by Ying-shih Yü
culties aris-
ing from the distance between the autonomy of the text and the original inten-
tion of the author.57
Zhu Xi’s concern with the objectivity of textual interpretation also led him to
stress the importance of doubt in book learning. This is equivalent to what
Betti calls the “critical moment” within the pro cess of interpretation— a mo-
ment that “is called upon in cases requiring a questioning attitude, such as the
emergence of incongruences, illogical statements or gaps in a line of argu-
ment.”58 Zhu Xi said:
I used to tell friends that in book learning, one ought to think and seek
points of doubt. However, I have now come to realize that it is better to
study with an open mind. After working closely at a text for a long time,
you will naturally benefi t by it, but at the same time, you will also encoun-
ter points where doubt naturally arises. For a close reading will inevitably
lead to places that block your path and cause you perplexity. Thus, doubts
will come to your consciousness and require you to compare, to weigh, to
ponder over. It is not fruitful to start out with the intention of fi nding
things to doubt. . . . When I studied the Analects in my early years, my
doubts were immediately raised. The simple fact that the same passage
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 193
had been given widely diff er ent explanations by vari ous commentators
led me to doubt.59
Dr. Hu Shih
(1891–1962) may have somewhat exaggerated his case when
he said that Zhu Xi’s “doubt with an open mind” has led to the growth of a “sci-
entifi c tradition” in China.60 It may not be too far- fetched, however, to suggest
that Zhu Xi’s emphasis on the importance of open- mindedness, removal of
“preconceived ideas,” and, above all, the critical spirit of doubt in textual inter-
pretation did lead him to establish a methodology of Chinese Geisteswissen-
schaften with which objective knowledge of the Confucian message may be
fruitfully pursued.
Now let us turn to Zhu Xi’s fi nal stage of interpretation in which the text
comes to life. “Once we obtain princi ples,” he says, “we also have no need of the
classics.” 61 This clearly means that the classical text itself is also eventually to be
transcended. It is at this point that the text comes to life in the sense that what
is interpreted is transformed into an organic part, so to speak, of the interpret-
er’s spiritual life. He pointed out: “The reason that we have to learn from books
is to discover moral princi ples. However, once we have understood these princi-
ples, we will fi nd that they are originally inherent in our own nature, not im-
posed on us from the outside.” 62 He further clarifi ed the meaning of this state-
ment as follows: “In book learning, we must not only seek moral princi ples from
the text. Instead we must also reverse the pro cess by seeking them in ourselves.
There are [princi ples] that had already been clearly stated by the sages but of
which we are still ignorant. In light of the words of the sages, we will be able to
acquire them by examining ourselves.” 63 What he is saying here is that not only
do we interpret the classics but, more impor tant, the classics interpret us. In
this regard, he is no diff er ent from his philosophical opponent Lu Xiangshan,
who has been particularly known for the statement “All the Six Classics are my
footnotes.” 64 Thus, Zhu Xi reaches the level of existential interpretation, which
presupposes some kind of preunderstanding. In his terminology, it is an “inner
experience relevant to the self’ ” ( qieji tiyan
). Ultimately, as he repeat-
edly stressed, all the classical texts must be understood beyond literalism and
as an inner experience relevant to the interpreter’s self.65 He testifi ed that this
was exactly how he had studied the Confucian texts all along.66 What is actually
involved here is, to borrow Bultmann, “a preceding living relationship to the
subject matter which fi nds expression in a text either directly or indirectly.” It is
a kind of inquiry that “is always guided by a pre- existing and preliminary under-
standing of human existence, i.e., a defi nite existential understanding.” 67
I must hasten to add, however, that in the case of Zhu Xi, “ human existence”
can only be understood in a moral sense of the Confucian type. For him, what
is “relevant to the self” is always morally relevant. Although his “inner experi-
ence relevant to the self” involves preunderstanding of a moral kind, there is no
reason to believe that this moral ele ment interferes directly with the objective
194 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
interpretation of a text. What it actually aff ects is rather the decision to select
and order texts for interpretation. His order of book learning— the Four Books,
the Five Classics, and histories, for example— was established precisely on the
basis of “moral relevance to the self.” But once the interpreter sets out to work on
his text, he must follow strictly the methodological rules of textual interpretation
and relegate all moral considerations to the background. It is only at the very end
of the investigations of a text that moral relevance to the self of the interpreter
comes into full play. He must then be able to rise above the text to seek existential
understanding, which alone can give meaning to his moral existence. It is pre-
cisely at this point that dao wenxue returns to zun dexing, bo to yue, and zhizhi to jing. In a word, knowledge is transformed into moral practice. The transformation undoubtedly involves a “leap” in understanding— a “leap” from the in-
tellectual level to the moral level. Such a “leap” is pos si ble only if the desire to
understand arises from the actual moral needs of the interpreter. Thus, Zhu Xi’s
view of the role of knowledge in life may be seen as necessarily presupposing
spiritual cultivation at the same time. Without self- cultivation, how can one pos-
sibly distinguish au then tic moral needs from disguised selfi sh desires? Intellec-
tual pro gress and spiritual pro gress must go side by side to reach the meeting
ground on which the “leap” fi nally takes place. Here, I believe, lies the central
signifi cance of Zhu Xi’s lifetime eff orts to reinterpret Cheng Yi’s formula, “self-
cultivation requires seriousness; the pursuit of learning depends on the exten-
sion of knowledge.”
