by Ami Pedahzur
Even more complicated are the attempts to block the support of states. Iran, which over the last few years has become a major source of funding for the various Palestinian groups, has a ramified network of financial, security, and intelligence organizations that can overcome different barriers set by Israel. Hence, it can be assumed that despite a few successes in revealing attempts to channel funds to groups of terrorists, many more such attempts remain hidden from intelligence organizations. Since terrorist attacks, either suicide operations or rocket barrages, are relatively cheap, and given that the various terrorist networks do not seem to have been weakened over the years, it appears that the campaign to crack down on the financiers of these groups has not been very successful.
INTELLIGENCE AND THE ARMED FORCES
Despite the proven success of the defensive model, policymakers and the heads of the security establishment are unlikely to give up the war model easily. Still, I think it important to make some recommendations for intelligence organizations and the armed forces to consider.
Israel’s intelligence organizations, headed by the GSS, have indeed developed impressive capabilities. They have helped to intercept acts of terrorism while still in the planning stages and to strike at terrorists and their leaders. Terrorists are skilled at eluding intelligence efforts, however, and they will continue to be so. It is impossible to monitor every terrorist cell and thwart every attack. In order to contend with terrorists effectively, intelligence and thwarting forces have to be as flexible as the terrorists—a virtually impossible task as well. Therefore, instead of implementing organizational reforms that will end up in a new series of struggles between the various agencies, the agent model that is employed in the United States should be adopted, with certain adjustments. The idea is to establish a main headquarters for the struggle against terrorism that will serve as the hub of a network that will send out its arms to each and every one of the various intelligence and thwarting forces. The establishment of such a headquarters will not require any far-reaching organizational reforms or a massive investment of resources. At the same time, it will enable daily coordination among the various bodies and a rapid deployment of the necessary resources when a terrorist threat is detected by one of the intelligence organizations. Representatives of all the forces in charge of coping with terrorism will be stationed full-time at the headquarters. Their job will be real-time coordination among the various organizations. The prime minister’s advisor for coping with terrorism or an intelligence advisor will supervise the headquarters, as the Agranat Commission and the Committee of Inquiry Into the Intelligence System in Light of the War in Iraq recommended.16
The basic requirements for the position of advisor should be a deep familiarity with all aspects of terrorism and with the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence and thwarting forces. The advisor must have the ability to analyze contradictory intelligence assessments, to present the leadership with as clear picture as possible while distinguishing between assessments based on intelligence and those based on guesswork, and to offer viable alternatives for coping with each challenge. Other important duties of the advisor would include the assessment of various counterterrorism policies that have been implemented in the past as well as by other countries and a careful drawing of conclusions from such experiences. These conclusions will become highly valuable for the creation of a framework for an official counterterrorism policy. This new model should not replace the war model altogether, but rather should incorporate successful elements from alternatives, including the criminal-justice and the reconciliatory models.
The advisor would have to be close to but independent of the prime minister. One of the advisor’s main functions would be to prevent the leadership from acting under public or political pressure, to offer alternative models of response, and to help leaders instill a sense of security in the civilian population. Another no less important function would be to serve as an unbiased arbiter in the event of struggles between organizations. The position of advisor would not be at the expense of the triennial evaluation of the regional and functional sectors of the responsibilities of each of the intelligence organizations and the redefining of the borders of each sector in keeping with changing circumstances. A permanent committee whose role would be defined by law would conduct this evaluation. Participants in the discussions would include representatives of the parliamentary system, the prime minister’s advisor, and heads of the intelligence organizations. A clear division of fields of activity that would be sensitive to the changing types of threats could mitigate the extent of interorganizational struggles.
In the area of international cooperation, the picture actually looks brighter. Global terrorism has opened an unprecedented window of opportunity for Israel. Most of the countries around the globe are afraid of terrorist attacks against their citizens. This fear has found public expression in the signing of international treaties against terrorism and increasing intelligence cooperation among friendly states. Even though many countries are not interested in formal or even informal friendly ties with Israel, the importance of intelligence cooperation sidelines such issues. Israel still enjoys significant prestige, mainly in the human-intelligence field. The intelligence organizations of many countries are glad to benefit from the knowledge Israel has developed and receive information from this country.17 Since the Israeli intelligence community does not have unlimited resources, it, too, can benefit from the assistance of intelligence organizations from rich countries that are spearheading the development of high-tech intelligence-gathering instruments and their use in the struggle against terrorism. Before intelligence organizations around the world can express openness to the idea of cooperation with Israel, however, Israel will have to give up its longstanding habit of violating the sovereignty of other states. In an era of multiple and increasingly sophisticated threats, Israel cannot afford to jeopardize strategic cooperation with potential allies in the war against terrorism.
