Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander

by Unknown

  We began to feel like tour guides-and this in a theater of war where the final decision was imminent. But that is the way of war. In between tough engagements and murderous battles, there is time for relaxation, for regeneration. And all this in the knowledge that it could be one's last day.

  During the discussion of the situation that followed, Stumme left us in no doubt that the decisive battle was imminent.

  "According to North Africa, 1942: Rommel, the Desert Fox 115 our information, the British are receiving large quantities of war materiel, which is being landed at Suez and then brought up to the front at once. Montgomery is behaving like all British commanders: if by means of materiel men can be spared, then that is what is done.

  "We, unfortunately, are not in that happy position. The supplies. that are reaching us don't cover, by a long way, the minimum we need. My greatest worry is the almost complete air superiority of the British, which in the desert, without cover, represents a mortal danger. We have far too few fighters, and those few are for the most part still grounded without fuel.

  "I have just asked Rommel, once again, to bring all his influence to bear on Hitler and Goering to see that we are provided, as quickly as possible, with fuel, more tanks, 88mm guns, and fighter aircraft.

  “Your task in the coming British offensive,” Stumme concluded, “will be to guard our open southern flank and prevent any attempt to circumvent us.”

  The Retreat from El Alamein All was still quiet at the front-it was now October 1942-and especially in our oasis. The daily flights of the Ghibli revealed nothing out of the ordinary in our sector.

  Our days in the singularly beautiful oasis of Siwa were undoubtedly numbered. The reports of British preparations for an offensive were accumulating. I worked out a plan to enable the rear sections, including the bakery platoon, to march in the direction of the coast without being threatened by the British advance.

  In addition, I discussed with the company commanders the two possible ways in which we might go into action: either via the winding road to the north, or to the west via the Giarabub oasis, veering north from there. I was well stocked with fuel and ammunition. All the water canisters were filled. We had to figure that, after the corning offensive, the confusion would be so great that in the early days the delivery of supplies in the depths of the desert was not something we could count on.

  In the middle of October, according to our information, the British had 1,000 tanks at their disposal, including 4M of the new, superior, American-made Shermans, against which we could put up just 200. Opposing the 195,000 British, including their allies, who were all fully motorized, we had on our side 24,000 men. In the middle of October, we received only 44 percent of the minimum supplies for the next eleven days. Our tanks were furnished with fuel for a mere 300 kilometers. In addition, the air superiority of our opponents was complete. Our few fighters, which likewise suffered from lack of fuel, could not compete.

  On 23 October, the expected inferno broke forth with 1,000 guns and sustained attacks by the RAF. Montgomery opened concentrated fire on our positions and, in doing so, blasted a hole in our mine fields.

  My battalion was put on the alert.

  “Counterattack by 15th Panzer Division planned for tomorrow,” Gause informed us. “You will hold yourself ready for counterattack or to protect southern flank.” The orders came in a radio message from Gause (which was intercepted by Ultra at The Retreat from El Alamein 117 Park. This was told to me in 1985 by Jean Howard.) The fact that all our actions were known at once to the British, represented for us a further catastrophe.

  Next day, we received more alarming news: General Stumme, on a visit to the front, had come under a sudden concentration of fire and died, presumably of a heart attack. Rommel had broken off his treatment at once and returned to Derna-still not well-on 25 October. That put fresh heart into our people.

  Our counterattack was ineffective, Under the hail of bombs and the rockets used for the first time by the British fighters, and in face also of a defensive line of tanks, it broke down. But the Afrika Korps and the Italian divisions offered fierce resistance to the British offensive. Up to 29 October, Monty Was unable to force a breakthrough, although our positions were exposed ceaselessly to the attacks of the RAF and heavy artillery fire. The bombers and fighters came in flyover formation, as though it were peacetime, even by night, when the whole battlefield was lit by flares.

