1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  It took a considerable amount of time before the United States recognized the fundamental change in British policy. America’s leaders remained leery of London’s intentions. Madison, Monroe, Gallatin, Adams, Clay, and their colleagues would have to be shown by concrete action that a new relationship existed. They wanted one, of course—every administration since Washington had wanted it—but they were not expecting a basic change in British policy. For them, the most important question was: would Britain’s leaders finally accept the independence of the United States and treat her with respect? They had not in the past, and their attitude had eventually led to war. A change of the magnitude that Castlereagh envisioned appeared unlikely to an American leadership that for years had dealt with British ministries with wholly different attitudes.

  Napoleon’s triumphal entry into Paris on March 20, 1815, so soon after the Treaty of Ghent, helped move Britain and America toward a new rapport. His appearance was not a surprise in London. For many weeks, Liverpool and his colleagues had worried about a military coup in Paris. Nonetheless, when the event happened, Liverpool had half his army in North America in the quixotic pursuit of more territory. That army was needed immediately in Flanders, but it would not be available for weeks. In that time Bonaparte could raise an immense army and become as big a menace as ever.

  Immediately after seizing power, Napoleon tried to reassure the allies that he had changed, that his intentions were peaceful, but they were having none of it. When he entered Paris, the great powers unanimously committed themselves to destroying him before he got too strong. They were ready to bring their full weight to bear against him. Wellington was in Vienna at the time, and the powers looked to him to lead the coalition armies. He had to act fast, however. If Bonaparte were given sufficient time, he could raise an immense army and be hard to defeat. For Liverpool to have a large part of the British army in North America at this critical moment appeared the height of folly.

  Fortunately, Napoleon’s timing was not propitious for another grand attempt to rule Europe. The divisions that had plagued the allies since his demise were well on their way to resolution at Vienna. In January the czar had chosen to compromise on Poland, and Prussia and Austria had done the same on Saxony, paving the way for a general agreement.

  President Madison was naturally concerned that a renewal of the old war in Europe might reignite the maritime issues that caused the War of 1812. The peace treaty was silent on them because the parties could not agree. Castlereagh was alive to the danger, and he moved quickly to prevent neutral trade and impressment from reemerging to disrupt his rapprochement with the United States. The British were careful not to interfere with American trade, and naval officers were given strict rules to prevent impressment from becoming a problem again. Instead of a callous disregard of American rights on the high seas, there came a sensitivity from London that avoided conflict. Madison, for his part, although unaware of London’s new attitude, was slow to take offense at British actions. Thus, tentatively, the two old enemies took the first, halting steps toward a new relationship.

  But would this new British policy continue after Napoleon was defeated and packed off to St. Helena? That critical question was answered quickly as well, when Castlereagh at every opportunity avoided serious controversy. His new policy did not turn out to be an expedient to get Britain through her trial with Napoleon. Castlereagh’s strategy was based on the conviction that the long-term interests of Britain required friendship with America. Castlereagh and Madison thus laid the foundation of a peaceful relationship between the two great English-speaking countries that was to last more than two centuries and was to serve both them and the world extraordinarily well.

  The U.S. Navy’s role in bringing about Britain’s newfound respect for the United States was critical. The part played at the battles of Lake Erie and at Plattsburgh Bay are obvious and have been celebrated by historians and the public alike. The role of the navy at Baltimore, although not as well-known, has been recognized. Less so the Battle of New Orleans, where the navy’s part has remained hidden but was nonetheless a key factor in victory, as Jackson himself acknowledged. Even less appreciated is the importance of the great victories on the high seas. Historians, without exception, portray these episodes as spectacular but of no strategic significance. Yet when one considers that they played a major role in changing London’s attitude toward America, they were of great strategic importance, as was the triumph at New Orleans. The battle may have come after the peace treaty, but in turning that document from a temporary armistice into a lasting peace, the victory at New Orleans was of fundamental value. The public was not wrong in celebrating it, for, in many ways, it was the greatest triumph of the war for America and had the most lasting impact.

  Of equal significance was the way President Madison conducted the war. He did so within the confines of the Constitution. He managed the conflict in strict accordance with the republican principles he had always espoused. He did not aggregate great power to himself and build up a strong central government, nor did he try to crush his opponents by passing sedition laws. In conducting himself in this manner, he immeasurably strengthened the democratic forces that had been building in America since the start of the Revolution and that had accelerated under Jefferson.

  The war strengthened these democratic forces even more by reducing the elitist Federalist Party to insignificance in national politics and by extending the franchise. During the war so much reliance was placed on militias that men who risked their lives demanded that the property qualifications to vote be relaxed so they could participate in elections. It seemed absurd to ask them to fight and die when they could not vote.

