What will be the event of these commotions who can discover? And how can we know what may determine the course of that flood of power, which is now in a state of uncertain fluctuation, or seems driven to different points by different impulses? How soon may the Dutch see their barrier attacked, and call upon us for the ten thousand men which we are obliged to send them? How soon may the house of Austria be so distressed, as to require all our power for its preservation?
That we are to leave nothing unattempted for the security of our own religion and liberty, will easily be granted, and, therefore, unless it can be proved that we may be equally secure, though the house of Austria be ruined, it will necessarily follow that we are, with all our power, to enforce the observation of the Pragmatick sanction.
This is not an act of romantick generosity, but such as the closest attention to our own interest shows to be necessary; in defending the queen of Hungary we defend ourselves, and only extinguish that flame, by which, if it be suffered to spread, we shall ourselves be consumed. The empire may be considered as the bulwark of Britain, which, if it be thrown down, leaves us naked and defenceless.
Let us, therefore, consider our own danger, and remember, that while we are considering this supply, we are deliberating upon nothing less than the fate of our country.
Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, to the effect following: — Sir, I am on this occasion of an opinion different from that of the honourable member who spoke the second in this debate, though on most questions our judgment has been the same. I am so far from seconding his proposal for delaying the consideration of this supply, that I think it may justly be inquired, why it was not sooner proposed.
For the support of the house of Austria, and the assertion of the Pragmatick sanction, no man can be more zealous than myself; I am convinced how closely the interest of this nation and that of the Austrian family are united, and how much either must be endangered by the ruin of the other, and, therefore, I shall not delay, for a single moment, my consent to any measures that may reestablish our interest on the continent, and rescue Germany once more from the jaws of France.
I am afraid that we have lost part of our influence in the neighbouring countries, and that the name of Britain is less formidable than heretofore; but if reputation is lost, it is time to recover it, and I doubt not but it may be recovered by the same means that it was at first obtained. Our armies may be yet equally destructive, and our money equally persuasive.
We have not yet suffered, amidst all our misconduct, our naval force to be diminished; our sailors yet retain their ancient courage, and our fleets are sufficient to keep the dominion of the ocean, and prescribe limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power remains unimpaired, while Britain retains her natural superiority, and asserts the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot become despicable, nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance. We may still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those nations which we cannot invade.
To preserve this power let us watch over the disposal of our money; money is the source of dominion; those nations may be formidable for their affluence which are not considerable for their numbers; and by a negligent profusion of their wealth, the most powerful people may languish into imbecility, and sink into contempt.
If the grant which is now demanded will be sufficient to produce the ends to which it is proposed to be applied, if we are assured of the proper application of it, I shall agree to it without hesitation. But though it cannot be affirmed that the sum now demanded is too high a price for the liberties of Europe, it is at least more than ought to be squandered without effect, and we ought at least to know before we grant it, what advantages may be expected from it.
May not the sum demanded for the support of the queen of Hungary be employed to promote very different interests? May it not be lavished to support that power, to which our grants have too long contributed? that power by which ourselves have been awed, and the administration has tyrannised without control?
If this sum is really intended to support the queen of Hungary, may we not inquire how it is to be employed for her service? Is it to be sent her for the payment of her armies, and the support of her court? Should we not more effectually secure her dominions by purchasing with it the friendship and assistance of the king of Prussia, a prince, whose extent of dominions and numerous forces, make him not more formidable than his personal qualities.
What may be hoped, sir, from a prince of wisdom and courage, at the head of a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, with eight millions in his treasury? How much he must necessarily add to the strength of any party in which he shall engage, is unnecessary to mention; it is evident, without proof, that nothing could so much contribute to the reestablishment of the house of Austria, as a reconciliation with this mighty prince, and that, to bring it to pass, would be the most effectual method of serving the unfortunate queen that requires our assistance.
Why we should despair, sir, of such a reconciliation I cannot perceive; a reconciliation equally conducive to the real interest of both parties. It may be proved, with very little difficulty, to the king of Prussia, that he is now assisting those with whom interests incompatible and religions irreconcilable have set him at variance, whom he can never see prosperous but by the diminution of his own greatness, and who will always project his ruin while they are enjoying the advantages of his victories. We may easily convince him that their power will soon become, by his assistance, such as he cannot hope to withstand, and show, from the examples of other princes, how dangerous it is to add to the strength of an ambitious neighbour. We may show him how much the fate of the empire is now in his hands, and how much more glorious and more advantageous it will be to preserve it from ruin, than to contribute to its destruction.
If by such arguments, sir, this potent monarch can be induced to act steadily in defence of the common cause, we may once more stand at the head of a protestant confederacy; of a confederacy that may contract the views and repress the ambition of the house of Bourbon, and alter their schemes of universal monarchy into expedients for the defence of their dominions.
