Page 263, line 34: The German military attaché in Ankara reported to Berlin that Donovan was “interested in country’s roads and ports in view of the events which are going to take place in the Balkans.” Report to Foreign Office, Feb. 6, 1941, PAA.
Page 264, line 11: Speech, ULPA.
Page 264, line 28: New York Times, Feb. 7, 1941. A French government spokesman in Vichy explained that Donovan had been denied a visa to cross Syria because of “the extremely delicate geographical situation of Syria between British Palestine and Turkey. Colonel Donovan was told he was welcome and free to go anywhere he wanted in North Africa, but in view of the delicate situation in Syria the French government desired to avoid any incidents that might harm our empire, especially as Colonel Donovan was accompanied by Lord Forbes, who is a British citizen. . . . We certainly hope Colonel Donovan will not take the refusal personally as an insult.” New York Times, Feb. 8, 1941.
In December 1940, Germany ordered Vichy to refuse Donovan admission to any French territories, and on February 2, 1941, the order was repeated because of Nazi fear that Donovan would intrigue against their interests in Syria or North Africa. Record of the meeting of the Subcommission on Political and Military Affairs, PAA.
On February 8, the Portuguese ambassador in London reported to the Foreign Office in Lisbon that Donovan was making a study of the arms needed for an anti-German uprising in France and North Africa. That very day the report was phoned to Berlin. Hitler was sufficiently disturbed that he discussed Donovan’s activities with Mussolini.
Page 264, line 30: New York Times, Feb. 6, 1941.
Page 265, line 31: Neale, 453.
Page 265, line 44: Roosevelt Library.
Page 266, line 11: “We are expecting Colonel Donovan too in the near future, and he should have a great deal of interest to say about the Balkans, where his talks would seem to have had an excellent effect,” King George wrote to Roosevelt on February 14, 1941. Roosevelt Library.
Page 266, line 20: Eden, 226.
Page 266, line 37: Lecture, War Dept., Hoover Institution.
Page 266, line 40: Donovan also developed striking concepts for a “war of movement.” “It is my distinct impression that General Donovan’s strategic views derived in part from his own World War I experiences and observations from which he concluded that his was no way to fight a war, and began to crystallize and take form during the course of his extended tour of observation through parts of Europe and the Balkans shortly prior to the entry of the United States into the war.” Frank G. Wisner to Allen Dulles, Dec. 30, 1954, Princeton University Library.
Donovan also told the President that the British should hold on in the Balkans to keep Hitler from invading the United Kingdom. He said too that the Germans wanted to secure the Balkans to insure supplies of oil, food, and raw materials. “Such a joint venture,” he concluded, “would result in economy of time, of force, and of administration.” Lane and Petrov.
Page 267, line 32: Hoare, 107.
Page 267, line 44: Winston Churchill had instructed Hoare to give Donovan this message to President Roosevelt. Higgins.
Page 268, line 18: Gallo, 104.
Page 269, line 6: Speech, April 11, 1941, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
Page 269, line 24: Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 365.
Page 269, line 34: Friedlander, 208.
Page 269, line 38: In his report Hayningen-Hesse referred to “Colonel Donnovan.” David Kahn, 469.
Page 270, line 40: Conyers Read manuscript, 17, Pforzheimer Collection.
Page 271, line 18: Neale, 550.
Page 271, line 38: Interview with Pinto. Pinto also remarked, “The British actor Leslie Howard spent his last night on earth here at the Palacio. He left with two British schoolchildren and their nanny who were returning to England. The Germans knew that Howard was a British agent, and they learned of his departure and made certain that his plane was shot down. Others have said the Germans believed that Churchill was aboard the plane, but I’ve never thought this was their belief.”
Pinto explained that “when the Germans spoke in loud voices I knew they wanted to be overheard. When they whispered, they had a secret.” When a German agent confided in him, Pinto realized he was planting false information since he believed a British or American agent would soon happen along to pump him. Every day, according to Pinto, a violin and piano ensemble played for lunch and dinner at the Palacio. Every time a known agent entered the room, the ensemble struck up a tune entitled, “Boo, Boo, I Am a Spy.”
Page 271, line 40: Harriman and Abel, 21.
Page 272, line 5: Buffalo News, March 15, 1941, and Buffalo Courier-Express, March 19, 1941. Among the other Clipper passengers were Francis Aiken, Ireland’s minister for defense coordination, and Dr. Eelco N. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands prime minister.
Page 273, line 19: “The trip to the Balkans impressed him [Donovan] with respect to the skills of the Germans and their complete infiltration of the area,” remarked Edwin Putzell, Jr. Putzell to author, Aug. 23, 1981.
