“We get valuable information from both of the Yugoslav leaders,” he later told Ned Putzell. “No intelligence is worth a hoot unless it is unprejudiced. It is necessary to see it through more than one eye.”
When the serious talk was completed, tea was served in the heirloom set belonging to Donovan’s friend Mrs. Williams, who owned the villa. Tito’s dog leaped into the room. His enormous tail, wagging with delight, brushed the tea things off a serving table onto the floor, where they landed with a crash. Donovan surveyed the debris sorrowfully, as well he might; after the war Mrs. Williams sued the OSS for the damage to her treasured tea service. She also complained that the contents of her wine cellar had disappeared.
“Anybody who thinks she can hide liquor in wartime is daft,” observed Henry Ringling North.
On August 15 Donovan was again aboard the Tuscaloosa, this time for the Anvil-Dragoon landings in the south of France. He had a jeep and his driver, Sergeant Buda, aboard so he could explore the enemy positions with more mobility once he got on land. Donovan had every intention of driving all the way to Paris. About the same time that he went ashore with Gen. Alexander Patch’s Seventh Army, a fresh OSS team landed from another ship.
“Seeking out his OSS team,” said Allen Dulles, “he found them upset because they had landed on one beach, their equipment on another, and no available transportation.”
Donovan listened to their gripes. “Any man who can’t get transportation somehow doesn’t belong in this outfit,” he announced with a smile, “and I’ll fire the first man caught stealing a car.”
OSS man Bob Thayer was also at St.-Tropez with two French officers. Donovan suddenly appeared in his jeep. “I want to borrow one of your French officers,” he told Thayer. “I want to go to Paris.”
“You can’t get into Paris,” said Thayer.
“It’s all right,” Donovan said. “I’ve got my people spotted around. I want a naval officer to see me through. I’ll be gone for three days.”
One of Thayer’s officers got into the jeep with Donovan, and they were off. He was indeed back in three days.
“You were right,” said Donovan. “We were almost ambushed.”
According to Thayer, Donovan tried to reach Paris three separate times. He was determined to be there when the underground French Forces of the Interior (FFI) rose in revolt, and his agents had informed him he had better hurry. OSS man Gerald W. Davis was with an operational group element that made the first contact with the Third and Seventh armies in the vicinity of Lyon. Later he wrote:
It was mid-morning on the day before Paris fell at Field Headquarters of Third Army. The 11th SF [Special Forces] Det. HQ tent flap was thrown back and, unexpectedly, in came General Donovan followed by Ernest Hemingway [then a war correspondent]. They were both almost boyishly exuberant. General Donovan announced that they were on their way to Paris and wanted a briefing. I outlined the friendly and enemy dispositions and the Paris FFI conditions as we knew them and recommended a road route to Paris. As they were about to depart in their jeep (with General’s two stars), Hemingway asked me if I could find a submachine gun for himself. I cocked an eye at Donovan, and he nodded. I gave Hemingway a Madson, my personal arm, and two clips of ammunition. Off they went as though to a picnic—on their way to participate in the liberation of their beloved Paris—Donovan in the right front seat of the jeep—Hemingway perched on the back like a full-sized toy bear holding the Madson on his lap.
With Sergeant Buda at the wheel, Hemingway and Donovan worked their way past the forward assault elements of Gen. Philippe Leclerc’s First Armored Division, which had been given the task of liberating Paris. They crept forward through the outskirts of Paris, engaging German patrols with machine-gun fire when they encountered them, and were among the first Allied soldiers to pass beneath the Arc de Triomphe.
Donovan and Hemingway gathered up other OSS men who had been living under deep cover in Paris or who were arriving from all directions, and several score of FFI. They decided to liberate the Ritz Hotel. German officers were still packing their bags in the rooms when the unkempt crew, armed to the teeth, burst into the lobby. Charles Ritz was there. The assistant manager rushed to the door to keep the intruders from upsetting the cherished decorum of the hotel. He recognized David Bruce, who was among the OSS men, and Hemingway as prewar guests.