Adjustment is also necessary in the thwarting sphere. In late 2006, Israel’s Channel Two television broadcasted a segment in which the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) revealed for the first time the existence of a counterterrorism military school. The soldiers who were training there appeared in the broadcast while practicing takeover scenarios developed during a period of hostage taking incidents. The segment, which was broadcast four months after the Second Lebanon War, was designed to relay a firm message: Israel is prepared for the struggle against terrorism. More than anything else, however, it showed that the IDF is ready to contend with incidents whose chances of occurring are low.
The major lesson learned from the Second Lebanon War is that military units must become more professional in their fields of specialization. Tracking down and arresting terrorists is not a mission that requires the assignment of elite units. In many countries that adhere to the criminal-justice model, police forces carry out this task. Yet given the volume of terrorism with which Israel has to cope, police forces by themselves will not be able to counter this challenge. That said, much of the burden can be transferred to the Border Police as well as to soldiers who would be trained specifically for such missions. In December 2005, six independent battalions, including the armored infantry, established back in the days of the first intifada, were concentrated under the Kfir (900) Brigade. Each battalion is under the command of a different regional brigade in the West Bank and is designated to operate against Palestinian fighters in an area familiar to its soldiers. The soldiers themselves go through a specialized seven-month training period in microwarfare to prepare themselves for the operations to which they will be assigned. With the support of Yamam, the elite mistaarvim units Duvdevan and Yamas, the border police, and the unmanned-aerial-vehicle and helicopter squadrons, the Kfir brigade soldiers should be the operational arms of the GSS in the occupied territories and enable their comrades from the Armored Corps, the Infantry Corps, and the elite units to focus on their own training and to fulfill their original, designated
purposes in times of emergency. The successful Sayeret Matkal and Shaldag operation on Syrian soil in September 2007 is a prime example of the great potential of the special units, when they are not occupied with side missions that do not correspond with their qualifications and their original objectives. While Sayeret Matkal soldiers gathered crucial intelligence and evidence that Syria was building a nuclear facility, the Sayeret Shaldag men used their special laser position-pinpointing equipment to make it feasible for the Israeli Air Force to attack and eradicate it. Hence, the Yamam should remain the sole counterterrorism SWAT team, while the elite military units should be removed from the counterterrorism scene and be deployed for such missions only if they serve the purpose of training them to perform better in their designated fields of expertise.
At the time that this book was written, there was no end in sight to Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians or with the Arab world in general. The conflict, which used to be territorial in nature, has changed in recent years, becoming an ideological and theological dispute as well. This significantly worsens the situation with regard to the challenges of terrorism. The chances of reducing the levels of violence seem slimmer than ever, as the players are not only Palestinian groups plotting to strike at Israeli and Jewish targets, but also Sunni and Shiite cells all over the world, who are ideologically committed to the destruction of the State of Israel.18
This book focuses entirely on Israel’s struggle against terrorism, which has so far not been extensively researched, at least not with respect to its operational dimension. Even so, it must be recalled that together with the terrorism threat, the Israeli security establishment is constantly contending with strategic threats from other sources. Worth mentioning, among others, are the Iranian nuclear threat, the risk of war with the states bordering on Israel, and the risk of the rise of other radical regimes in the region. While terrorism tends to occupy the public as well as policymakers, it is imperative to understand and internalize the psychological dimension of terrorism and the limitations of the use of force in a nonsymmetrical struggle. It is time to give other counterterrorism models a chance while diverting the war model to where it belongs: strategic threats posed by state actors.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1 Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Terrorism and Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled,” in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 3—23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats,” Terrorism and Political Violence 1, no. 2 (1989): 242—269; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analyzing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 2 (2002): 77—122; Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 332—333.
2 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1986), 125.
3 For example: Peter Chalk, “EU Counter-terrorism, the Maastricht Third Pillar, and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 2 (1994): 103—145; Peter Chalk, “The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (1995): 10—44; Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996); Peter Chalk, “The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998): 373—388; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 1 (1998): 389—413; Crelinsten, “Terrorism and Political Communication,” 3—23; Crelinsten, “Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Democracy,” 242—269; Crelinsten and Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism,” 307—340; Charles Dunlap, “The Policeization of the Military,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 27, no. 2 (1999): 217—232; Ariel Merari, “Deterring Terrorists,” paper presented at the Terrorism Beyond the 21st Century conference, Oklahoma City, April 2000, 16—19; Fernando Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998): 351—371; Ken G. Robertson, “Intelligence Terrorism and Civil Liberties,” in Wilkinson and Stewart, Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 549—569; David T. Schiller, “The Police Response to Terrorism: A Critical Overview,” in ibid., 536—548; Paul Wilkinson, “Pathways Out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies,” in ibid., 453—465; G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990).
