“The wine is red,” announced the BBC, thus giving the code instruction for the Resistance to strike. All over France and in the Low Countries, men, women, and children and their OSS and SOE friends blocked highways, dynamited bridges, destroyed German supplies, and ambushed German columns.
Donovan and Bruce sailed from Plymouth with the Allied fleet shortly after midnight on June 6.
“I went over in the Tuscaloosa, which was the flagship of Admiral Deyo,” Donovan reported a week later to Franklin Roosevelt.
Donovan and Bruce watched the attack from the Tuscaloosa, with Donovan sitting beside the ship’s big guns and munching apples. Then about three in the afternoon, both men took a launch over to the Bayfield, an ammunition ship, where OSS man Bob Thayer was giving an intelligence briefing. Thayer, who was in touch with the OSS agents working behind the German lines, was able to report on the activities of the French Resistance. Shortly afterward, Donovan and Bruce went ashore onto Utah Beach to contact OSS agents.
“I was pretty nervous about the whole affair,” Bruce said later.
Perhaps it was my nerves, or my own clumsiness, but I almost killed Donovan. A German plane came swooping down to strafe us, and trying to get away, I plunged right into Donovan, the edge of my steel helmet cutting him just below the jugular vein. He spouted blood, and I thought he was a goner.
Despite the blood pouring out, Donovan insisted it was only a superficial cut. He said we had to push inland and make contact with our agents. We got to an American battery captain who stopped us, but then saw Donovan’s Congressional Medal of Honor ribbon, and waved us on. He was still bleeding.
We saw no agents but we did run into a German machine-gun nest. We hit the dirt and burrowed in. Donovan told me that we could not be captured. We knew too much. He asked me whether I was carrying my poison pill. I admitted I was not. Donovan said that was all right, he had at least two on him and would give me one. But, when he searched his pockets, he could not find them. Then he remembered that he had left them in his medicine cabinet in the bathroom back at Claridge’s Hotel in London.
“David,” said Donovan, “if we get out of this alive, please call Gibb, the hall porter, and tell him to warn everyone not to touch the medicine in my bathroom.”
Then he added, “Ah well, no matter for the pills. If the Germans take us, I’ll shoot you first as your commanding officer, then I’ll shoot myself, so there’s nothing to worry about.”
Fortunately, Allied troops arrived and silenced the German guns. Donovan and Bruce were able to contact OSS agents with the Resistance. Ignoring the injury to his neck, Donovan explored the entire battlefront, observing the Allied operations with a professional eye. Then he returned to London and called together the OSS staff.
“His staff meetings were all very much to the point—brief,” said W. C. Reddick, who was in charge of documentation, counterfeiting, and clothing agents appropriately for their missions. “I recall the one he called just after his landing with the invasion of France. His account was graphic. Told it more like an athletic event.”
One London staffer asked if the troops were scared. “Hell, yes,” answered Donovan. “You could smell them!”
President Roosevelt had asked Donovan to make a thorough report on how well his generals and their forces were doing. On June 14, by then back in Washington, Donovan wrote to FDR:
Having just returned from the beachhead in France, I hope that you might find it of some interest to get certain conclusions based on my observations there.
1. The success of the landing as a whole shows certain fundamental weaknesses in the basic German position. These weaknesses are not only psychological; they are material and physical. It was clear that the Germans had neither the resources nor the capabilities to meet the attack at every possible landing beach. We talked to prisoners at the Utah Beach. One of them, a captain of the regular service, said that he was overwhelmed when he saw the ships coming in and then felt that he wanted to be identified with a movement that seemed so powerful and so efficient.
2. The presence of so many foreigners in the German forces was indicative of the same kind of difficulty that Napoleon had in Russia, as well as at Waterloo. Many of the Poles in the ranks of enlisted men were looking for an opportunity to escape.
3. All these various elements of disintegration, spiritual as well as physical, might result in a speedy breakup of the whole German defense if we can sustain an accelerated military pressure.