“What are you doing here?”
“We’ve come with a few guests for a short stay,” replied Hemingway.
“What can I do for you?”
“How about 73 dry martinis?” asked Hemingway.
Charles Ritz claimed that it was not martinis but a magnum of champagne that helped the OSS men celebrate the liberation of the Ritz.
“Then there was some rifle firing,” Ritz remembered, “and Hemingway rushed up on the roof and fired several bursts from his submachine gun at snipers.”
That night Donovan slept in a bed whose sheets were the same ones a German general had slept in the night before.
Among the OSS men now in Paris were William Haines and Walt Rostow, who were interrogating French businessmen involved in the production of German aircraft and aeroengines. “Donovan gathered the OSS personnel in town for a cheerful dinner at a first-class restaurant,” said Rostow, “but food was exceedingly scarce. The restaurant supplied champagne and, of all things, corn on the cob—the only time I ever heard of the French serving what they regarded as cattle food. We supplied K and C rations, which the distinguished chef converted into fine fare, subtle sauces and all. A memorable occasion when there was still an occasional shot to be heard around town.”
By the time Paris was officially liberated on August 25, Donovan was already in London conferring with King Peter and Prime Minister Subasić of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs urged Donovan to use his influence to keep Tito’s Partisans from attacking Mihajlović’s Chetniks. Donovan reported his interviews to Roosevelt. He also sent him an intelligence report on the situation in Yugoslavia, where the German forces were in retreat and the Russians were advancing toward the nation’s borders. He wrote,
Some of Mihajlović’s old followers now consider that it is imperative to alter the movement’s attitude toward the invaders and to protect Serbia from attack from beyond its borders. The position of those Chetniks who advocate cooperation with the Germans is strengthened by the fact that the latter may soon be forced to evacuate Serbia. This would be a signal for a show-down engagement between the communists and the nationalists. Mihajlović therefore probably intends to cooperate with the German Army while it is still in Serbia, in order to lessen the effectiveness of Tito’s Partisans. By emphasizing the common fight against communism, Mihajlović would obtain as many weapons as possible from the Germans. He feels that he will then be able to take over the German positions easily when the German Army leaves.
34
Preparing for the Peace
ON JUNE 15, 1944, the first German V-1 rocket bomb bumbled through the sky and fell on London with a roar. Donovan’s agents had tracked the development of the FZG-76 from its inception at the Research Station at Peenemünde in June 1942, and Donovan knew that mass production of the buzz bomb had begun in March 1944. He also knew that the V-2, the A-4 rocket, was being developed in an underground factory near Nordhausen in the Harz Mountains, and that it would be far more devastating. The question in his mind on June 19 was why the Germans were firing the buzz bomb at southern England. His agents in Germany all reported that most German leaders knew they had already lost the war. Donovan sent the following cable to London:
Since enemy use of either robot planes or rockets appears to be irreconcilable with good timing or good military judgment, I am looking for some rationalization. Do the Germans believe this attack of sufficient vehemence to be untenable to British-American war effort by the maintenance of suspense and terror? Have you learned that any special explosive is used for the first time in these weapons? If no abnormal explosive is indicated, watch keenly for evidence of the dissemination o
f any sort of contagion near to places hit. Does wreckage of devices indicate use of gyro? Do robots come over at definite time intervals and how many in 24 hours? Are we using radar defensively? Give appraisal of whole affair. Urgent.
In four days OSS London answered Donovan’s questions. Earlier OSS penetration of rocket sites had led to heavy Allied bombing, and the “bombing necessitated entire change of method in launching these craft.” Military judgment must have been sidetracked. There was “no evidence of special explosive,” and “no evidence as yet of any sort of contagion near place where PAC [pilotless aircraft] hit.”