  The War of 1812 was thus of great importance in the nation’s history because it initiating a fundamental change in Britain’s relationship with the United States while strengthening the nation’s democratic principles. In that sense it was a second War of Independence. Of course, the actual independence of America was never an issue and never in doubt, but her experiment in republican government, which, when the conflict began, was not fully secure, became so as a result of military and political successes achieved during and immediately after the war. America proved that its republican form of government could deal with a crisis and deal with it successfully without discarding its constitution. In that way the War of 1812 completed the fight for independence begun in 1775. The new unity and strength of the republic freed her for a century from European entanglements and allowed her people to prosper in spite of the vicissitudes that would continually challenge them.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  I am deeply indebted to many people for their generous help in writing this book, beginning with my wife, Kay, who has provided consistent support and sage advice through the vicissitudes of what is an all-consuming task over a long period. My gifted agent, Rob McQuilkin of Lippincott Massie McQuilkin, provided astute guidance and much needed encouragement through the various stages of the project, from initial conception to final publication. Lara Heimert, executive editor at Basic Books, improved the manuscript immeasurably by her brilliant critiques offered at critical moments. Associate editor Alex Littlefield assisted her and made an enormous contribution to the quality of the final product. Vice Admiral George Emery, U.S. Navy (Retired), generously shared his incomparable knowledge of the naval aspects of the War of 1812, reading the entire manuscript with great care and providing detailed, thoughtful advice. My nephew, Michael Daughan, who has worked for the navy his entire career and has an avid interest and broad knowledge of the early history of the service, read and brilliantly criticized the entire manuscript twice, improving it significantly. My daughter, Mary Daughan Sheft, read and commented on the text with her usual skill and insight. Kay Mariea, Perseus’s director of editorial services, oversaw editorial production with good humor and great expertise.

  I also want to thank my friend Alexander (Sandy) Brook, Maine’s legendary editor, publisher, and writer, for his consistent encouragement; my
son-in-law, Mark Sheft; and my brother William (Jerry) Daughan for their unfailing support as well.

  A work that encompasses the entire history of the War of 1812 must inevitably draw on the studies of innumerable scholars and writers; they are listed in the endnotes and bibliography. I was particularly blessed by the exceptional outpouring of thoughtful scholarship that has appeared in the last twenty-five years. I also want to thank my former students and colleagues at the Air Force Academy, Connecticut College, and the Coast Guard Academy and my teachers at the University of New Hampshire, Stanford, and Harvard who excited my long-standing interest in the great issues of war and peace that are at the heart of this book and my previous work, If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—From the Revolution to the War of 1812.

  NOTES

  INTRODUCTION

  x Byron did not have to wait: Charles O. Paullin, Commodore John Rodgers: Captain, Commodore, and Senior Officer of the American Navy, 1773-1838 (1909; reprint, Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 252.

  xi Midshipman John Taylor was: Samuel Eliot Morison, Old Bruin: Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794–1858 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 35.

  xi “by altering [his] course”: Excerpt from Commodore Rodger’s Journal, June 23, 1812, in The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, ed. William S. Dudley (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1985), 1:154–57.

  xii “I acknowledge”: Byron to Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, June 27, 1812, in Dudley, ed., Naval War of 1812, 1:159.

  xii “We have lost”: Leonard F. Guttridge, Our Country, Right or Wrong: The Life of Stephen Decatur, The U.S. Navy’s Most Illustrious Commander (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2006), 133.

  xiii “in furtherance of that spirit”: Times (London), Aug. 22, 1812.

  CHAPTER 1

  2 the American ambassador to France: In 1785 Jefferson succeeded Benjamin Franklin as the U.S. ambassador in Paris, where he remained until 1789. Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), 185.

  3 might not even survive: Forest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Norton, 1979), 147–49, 165–71.

  4 the culture in which they were raised: Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: Norton, 1982), 91–92; Irving Brant, James Madison, vol. 3: Father of the Constitution, 1787–1800 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 289.

  5 Washington issued his famous proclamation: James Flexner, George Washington: Anguish and Farewell (1793–1799) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 25–37.

  6 These six frigates: Marshall Smelser, The Congress Founds the Navy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 68.

  6 Washington was disappointed: Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 388–96; Steven Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795–1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 19–77.

  7 to fight the Quasi-War: Michael Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000); Alexander Deconde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797–1801 (New York: Scribner’s, 1966).