4. After the initial landing, we lost our momentum. If it is not regained and reaccentuated, there can be a recoalescing of the elements that make for disintegration.
5. Everything that I saw made clear that the Germans no longer have an Air Force that belongs in the Big League. They were able to have bombers over us at night and to send over some fighter bombers in bombing missions during the day, but our intelligence showed us that planes hurriedly brought in from Germany were in a very poor state of serviceability.
6. Also, the E-boats which attacked us were, like the planes, not the operations of a great power.
7. One thing that struck me was the very slow reaction of the Germans in counterattack. To me that seemed due to the measures of the Resistance Groups, but, more important, to the work of our Air Corps in the destruction of bridges and oil installations. Our intelligence showed that the present German needs for oil are 1.2 million tons. General oil shortage has not yet impaired mobility of ground forces in N.W. Europe. Constriction of mobility has been due to improved tactical bombing program—bridges, supply dumps, motor transport. However, strategic attack on oil target system could readily reduce output to 600,000 tons per month. With activity in East and West available enemy reserves could bridge the gap for two or three months at the most. This makes oil targets almost a front line target.
Two things particularly impressed me from our side. They were the following:
A. The tremendous effect that the radar countermeasures had in giving us initial advantage. I saw for myself the effect of jamming guided missiles and the detection of attempted countermeasures by the enemy.
B. The tremendous development in precision firing of our naval guns. The navy guns performed the duties not only of field guns but of railroad guns. It is in reality like corps artillery. I think it is probably true that never before has it been attempted to silence with naval gunfire so elaborate a system of coast defenses as here. After the first day the great block of firing was on targets requested by Signal Force Control Parties both to break up threatened counterattacks and to prepare the advance of our troops. The Nevada, operating close inshore and threatened by a great number of small and medium batteries, performed with the greatest gallantry and effectiveness. She succeeded, with her fourteen-inch main battery, in breaking up a serious counterattack which was forming the night of D day north of Carentan, consisting of armored troops and artillery.
All of this demonstrated to me the tremendous strides that have been made which are scarcely appreciated by those who have not observed closely the new equipment and technique of naval gunfire. With the excellent fire control and navigation equipment, not only can the naval forces be used as artillery in placing troops ashore but for protecting them from enemy artillery while expanding the beachhead and assisting them in all defenses until they are beyond range.
In a few days Donovan went to the White House to elaborate on his report to Roosevelt. He had been highly critical of the U.S. landings at Anzio, but he could report that things had gone much better in Normandy.
The same day that Donovan reported to Roosevelt about D day, the President asked for his opinion of De Gaulle. Was he the indispensable French leader he claimed to be, or were there possibly others in France who might have as much or more influence with the Resistance? On the morning of June 15 Donovan and Stimson met to discuss the subject.
“The President last night told me that he had got his information from Donovan about there being a number of other organized Resistants,” Stimso
n wrote in his diary. Donovan told Stimson that he had heard from Allen Dulles and others that, on the whole, De Gaulle was the symbol of the Resistance. However, the French distinguished between De Gaulle as a symbol and as a politician; he did not have the political power he thought he did. Donovan suggested that Eisenhower invite De Gaulle to confer about who should be established in each section of France as it was liberated. Stimson thought it an interesting idea, and he passed it on to General Marshall in London.
Donovan had already prepared a memorandum for the President on his thinking about the De Gaulle question, but now he decided not to send it. He explained to Roosevelt,
Before I sent it Mr. Stimson called me, and since talking with him I have torn up that memorandum. In view of the questions raised by Mr. Stimson, I think it my duty to tell you what I said to him concerning my position.
I told him that our intelligence clearly showed that there were many people in France, particularly those in the Maquis resistance groups, who did not like the Algiers set-up. I said also there were many who did not look with favor upon De Gaulle as a political figure. However, I told him that in view of the present situation, there were many in the resistance groups, whatever their view of De Gaulle as a political leader, who thought it advisable to have him in France now as a symbol of resistance.