But in transacting these affairs, let us not engage in any intricate treaties, nor amuse ourselves with displaying our abilities for negotiation; negotiation, that fatal art which we have learned as yet very imperfectly, and which we have never attempted to practise but to our own loss. While we have been entangled in tedious disquisitions, and retarded by artful delays, while our commissaries have been debating about what was only denied to produce controversies, and inquiring after that which has been hid from them only to divert their attention from other questions, how many opportunities have been lost, and how often might we have secured by war, what was, at a much greater expense, lost by treaties.
Treaties, sir, are the artillery of our enemies, to which we have nothing to oppose; they are weapons of which we know not the use, and which we can only escape by not coming within their reach. I know not by what fatality it is, that to treat and to be cheated, are, with regard to Britons, words of the same signification; nor do I intend, by this observation, to asperse the characters of particular persons, for treaties, by whomsoever carried on, have ended always with the same success.
It is time, therefore, to know, at length, our weakness and our strength, and to resolve no longer to put ourselves voluntarily into the power of our enemies: our troops have been always our ablest negotiators, and to them it has been, for the most part, necessary at last to refer our cause.
Let us, then, always preserve our martial character, and neglect the praise of political cunning; a quality which, I believe, we shall never attain, and which, if we could obtain, would add nothing to our honour. Let it be the practice of the Britons to declare their resolutions without reserve, and adhere to them in opposition to danger; let them be ambitious of no other elogies than those which may be gained by honesty and courage, nor will they then ever find their allies diffident, or their enemies contemptuous.
By recovering and asserting this character, we may become once more the arbiters of Europe, and be courted by all the protestant powers as their protectors: we may once more subdue the ambition of the aspiring French, and once more deliver the house of Austria from the incessant pursuit of those restless enemies.
The defence of that illustrious family, sir, has always appeared to me, since I studied the state of Europe, the unvariable interest of the British nation, and our obligations to support it on this particular occasion have already been sufficiently explained.
Whence it proceeded, sir, that those who now so zealously espouse the Austrian interest, have been so plainly forgetful of it on other occasions, I cannot determine. That treaties have been made very little to the advantage of that family, and that its enemies have been suffered to insult it without opposition, is well known; nor was it long ago that it was debated in this house, whether any money should be lent to the late emperour.
No publick or private character can be supported, no enemy, sir, can be intimidated, nor any friend confirmed in his adherence, but by a steady and consistent conduct, by proposing, in all our actions, such ends as may be openly avowed, and by pursuing them without regard to temporary inconveniencies, or petty obstacles.
Such conduct, sir, I would gladly recommend on the present occasion, on which I should be far from advising a faint, an irresolute, or momentary assistance, such supplies as declare diffidence in our own strength, or a mean inclination to please contrary parties at the same time, to perform our engagements with the queen, and continue our friendship with France. It is, in my opinion, proper to espouse our ally with the spirit of a nation that expects her decisions to be ratified, that holds the balance of the world in her hand, and can bestow conquest and empire at her pleasure.
Yet, sir, it cannot be denied that many powerful reasons may be brought against any new occasions of expense, nor is it without horrour and astonishment that any man, conversant in political calculations, can consider the enormous profusion of the national treasure. In the late dreadful confusion of the world, when the ambition of France had set half the nations of the earth on flame, when we sent our armies to the continent, and fought the general quarrel of mankind, we paid, during the reigns of king William and his great successour, reigns of which every summer was distinguished by some important action, but four millions yearly.
But our preparations for the present war, in which scarcely a single ship of war has been taken, or a single fortress laid in ruins, have brought upon the nation an expense of five millions. So much more are we now obliged to pay to amuse the weakest, than formerly to subdue the most powerful of our enemies.
Frugality, which is always prudent, is, at this time, sir, indispensable, when war, dreadful as it is, may be termed the lightest of our calamities; when the seasons have disappointed us of bread, and an universal scarcity afflicts the nation. Every day brings us accounts from different parts of the country, and every account is a new evidence of the general calamity, of the want of employment for the poor, and its necessary consequence, the want of food.
He that is scarce able to preserve himself, cannot be expected to assist others; nor is that money to be granted to foreign powers, which is wanted for the support of our fellow-subjects, who are now languishing with diseases, which unaccustomed hardships and unwholesome provisions have brought upon them, while we are providing against distant dangers, and bewailing the distresses of the house of Austria.
Let us not add to the miseries of famine the mortifications of insult and neglect; let our countrymen, at least, divide our care with our allies, and while we form schemes for succouring the queen of Hungary, let us endeavour to alleviate nearer distresses, and prevent or pacify domestick discontents.
