by Ami Pedahzur
In the years since the attack, Palestinian militant groups have upgraded their abilities in guerrilla warfare and terrorism. “Necessity is the mother of invention,” as the popular saying goes. Despite Israel’s unceasing efforts to seal the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, whose entire length is just over 7.5 miles, local entrepreneurs still managed to find all sorts of ways to smuggle weapons, ammunition, and money from Sinai into Gaza. The drip of weapons turned into a flood in January 2008, when Hamas activists took down the wall between Gaza and Egypt. Smugglers also use the 130-mile-long border between Israel and Sinai, which, following the opening of the Gaza-Egyptian border, became a highly sensitive area due to the success of armed Palestinians in infiltrating the Sinai Desert and using it as a point of departure for attacks in Israel. Not only have the groups engaged in terrorism become a greater challenge, but their tactics have also become more sophisticated over the years, a fact that requires the heightened alertness of the security establishment. Throughout the Al-Aqsa intifada, the Palestinians increased their use of high-trajectory weapons, due to Israel’s success in foiling suicide attacks.6
At first the rockets were short-range Qassams fired from the Gaza Strip toward northern Negev communities. As the intifada progressed, Grad missiles with a range of ten miles appeared on the scene. The Palestinian factions, frustrated at the limited effects of the rockets in comparison to suicide attacks, are constantly striving to increase their effectiveness. One of the ways to do this is to smuggle the missiles into the West Bank or manufacture them there. In one such attempt three Palestinians were arrested on October 5, 2005, after trying to smuggle technological information on rocket production to the West Bank from Gaza. Unlike the Gaza Strip, launching rockets from the West Bank threatens installations such as the Ben-Gurion Airport and large urban centers, including the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. The rockets are not the only threat hanging over Israel’s residents. Terrorists do not usually limit themselves to a single tactic, but rather tend to use every method that proves its efficacy (see figure 10.2). Thus, for example, the Palestinian networks have never stopped their attempts to kidnap Israelis for bargaining purposes. In most cases the kidnap victims are soldiers, but these groups have stressed in the past that they also view civilians as legitimate targets. Israel must also continue to be on guard against suicide bombers. Even though the security establishment has managed to set up mechanisms over the years to make the dispatching of suicide bombers into Israel very difficult, the militants find it hard to abandon this method because of its great effectiveness. There are large numbers of Palestinians ready to strap an explosive belt around their waists and strike at targets in Israel and around the world, and these are certainly still a cause for worry. Another formidable threat is the potential use of force multipliers. Even though conventional terrorism has proven to be the most effective means of causing the maximum number of victims, attacks that make use of such multipliers produce a strong psychological effect.7
FIGURE 10.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ISRAELI TARGETS BY TACTIC, 1993–2007
Source: NSSC Dataset on Palestinian Terrorism, www.nssc.haifa.ac.il
Palestinian terrorism is not the only front where Israel has found itself with no definitive response. The assassination of Imad Mughniyah on February 12, 2008 in the Kfar Suseh neighborhood of the Syrian capital brought to the headlines the name of the archterrorist, who for over two decades was responsible for some of the most horrific attacks against Israeli and other Western targets while staying out of the spotlight. During the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah successfully sowed terror on the Israeli home front by launching rockets against civilian population centers. Eight months after the war, Israeli civilians learned that one of those rockets had landed in the heart of Haifa’s oil-refinery compound, where there is a large concentration of hazardous substances. Similar to the Pi Glilot incident, here too, luck played a major role. The rocket, one of 124 that landed in the Haifa Bay area during the war, exploded in an open space, and no major disaster occurred.8
In the first months of 2008, most estimates are that while Hezbollah still cannot operate and function freely in southern Lebanon, as it was able to before the July—August 2006 war, the military wing of the organization under the leadership of Mughniyah was able, with the aid of Iran and Syria, to restore large parts of its artillery capabilities and arsenal, especially regarding short and mid-distance missiles.9 Hence, the war did not change the basic strategic balance between the two sides. Even the assassination of Mughniyah, who was an invaluable asset for Hezbollah and Iran, will not have a significant impact. He trained a number of potential successors over the years. Furthermore, the war exemplified again, as in the 1980s during Israel struggle against the PLO and as in the 1990s against Hezbollah, and even in the last few years against the Palestinian groups operating in the Gaza Strip, that Israel, for all its military superiority, has not found an effective offensive response to artillery attacks initiated by terrorist groups.
