Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander

by Unknown

  Now, on the evening of 6 June, it seemed to have become clear even to Hitler that it must be a matter of a large-scale invasion. But, as Feuchtinger told us, Hitler and his High Command still reckoned on a further landing in the Pas de Calais. The panzer divisions and reserve units stationed there were not to be withdrawn, on express orders from Hitler.

  At the same time it was also clear to the last man that the invasion had succeeded, that it could now be only a matter of days or weeks before the Allies would have landed sufficient forces to be able to mount an attack on Paris, and finally on the German Reich. If it were not for that damned air superiority!

  Even by night “Christmas trees” hung in the sky bathing the whole area in bright light. The air attacks never stopped; the navy laid a barrage of fire on our positions and bombarded the city of Caen, which was a focal point in our lateral communications.

  By day it was even worse: at any movement on the battlefield, even of an individual vehicle, the enemy reacted with concentrated fire from the navy or attacks by fighter-bombers.

  Either our radio communications were being intercepted or the navy had divided up the whole area into grid squares and had only to pass on the square number to launch a sudden concentration of fire.

  Against such concentrations, and for the night, we all dug foxholes beside our vehicles, which provided some protection.

  All our supplies came from the Paris area and could be moved only by night.

  During the night of 7 June I received orders to continue the attacks on Escoville also on the following days. “We must try to crush the bridghead east of the Ome, which as yet is small,” was the message from our divisional commander.

  Then, in the morning, we saw on the rising ground north of Escoville up to a hundred gliders lying in the fields, a sign that further units of the 6th Airborne Division had landed.

  Units of the panzer reconnaissance battalion Were still dug in on the southern edge of Escoville. A combat patrol forced its way into the village and suffered heavy losses, but brought out thirteen prisoners. One of them talked, “We had the task of attacking southward The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 181 through Escoville, to extend the bridgehead and reach our original objective. We are only waiting for reinforcements.” Back at my command post, I got into conversation with an NCO of the 6th Airborne Division. He was slightly wounded and was just being treated by our doctor. He thanked us for his fair treatment, but was somewhat embittered.

  "I belong to B company under Major John Howard. We had the task of landing at midnight with six gliders by the two Ome bridges near B6nouville and taking the bridges intact. We had been trained for this operation for over a year. We landed right by the bridges. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. They didn't even have time to carry out the prepared demolitions. I think we were the very first to land on French soil. We were mighty proud, especially since we had only a few casualties.

  "Major Howard had told us that after the operation had succeeded we would be flown back to England, to be held in readiness for another action.

  “Then, yesterday evening, our Major received orders to attack the village of Escoville this morning. The little bridgehead had to be extended. A task for which, in my opinion, we were never intended. We forced our way into the village, but came under heavy fire from all sides, especially from your bloody 'eighty-eights.” I believe more than half our company have been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. After the feeble resistance at the bridges we seem to have stumbled here on a strong, battle-tried opponent.

  “Our Major was so proud of the coup de main. And now this disaster. All the same, we know our landing from the sea has been successful. You can't stop us any more from marching on Paris before long. You can't win this war any more.” One of the bridges is known today as “Pegasus Bridge,” so called after the flying horse emblem of the British airborne forces.

  Meanwhile reports were coming in from our right flank: my II Battalion was engaged in heavy defensive fighting, especially on the right flank near and north of Troarn. On no account must the enemy break through there on our unprotected, open flank.

  On 7 June its commander, Captain Kurzon, was kille. He was promoted posthumously to Major and awarded the Knight's Cross.

  Lieutenant Brandenburg, who with his No.5 Company had been the first to make contact with the enemy during the night of the 6th. was also killed. Both were buried in ground to the rear and later reinterred.

  These were heavy losses for us all. Division sent Major Kurz of the reserve that same day as the new commander of the battalion.

  He was an infantryman and had been in Russia; in that respect he was very suitable for the immediate task. Within a short while he had integrated himself and became one of my most reliable and successful leaders in the combat group.

  On 8 June neither we nor the British attacked. On both sides the wounded had to be cared for and casualties replaced. To our surpnse a few Messerschmidts suddenly appeared. They were at once involved in an air battle.

  An RAF fighter was shot down over the British lines. The men all raised their arms in jubilation. Were the promised “1,000 fighters” about to turn up after all?

  But a Messerschmidt was also shot down. The pilot was able to save himself by parachute and landed near the reconnaissance battalion. He was brought along to me. He swore and waved his arms about, “What are we supposed to do with a couple of fighters against this superiority? Where the hell are the 1,000 fighter planes?” We didn't know either.

  In the afternoon Major Waldow reported back from leave. His men of the reconnaissance battalion were glad. He was very popular, especially as he stuck up for them and always tried to avoid unnecessary losses.

  At the same time as Waldow came an order also came from division: “Von Luck's combat group will assemble on the morning of 9 June for a decisive attack on Escoville, advance on Ranville, and take possession of the Ome bridges. Assigned to it for this purpose will be: Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21, No.4 Company of Panzer Regiment 22, three batteries of Major Becker's Assault-gun Battalion 200, and one company of Antitank Battalion 220 with 8.8cm guns. The division's artillery will support the attack within the limits of its supply of ammunition.” Late that evening all the commanders, along with an artillery observer, gathered at my post.