If there be any man whom the sight of misery cannot move to compassion, who can hear the complaints of want without sympathy, and see the general calamity of his country without employing one hour on schemes for its relief; let not that man dare to boast of integrity, fidelity, or honour; let him not presume to recommend the preservation of our faith, or adherence to our confederates: that wretch can have no real regard to any moral obligation, who has forgotten those first duties which nature impresses; nor can he that neglects the happiness of his country, recommend any good action for a good reason.
It should be considered, sir, that we can only be useful to our allies, and formidable to our enemies, by being unanimous and mutually confident of the good intentions of each other, and that nothing but a steady attention to the publick welfare, a constant readiness to remove grievances, and an apparent unwillingness to impose new burdens, can produce that unanimity.
As the cause is, therefore, necessarily to precede the effect, as foreign influence is the consequence of happiness at home, let us first endeavour to establish that alacrity and security that may animate the people to assert their ancient superiority to other nations, and restore that plenty which may raise them above any temptation to repine at assistance given to our allies.
No man, sir, can very solicitously watch over the welfare of his neighbour whose mind is depressed by poverty, or distracted by terrour; and when the nation shall see us anxious for the preservation of the queen of Hungary, and unconcerned about the wants of our fellow-subjects, what can be imagined, but that we have some method of exempting ourselves from the common distress, and that we regard not the publick misery when we do not feel it?
Sir Robert WALPOLE replied, to the following effect: — Sir, it is always proper for every man to lay down some principles upon which he proposes to act, whether in publick or private; that he may not be always wavering, uncertain, and irresolute; that his adherents may know what they are to expect, and his adversaries be able to tell why they are opposed.
It is necessary, sir, even for his own sake, that he may not be always struggling with himself; that he may know his own determinations, and enforce them by the reasons which have prevailed upon him to form them; that he may not argue in the same speech to contrary purposes, and weary the attention of his hearers with contrasts and antitheses.
When a man admits the necessity of granting a supply, expatiates upon the danger that may be produced by retarding it, declares against the least delay, however speciously proposed, and enforces the arguments which have been already offered to show how much it is our duty and interest to allow it; may it not reasonably be imagined, that he intends to promote it, and is endeavouring to convince them of that necessity of which he seems himself convinced?
But when the same man proceeds to display, with equal eloquence, the present calamities of the nation, and tells to how much better purposes the sum thus demanded may be applied; when he dwells upon the possibility that an impolitick use may be made of the national treasure, and hints that it may be asked for one purpose and employed to another, what can be collected from his harangue, however elegant, entertaining, and pathetick? How can his true opinion be discovered? Or how shall we fix such fugitive reasonings, such variable rhetorick?
I am not able, sir, to discern, why truth should be obscured; or why any man should take pleasure in heaping together all the arguments that his knowledge may supply, or his imagination suggest, against a proposition which he cannot deny. Nor can I assign any good purpose that can be promoted by perpetual renewals of debate, and by a repetition of objections, which have in former conferences, on the same occasion, been found of little force.
When the system of affairs is not fully laid open, and the schemes of the administration are in part unknown, it is easy to raise objections formidable in appearance, which, perhaps, cannot be answered till the necessity of secrecy is taken away. When any general calamity has fallen upon a nation, it is a very fruitful topick of rhetorick, and may be very pathetically exaggerated, upon a thousand occasions to which it has no necessary relation.
Such, In my opinion, sir, is the use now made of the present scarcity, a misfortune inflicted upon us by the hand of providence alone; not upon
us only, but upon all the nations on this side of the globe, many of which suffer more, but none less than ourselves.
If at such a time it is more burdensome to the nation to raise supplies, it must be remembered, that it is in proportion difficult to other nations to oppose those measures for which the supplies are granted; and that the same sum is of greater efficacy in times of scarcity than of plenty.
Our present distress will, I hope, soon be at an end; and, perhaps, a few days may produce at least some alteration. It is not without reason, that I expect the news of some successful attempts in America, which will convince the nation, that the preparations for war have not been idle shows, contrived to produce unnecessary expenses.
In the mean time it is necessary that we support that power which may be able to assist us against France, the only nation from which any danger can threaten us, even though our fleets in America should be unsuccessful.
If we defeat the Spaniards, we may assist the house of Austria without difficulty, and if we fail in our attempts, their alliance will be more necessary. The sum demanded for this important purpose cannot be censured as exorbitant, yet will, I hope, be sufficient: if more should hereafter appear necessary, I doubt not but it will be granted.
The question passed without opposition.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 1, 1741.
DEBATE ON CHOOSING A SPEAKER.
The new house of commons being met, the usher came from the house of lords, with his majesty’s commands for their immediate attendance, when they were ordered to choose a speaker; and being returned, Mr. PELHAM addressed himself in the following manner to the clerk of the house:
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