Delphi Collected Works of René Descartes

by René Descartes

  Love is an emotion of the soul caused by the movement of the spirits which incites it to join itself willingly to objects which appear to it to be agreeable. And hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul to desire to be separated from the objects which present themselves to it as hurtful. I say that these emotions are caused by the spirits in order to distinguish love and hate, which are passions and depend on the body, both from the judgments which also induce the soul by its free will to unite itself with the things which it esteems to be good, and to separate itself from those it holds to be evil, and from the emotions which these judgments excite of themselves in the soul.

  ARTICLE LXXX.

  What it is to join or separate oneself by ones free will.

  For the rest, by the word will I do not here intend to talk of desire, which is a passion apart, and one which relates to the future, but of the consent by which we consider ourselves from this time forward as united with what we love, so that we imagine a whole of which we conceive ourselves as only constituting one part, while the thing loved constitutes another part. In the case of hatred, on the other hand, we consider ourselves only and as a whole, entirely separated from the matter for which we possess an aversion.

  ARTICLE LXXXI.

  Of the distinction usually made between the love belonging to concupiscence and that of benevolence.

  And two sorts of love are usually distinguished, the one of which is named the love of benevolence, that is to say the love which incites us to wish well to what we love; the other is named the love of concupiscence, that is to say the love that causes us to desire the thing that is loved. But it appears to me that this distinction concerns the effects of love alone, and not its essence; for as soon as we are willingly joined to some object, of whatever nature it may he, we have for it a feeling of benevolence, i.e. we also join to it willingly the things which we believe to be agreeable to it: and this is one of the principal effects of love. And if we judge that it is a desirable thing to possess it, or to be associated with it in some other manner than through the will, we desire it: and this is likewise one of the most ordinary effects of love.

  ARTICLE LXXXII.

  How very different passions agree, inasmuch as they participate in love.

  There is also no need to distinguish as many kinds of love as there are diverse objects which we may love; for, to take an example, although the passions which an ambitious man has for glory, a miser for money, a drunkard for wine, a brutal man for a woman whom he desires to violate, a man of honour for his friend or mistress, and a good father for his children, may be very different, still, inasmuch as they participate in love, they are similar. But the four first only have love for the possession of the objects to which their passion relates, and do not have any for the objects themselves, for which they only have desire mingled with other particular passions. But the love which a good father has for his children is so pure that he desires to have nothing from them, and does not wish to possess them otherwise than he does, nor to be united with them more closely than he already is. For, considering them as replicas of himself, he seeks their good as his own, or even with greater care, because, in setting before himself that he or they form a whole of which he is not the best part, he often prefers their interests to his, and does not fear losing himself in order to save them. The affection which honourable men have for their friends is of this nature even though it is rarely so perfect; and that which they have for their mistress participates largely in it, but it also participates a little in the others.

  ARTICLE LXXXIII.

  Of the difference which exists between simple affection, friendship, and devotion.

  We may, it seems to me, find differences in love according to the esteem which we bear to the object loved as compared with oneself: for when we esteem the object of love less than ourselves, we have only a simple affection for it; when we esteem it equally with ourselves, that is called friendship; and when we esteem it more, the passion which we have may be called devotion. Thus we may have affection for a flower, a bird, a horse; but unless we have a very ill-regulated mind, we can have friendship for men alone. And they are so truly the object of this passion, that there is no man so imperfect that we cannot have for him a very perfect friendship, when we are loved by him, and when we have a truly noble and generous soul, in accordance with what will be afterwards explained in Articles CLIV and CLVI. As to the meaning of devotion, its principal object is no doubt the supreme Divinity to whom we cannot fail to be devoted when we know Him as we should; but we may also have devotion for our prince, country, town, and even for a particular man, when we esteem him much more than ourselves. Now the difference which exists between these three sorts of love is shown principally by their effects; for inasmuch as in all of them we consider ourselves as joined and united to the thing loved, we are always ready to abandon the lesser portion of the whole into which we both enter, in order to preserve the other portion. This brings it to pass that in simple affection we always prefer ourselves to the object loved; and, on the other hand, in devotion the thing loved is so much preferred to the self, that we do not fear death in order to preserve it. We have frequently seen examples of this in the case of those who have exposed themselves to a certain death in the defence of their prince or their town, and in some cases even for the private persons to whom they were devoted.

  ARTICLE LXXXIV.

  That there are not as many kinds of hate as of love.

  For the rest, although hatred is directly opposed to love, we do not always divide it into so many species because we do not to the same extent notice the difference which exists between the evils from which we are separated by our will, as we do that which exists between the good things to which we are joined.

  ARTICLE LXXXV.

  Of delight and revulsion.