  Monty regrouped. During the night of I to 2 November 1942, a second offensive began. With 400 tanks and strong artillery and air support, he launched an attack on a narrow sector of the northern front against an unfortunate, inferior Italian division and forced a breakthrough. The division was wiped out after the majority of the Italians had been wounded or killed.

  Rommel pulled out the 21st Panzer Division, which had been stationed in the south, and threw it against the point of breakthrough. At the same time, I received orders to fill the gap and support the XX Italian Corps, which was left on its own.

  That same day, 2 November, in accordance with our prearranged plan, I ordered the supply sections, including the bakery platoon, to go to our supply center in Cyrenaica. To maintain vital contact for our supplies, I gave them a radio armored car.

  Before dawn-on 3 November-we left the Siwa oasis. We arrived in the area of the XX Italian Corps, which, for the moment, had not yet come under strong attack, except from the RAF.

  I was able, thank goodness, to keep in constant touch with Rommel's HQ. I was informed that Rommel would shortly be giving the order to retreat, since our front, which had been broken through at several points, could no longer hold out against the superior enemy and the constant air attacks. By giving up Cyrenaica, Rommel planned to reach Tripolitania and set up a line of defense there. In so doing, it seemed to him important to bring to safety, over a 118 PANZER COMMANDER distance of nearly 2,000 kilometers, as many units as possible, especially the battered, nonmotorized Italian infantry divisions. In the midst of these considerations, a briefly worded order from I I the Fuehrer reached Rommel at midday to the effect that there was no other choice for our soldiers but victory or death. With that, any retreat was forbidden by the highest authority. As he told me a few weeks after the event, Rommel wavered between doing his duty of absolute obedience to the oath he had taken, and the reality at the front, with the threatening destruction that implied of the whole Africa Army. That same afternoon of 3 November, he decided to pass on to his commanders the Fuehrer's order to hold fast; the men, however, were not to be informed.

  Rommel was sorely frustrated, but for thepresent, he obeyed. On the morning of 4 November, after ;trong artillery preparation, the British launched an attack against the Afrika Korps. By using 200 tanks, including many of the superior Shermans, and against bitter resistance from the 20 tanks left to us, deep breaches were made. But the Afrika Korps still held out and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy, mainly with our 88s.

  While the enemy could replace his losses immediately, we lacked any replacements of tanks, heavy weapons, and ammunition. Then, however, toward ten o'clock, after renewed heavy artillery fire and relays of attack by the RAF, the British moved against the I front of the XX Italian Corps, which, with its poorly equipped defensive weapons, stood no chance of stopping the attack. I tried to give the Italians as much help as possible, but with my armored reconnaissance vehicles and their equally weak antitank guns, any help I could offer was more moral than effective. It was heart-rending to have to witness how the Ariete Division our most loyal allies) and the remains of the Trieste and Littorio Divisions, fought with death-defying courage; how their tanks (the..sardine tins“ so often mocked by us) were shot up and left burning on the battlefield. Although I was engaged in actions myself, I kept in contact with the XX Italian Corps until it was almost surrounded. At about 1530 hours, the commander of the Ariete Division sent his last radio message to Rommel: ”We are encircled, the Ariete tanks still in action." By evening, the XX Italian Corps had beeii destroyed.
We lost good, brave friends, from whom we demanded more than they were in a position to give. The British now stormed through a breach 20 kilometers wide The Retreat from El Alamein 119 and threatened a southern outflanking of the Afrika Korps, which was fighting desperately in the north. At that, Rommel decided to begin an immediate retreat and thus ignore Hitler's order. Of the 750 or so tanks, which the Africa Army had at its disposal before the British offensive, only 12 were still available to us.

  I received orders to disengage from the enemy and transfer, in the first place, to the area between Siwa and the Giarabub oasis, which was already in Libyan territory west of Siwa. My task was to reconnoiter in every direction and report, or prevent, any outflanking attempt south of the movement of retreat.