K N O W L E D G E A S T H E F O U N D AT I O N O F M O R A L I T Y:
A P H I L O S O P H I C A L O V E R V I E W
As indicated earlier, Zhu Xi’s emphasis on “inquiry and study” in his debate
with Lu Xiangshan is deeply rooted in his philosophical system. In this con-
cluding section I propose to discuss, briefl y, a few of his philosophical ideas
directly related to the central thesis of this study.
The logical place to begin is Zhu Xi’s view of the function of “intelligence” (or
“wisdom” zhi
) in human nature. Of the four cardinal virtues inborn in man
according to Mencius (372–289 b.c.e.)— humanity ( ren ), righ teousness ( yi ),
propriety ( li ), an
d intelligence ( zhi)—it is noteworthy that Zhu Xi considered
“humanity” and “intelligence” to be the more active pair. While “humanity” is
undoubtedly an all- embracing virtue, “intelligence,” by virtue of its power to “ac-
complish things from beginning to end,” is no less impor tant.68 When a stu-
dent asked him why Mencius placed “intelligence” at the end of the list, he an-
swered thus: “Mencius was actually talking about a circle. In fact, humanity,
righ teousness, and propriety are all stored in intelligence. You can act in a cer-
tain way only when you know it.” 69 Elsewhere he further pointed out, “[Like
humanity] intelligence also includes all [the four virtues] because knowledge
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 195
comes fi rst”70 and “Humanity and intelligence are inclusive while righ teousness
and propriety are not.”71 To say that Mencius’s list is actually a “circle” is to re-
fute in a subtle way the traditional interpretation that “intelligence” is the last
of the four cardinal virtues. His description of “intelligence” in terms of its
“power to accomplish things” and “inclusiveness” refers primarily to its active
and dynamic character, which alone can set the other three virtues in motion.
For example, he explic itly stated: “Consciousness is clearly something arising
from intelligence. . . . The reason that intelligence is close to humanity is that it
is the point at which the circle of the ‘Four Beginnings’ starts to move. Without
intelligence, humanity cannot be set in motion.”72 This also explains why he
defi ned, elsewhere, “intelligence” as the “masculine way” ( qiandao
), that is,
possessing active, vigorous, aggressive, productive qualities.73 For this reason,
he held the view that sagehood ( sheng
) must also require “intelligence” for
completion.74 “Without intelligence, sagehood gets nowhere.”75
With his emphasis on the importance of “intelligence” (better, in his case,
“intellect”), it is only natu ral that his philosophical system admits of no such dis-
tinction as moral knowledge ( dexing zhi zhi
) versus sense knowledge
( wenjian zhi zhi
) . In the history of Neo- Confucianism, this distinction
was fi rst proposed by Zhang Zai;76 it received the following reformulation in the
hands of Cheng Yi: “The knowledge obtained through hearing and seeing is
not the knowledge through moral nature. When a thing (the body) comes into
contact with things, the knowledge so obtained is not from within. This is what
is meant by extensive learning and much ability today. The knowledge obtained
from moral nature does not depend on seeing and hearing.”77 The language
suggests Mencius’s distinction between the function of the senses and that of
the mind.78 Mencius did not distinguish two types of knowledge, however. In a
diff er ent place, Zhang Zai speaks of the two types of knowledge in a slightly
diff er ent way: “Knowledge gained through enlightenment that is the result of
sincerity is the innate knowledge of one’s natu ral character. It is not the small
knowledge of what is heard or what is seen.”79 The term “small knowledge” is obvi-
ously a borrowing from Zhuangzi
(369?–286? b.c.e.). Although Zhuangzi
contrasts “small knowledge” with “ great knowledge,” the diff erence between
the two is most likely one of degree rather than kind.80 Clearly, the distinction
must be credited to Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi.