Page 273, line 30: Time, March 31, 1941. Journalist Elizabeth Valentine wrote, “On and off during the past year foreign correspondents from American newspapers have found themselves involved in a gopher hunt. The territory was the Near East, the Continent, and the British Isles: the quarry was Colonel William J. Donovan. First spotted nonchalantly boarding a waiting clipper in Baltimore, he later popped up unannounced at 10 Downing Street, and then appeared and disappeared mysteriously all along the line from Cairo to Gibraltar. His comings and goings were always inconspicuous and unheralded, and when nabbed by reporters, he was as affable and enigmatic as a Tibetan lama. Colonel Donovan was on a fact-finding mission for the President—‘just having a look around’—beyond this he had nothing to say.” Of an interview with Donovan, Valentine wrote, “Directly after saying how-do-you-do-won’t-you-sit-down, he begins asking questions; the caller has a fine time talking about himself, leaves in a warm glow, without a scrap of personal information about William J. Donovan.”
Chapter 23. The Intelligence Proposal
Page 275, line 7: Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Page 276, line 7: Washington Star, March 27, 1941.
Page 276, line 27: Conyers Read manuscript, 19, Pforzheimer Collection.
Page 276, line 42: Ibid., 20.
Page 277, line 5: Irving, 41. In his speech declaring war on Yugoslavia, Hitler shouted that Roosevelt had sent Colonel Donovan, “a completely unworthy creature,” to intrigue in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Bailey.
“The German and Italian radio and press attacked Donovan, Minister Fotitch, and me as instigators of the uprising,” said Sveteslav Petrovic. Petrovic, 245.
Page 278, line 2: New York Times, April 12, 1941.
Page 278, line 25: Speech, April 11, 1941, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. After his speech Donovan had a talk with Adlai Stevenson, then a prominent Chicago lawyer who was a leading member of the council. The two men believed that the Chicago Irish might be persuaded to help influence Ireland’s government to grant Great Britain naval bases. Adlai Stevenson.
Page 278, line 29: New York Times, April 12, 1941.
Page 278, line 39: Donovan also penned a widely read magazine article. “The Nazis have not overlooked their opportunity in our hurried preparations to meet sudden danger,” he said. “With the same psychological sabotage they used to ‘soften’ one European democracy after another before plucking them off by force, the Nazis are offering countless suggestions and innuendoes to persuade us that democracy has made us ‘soft’—not fit material to challenge the ‘tougher’ products of Nazi discipline.
“A few months ago I traveled all over the U.S. I visited our training camps. I was with our fleet at sea. Nowhere did I see evidence of softness.”
Donovan also wrote, “Although greater brawn is not important in their jobs, some of the finest physical specimens in my regiment during the last war were men from banks, offices, and sto
res.” He concluded, “I would bet on democratic peoples anyhow. I have yet to learn of a strong and enlightened people submitting for long to dictatorship. Nor has democracy ever flourished among the weak. It takes the best qualities of humanity to make democracy possible at all. We have every reason to look upon our trust in democracy as a barometer of our fitness to defend this country.” “Who Says We’re Soft.”
Page 278, line 41: Fight for Freedom Archives, Princeton University Library.
Page 279, line 5: MacLeish to Donovan, May 17, 1941, and Fight for Freedom Archives, Princeton University Library.
Page 279, line 32: Eugene Grassman journal, June 8, 1941, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan Library.
Page 279, line 43: New York Times, April 26, 1941.
Page 280, line 20: Conyers Read manuscript, 20, Pforzheimer Collection.
Page 281, line 36: Godfrey had discussed the idea of unifying U.S. intelligence with Ambassador Winant in London, and in New York he conferred with Sir William Wiseman, a senior British intelligence man who had served in America during World War I. Both Stephenson and Wiseman talked to Donovan about a central U.S. intelligence, and the British representatives made it clear they felt that Donovan should head it. Beesly, 181.
Page 283, line 22: Buffalo News, April 1, 1941.
Page 283, line 24: Conyers Read manuscript, 21, Pforzheimer Collection.
Page 283, line 33: Pearson.
Page 286, line 8: Roosevelt Library.
Page 287, line 2: Roosevelt had considered Donovan for a domestic propaganda role. Henry L. Stimson conferred with the President and noted in his diary, “He had first of all told me that La Guardia had accepted the position of home defense until August and outlined the two committees which La Guardia wishes to create. The second committee—sort of a ballyhoo committee. He was thinking of Donovan, Bill Bullitt, Pat Hurley: hasn’t made up his mind. He wants a high-ranking officer to help La Guardia in home defense.” “Memorandum of Interview with Roosevelt,” May 20, 1941, Henry L. Stimson papers, Yale University Library.
Page 287, line 29: “At a Bureau of the Budget conference regarding a preliminary draft of the proposed order, Colonel Donovan explained that he proposed to set up a service organization which would collect and analyze information for the Army, the Navy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies. For each project, there would be a correlated summary supported by reports from such technicians as geographers, political scientists, and economists. Colonel Donovan wanted the Library of Congress to serve as an instrument for securing the cooperation of libraries and scholars, and he hoped that an FBI man would assist him on the offensive side of his work. He mentioned Robert Sherwood as a type of person who would be used in the overseas information program. While he referred to the President’s desire that he set up a committee on the ‘Economics of the future,’ plans were already far advanced for a separate board of economic defense.” Report in the OSS Archives, National Archives.