Mr. Stimson then asked me my opinion as to what should be done regarding De Gaulle’s claim that his committee should be recognized as the provisional government. I told him that I thought it was right to refuse the demand of the De Gaulle committee for recognition as the provisional government unsanctioned by the approval of the people of France. I did say, however, that there was danger then in France, as well as in England, it would be made to appear that it was your dislike of De Gaulle that prevented this recognition and that this should be avoided. In reply to Mr. Stimson’s request for my suggestion, I said the following: We should keep in mind the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes that “the elements need eternal repetition.” Occasion should be taken now to clearly set forth the manner in which we would deal with the liberated areas.
In doing that I thought we ought to put the military situation at the forefront and full recognition should be given to De Gaulle as a military leader under Eisenhower. This was particularly necessary since already formal recognition had been given to General Koenig as the leader and representative of the resistance groups at our High Command. Having given this recognition to General De Gaulle and making the fullest use of him as a symbol of resistance, it could then be stated that General Eisenhower would consult with him as to the selection of individual administrators in the various regions. This consultation would not carry with it his recognition as head of a provisional government. . . . Such a position would appeal to the ultimate logic of the French people, and they are the ones whom I think you would wish to address. We thus clearly define the distinction we make in De Gaulle as a political and military leader; and while we recognize him in his military capacity, we leave it to the French people to determine his political position.
By July 4 Donovan could tell Roosevelt that his OSS teams were infiltrating at will through the German lines. “Before D day in France, I favored placing our espionage and intelligence people forward with corps and division,” he informed Roosevelt. “Instead it was decided to leave them back with army, which was the British plan. My objection to this plan was based on experience with former landings that there would be fluidity coming from the campaign, thus enabling us to infiltrate our agents. I talked to General Bradley at the beachhead on D plus 1 and was able to get some of our men ashore.”
Now Donovan was receiving detailed reports from his men in Normandy. The OSS French agents and French Resistance had become virtually the same. Donovan was able to give Roosevelt the following observations on the progress of the fighting:
Axis troops do not fight as hard as in Tunisia and early Italian campaigns.
Foreign levees in German units surrender easily, but are being told they will be shot by Americans.
Most divisions on north and northeast front of beachhead are now less than one-half normal strength.
They have not seen one German plane in daylight. Luftwaffe attacks beaches regularly one hour after dark, flak very heavy—enemy damage to us usually nil. Our planes everywhere.
French report most German soldiers rarely discussed future, but implied they expected war to be lost eventually ever since last year.
German prisoners not as fine type nor as arrogant as in early days in Tunisia, Sicily, etc. Most seem happy to be captured and out of it.
German Army morale definitely weaker—absence of Luftwaffe a constant blow to their confidence.
Guts of our paratroopers and assault troops tops. G.I.s fought like demons. Where bodies our airborne troops found isolated, frequently surrounded by six or more dead Germans.
Mechanical equipment captured such as radio-controlled small tanks (doodlebugs) etc. all show fine workmanship—no deterioration electrical and mechanical parts. Excellent strong night flares—very bright.
OSS agents inside Germany were sending Donovan other intriguing reports, which he shared with FDR. On July 6, he told the President,
The Japanese Army and Navy, as well as the Foreign Office, are still endeavoring to persuade Germany into a separate peace with the USSR. Early in June, General Arisue recommended this move during a talk with the German military attaché in Tokyo. In the opinion of the Japanese, the war’s center of gravity has moved to the western front and thus the USSR and Germany should come to terms so that a common front may be made against the western nations. The trip which Malik, the Soviet ambassador to Japan, made from Tokyo to Moscow on June 20 at the behest of the Japanese Foreign Office was for the purpose of sounding out whether the USSR would agree to negotiate a settlement of the Pacific war. Japan is looking ahead to a defeat of Germany and thinks that the USSR will not want to face the United States and the latter’s allies all by herself. Japan is ready to make very great concessions to the USSR and cooperate with her as an ally. Shigemitsu, the Japanese foreign minister, denied up to June 8 that any arrangements existed between the USSR and Japan. He even refused to admit that Japan was shipping supplies to the USSR, which is a fact confirmed by information which came to Berlin via Switzerland.