According to this distinction, then, moral knowledge lies in a higher realm,
to which human intellect has no access. This is even more so with Cheng Yi
than with Zhang Zai, for while the latter only said that moral knowledge does
not originate from senses, the former held that moral knowledge does not de-
pend on the senses. If this is the case, then all Zhu Xi’s talk about “investiga-
tion of things,” “extension of knowledge,” and book learning would be pure
nonsense. Therefore, from Zhu Xi’s philosophical point of view, this distinc-
tion is false and must be rejected. When a student asked him whether there is
something called sense knowledge, he replied with a contemptuous tone:
196 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
“ There is only one kind of knowledge! What is at issue is whether our knowl-
edge is true or not true. Why should we argue on such a matter? It is defi nitely
not the case that [ after we have acquired sense knowledge], we later obtain an-
other kind of knowledge.” 81 Discussing Zhang Zai’s conception of sense knowl-
edge, he further remarked:
In order to be able to learn, we must possess senses of seeing and hearing
( jianwen
) . How can we possibly do without them? We work hard
with our senses until we achieve a wide and far- reaching penetration.
Ordinarily, when we study something by relying on senses, the knowl-
edge obtained is only limited to a single princi ple. However, when we
reach the stage of a general penetration, all the princi ples become one.82
In his view, even if we call knowledge arrived at in the fi nal stage “moral knowl-
edge,” it diff ers from sense knowledge only in degree. In his terminology, it is
rather a diff erence between shallowness and depth as well as between coarse-
ness and refi nement.83 Moreover, moral knowledge, a term he never really
adopted, can only be developed out of sense knowledge. What is even more re-
vealing is his sharp criticism of Zhang Zai with re spect to this distinction:
quest ion: What about Hengqu’s
[Zhang Zai] distinction between
sense knowledge and moral knowledge?
answ er: It is fallacious. Sense knowledge also follows the same princi ple.
I do not understand, given such an extraordinary intelligence as his,
how he could possibly make so glaring a mistake.84
He knew very well that Cheng Yi not only had subscribed to the same view
but even developed it to a more rigid form. So his criticism of Zhang Zai was
equally applicable to Cheng Yi. Because of his great re spect for the latter, how-
ever, he purposely omitted the latter’s name in his discussions. This is clear
evidence that although he basically followed Cheng Yi’s teaching, he neverthe-
less consciously went beyond him in the intellectualization of the Confucian
way.85 It was largely because of his great infl uence that the distinction between
moral knowledge and sense knowledge had fallen into almost complete obliv-
ion until Wang Yangming arrived on the scene.
Zhu Xi’s emphasis on knowledge as a foundation of morality must also be
understood in light of his views of li (princi ple) and mind. To begin with, it is
necessary to clarify a common misunderstanding concerning one aspect of the
relationship between princi ple and mind in his system. Zhu Xi often makes
such statements as “the mind possesses a multitude of princi ples and responds
to the myriad aff airs,” “the mind embraces all the princi ples,” “the myriad
princi ples are completely embodied in a mind,” and “all the princi ples are origi-
nally within the mind, not obtained from the outside.” 8
6 These statements have
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 197
given rise to the interpretation that he was not really interested in objective
knowledge of the external world. His “investigation of things,” according to this
interpretation, is therefore nothing but seeking confi rmation of the knowledge
of “princi ples” already contained in one’s own mind. Dai Zhen’s
(1724–
1777) sharp criticism of his view that “princi ple is received from Heaven and
completely embodied in the mind,” 87 for example, is based on such an inter-
pretation. This is not the place to go into details concerning this impor tant
matter. I merely wish to point out that despite his sometimes loose and there-
fore misleading language, Zhu Xi did not hold that the mind possesses knowl-
edge of princi ples before the “investigation of things.” As he makes clear in his
famous “emendation” to the Great Learning, the mind is only “formed to know.”
He also states unequivocally, “Although the myriad princi ples are embodied in
our minds, the mind must still be made to know them.” 88 I believe it would
make much better sense if we took his “princi ples embodied in the mind” as a
priori forms of understanding— something akin to, though not the same as,
“categories” in the Kantian spirit. He seems to think that for each and every
“princi ple” of a thing or event, there is a corresponding a priori form in the mind.
Apparently, he also believes that eventually all the princi ples can be shown to
be diff erentiations from a single unitary princi ple. This is clearly expressed in
the celebrated dictum he inherited from Cheng Yi, “The princi ple is one, but its
manifestations are many” ( liyi fenshu
).89 However, these a priori forms
in the mind are empirically empty. The postulation of a priori forms corre-
sponding to princi ples of things and events in the external world is necessary
because from his point of view, it alone can explain how our minds are “formed
to know” the latter. Yet on the other hand, as amply shown in his conversations
as well as writings, no positive knowledge of princi ples is pos si ble without the
“investigation of things.” Seen in this way, not only was he genuinely interested
in objective knowledge of the external world but his whole philosophical sys-
