This, my lords, may be observed of the only enterprise, which it is reasonable to believe was in reality intended against the Spaniards, if even of this our ministers had not before contrived the defeat. But of all the rest of our armaments it does not appear that any effect has been felt but by ourselves, it cannot be discovered that they even raised any alarms or anxiety either in our enemies or their allies, by whom perhaps it was known that they were only designed as punishments for the merchants of Britain.
That our merchants have already been severely chastised for their insolence in complaining of their losses, and their temerity in raising in the nation a regard for its commerce, its honour, and its rights, is evident from a dreadful list of three hundred ships taken by the Spaniards, some of which were abandoned by their convoys, and others seized within sight of the coasts of Britain.
It may be urged, my lords, that the Spaniards have likewise lost a great number of vessels; but what else could they expect when they engaged in a war against the greatest naval power of the universe? And it is to be remembered, that the Spaniards have this consolation in their misfortunes, that of their ships none have been deserted by their convoys, or wilfully exposed to capture by being robbed of their crews, to supply ships of war with idle hands.
The Spaniards will likewise consider, that they have not harassed their subjects for the protection of their trade; that they have not fitted out fleets only to amuse the populace. They comfort themselves with the hope, that the Britons will soon be reduced to a state of weakness below themselves, and wait patiently for the time in which the masters of the sea shall receive from them the regulation of their commerce and the limits of their navigation.
Nor can it be doubted, my lords, but that by adhering to these measures, our ministers will in a short time gratify their hopes; for whatsoever be the difference between the power of two contending nations, if the richer spends its treasures without effect, and exposes its troops to unhealthy climates and impracticable expeditions, while the weaker is parsimonious and prudent, they must soon be brought to an equality; and by continuing the same conduct, the weaker power must at length prevail.
That this has been hitherto the state of the war between Britain and Spain, it is not necessary to prove to your lordships; it is apparent, that the expenses of the Spaniards have been far less than those of Britain; and, therefore, if we should suppose the actual losses of war equal, we are only wearing out our force in useless efforts, and our enemies grow every day comparatively stronger.
But, my lords, let us not flatter ourselves that our actual losses have been equal; let us, before we determine this question, accurately compare the number and the value of our ships and cargoes with those of the Spaniards, and see on which side the loss will fall.
And let us not forget, what in all the calculations which I have yet seen on either part has been totally overlooked, the number of men killed, or captives in the British and Spanish dominions. Men, my lords, are at once strength and riches; and, therefore, it is to be considered, that the most irreparable loss which any nation can sustain is the diminution of its people: money may be repaid, and commerce may be recovered; even liberty may be regained, but the loss of people can never be retrieved. Even the twentieth generation may have reason to exclaim, How much more numerous and more powerful would this nation have been, had our ancestors not been betrayed in the expedition to Carthagena!
What loss, my lords, have the Spaniards sustained which can be put in balance with that of our army in America, an army given up to the vultures of an unhealthy climate, and of which those who perished by the sword, were in reality rescued from more lingering torments?
What equivalent can be mentioned for the liberty of multitudes of Britons, now languishing in the prisons of Spain, or obliged by hardships and desperation to assist the enemies of their country? What have the Spaniards suffered that can be opposed to the detriment which the commerce of this nation feels from the detention of our sailors?
These, my lords, are losses not to be paralleled by the destruction of Porto Bello, even though that expedition should be ascribed to the ministry. These are losses which may extend their consequences to many ages, which may long impede our commerce, and diminish our shipping.
It is not to be imagined, my lords, that in this time of peculiar danger, parents will destine their children to maritime employments, or that any man will engage in naval business who can exercise any other profession; and therefore the death or captivity of a sailor leaves a vacuity in our commerce, since no other will be ready to supply his place. Thus, by degrees, the continuance of the war will contract our trade, and those parts of it which we cannot occupy, will be snatched by the French or Dutch, from whom it is not probable that they will ever be recovered.
This, my lords, is another circumstance of disadvantage to which the Spaniards are not exposed; for their traffick being only from one part of their dominions to another, cannot be destroyed, but will, after the short interruption of a war, be again equally certain and equally profitable.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that we have hitherto suffered more than the Spaniards, more than the nation which we have so much reason to despise; it appears that our fleets have been useless, and that our troops have been only sent out to be destroyed; and it will, therefore, surely be allowed me to assert, that the war has not been hitherto successful.
I am, therefore, of opinion, my lords, that as the address now proposed, cannot but be understood both by his majesty and the nation, to imply, in some degree, a commendation of that conduct which cannot be commended, which ought never to be mentioned but with detestation and contempt, it will be unworthy of this house, offensive to the whole nation, and unjust to his majesty.
His majesty, my lords, has summoned us to advise him in this important juncture, and the nation expects from our determinations its relief or its destruction: nor will either have much to hope from our counsels, if, in our first publick act, we endeavour to deceive them.