“PAC are robot compass controlled, compass set prior to launching,” continued the report. “No change in flight possible. PAC show up on radar.”
OSS Bern, Switzerland, was sending Donovan reports from inside Germany. On July 10 Donovan learned of an underground plant south of Kahla, on the railroad line between Rudolstadt and Jena, where “new secret weapons are also produced. In comparison with the V-1 model, the V-2 travels through the stratosphere. It is radio-controlled and is therefore a more accurate weapon. In addition, it possesses a longer range. This new model will be in use by the Nazis within 60 days at the outside.” Donovan also learned that the Germans were at work on a still more advanced rocket bomb, the two-stage A-10, which was designed to cross the Atlantic and bombard cities on America’s East Coast.
OSS was intercepting German intelligence and diplomatic dispatches, and 109 read with interest a report from German Ambassador Dieckhoff in Madrid, who forwarded information from Spanish sources in London on July 2: “In the last two days, the initial results of the rocket bombing of southern England have become a great deal graver. If this bombing is maintained, it is anticipated that there will be heavy damage and disorder, even though public services have not yet been halted.”
Donovan suspected the Germans had come to the mistaken conclusion that their buzz bombs could change the course of the war, and he was able to warn both London and Washington that by the end of the summer a deadlier rocket was bound to cause even more casualties and damage.
“It was all another example of Hitler’s irrational behavior,” he said afterward. “On one hand, our agents were garnering more and more information showing that Germany had lost the war, but here was Hitler clutching at a last straw.”
Much of Donovan’s knowledge about what was going on inside Hitler’s faltering Reich came to him through Allen Dulles, his man in Bern, who was later to direct the CIA. It was Dulles who first reported on the plot to assassinate Hitler.
“Two emissaries of the conspiring group first approached the OSS representative in Bern in January, 1944,” Donovan told Roosevelt.
The group was then described as composed of various intellectuals from certain military and government circles gathered into a loose organization. The membership was said to be somewhat divided as to a course of action, some holding that Hitler and his cohorts should be made to shoulder all responsibility to the bitter end; while others favored an overthrow of Hitler and the organization of a new government before the fighting stops, which might negotiate peace. The conspiring elements were united in their preference for a western rather than eastern orientation of German policy. In general, they were characterized by their emissaries as well-educated and influential but not rightist individuals; such characterization may have been designed for Anglo-American consumption. The group as a whole apparently maintained its foreign contacts through the Canaris organization [Abwehr].
Donovan assigned the OSS code name Breakers to this group’s plan, which called for Hitler’s assassination followed by an uprising of the German underground. The underground asked that the OSS cooperate in supplying arms and arrange for American forces to come to its assistance.
“Such action,” said Donovan to Roosevelt, “would be contingent upon assurances from Britain and the United States that, once the Nazis had been overthrown, negotiations would then be carried out solely with the Western powers and under no circumstances with the USSR. The essential conservatism of the group’s planners was stressed, but also its willingness to cooperate with any available elements of the Left except for the communists. The group expressed its anxiety to keep Central Europe from coming under Soviet domination.”
Donovan was surprised when Roosevelt refused to permit him to help the German plotters. “If we start assassinating chiefs of state, God knows where it all would end,” FDR told his intelligence chief. “If the Germans dispose of Hitler, that is their prerogative, but the OSS must have nothing whatsoever to do with it.” Roosevelt also told Donovan that the United States could not act against the interests of an ally, the Soviet Union. Thus Donovan instructed Dulles not to take any action. “The United States would never act without previous consultation with the USSR,” he said.
Soviet victories in the East and Allied successes in France further strengthened the group plotting against Hitler. Early in July it became apparent that the Nazis had become aware of the plot and were taking countermeasures. Reports reaching Donovan said that Heinrich Himmler might well take control; if he did, he intended to negotiate with the Soviet Union. On July 4 Donovan received a report from “a trustworthy source” stating that “a man in a high position in the Foreign Office in Stockholm has claimed that Nazi morale and the German military machine are undergoing a rapid deterioration. This Swedish career diplomat has had experience with Russian affairs; according to him, generals are not politically significant any more. Himmler is prepared to grab the helm, and if he manages to accomplish this, he will attempt a separate arrangement with the USSR.
