new ways of defeating terrorism time and time again? The public and the politicians are more sensitive to terrorism than to other threats because of its impact on civilians and the sense of insecurity it instills.3 Frustration in the face of terrorist attacks and the panic they create leads policymakers to dismiss the fact that military power suffers from inherent limitations in the struggle against nonstate actors, including groups that use terrorism. Policymakers are eager to satisfy the public with an immediate and decisive response. Hence, they are more open to offensive responses that are offered to them by the intelligence community and the armed forces than they are to long-term defensive measures. There are close ties between policymakers and the armed forces in Israel, and the fact that many of the decision makers were formerly high-ranking officers, often in elite units, most notably Sayeret Matkal, increases their inclination to use offensive responses. In this reality, the police are almost entirely excluded from the decision-making circle, and hence the criminal-justice model has little chance of being implemented. The defensive model is applied only following attempts at offensive responses that have proven to be futile.
FIGURE 10.1 PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ISRAELI TARGETS, 1948–2006
Source: NSSC Dataset on Palestinian Terrorism, www.nssc.haifa.ac.il
One of the major obstacles in reforming the counterterrorism policy is that heads of the various branches of the security establishment are aware of the policymakers’ distress and their desire to respond promptly. Thus, regardless of their primary duties, they elevate the response to terrorism to the top of their agendas. By doing so, they hope to secure the flow of resources to their agencies and enhance their reputations. In the upper echelons, this may include decisions to form new units or wings within units that already exist, to divert forces to counterterrorism missions, and to acquire new technologies for such missions. Mid-ranking officers within the various forces feel similar pressures. In order to perform well against terrorism, they overload their units, which in most cases have completely different primary roles, and engage in competition with other units regarding seniority in this type of warfare. The outcome, as proven in the Israeli case, is that despite the innovative spirit and the fierce competition among the various forces, most initiatives lead to either short-term successes or outright failures. More important, consumed by the notion that the struggle against terrorism should be on top of their agendas, intelligence organizations tend to sublimate other considerations to this goal and thus either overlook or even indirectly give rise to more severe threats. The preparedness of the armed forces, which constantly innovate and train in microcounterterrorism tactics, to cope with other threats is also undermined. The application of the war model thus leads to an escalating cycle of terrorism as well as to distressing outcomes in other arenas.
CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
As with many terrorist events that have not cost lives, most of Israel’s citizens have forgotten the explosion at the country’s largest fuel and gas facility that took place on May 23, 2002. I did not know much about the circumstances of that incident until one Friday morning in late December of that year. At that time I was teaching a seminar on terrorism, part of the master’s-degree program for students at the University of Haifa who were members of the security establishment. The small classroom in which the course was held fostered a degree of intimacy among the students. In the first row, slightly
apart from the other students, sat a mild-mannered man who occasionally made comments revealing his deep familiarity with the subject we were discussing. Few Israelis would recognize this man’s name—Rafi Taterka—but there is no one in the intelligence community who has not heard of him. Taterka, who began his career in the operations branch of the GSS, rose through the ranks until he was head of the branch and then deputy head of the entire organization. About five years after his retirement from the GSS, Taterka was appointed CEO of Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures, the government company responsible for Israel’s oil and gas reserves.4
Part of the seminar coursework involved the presentation of an outline of each student’s final paper in front of the class. Rafi had a different idea. Instead of describing the subject of his seminar paper, he presented the class with his company’s report on the internal investigation into the terrorist attack perpetrated by the Silwan cell of Hamas against the Pi Glilot oil and gas depot. The cell’s members had managed to attach a one-kilogram explosive charge to a tanker truck and to explode the charge by remote control after the truck had entered the protected compound. Taterka promised an experience we would not soon forget, and he was good on his word. The in-depth investigation included a minute-by-minute silent video portrayal of the attack, as captured by security cameras positioned in various locations at Pi Glilot. The picture of the tanker truck exploding and bursting into flames at the diesel storage area is still deeply engraved in my memory. The shocking aspect of the attack has nothing to do with the results. No lives were lost, and there were no injuries. The cold sweat that drenched my back and the shocked expressions frozen on the faces of the other students were the result of the scenario running through our heads, in which the tanker truck had exploded not in front of the diesel storage area, but rather in front of the gas storage area a few dozen meters away. This could have been Israel’s 9/11. The Pi Glilot facility is located on the outskirts of Tel Aviv, and a few hundred meters away, on the other side of the highway, is Israel’s intelligence city—a series of military bases and civilian facilities that serve Aman and Mossad.5