Additionally, powerful players such as Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria, which are interested in maneuvering proxy players in the Palestinian arena and controlling the intensity of the violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, are constantly trying to transfer funding and munitions to the various Palestinian networks and in certain cases to train their people. Mughniyah was a major facilitator of this endeavor. Religious divisions between Sunni and Shiite regimes seem to be less relevant when it comes to the struggle against Israel. Syria, for example, where most of the residents are indeed Sunni, helps Iran in transferring weapons shipments to Hezbollah and is even in direct contact with that organization, supplying it with intelligence concerning Israel. Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, has supported all the Palestinian factions throughout the Al-Aqsa intifada, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are faithful to a radical Sunni doctrine. The cargo ship Karine A, which was attempting to smuggle weapons and ammunition to Gaza but was intercepted by Shayetet 13, is just one example of the efforts invested by Tehran in aiding the Palestinian struggle. A simpler method of providing assistance has always been funding and/or remuneration. The Iranian rulers, as well as the Saudi royal house, which follows a Wahhabi Sunni ideology, have deposited huge sums of money in the personal bank accounts of senior Hamas activists. Saddam Hussein’s secular Baathist regime preferred to help families of suicide bombers directly by depositing $15,000 in the personal bank accounts of each Palestinian family with a son who carried out a suicide attack.10
Finally, yet important, is the threat posed by the global jihadi movement. After the American invasion of Afghanistan and the destruction of Al-Qaeda’s organizational infrastructure, the latter became an amorphous coalition of groups all over the world, called the global Salafi jihad, or “Al-Qaeda 2.0.” Though many believe that the main target of the network is the United States, it has also proved that it is interested in and capable of striking at Israeli and Jewish targets in Israel and around the world. Through the years, Al-Qaeda and local groups inspired by the global-jihad ideology have committed a number of terrorist attacks against such targets. These have included a truck-bomb explosion near a synagogue on the island of Djerba, Tunisia, on April 11, 2002; a suicide bombing in the Israeliowned Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, on November 28, 2002; and the firing of a shoulder-launched rocket against an Israeli Arkia Airlines plane at the same location and on the same day. A year later, on November 15, 2003, two suicide bombers attacked a synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey, and five days later a suicide bomber detonated a device near the Israeli consulate in Istanbul. The anti-Israeli operations by Al-Qaeda affiliates continued in April 2004 with a double attack on recreation sites in the Sinai Peninsula filled with Israel tourists; the Hilton Taba Hotel and the Ras A-Satan recreation village were both struck by car bombs. Finally, in the summer of 2005, global Salafi jihad militants succeeded in surprising Israel by launching a Katyusha rocket from Jordanian territory toward the resort town of Eilat.11
Among the mos
t challenging threats Israel faces today are attacks by terrorists who are not Palestinians or even Arabs. The risk emerges from countries where terrorists enjoy unlimited freedom of movement—mainly Africa and the Middle East, but not only there. The salient example of such an activity is the case of two British youths of Pakistani origin who volunteered to commit a suicide attack at a bar in Tel Aviv called Mike’s Place at the behest of Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Twenty-two-year-old Asif Mohammed Hanif, a resident of the town of Hounslow near London, and Omar Khan Sharif from Derby, who was five years older than his friend, had become acquainted when they had visited Damascus at the same time in order to pursue their Islamic studies. Both were associated with the Al-Muhajiron (“The Immigrants”) group that was active in England and believed in war against the West. A friendship developed between the two, and the rumor soon spread that the two wanted to offer themselves in the name of the struggle against Israel. On April 12, 2003, they reached the Jordanian side of the Allenby Bridge, presented their British passports at the border checkpoint, and asked for permission to enter Israel. The two aroused the suspicion of an airport security guard, and a GSS officer questioned them on the purpose of their visit in Israel, the route they had taken before arriving at Israel, and the people they intended to meet. In the end, the interrogation did not yield any cause for further detention, and they were allowed into the country.
Hanif and Sharif enjoyed complete freedom of movement in Israel. First they traveled to Gaza, and after a short stay there they visited Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Nablus, and Ramallah. At the end of their tour, they returned to Gaza, where they made contact with members of the Hamas military wing. The British pair introduced themselves to the local people as peace activists and made sure to link up with representatives of international humanitarian organizations and to visit institutions that granted welfare services to the Palestinians. On April 29, more than two weeks after they had gained entrance to Israel, they joined a group of Italian journalists traveling to Tel Aviv. The journalists’ vehicle was not checked, according to the policy that was customary then, and from there it was not very far to the youth hostel on 48 Ha’yarkon Street. On the wall of the hostel, the two found an invitation in English to music evenings at the neighboring bar, Mike’s Place. The next day, at a late hour, they left the hostel and made their way to the bar. While they were waiting at the entrance to the building, Sharif’s explosive device, rigged up in a Koran, had a technical failure. While the detonator exploded the main charge failed to go off. Hanif decided to carry out the operation on his own. At 1:00 a.m. a strong blast was heard from the area of the bar. Ten minutes later, the police received a report about a man who was seen running away from the vicinity of the explosion. The man, Omar Sharif, tried to enter the lobby of the nearby David Intercontinental Hotel, but the security guard at the entrance pushed him back. Sharif rushed outside and stopped a taxi. He had just about got into the car when the security officer who had pursued him arrived in time to pull him out of the cab. Despite the joint efforts of the officer and the driver to restrain him, Sharif was still able to escape and fled toward the beach. After combing the area, the police found only his jacket and explosive device. On May 12, his body washed up on the shore.12