  7 “first mentor of the Federal Navy”: Retired Vice Admiral George Emery, “Thomas Truxtun: First Mentor of the Federal Navy,” Pull Together: Newsletter of the Naval Historical Foundation (Fall/Winter 2010–11): 12–14.

  8 Federalists continued to believe: Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005), 162.

  10 The tiny navy that Jefferson: Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801–1805 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); George C. Daughan, If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 346–74.

  11 Napoleon wanted to fight them: Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 450–52.

  11 Nelson demonstrated at the Battle: David Howarth, Trafalgar: The Nelson Touch (New York: Atheneum, 1969).

  CHAPTER 2

  13 Ambassador James Monroe: Monroe had replaced Rufus King in August 1803.

  14 Orders in Council: Orders in Council were executive degrees.

  15 “strangling the maritime power”: Madison to Jefferson, March 12, 1815, quoted in Irving Brant, James Madison, vol. 6: Commander in Chief, 1812–1836 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 355.

  15 Harrison Gray Otis wrote: Samuel E. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis: The Urbane Federalist (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 327.

  15 “The general business of impressing”: Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 281.

  15 “This whole controversy”: Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 281.

  15 seizing ships at a faster rate: By June 1812 France had seized 434 American vessels and Great Britain 389. Glenn Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the War of 1812 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), 2:52.

  16 Humphreys was not about: Spencer C. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 113–14; Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), 1:155.

  17 “the decayed and heartless”: Times (London), July 5, 1813.

  18 “an American in England pines”: Benjamin Waterhouse, A Journal of a Young Man of Massachusetts (Boston, 1816), reprinted as Extra No. 18 of the Magazine of History (New York, 1911).

  18 Alcohol was liberally: James Tertius De Kay, Chronicles of the Frigate Macedonian, 1809–1922 (New York: Norton, 1995), 37.

  19 “inhuman [resembling] roasted meat”: Samuel Leech, Thirty Years from Home: A Seaman’s View of the War of 1812 (1843; reprint, Tucson, AZ: Fireship Press, 2008), 20.

  19 In 1806 the Admiralty: Dudley Pope, The Black Ship (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), 62–63 and Appendix A.

  19 “Fifty were laid”: Leech, Thirty Years from Home, 41.

  19 “No plea of necessity”: Leech, Thirty Years from Home, 26–27.

  20 “Hence, what with poor”: Leech, Thirty Years from Home, 60.

  20 Worse, men wounded: Pope, The Black Ship, 123–26.

  20 “Here was encouragement”: William Richardson, A Mariner of England: An Account of William Richardson from Cabin Boy in the Merchant Service to Warrant Officer in the Royal Navy, 1780–1819, as Told by Himself, ed. Colonel Spencer Childers (London: John Murray, 1908), 100–11. For a different view of life in the Royal Navy, see N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815 (New York: Norton, 2004), 565–66, and Jon Latimer, 1812: War with America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 6.

  20 it is generally agreed: Castlereagh speech in the House of Commons, reproduced in Times (London), Feb. 19, 1813; James F. Zimmerman, Impressment of American Seamen (New York: Columbia University, 1925), 27.

  21 “We must on no account”: Times (London), Jan. 11, July 3, and Aug. 2, 1813.

  21 offering five pounds for: C. S. Forester, The Age of Fighting Sail: The Story of the Naval War of 1812 (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 39.

  22 Deserters from the Royal Navy: Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 569.

  22 the British felt that the real reason: Times (London), Dec. 25, 1812.

  22 The ministry wanted: Times (London), Feb. 20, 1813.

  CHAPTER 3

  23 At the end of 1807: “Eighth Annual Message to Congress, November 8, 1808,” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1984), 544; Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), 457.

  23 In December 1807: Ketcham, James Madison, 456–57.

  24 By the end of 1807: Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1936), 96.

  24 “withdraw from the reach”: Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administra
tive History, 1801–1829 (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 268.

  24 The British were indeed hampered: George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), 43.

  26 The stranger turned out to be: Commander Arthur Bingham, R.N., to Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, R.N., May 21, 1811, and Commodore John Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, May 23, 1811, in The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, ed. William S. Dudley (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1985), 1:40–50.

  26 During the summer he conferred: Ketcham, James Madison, 508.

  26 “We have been so long”: Monroe to James Taylor, June 13, 1812, in Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 670.

  27 “Perceval [and his colleagues]”: Irving Brant, James Madison, vol. 6: Commander in Chief, 1812–1836 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 16.

  27 Republican malcontents: Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752–1839 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971), 144–70.

  27 Madison felt that he: Richard Buel Jr., America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle Over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 138.