  And I only find one distinct characteristic of any note which is alike in both. It consists in the fact that the objects both of love and hatred may be represented to the soul by the external senses, or else by the internal, and by its own reason: for we commonly denominate good or evil that which our interior senses or our reason make us judge to be agreeable or the contrary to our nature; but we term beautiful or ugly that which is so represented to us by our outward senses, principally by that of sight, which alone is more considered than the others; hence two sorts of love originate, i.e. that which we have for good things, and that which we have for beautiful things, to which we may give the name of attraction or delight in order not to confound it with the other, nor yet with desire, to which we often attribute the name of love. And from thence also, two kinds of hatred in the same way take their rise, the one of which relates to evil things, the other to ugly things; and this last may be called horror or aversion in order to distinguish it. But what is most remarkable here is that these passions of delight and detestation or horror are usually more violent than the other sorts of love or hate, because what comes to the soul by the senses touches it more forcibly than what is represented to it by its reason, and that even though these first passions have usually less truth; so that of all the passions it is these which deceive the most, and against which we should guard ourselves most carefully.

  ARTICLE LXXXVI.

  The definition of Desire.

  The passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which dispose it to wish for the future the things which it represents to itself as agreeable. Thus we do not only desire the presence of the absent good, but also the conservation of the present, and further, the absence of evil, both of that which we already have, and of that which we believe we might experience in time to come.

  ARTICLE LXXXVII.

  That it is a passion which has no opposite.

  I know very well that usually in the Schools the passion which makes for the search after the good which alone is called desire is opposed to that which makes for the avoidance of evil, which is called aversion. But inasmuch as there is no good whose privation is n
ot an evil, nor any evil considered in a positive sense, whose privation is not a good, and that in investigating riches, for example, we necessarily shun poverty, in fleeing from sickness we make for health, and so on with other things, it seems to me that it is always an identical movement which makes for the search after good, and at the same time for the avoidance of the evil which is contrary to it. I merely remark this difference in it, that the desire which we have when we make for some good is accompanied by love, and then by hope and joy; while the same desire, when it tends to remove itself from evil contrary to this good, is accompanied by hate, fear and sadness; which is the cause of our judging it to be contrary to itself. But if we wish to consider it when at the same time it relates equally to some good with the view of seeking it, and to an opposed evil in order to avoid it, we may very clearly see that it is but one passion which brings about both the one and the other.

  ARTICLE LXXXVIII.

  Its different species.

  There would be more reason in distinguishing desire into as many different species as there are different objects sought after; since, for example, curiosity, which is none other than a desire for knowledge, differs much from desire for glory, and this again from desire for vengeance, and so on in the case of other objects. But it is here sufficient to know that there are as many species of the passions as there are of love and hatred, and that the most important and strongest are those which take their rise from the emotions of delight and revulsion.

  ARTICLE LXXXIX.

  The desire which springs from revulsion.

  Now, although it is only one and the same desire which makes for the search after a good and the escape from an evil which is contrary to it, as has been said, the desire which originates from delight cannot fail to be very different from that which springs from revulsion; for this delight and revulsion which are truly contrary to one another, are not the good and the evil which serve as objects for those desires, but only two emotions of the soul, which dispose it to seek after two very different things. That is, revulsion is instituted by nature to represent to the soul a sudden and unexpected death, so that although it is sometimes but the touch of a grub, or the sound of a trembling leaf, or one’s own shadow, which causes us to be seized with horror, we at once feel as much emotion as though a very evident peril of death offered itself to the senses; and this is what suddenly produces the agitation which causes the soul to employ all its forces in order to avoid an evil so present; and it is this kind of desire which we commonly call avoidance and aversion.

  ARTICLE XC.

  That which springs from delight.

  On the other hand, delight is specially instituted by nature to represent the enjoyment of that which gives pleasure as the greatest of all the good things which pertain to man, which causes us to desire this enjoyment very ardently. It is true that there are various sorts of delight and that the desires which take their origin in these diverse varieties are not all equally powerful. For, to take an example, the beauty of flowers incites us only to look at them, and that of fruits to eat them. But the principal one is that which proceeds from the perfections which we imagine in a person whom we think may become another self; for with the difference of sex which nature has placed in men, as in the animals without reason, it has also placed certain impressions in the brain which bring it to pass that at a certain age, and in a certain time, they consider themselves defective, and as though they were but the half of a whole, of which an individual of the other sex should be the other half. In this way the acquisition of this half is confusedly represented by nature as the greatest of all imaginable goods. And although we see many persons of this other sex, we do not for all that desire several at the same time, inasmuch as nature does not cause us to imagine that we have need of more than one half. But when we observe something in one which is more agreeable than what we at the same time observe in others, that determines the soul to feel only for the first all the inclination which nature gives it to seek for the good which that nature represents to it as the greatest that can be possessed; and this inclination or desire which thus springs from delight more usually receives the name of love than the passion of love which has above been described. It has likewise stranger effects and it is what provides the principal material for the writers of romances and for poets.