4 Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 27—28, 39—40.
5 Crelinsten and Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism,” 318—322; Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic During the Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 4 (June 2006): 359—382.
6 “Palestinians Support the Ceasefire, Negotiations, and Reconciliations Between the Two Peoples, But a Majority Opposes Arrests and Believes That Armed Confrontations Have Helped Achieve National Rights,” Public Opinion Poll no. 3 (December 2001); “While Indicating Important Shifts in Palestinian Public Attitudes Toward the Intifada and the Peace Process, PSR Poll Shows Significant Support for the Appointment of a Prime Minister and Refusal to Give Confidence in the New Palestinian Government,” Public Opinion Poll no. 6 (November 2002); “With Arafat’s Popularity Reaching Its Highest Level in Five Years, Three Quarters of the Palestinians Support the Maxim Restaurant Suicide Bombing and Two-Thirds Believe the Roadmap is Dead,” Public Opinion Poll no. 9 (October 2003); “After Four Years of Intifada, an Overwhelming Sense of Insecurity Prevails Among Palestinians Leading to High Levels of Support for Bombing Rocket Attack on One Hand and to High Levels of Demand for Mutual Cessation of Violence and Questioning the Effectiveness of Armed Attacks on the Other,” Public Opinion Poll no. 13 (September 2004). All published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, www.pcpsr.org (accessed May 27, 2007).
7 Graham H. Turbiville Jr., “Preface: Future Trends in Low Intensity Conflict,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 11, nos. 2—3 (Winter 2002): 155; Tamir Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars,’” International Affairs 80, no.1 (January 2004): 19—37; Mark Kramer, “The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004—2005): 5—62; Melissa S. M. Bazarian, “Whither the Iraqi Insurgency: Prospects for Counterinsurgent Success,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 13, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 24—53; Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Zeev Maoz, “Evaluating Israel’s Strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949—2006,” Security Studies 16, no. 3 (July—September 2007): 319—349; David Tucker, “What’s New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 1—14; Eli Carmon, “The Role of Intelligence in Counter-terrorism,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 119—139; Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (June 2003): 473-507; Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamists Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 4 (July-August 2005): 275-293; Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-361; Stephen Marrin, “Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the Beginning,” Journal of Homeland Security (November 2003), www.homelandsecurity.org (accessed May 27, 2007); Marco Cepik, “Sistemas nacionais de inteligencia: Origens,
logica de expansão e configuração atual” (National Intelligence Systems: Origins, the Logic of Expansion, and Current Configuration), Dados 46, no. 1 (2003): 75-127; Walter W. Burke, Organizational Change: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002); Charles R. Wise, “Organizing Homeland Security,” Public Administration Review 62, no. 2 (September 2002): 131-144; Uriel Rosenthal, “September 11: Public Administration and the Study of Crises and Crisis Management,” Administration and Society 35, no. 2 (May 2003): 129-143; John R. Deni, “The NATO Rapid Deployment Corps: Alliance Doctrine and Force Structure,” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 3 (December 2004): 498.
8 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 905-934; Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 16-17.
9 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” 907; Michael Horowitz, “The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2006), 38; John W. Soule, “Problems in Applying Counterterrorism to Prevent Terrorism: Two Decades of Violence in Northern Ireland Reconsidered,” Terrorism 12 (1989): 31-46; Brian Martin, “Instead of Repression,” Social Alternatives 25, no. 1 (2006): 62; Christopher Davy, “Managing Risk and Uncertainty: An Approach to Counterterrorist Planning,” in Alan Thompson, ed., Terrorism and 2000 Olympics (Canberra: Australian Defense Center, 1996), 165; Aharon Yariv, “Countering Palestinian Terrorism” in Ariel Merari, ed., On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism (Frederick, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), 4; Ariel Merari and Shlomi Elad, Foreign Terrorism: Palestinian Terrorism Abroad (1968–1986) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1987), 118; Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler, “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 183-200; Nathaniel N. Keohane and Richard G. Zeckhauser, “The Ecology of Terror Defense,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26, nos. 2-3 (March 2003): 201-229.
