Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century
Page 41
letter quoted in Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, chap. 36, 319.
12.
ZYL, chap. 64, 2521–2522. Similar discussions on the relationship between zun dexing
and dao wenxue may also be found in chap. 117, 4504–4505, and chap. 118, 4568–4569.
For the quoted saying of Cheng Yi, see Yishu
in the Er- Cheng quanshu
,
SBBY, 15, 20a.
13. See Yishu, 18:5b; En glish translation in Chan, SB, 562.
14. For instance, see ZYL, chap. 64, 2522–2523.
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 203
15. Ibid., chap. 115, 4425.
16. Ibid., chap. 115, 4415.
17. For instance, he says: “The concept ‘seriousness’ truly constitutes the key link ( gangling
) in the teachings of the sages. It is also the chief method for moral cultivation.”
Ibid., chap. 12, 335.
18.
Wenji, chap. 51, 897, “Reply to Huang Zigeng
.”
19. For instance, Zhu Xi says: “The mind is the refi ned essence of material force,” ZYL,
chap. 5, 138.
20. Ibid., chap. 9, 235. Similar views may also be found in his writings. See Wenji, chap. 50,
875, “Reply to Cheng Zhengsi
,” and chap. 54, 972, “Reply to Guo Xilü
.”
21. Ibid., chap. 115, 4425.
22. Ibid., chap. 9, 241.
23. Ibid., chap. 9, 241–242.
24. Yan Yuan
(1635–1704), Sicun bian
(Shanghai: Guji, 1957), 104.
25. Chen Jian
, Xuebu tongbian
, CSJC, “Tigang”
, 102; Chen’s view is
quoted with approval in Gu Yanwu
, Rizhi lu
, WYWK, chap. 18, 118.
26. ZYL, chap. 10, 255.
27. Wenji, chap. 14, 204. For the dating of this memorial, see Wang Maohong, Zhuzi
nianpu, chap. 2, 197–200.
28. ZYL, chap. 10, 264.
29. Chan, SB, 89.
30. Wang Maohong, Zhuzi nianpu, chap. 4, 340–341. The Four Books are Daxue ( Great
Learning), “Zhongyong” (Doctrine of the Mean), the Lunyu
(Analects), and the
Mencius (Mengzi
). The Six Classics are the Shijing (Classic of Poetry),
the
Shujing or Shangshu
,
(Classic or Book of History), the Yijing
(Classic of
Changes), the Liji
(Classic of Rites), the Chunqiu
(Spring and Autumn
Annals), and the Yuejing
(Classic of Music). Since the Classic of Music has long been
lost, however, the Six Classics are also referred to as the Five Classics.
31. ZYL, chap. 11, 309. See also 298, 200–201.
32. Ibid., chap. 19, 689. His discussions throughout this chapter make it clear that his em-
phasis in classical studies is placed on knowledge of moral princi ples.
33. Ibid., chap. 11, 301.
34. Wenji, chap. 46, 800, “Reply to Pan Shuchang
.”
35. Ibid., chap. 35, 558, “Reply to Lü Bogong
.”
36. For Cheng Hao’s
(1032–1085) rather negative attitude toward book learning, see
Yishu, 3:1b and 2a; Xie Liangzuo
, Shangcai yulu
, Zhengyi Tang quanshu
, 2:11b. For Cheng Yi’s limited approval of study of the Classics, see Yishu,
15:12a; 16a; “Cuiyan”
, in the Er- Cheng quanshu, 1:25a. On this prob lem, see Ichikawa
Yasuji
, Tei I- sen no tetsugaku no kenkyû
(Tokyo: Tokyo Uni-
versity Press, 1964), 137–140. Professor Qian Mu is right in saying that it was Zhu Xi
who introduced history into the Cheng- Zhu curriculum of Neo- Confucian learning.
See his Zhuzi xin xue- an
(Taipei: Sanmin, 1971), book 5, 113.
37.
Zhangzi quanshu
, GXJBCS, chap. 6, 108.
204 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
38. ZYL, chap. 119, 4584. See also chap. 114, 4399–4400, where he says: “Only by a constant
engagement in book learning can the functioning of one’s mind be prevented from be-
ing interrupted.”
39. Wenji, chap. 64, 1188, “Reply to Jiang Duanbo
.”
40. Ibid., chap. 44, 764, “Reply to Jiang Degong
.”
41. Ibid., chap. 49, 855, “Reply to Chen Fuzhong
.”
42. This idea comes from a passage in the Yijing
; see James Legge, trans., Yi King,
SBE, 300. Zhu Xi actually quoted it in another conversation. See ZYL, chap. 120, 4639.
43. ZYL, chap. 11, 298–299. Here he referred, respectively, to the essentialists of the Lu
Xiangshan School and the many- angled scholars of the Lü Zuqian School. See Qian
Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an, book 1, 676.
44. ZYL, chap. 33, 1336.
45. Ibid., chap. 69, 2767.
46. The Analects of Confucius, trans. D. C. Lau (
) (New York: Penguin, 1979), 86.
47. Wenji, chap. 31, 494, “Comments on Zhang Shi’s ‘Interpretations of the Analects of
1173.’ ”
48. ZYL, chap. 11, 304. However, he also points out that if the names of things and institu-
tions in a text are not central to our understanding of its meaning, we may be satisfi ed
with a general knowledge of them. See ibid., 301.