  In the morning of 5 November, I reached an area north of the Siwa and Giarabub oases without coming into contact with the enemy. Our patrols were positioned in a wide fan, with observation to the east, the southeast, and the south.

  Sandstorms and heavy downpours of rain set in, making many tracks almost impassable for the elements of the Africa Army that were now falling back.

  Next day, we had our first contact with the enemy, with British patrols that had been sent out, it seemed, to explore the possibility of a southern outflanking; but they proved easy to repulse.

  On 7 November, in the depths of the desert, a patrol putting out a long feeler to the east, discovered General Ramcke, the commander of the paratroop division, which had been in action on the right wing south of Alamein. General Ramcke was brought to us in a scout car. He looked emaciated and asked to be taken, at once, to Rommel. His paratroops-an elite unit-had been through an adventurous time.

  I at once sent a radio message to Rommel: “General Ramcke, with 700 men and all weapons, has been discovered by us; he himself is with me at the command post.” Rommel replied that he had been very worried about the paratroops and had almost given them up. I was to have the General taken to him at once and to convey his men to him with available vehicles.

  I shall never forget the sight of Ramcke's men coming toward us, exhausted, out of the desert. For reason of space, they had left everything behind except for weapons and water, but their morale was astonishing.

  In the morning of 8 November, Rommel appeared at my command postast of the Egyptian-Libyan border-and gave me a review of the general situation. The Africa Army had been in full retreat toward the Libyan border since 4 November. We were resisting the vigorous British advance with our last resources. The fuel that had been landed in Benghazi had come too late or not even reached the German panzer divisions; as a result, some of the last tanks had had to be blown up. At that moment, only four tanks were ready for action; the burden of defense was falling, therefore, mainly on the 88s.

  Rommel spoke of the terrible scenes that were taking place on the coastal road. Pursued by British tanks and covered inescapably by carpets of bombs, vehicles were left standing in flames, while the men tried to save themselves on foot. Owing to these insurmountable obstacles, the supply trucks were hardly able to make progress.

  Rommel's intention was to hold open the border passes into Libya and channel through them-Airected by pickets of officersthe greater part of the Africa Army.

  I could see the profound disappointment in Rommel's face.

  "Through Hitler's crazy order to hold out, we lost a vital day, which cost us losses that cannot be made good. I can't hold Cyrenaica, so with the remains of the Afrika Korps, under General Bayerlein, I shall cross southern Cyrenaica, despite the rains and the sandstorms, in order to set up a first line of defense at Mersa el Brega (just short of Tripolitania).

  “I have information,” Rommel continued, “that the British, by means of reconnaissance detachments and scout cars, are trying to explore and prepare a southern outflanking of the whole Afrika Korps. This is a deadly danger. So I'm going to send you the Voss Reconnaissance Group, (Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 580 under Major Voss and Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 33 under Major Linau). You will then be strong enough to prevent any outflanking.” Rommel seemed unbroken. But one couldn't fail to notice how disillusioned he was at being left in the lurch in this way by the highest authority. What had become of Rommel's proud Africa Army? How depressing it must have been for him to have to give up in a matter of days all that had once been conquered in unprecedented operations.

  All of us now felt that we had to stand by “our Rommel.” Major Voss and Major Linau appeared with their battalions; the panzer reconnaissance group of the Africa Army was formed under my command. From Voss I heard more of the appalling events unfolding at the coast.

  “It was terrible to have to see how the Italians, and our own people, hung in clusters on the few vehicles that were still intact,” The Retreat from El Alamein 121 Voss reported. “Some of the remaining tanks were on tow, as thy were out of fuel. The supply vehicles could hardly make their way forward against the retreating mmm. Worst of all was the helplessness in face of the RAF, which covered the one asphalt road With bombs and machine-gun fire, not only by day but also by night.” I divided up our operational territory SO that it could be watched over without a break by our three battalions.