  “we a ssemble before dawn, before the enemy air force can intervene or the navy be effective. The motorcycle escorts of the reconnaissance battalion and the grenadiers of 11 Battalion not tied down by the enemy will lead, followed by I Battalion, and supported by the tanks of No.4 Company, as well as Becker's SPWS. The 8.8cm The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 183 antitank guns will take up positions on the hill south of Escoville, to ward off counterattacks by British tanks.” It would take a powerful and effective combat group to offset the impact of the naval guns and fighter-bombers.

  We assembled an hour before dawn. I traveled with a little command group behind the reconnaissance battalion, so that I could make decisions on the spot.

  During the night we had been plastered with heavy naval fire and bombs. Our preparations had evidently been spotted.

  Lance-Corporal Hammel, who took part in the attack as a motorcycle escort, recalls, "With support from the tanks and assaultguns we soon forced our way into Escoville. The remaining civilian population had gathered by the church. We found a few children running around looking for their parents.

  We took them to the church.

  “The British of the 6th Airborne Division put up fierce resistance. When it became light, heavy fire from the navy began to fall on the center of the village and its southern edge. We could make no progress. Then the news reached us that our beloved commander, Major Waldow, had been killed, only a day after coming back from his wife. This was a blow to us all. We couldn't even recover his body at first because of the barrage of fire. It was not until after dark that a patrol of volunteers, whom the British in fairness allowed to pass, was able to bring Major Waldow back and bury hi
m further to the rear. Later the British transferred him to their military cemetery in Ranville, where he found his last rest among his former enemies.” Waldow's death greatly affected me personally. During the course in Paris I had often had talks with him from which I could infer his contempt for Hitler. As I heard later, he had belonged to the wide circle of “the men of 20 July 1944.” I had told Waidow of Rommel's prophecy. He too had set his hopes on Rommel. Waldow was an officer of the old Prussian school, highly decorated in Russia, modest and always considerate of the welfare of his men. His sister told me later, for example, that he had once been in a Russian village surrounded by partisans. The inhabitants had had nothing to eat for days. Wdldow thereupon distributed his men's rations among the women and children. During the night a deputation of partisans suddenly appeared, “German, you have given our women and children food: spacibo (thank you). For that you may leave the village tonight with your men. We will not attack.” A sign of humanity on both sides.

  Captain Brandt from the division's reserve of officers took over the reconnaissance battalion in place of Waldow.

  For Wemer Kortenhaus, too, at that time a tank commander in No. 4 Company, 9 June became a nightmare. "That day was for us one of the hardest actions ever. We assembled with about ten tanks under the trees of the avenue south of Escoville. We drove with closed ports, one tank after the other, to the fight past the chateau into a large meadow, which was enclosed by hedges.

  There we intended switching to broad wedge formation for attack, the grenadiers behind and alongside us.

  “Then everything happened very quickly: within a few minutes we had lost four tanks, knocked out by the naval guns. On my tank a Mk IV with the short barrel) the turret jammed, so that I could only shoot into the hedges with my machine-gun. The fire became more intense, so that on orders from Major von Luck we had to withdraw, as did the grenadiers. I ”The artillery fire continued unabated. Some 30 or 40 grenadiers must have been killed by it.

  "On the evening of that 9 June we realized that we could no longer drive the British back into the sea.

  "In 1960, when the ruins of the chateau were still standing, I went over the action again on the spot.

  "Our attack could not have succeeded, for behind the hedge was a solid wall, which we could have broken through with our tanks only at the risk of disadjusting our guns. In front of the wall was a ditch-very convenient for the elements defending themselves there. And in the wall there were holes, made by artillery shells, through which the defenders could easily retreat.

  “For us, therefore, it was an unfavorable sector for a tank attack.” From the reports of patrols it appeared that on 8 June the 51st Highland Division had been moved into the bridgehead to relieve the hard-pressed 6th Airborne. With that the likelihood of pushing back the bridgehead was further reduced. I knew the 5 1 st Highland Division from North Africa; it had been regarded even then as an expefienced elite unit.

  To my surprise a combat patrol came back one day with a man on a DKW motorcycle. I looked at the machine. It was painted The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 185 khaki and bore the sign of my Reconnaissance Battalion 3 on its mudguard. This machine had been through its own little “safafi.” It had been captured by the British in North Africa, shipped to England and from there sent to Normandy, where my men recaptured it and returned it to me intact.

  Meanwhile, during the-nights of 7 and 8 June, the two panzer divisions, the Panzer Lehr Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division, having arrived at the invasion front after hard and costly marches from their concentration areas far to the east and south of Caen, had been thrown into counterattacks and defensive fi'ghting west of Caen. But they, too, decimated and unnerved by the constant attacks of the RAF, were no longer able to make any i.mpression on the bridgeheads west of Caen and were stuck.

  ','Operation Goodwood“”" 18/19 July 1944 Hitler now seemed to grasp that this was the invasion and not a diversionary maneuver; but he would still not rule out a further operation in the Pas de Calais.