  ARTICLE XCI.

  The definition of Joy.

  Joy is an agreeable emotion of the soul in which consists the enjoyment that the soul possesses in the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as it own. I say that it is in this emotion that the enjoyment of the good consists; for as a matter of fact the soul receives no other fruits from all the good things that it possesses; and while it has no joy in these, it may be said that it does not enjoy them more than if it did not possess them at all. I add also that it is of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own, in order not to confound this joy, which is a passion, with the joy that is purely intellectual, and which comes into the soul by the action of the soul alone, and which we may call an agreeable emotion excited in it, in which the enjoyment consists which it has in the good which its understanding represents to it as its own. It is true that while the soul is united to the body this intellectual joy can hardly fail to be accompanied by that which is a passion; for as soon as our understanding perceives that we possess some good thing, even although this good may be so different from all that pertains to body that it is not in the least capable of being imagined, imagination does not fail immediately to make some impression in the brain from which proceeds the movement of the spirits which excites the passion of joy.

  ARTICLE XCII.

  The definition of Sadness.

  Sadness is a disagreeable languor in which consists the discomfort and unrest which the soul receives from evil, or from the defect which the impressions of the brain set before it as pertaining to it. And there also is an intellectual sadness which is not passion, but which hardly ever fails to be accompanied by it.

  ARTICLE XCIII.

  The causes of these two passions.

  But when intellectual joy or sadness thus excites that which is a passion their cause is evident enough; and we see from their definitions that joy proceeds from the belief that we have of possessing some good, and sadness from the belief that we have of possessing some evil or defect. It often, however, happens that we feel sad or joyful without being thus able distinctly to observe the good or evil which are the causes of it; e g when this good or this evil form their impressions in the brain without the intermission of the soul, sometimes because they only pertain to the body, and sometimes, too, although they pertain to the soul, because it does not consider them as good and evil, but under some other form the impression of which is joined to that of good and of evil in the brain.

  ARTICLE XCIV.

  How these passions are excited by things good and evil which only concern the body, and in what pleasurable stimulation and pain consists.

  Thus when we are in full health and the weather is more serene than usual, we feel a gaiety within us which proceeds from no function of the understanding, but only from the impressions which the movement of the spirits causes in the brain; and we never feel sad in the same way except when the body is indisposed, even although we do not know that it is so. Thus the titillation of the senses is so nearly followed by joy, and pain by sadness, that the greater part of mankind does not distinguish the two. And yet they differ so much that pains may sometimes be suffered with joy, or pleasurable sensations received which cause displeasure. But the cause which brings it to pass that in a general way joy follows pleasurable sensation, is the fact that all that we call pleasurable sensation or agreeable sentiment is simply due to the fact that the objects of sense excite some movement in the nerves which would be capable of harming them had they not strength sufficient to resist the movement, or were the body not well disposed; and this produces in the brain an impression which, being instituted by nature to give evidence t
o this good disposition and this strength, represents that to the soul as a good pertaining to it, inasmuch as it is united to body and thus excites in it joy. It is almost the same reason which brings it about that we naturally take pleasure in being moved by all sorts of passions, even by sadness and hatred, when these passions are only caused by the strange adventures which we see represented in a theatre, or by other similar means which, not being able to harm us in any way, seem pleasurably to excite our soul in affecting it. And the cause which brings it to pass that pain usually produces sadness, is that the feeling which we call pain always proceeds from some action which is so violent that it hurts our nerves; in this way, being instituted by nature to signify to the soul the injury which the body receives by this action, and its weakness in not being able to resist it, it represents both to it as evils, which are always disagreeable to it, excepting when they bring about certain good results which it esteems more than these.

  ARTICLE XCV.

  How they may also be excited by the things good and evil which the soul does not notice even although they belong to it, such as the pleasure taken in encountering risk or in the recollection of a past evil.

  Thus the pleasure which young people often take in undertaking difficult tasks and in exposing themselves to great perils, even although they hope for no profit or glory by doing so, proceeds in their case from the fact that the reflection which they make that what they undertake is difficult, makes an impression in their brain which, being united to that which they might form were they to think that it is a good thing to feel sufficiently courageous, happy, skilful, or strong to dare to risk themselves to such an extent, is the cause of their taking pleasure in so-doing. And the happiness which old people have when they recollect the evils which they have suffered, proceeds from the fact that they represent to themselves that it is a good thing to survive in spite of them all.

  ARTICLE XCVI.

  The movements of the blood and the spirits to which the five preceding passions are due.