Page 286, line 42: Hyde, 153.
Page 289, line 2: Franklin Roosevelt, Complete Press Conferences, Press Conference No. 750, June 24, 1941.
Page 290, line 23: New York Times, July 12, 1941.
Page 290, line 31: “Attached is an Order designating William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information,” stated Harold Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget in a memorandum to the President dated July 3, 1941. “Pursuant to your instructions, we have worked with Ben Cohen in preparing and clearing this draft which bears the approval of Colonel Donovan, Secretary Knox, and Secretary Stimson. Since the appointment is made by virtue of your authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, it should be issued as a Military Order.
“While both the Army and Navy objected to our original title for Colonel Donovan of Coordinator of Strategic Information or Coordinator of Defense Information, I think either of these titles is preferable to the one used in the Order as now presented. ‘Coordinator of Information’ is vague and is not descriptive of the work Colonel Donovan will perform.
“Also attached is a proposed press statement you may wish to issue at the time of signing the Order. We are preparing appropriate letters to the departments and agencies concerned with the subject of defense information, requesting their full cooperation with Colonel Donovan in carrying out his duties.” Roosevelt Library.
The Order as signed by Roosevelt read: “By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
“1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.
“2. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.
“3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.
“4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information shall in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
“5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities and services.
“6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Information.”
Chapter 24. Donovan’s Brain Trust
Page 295, lines 6–35; Page 296, lines 1–2: Field, “Memorandum on Office of Coordinator of Information,” manuscript, April 5, 1963. Given to author by Field.
Page 297, line 2: Cline, 36.
Page 297, line 13: The previous tenant was Wayne Coy, FDR’s special assistant and executive secretary of the Office of Emergency Manpower. “High Strategist.”
Page 297, line 33: Berle.
Page 297, line 34: Arnold.
Page 298, line 9: Ickes.
Page 298, line 18: Morgenthau diary, Roosevelt Library.
Page 299, line 16: Interview with Mrs. William Langer.
Page 299, line 31: Roosevelt Library.
Page 300, line 13: Blaire Bolles, “A Look at ‘Invisible’ C.O.I.,” Washington Star, Oct. 5, 1941.
Page 301, line 17: Field, “Memorandum on Office of Coordinator of Information,” manuscript, April 5, 1963, author’s collection.
Page 301, lines 18–44; Page 302, lines 1–18: Telephone interview with Landon.
Page 302, line 25: “With the permission of Colonel Frank Knox, secretary of the navy and owner of the Chicago Daily News, I severed my connection with that newspaper for a period of three months, and started preparing myself for a trip to the Far East,” stated Mowrer. “It was understood that, although furnished with credentials from the United States Government, I was to show these only when necessary and pass currently as a newspaper correspondent. In the course of my travel I divulged my character as Colonel Donovan’s representative to only about a half dozen persons, exclusively British and American, some of whom, like British Minister Duff Cooper, had heard of my trip in advance and promised cooperation.” “Final report of Edgar Ansel Mowrer to Colonel Donovan, concerning a mission to the Far East in the Autumn of 1941,” Allen Dulles papers, Princeton University Library.
Page 303, line 26: Transcript of conversation between Dulles and Mowrer, circa 1962, Princeton University Library.
Page 303, lines 31–44; Page 304, lines 1–4: Telephone interview with McBaine.
Page 304, lines 1–36: Morris.
Page 305, line 42: Interview with Richards.
Page 306, lines 1–13: Interview with Kermit Roosevelt.
Page 307, line 40: Caroline Bland manuscript.
Page 308, lines 12–19: Rostow to author.
Page 309, lines 30–45; Page 310, lines 1–15: Interview with Mrs. William Langer.
Page 312, line 15: Walter Langer.
Page 312, line 44: David Bruce letter to the New York Times.
Page 313, line 18: Steve Early suggested to FDR, “If you are asked a question about Colonel Donovan’s organization, the following is suggested:
“Almost every time the government of the United States acts to strengthen its defenses and to increase its efficiency—for the better protection of the people of the United States—it seems that one or two senators immediately label that act in a way that creates distrust, fear and misunderstanding.
“One senator has referred to Colonel Donovan’s organization as an Ogpu or Gestapo. That just isn’t so.
“Another senator has spoken in a way that leads to misunderstanding and distrust of the ‘good neighbor’ policy. We intend, however, to carry on—to do our best to strengthen our defenses and give the Government a better efficiency.” Aug. 1, 1941, Roosevelt Library.
Chapter 25. COI Sets Up Shop
Page 314, line 13: Donovan, “Intelligence: Key to Defense.”
Page 315, line 9: Interview with Will.
Page 315, line 15: Rowan and Deindorfer, 615.
Page 316, line 3: Daniels.
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