Most of the onus of gathering intelligence in such cases fell on the shoulders of Mossad, which now had to monitor social networks operating in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Israeli intelligence’s familiarity with some of these regions is very limited. Furthermore, the increase in Islamic immigration to the West has now created a situation in which almost every major city in Europe, America, and Australia has a widespread network of mosques, as well as Islamic education and welfare institutions. The ability of a small organization such as Mossad to obtain intelligence on all the sites that may potentially develop into extremist action—oriented cells is also very limited. This is emphasized by the fact that Mossad knew nothing of the 9/11 plot. Furthermore, the only partial cooperation offered by local intelligence agencies does not effectively help Mossad to thwart terrorism.13
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Is it possible to be better prepared for these challenges? Over the years, terrorism aimed at Israel has become more aggressive, and the civilian home front has become the front line. The Israeli war model, which has also been replicated in other countries, has not proven to be a success in meeting its goals. In order to effectively contend with terrorism, it is incumbent to transfer the bulk of counter-terrorism activity to alternative models. Citizens of democratic states must realize that terrorism pursues democracies wherever they may be and every so often will rear its head. Policymakers should refrain from making empty promises of being able to entirely eradicate terrorism.14 During times of terrorism, policymakers must exhaust all available resources in the framework of the conflict so that they may reduce its intensity and lower violence to tolerable levels. This could be achieved by applying elements from the reconciliatory model. Moreover, since terrorism is a type of psychological warfare, politicians should fight the temptation to boost the morale of the public through sophisticated assassinations of terrorist leaders. The assassinations do not meet this goal. The public is aware that assassinations usually lead to retaliations by the terrorists and thus instead of feeling more secure, civilians feel more threatened. Policymakers themselves intensify the fear by warning the public of the unavoidable revenge. Hence, not only do such assassinations not undermine the capabilities of the various terrorist groups to attack, but they also intensify the terrorists’ desire to prove their viability by amplifying the psychological fear factor. Clear and honest statements by politicians who tell the public that terrorism, despite its horrific outcomes, rarely poses a major threat to the state’s national security would be welcome in that connection. Such statements would reassure the public and undermine the attempts of the terrorists to create a continuous state of fear, chaos, and mistrust of the public in its leaders. Beyond mitigating the psychological impact of terrorism, policymakers should allocate resources and formulate a defensive model that consists of three main stages: prevention, crisis management, and reconstruction.
At the prevention stage, it is extremely important to assess frequently the level of threat posed by terrorists. Preventive intelligence is essential, since it enables the security forces to implement effective selective prevention procedures. Yet even in the absence of accurate information, it is of the essence to try to bring different pieces of information together and to assess the risks on yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily bases. Such risk assessments are essential to planning more effective protection mechanisms for attractive targets in times of danger. These include the physical protection of targets, the allocation of resources for technological solutions, and the employment of a sufficient number of guards at strategic places. It is also important to deploy trained rescue forces if the risk seems immediate.
At the crisis-management stage, it is essential to design and implement routine procedures that will ensure a flow of relevant information to all the emergency forces after an attack. This is important in preventing too many or too few rescue forces from being sent in, as well as in ensuring that the forces can enter and leave the attack site unobstructed, whether by clearing urban traffic arteries or by the use of roadblocks. When an attack occurs, temporary headquarters should be set up at the site to synchronize the entrances and departures of the emergency forces and to coordinate activities inside the area. Moreover, a framework that defines the roles and routines of all actors participating in postattack crisis management is essential. Finally, since the first persons to encounter and provide information about terrorist attacks are usually members of the public, governments should try to educate the public on how to respond to such attacks.
In the reconstruction stage, it is important to treat the direct victims and their families, as well as other individuals who have been affected by an attack. Such treatment should follow a long-term plan that would allow state authoriti
es a degree of flexibility, enabling them to tailor different solutions for the different victims. At the end of the day, the goal should be a speedy and effective recovery for the victims, both physically and psychologically. No less important is putting businesses back on track as quickly as possible. This could be achieved by offering them various incentives such as tax relief. Most important, it is the duty of policymakers to mitigate the psychological effects of terrorist attacks immediately, using every media outlet, and thus to undermine the very goal of the terrorists.
On a different front, efforts to suppress channels of cash flow to terrorists should be reassessed. Groups such as Hamas are almost impenetrable when attempting to pin down their financing sources. In contrast to its image in the West, the group is first and foremost a social movement that runs a ramified system of charity and relief institutions. A significant part of the monies that are collected in the West is sent to these institutions out of a genuine desire to assist the Palestinian population, which is in dire need of health and welfare services. The relatively amorphous structure of the Hamas leads to situations in which the heads of the charity mechanisms in Gaza at the same time support terrorist cells and may transfer part of the funds to them, either directly or indirectly. The bulk of these pecuniary transfers are conducted on a local level and are not registered or documented, another fact that makes efforts to block the cash flow particularly difficult.15