  As Rommel told me on one of his visits to the front, he had begged Hitler orally and in writing to come to the front and form for himself an idea of the situation and the mood of the men. That seemed to us the least one might expect from an “army Fuehrer.” Instead, he issued his orders from Obersalzberg.

  There we had to give credit to Churchill, who came to the invasion front, showed himself to his men, and gave them heart.

  According to one of Hitler's orders, no division might be sent into action without his personal order.

  Not only Rommel but all of us were depressed that Hitler viewed the situation far too optimistically and “juggled” with divisions and army corps of which only decimated elements remained.

  The morale of the men was still surprisingly good, although all realized that Allied success in the west meant the end. The employment of VIand later V2 rockets, and the announcement of new “miracle-weapons,” gave the men some hope of a turn for the bet ter. For 12 June, division issued another order to attack: the village of St. Honorine, lying on a commanding hill, was to be won back, to give us a view over the enemy battlefield and deny the British a view of our own positions. My combat group was to be further reinforced. A brigade of multiple rocket-launchers, “moaning minnies,” with over 300 tubes 21 cm and 30cm in caliber, was to support us. These launchers had a particular psychological effect: the projectiles flew over the I battlefield with a loud, nerve-shattering whine and forced the surprised enemy to take cover immediately.

  With the two motorcycle companies of the reconnaissance battalion and some grenadiers of I Battalion on foot, supported by the few operational tanks of No.4 Company and Becker's assault-guns, we moved against St. Honorine shortly before dawn after heavy and concentrated fire by the rocket-launchers.

  “Operation Goodwood,” 18/19 July 1944 187 We took our opponents, elements of a Canadian division, by surprise and they gave up the village at once. I went in close behind the motorcycles and saw the enemy lines for the first time. Hundreds of gliders were lying on the ground. We dug ourselves in at once on the northern edge of the village, to secure the hill for ourselves.

  Then began the heaviest naval bombardment we had known so far.

  We could see the firing of the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The shells, of calibers up to 38cm, came whistling over like heavy trunks, to burst and rip vast craters in our lines. British fighter-bombers swooped down on us unhindered; a veritable inferno broke over our heads.

  Then, taking advantage of the haze and dust of the explosions, the Canadians came back and after hand-to-hand fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, forced us to give up the village again.

  What more could we set against this superiority in naval guns and fighter-bombers?

  We now finally gave up hope of making any impression on the British bridgehead, let alone of eliminating it. We realized how important this bridgehead was on our unprotected right flank.

  As Lance-Corporal Hammel was later to relate, “The barrage of fire on St. Honorine was the worst that we had experienced so far. We prayed. When we had pulled back to the village of Cuverville, a few kilometers further south, another heavy barrage of fire rained down on that village. Was there absolutely nowhere left here where one could get a breather and some sleep?” One result at least came of our frequent attacks and patroling activities: the British began to mine themselves inside the lines they had reached. This was a sure sign that for the moment they had no intention of launching further attacks.

  For a few weeks we had some peace in my sector. Patrols alone were deployed time and again, to put out feelers.

  Only once more, on 15 June, with heavy artillery support, did we try to attack Escoville; for this was the key position in order to recapture the Orne bridges. But this attack too was in vain and brought heavy losses to both sides. Nor would the situation change for us all the time we were within range of the naval guns and the enemy had absolute control of the air.

 
; The brave, hard-hit Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21 was pulled out on 16 June, but up to 29 June still had to ward off enemy attempts on the eastern edge of Caen to take possession of Caen and the Ome bridges there. On 30 June, the battalion was moved to the area south of Caen, to be restored to strength.

  On a visit to my command post General Feuchtinger told me that the British and Americans had occupied firm, if sometimes small bases along the whole invasion front.

  "There is no doubt that the Allies are bound to try, somewhere and sometime, to break out of the beachheads, if the invasion is not to have been in vain. Our weak point is our right flank, your sector, my dear Luck. South and east of you there are no reserves. The one advantage for you is that the terrain between the Ome and the overflowing Dives is so narrow that one division at most can attack out of the bridgehead. For that, however, we must be prepared, so you will be receiving further reinforcements and will set up a graduated defense in depth.

  The terrain is certainly suitable for a tank attack, but with its many villages, hedges, and bits of woodland it's even better 'tank-killing country."

  “Your task remains unchanged, to prevent any breakout or breakthrough from the bridgehead to the south or southeast.” , June went by. July was particularly hot. We all suffered from the mosquitoes; some people had to receive medical treatment for their swollen eyes. The corn was high and ripe, but the peasants no longer dared to go into the fields for fear of being taken for an enemy and shot.

  Almost every day 11 Battalion had to resist the attacks of strong assault groups and suffered heavy losses in the process.

  One hot morning, when I was observing the front with Major Kurz, a sniper's shot went through my cap. A bit of luck.

  At the beginning of July, the enemy suddenly attacked: “Operation Epsom” was started. (The British were fond of naming their operations after British race-courses.) The enemy tried to break through just west of the Ome, in the sector of Regiment 192. It was the llth Armored Division under Major-General