The Soviets, the Nazis, and the Japanese were in a swirl of secret diplomatic negotiations. Donovan knew that a major function of strategic intelligence was to supply the President of the United States with knowledge of what a presumed friend such as Stalin was actually attempting to do, as well as with information about the intrigues of avowed enemies. At the same time, the OSS had to provide tactical intelligence to those Allied armies already fighting in France and those planning still another landing in the south of France.
Collecting military intelligence and assessing the morale and attitudes of French civilians, Donovan’s agents kept him informed as to how the war was proceeding in France. The first OSS man in the south of France was Pierre Martineau, who jumped to the French Resistance with his radio operator, a young Pole named Janyk. As the Germans recognized that another Allied landing was likely to be made on the Mediterranean coast, they moved crack Waffen SS units into the area where the Resistance was active. Martineau and Janyk reported the troop movements to Donovan. The OSS dropped a quantity of a secret incendiary called Firefly to the Maquis. When OSS agents disguised as French workmen gassed up the German trucks and tanks rumbling down to the coast, they added Firefly. The trucks and tanks burst into flames when they were some distance down the road, creating chaos in the long line of vehicles. The Germans soon moved in two additional squads of Sicherheitsdienst and Gestapo to tighten the security on the coast. Several leaders of the French underground were caught by the Gestapo, as well as OSS man Martineau, but Janyk continued to send out information on German movements.
Among other OSS agents in southern France were René Dussaq, the Hollywood stunt man, and Joseph Le Fou (the Fool), whose sister had
been raped by the Germans and who now took pleasure in killing the enemy with his bare hands. Moe Berg, the erstwhile baseball player, had finished his work in Italy. Now he was posing as an entomologist behind the German lines.
Another OSS man, Geoffrey Jones, was flying to Algiers before going into France. “Someone told me that the man sitting opposite me was the baseball star Moe Berg,” he said. “I looked him over and when I saw his wristwatch, in spite of myself, I started to laugh. Naturally, he wondered what I was laughing at, but then when my watch caught his eyes, a big grin spread over his face too. Although no one was supposed to know that we were secret operatives, all of the graduates had been issued the same kind of special watch. The OSS might as well have hung tags around our necks.”
Presumably both Berg and Jones removed their watches before dropping into France. Jones had gone to school in Caen as a boy, and when the Allied invasion force swept ashore it landed only a mile and a half from where he had lived on the outskirts of St.-Tropez. Jones and his Maquis knocked out a radar installation at Fayence with small mortars and cleared fields so that Allied gliders could land. When coded instructions came over the BBC that the landings would be made on August 15, Jones was ready.
Donovan arrived in Naples in early August and proceeded to the OSS villa on Capri, where he met Colonel Toulmin, chief of the OSS mission in Cairo, and Colonel Huntington, who was to head the American military mission to Tito. On August 11, Tito arrived with Brig. Fitzroy MacLean of the British SOE. Tito brought along his enormous Alsatian dog, which was kept outside while Tito talked with the British and American intelligence leaders.
According to a report to Franklin Roosevelt, Donovan informed Tito that an OSS rescue and intelligence team had been dispatched to General Mihajlović. At that time Tito nodded his head and voiced no objection. He did say, however, that the men might not have such a good time with Mihajlović and suggested that their names be given to him so he could advise his troops to protect them in the event of trouble. Donovan was pleased with this response, for he was anxious to keep OSS men with both Mihajlović and Tito.
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