  Next day, Gause sent us, in addition, a Fieseler Stork, that welltried, light aircraft for reconnaissance and communication, which was now to be very useful to us, since we had had to return the Italian Ghibli. My adjutant or I went up in the plane once or twice a day to gain a general view of the terrain or of possible enemy movements. This saved fuel for our reconnaissance vehicles.

  On 5 November, the remains of the once proud Africa Army crossed he border into Libya; in ten days, on 13 November, our weary, decimated units reached Mersa el Brega. At the cost of terrible losses, 1,000 kilometers had been covered; the 21st Panzer Division had four tanks left.

  On 8 November HQ informed me that the Americans had landed in Morocco and Algeria and there was a danger that the Africa Army could be shut in on two sides. As a result, German Luftwaffe units landed in and around Tunis on 9 November and paratroops on the Ilth; to follow were the 10th German Panzer Division and an Italian division. The 5th Panzer Army was formed.

  The news of the American landing alarmed us, although we were still a long way from Tunisia. There were rumors that the French, with a task force from Chad, were on the march through the desert in the direction of Tunisia, in order to cut us off v a the i south.

  Some days later Rommel's HQ informed me that I was to be sent an Italian armored reconnaissance battalion, the Nizza. At first, I was not very pleased, as I had no great opinion of Italian weapons or morale. They duly arrived, well spread out and apparently still at normal fighting strength. Their commander, a tall, fairhaired Major, presented himself. As he told me later, he had been given the posting “for disciplinary reasons”, because of an affair with a member of the royal house. Tle officers and men came exclusively from the north.

  They were proud Piedmontese and Venetians. They wanted to show that they knew how to fight.

  “May our patrols go on reconnaissance with yours?” I was 122 PANZER COMMANDER asked by the commander and his officers.

  “That would be the best way for us to learn.” I inspected their armored cars and weapons. “More sardine tins,” said our men, who were standing around inquisitively.

  Indeed, the equipment didn't even approach the standard of that which we had had at the start of the Polish campaign. it was hopelessly inferior to the British Humbers and antitank guns.

  And yet, the Italians wanted to be sent into action at the front.

  In the difficult weeks that followed, my feelings wavered between admiration and pity for these brave men, who despite heavy losses, didn't give up and so remained to the end, our good friends.

  We have, without doubt, often done our Italian allies an injustice. Frequently mocked by our men as “spaghetti-eaters,” they were regarded, on account of their combat performance, as more of a burden than a help. We failed to consider that their weapons and armore
d cars were far from corresponding to the standard of those which we or our opponents employed in North Africa.

  The Italians have a cheerful, amiable disposition; they are of a different mentality from us Germans. It is said of them that they ,.work to live,“ whereas, we are supposed to ”live to work." There is no doubt that the Italians are outstanding engineers, designers, and road-builders; they have given the world the most beautiful operas and they are the best interpreters of classical music. The past culture of the Romans still marks these people today, and it has influenced all other modern cultures. Charm, gaiety, and a Mediterranean climate, always exercise their fascination on visitors to their beautiful country.

  All these qualities and characteristics determine, therefore, the features of the Italian soldier. He doesn't take war with deadly seriousness and ends it for his part when he considers it to be hopeless. Hitler's pathetic, cynical maxim, “the German soldier stands or dies,” is, to the Italian, profoundly alien.

  It is against this background that the active service and performance of our allies is to be seen. So much more highly did we value the service of the Nizza Battalion, whose officers and men fought bravely beside and with us to the bitter end.

  The lack of replacements of weapons, ammunition, and fuel, the supply problem now had a catastrophic effect on the retreat. It was not only that many tanks and combat vehicles had to be towed back or blown up; at times parts of the German Panzer Korps faced the attacks of the British tanks and the RAF with no fuel.

  The Retreat from El Alamein 123 Our reconnaissance battalion was greatly indebted to its supply officer: time and again he managed to organize the fuel that was vital to us, and deliver it to us through the desert in small convoys. Only once was a convoy caught between British lines and destroyed, as was reported to us by the accompanying radio car.