It seems, therefore, proper to change the common form of our addresses to the throne, to do once, at least, what his majesty demands and the people expect, and to remember that no characters are more inconsistent, than those of a counsellor of the king, and a flatterer of the ministry.
Then lord ABINGDON spoke to this effect: — My lords, I have always observed that debates are prolonged, and inquiries perplexed, by the neglect of method; and therefore think it necessary to move, That the question may be read, that the noble lords who shall be inclined to explain their sentiments upon it, may have always the chief point in view, and not deviate into foreign considerations.
[It was read accordingly.]
Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the purpose following: — My lords, I am convinced of the propriety of the last motion by the advantage which it has afforded me of viewing more deliberately and distinctly the question before us; the consideration of which has confirmed me in my own opinion, that the address now proposed is only a flattering repetition of the speech, and that the speech was drawn up only to betray us into an encomium on the ministry; who, as they certainly have not deserved any commendations, will, I hope, not receive them from your lordships. For what has been the result of all their measures, but a general confusion, the depression of our own nation and our allies, and the exaltation of the house of Bourbon?
It is universally allowed, my lords, and therefore it would be superfluous to prove, that the liberties of Europe are now in the utmost danger; that the house of Bourbon has arrived almost at that exalted pinnacle of authority, from whence it will look down with contempt upon all other powers, to which it will henceforward prescribe laws at pleasure, whose dominions will be limited by its direction, and whose armies will march at its command.
That Britain will be long exempted from the general servitude, that we shall be able to stand alone against the whole power of Europe, which the French may then bring down upon us, and preserve ourselves independent, while every other nation
acknowledges the authority of an arbitrary conqueror, is by no means likely, and might be, perhaps, demonstrated to be not possible.
How long we might be able to retain our liberty, it is beyond the reach of policy to determine, but as it is evident, that when the empire is subdued, the Dutch will quickly fall under the same dominion, and that all their ports and all their commerce will then be in the hands of the French, it cannot be denied that our commerce will quickly be at an end. We shall then lose the dominion of the sea, and all our distant colonies and settlements, and be shut up in our own island, where the continuance of our liberties can be determined only by the resolution with which we shall defend them.
That this, my lords, must probably, in a few years, be our state, if the schemes of the house of Bourbon should succeed, is certain beyond all controversy; and therefore it is evident, that no man to whom such a condition does not appear eligible, can look unconcerned at the confusion of the continent, or consider the destruction of the house of Austria, without endeavouring to prevent it.
But, my lords, though such endeavours are the duty of all who are engaged in the transaction of publick affairs, though the importance of the cause of the queen of Hungary be acknowledged in the speech to which we are to return an address, it does not appear that the ministers of Britain have once attempted to assist her, or have even forborne any thing which might aggravate her distress.
The only effectual methods by which any efficacious relief could have been procured, were that of reconciling her with the king of Prussia, or that of prevailing upon the Muscovites to succour her.
A reconciliation with the king of Prussia would have been my first care, if the honour of advising on this occasion had fallen to my lot. To have mediated successfully between them could surely have been no difficult task, because each party could not but know how much it was their common interest to exclude the French from the empire, and how certainly this untimely discord must expose them both to their ancient enemy.
As in private life, my lords, when two friends carry any dispute between them to improper degrees of anger or resentment, it is the province of a third to moderate the passion of each, and to restore that benevolence which a difference of interest or opinion had impaired; so in alliances, or the friendships of nations, whenever it unhappily falls out that two of them forget the general good, and lay themselves open to those evils from which a strict union only can preserve them, it is necessary that some other power should interpose, and prevent the dangers of a perpetual discord.
Whether this was attempted, my lords, I know not; but if any such design was in appearance prosecuted, it may be reasonably imagined from the event, that the negotiators were defective either in skill or in diligence; for how can it be conceived that any man should act contrary to his own interest, to whom the state of his affairs is truly represented?
But not to suppress what I cannot doubt, I am convinced, my lords, that there is in reality no design of assisting the queen of Hungary; either our ministers have not yet recovered from their apprehensions of the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, by which they were frighted some years ago into the bosom of France for shelter, and which left them no expedient but the treaty of Hanover; or they are now equally afraid of France, and expect the pretender to be forced upon them by the power whom they so lately solicited to secure them from him.
Whatever is the motive of their conduct, it is evident, my lords, that they are at present to the unfortunate queen of Hungary, either professed enemies, or treacherous allies; for they have permitted the invasion of her Italian dominions, when they might have prevented it without a blow, only by commanding the Spaniards not to transport their troops.
To argue that our fleet in the Mediterranean was not of strength sufficient to oppose their passage, is a subterfuge to which they can only be driven by the necessity of making some apology, and an absolute inability to produce any which will not immediately be discovered to be groundless.