“In Stockholm our people have reported that it is most probable that one Bruno von Kleist has got in touch with Soviet officials in Stockholm.”
The danger that Himmler might seize power caused the anti-Nazi group to strike before they were entirely ready. The attempt on Hitler’s life by Col. Claus von Stauffenberg on July 20 during a conference at Hitler’s Rastenburg headquarters was made without any support from the OSS and was a fiasco. Donovan and Dulles had followed Roosevelt’s orders, and the opportunity to overthrow the Nazi government and rob the Soviet Union of some of the fruits of its approaching victory was lost. OSS agents in Germany reported to Donovan that the Nazis were striking back at the generals who had attempted to kill Hitler.
On July 24 Donovan passed on a report to Roosevelt that stated, “It seems clear now that any prospect of an armed military revolt growing out of the putsch against Hitler has been crushed. I am inclined to believe that the Gestapo probably had a good deal of prior information about some of the persons involved, and were ready to strike and to strike hard. Himmler was probably glad to have the opportunity to do this before the retreating German armies were themselves on German soil, as it is far easier to deal with the Heimatheer than it would be to deal with the troops fresh from the defeats in the east, west, and south.”
Donovan also cautioned Roosevelt that
the next attempt to overthrow the Hitler regime from the inside is likely to come from an eastern-oriented group, possibly after a part of East Prussia is occupied and a German government a la Seydlitz is installed there. It is probable that the failure of [Gen. Ludwig] Beck and his friends [to assassinate Hitler] will still further increase the influence of Russia in Germany and somewhat decrease the influence of the West. Russia has throughout played a more realistic policy in dealing with the internal German situation than has either the United States or England, and it is possible that, from now on, the Seydlitz Committee will increase in importance and have a larger scope of action. This is a development we should not underestimate, particularly now that the western-oriented dissident group in Germany, in and outside of the army, has received a serious if not a fatal setback.
After driving back the Germans from Stalingrad, the Russians had persuaded such captured German generals as Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus and Gen. Walter von Seydlitz to turn against Hitler. Seydlitz became chairman of a Free Germany Committee, which
the Soviets expected would not only help defeat Hitler but would also insure Communist postwar domination of Germany.
It was apparent to Donovan that Roosevelt’s resolve to be faithful to the Soviet Union, an increasingly faithless ally, was fraught with danger for the future.
A week after the liberation of Paris, Donovan sent a memo to Roosevelt outlining “Future OSS operations in Central Europe.” He saw two phases of operations. Of phase one, he wrote:
The continued resistance of the enemy, in a military sense (though with reduced resources, depleted manpower) up to and within their own borders, with the gradual accent on organized subversion against our Army.
This will require a reorientation of our thinking. Up to the present we have been operating in enemy-occupied territory. An important factor for the success of our activities in France was the determination of the resistance groups, as well as their willingness to accept the help and guidance of the British and ourselves in the employment of weapons and tactics within their area against the enemy.
But in enemy territory we will not find (as we have found in France and are finding also in countries like Norway, Belgium, and Holland) friendly airstrips, reception committees, organizers and leaders. On the contrary, we must expect to meet (even though we try to make the enemy population do otherwise) the kind of resistance and the use of methods against us [that] we stimulated against the enemy in territory friendly to us.
In enemy territory, OSS must do with its own force what previously we had had done largely through resistance groups we have organized and trained, and we must place behind enemy lines for operational purposes as we now do for intelligence purposes, men of coolness, daring, and resourcefulness, who fully understand that they must depend upon their own enterprise rather than on support of the inhabitants.
Donovan Page 61