It is known, my lords, to all Europe, that Haddock had then under his command thirteen ships of the line, and nine frigates, and that the Spanish convoy consisted only of three ships; and yet they sailed before his eyes with a degree of security which nothing could have produced but a passport from the court of Britain, and an assured exemption from the danger of an attack.
It may be urged, that they were protected by the French squadron, and that Haddock durst not attack them, because he was unable to contend with the united fleets; but my lords, even this is known to be false: it is known that they bore no proportion to the strength of the British squadron, that they could not have made even the appearance of a battle, and that our commanders could have been only employed in pursuit and captures.
This, my lords, was well known to our ministers, who were afraid only of destroying the French squadron, and were very far from apprehending any danger from it; but being determined to purchase, on any terms, the continuance of the friendship of their old protectors, consented to the invasion of Italy, and procured a squadron to sail out, under pretence of defending the Spanish transports, that their compliance might not be discovered.
All this, my lords, may reasonably be suspected at the first view of their proceedings; for how could an inferiour force venture into the way of an enemy, unless upon security that they should not be attacked? But the late treaty of neutrality has changed suspicion into certainty, has discovered the source of all their measures, and shown that the invasion of Italy is permitted to preserve Hanover from the like calamity.
There is great danger, my lords, lest this last treaty of Hanover should give the decisive blow to the liberties of Europe. How much it embarrasses the queen of Hungary, by making it necessary for her to divide her forces, is obvious at the first view; but this is not, in my opinion, its most fatal consequence. The other powers will be incited, by the example of our ministry, to conclude treaties of neutrality in the same manner. They will distrust every appearance of our zeal for the house of Austria, and imagine that we intend only an hypocritical assistance, and that our generals, our ambassadors, and our admirals, have, in reality, the same orders.
Nothing, my lords, is more dangerous than to weaken the publick faith. When a nation can be no longer trusted, it loses all its influence, because none can fear its menaces, or depend on its alliance. A nation no longer trusted, must stand alone and unsupported; and it is certain that the nation which is justly suspected of holding with its open enemies a secret intercourse to the prejudice of its allies, can be no longer trusted.
This suspicion, my lords, this hateful, this reproachful character, is now fixed upon the court of Britain; nor does it take its rise only from the forbearance of our admiral, but has received new confirmation from the behaviour of our ambassador, who denied the treaty of neutrality, when the French minister declared it to the Dutch. Such now, my lords, is the reputation of the British court, a reputation produced by the most flagrant and notorious instances of cowardice and falsehood, which cannot but make all our endeavours ineffectual, and discourage all those powers whose conjunction we might have promoted, from entering into any other engagements than such as we may purchase for stated subsidies. For who, upon any other motive than immediate interest, would form an alliance with a power which, upon the first appearance of danger, gives up a confederate, to purchase, not a large extent of territory, not a new field of commerce, not a port or a citadel, but an abject neutrality!
But however mean may be a supplication for peace, or however infamous the desertion of an ally, I wish, my lords, that the liberty of invading the queen of Hungary’s dominions without opposition, had been the most culpable concession of our illustrious ministers, of whom it is reasonable to believe, that they have stipulated with the Spaniards, that they shall be repaid the expense of the war by the plunder of our merchants.
That our commerce has been unnecessarily exposed to the ravages of privateers, from which a very small degree of caution might have preserved it; that three hundre
d trading ships have been taken, and that three thousand British sailors are now in captivity, is a consideration too melancholy to be long dwelt upon, and a truth too certain to be suppressed or denied.
How such havock could have been made, had not our ships of war concluded a treaty of neutrality with the Spaniards, and left the war to be carried on only by the merchants, it is not easy to conceive; for surely it will not be pretended, that all these losses were the necessary consequence of our situation with regard to Spain, which, if it exposed the Portugal traders to hazard, did not hinder us from guarding our own coasts.
And yet on our own coasts, my lords, have multitudes of our ships been taken by the Spaniards; they have been seized by petty vessels as they were entering our ports, and congratulating themselves upon their escape from danger.
In the late war with France, an enemy much more formidable both for power and situation, methods were discovered by which our trade was more efficaciously protected: by stationing a squadron at the mouth of the Channel, of which two or three ships at a time cruized at a proper distance on the neighbouring seas, the privateers were kept in awe, and confined to their own harbours, or seized if they ventured to leave them.
But of such useful regulations in the present war there is little hope; for if the publick papers are of any credit, the king of Spain considers the captures of our merchants as a standing revenue, and has laid an indulto upon them as upon other parts of the Spanish trade.
It is, therefore, to little purpose that measures are proposed in this house, or schemes presented by the merchants for the preservation of our commerce; for the merchants are considered as the determined enemies of our minister, who therefore resolved that they should repent of the war into which he was forced by them, contrary to those favourite schemes and established maxims, which he has pursued till the liberties of mankind are almost extinguished.
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