49. Ibid., 305.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 282.
52. Ibid., 292, 306.
53.
Wenji; chap. 53, 943, “Reply to Liu Jizhang
.”
54. ZYL, chap. 36, 1581.
55. Ibid., 293. This compares well with the following maxim in con temporary Western
hermeneutics: “Meaning has to be derived from the text and not imputed to it.” See Jo-
sef Bleicher, Con temporary Hermeneutics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Boston:
Henley, 1980), 36.
56. See Emilio Betti’s discussion of the need of an “intellectual open- mindedness” for in-
terpretations in his “Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geistewissen-
schaften,” translated by Bleicher in Con temporary Hermeneutics, 85.
57. Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in his Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1981), 131–144.
58. Bleicher, Con temporary Hermeneutics, 40.
59. ZYL, chap. 11, 295.
60. Hu Shih, “The Scientifi c Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese
Mind, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1967), 104–131.
61.
ZYL, chap. 11, 305.
62. Ibid., chap. 10, 255.
63. Ibid., 287.
64. Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, chap. 34, 256–261.
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 205
65. ZYL, chap. 11, 286–288.
66. Ibid., chap. 30, 1235–1236.
67. Quoted in Bleicher, Con temporary Hermeneutics, 105–106.
68. ZYL, chap. 6, 175. The locus classicus of these four virtues is the Mencius, 6A.6 and
7A.21.
69. Ibid., chap. 53, 2048.
70. Ibid., chap. 20, 766.
71. Ibid., chap. 6, 172.
72. Ibid., chap. 20, 771. As taught in the Mencius, 2A.6, the Four Beginnings are: the sense
of compassion is the beginning of humanity, the sense of shame and dislike is the be
-
ginning of righ teousness, the sense of deference is the beginning of propriety, and the
sense of right and wrong is the beginning of intelligence.
73. Ibid., chap. 42, 1719; chap. 104, 4162.
74. Ibid., chap. 58, 2173.
75. Wenji, chap. 58, 1062, “Reply to Zhang Jingfu
.”
76. Zhangzi quanshu, chap. 2, 45. En glish translation in Chan, SB, 515.
77. Yishu, 25:2a; En glish translation by Chan, SB, 570. On the connection between Zhang
Zai and Cheng Yi, see A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Phi los o phers, Ch’ eng Ming- tao and
Ch’ eng I- ch’ uan
/
(London: Lund Humphries, 1958), 176–178.
78. Mencius, 6A.15.
79. Zhangzi quanshu, chap. 2, 40; Chan, SB, 507.
80. Guo Qingfan
(1844–1897), Zhuangzi jishi
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961),
chap. 1, 11 and 51.
81.
ZYL, chap. 34, 1440.
82. Ibid., chap. 98, 4002.
83. On this point, see also Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an, book 2, 388–389, and Zhang Liwen
, Zhu Xi sixiang yanjiu
(Beijing: CASS Press, 1981), 411–416.
84. ZYL, chap. 99, 4031.
85. Zhu Xi’s intellectualism also led him to distinguish two types of approach to the Con-
fucian Way. He said that among Confucius’s leading disciples, Zigong
took the
“intellectual approach” ( zhishi
), whereas Zeng Can
took the “practical ap-
proach” ( jianlü
). By the former he meant inquiry and study, and by the latter, he
meant practicing fi lial devotion and other moral virtues in daily life ( ZYL, chap. 27,
1088–1089). This distinction is in ter est ing in two ways: On the one hand, the very idea
that there is an “intellectual approach” to the Way reveals his emphasis on the role of
knowledge in Confucian teaching as a whole. On the other hand, the idea of a “practical
approach” to the Way suggests that he was very much conscious of the prob lem of how
to relate Confucianism to the life of the common (and in most cases also unlettered)
man. This is an impor tant subject needing further investigation. His view contrasts
sharply with that held by both Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming. Both phi los o phers
spoke highly of Zeng Can and slighted Zigong precisely because of the latter’s “intelli-
gence” and pursuit of many- sided “knowledge.” See Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, chap. 1,
20, “Letter to Hu Jisui
”; Yangming quanshu, 1: 24b; and Wang Yangming, In-
206 z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m
structions for Practical Living and Other Neo- Confucian Writings, trans. Wing- tsit Chan
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 71–72. It may be further noted that Zhu
Xi’s distinction continued to provoke strong reactions among scholars as late as the
Qing Period (1644–1912). For example, Cheng Tingzuo
(1691–1767), a great ad-
mirer of Yan Yuan, understandably rejected the distinction of two types as nonsense.
See Dai Wang
(1837–1873), Yanshi xueji
, WYWK, chap. 9, 115. But Quan
Zuwang, in his Jingshi wenda
, chap. 6, Jieqi ting ji, 451, and Dai Zhen, in
Mengzi ziyi shuzheng
(Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), 56, accepted it as valid.
86. See the examples con ve niently collected together in Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an, book 2,
1–24.
87. See Dai Zhen’s criticism translated in Chan, SB, 715–717. For further analy sis, see Ying-
shih Yü, “Dai Zhen and the Zhu Xi Tradition,” in Essays in Commemoration of the Golden
Jubilee of the Fung Ping Shan Library, ed. Chan Ping- leung, Lai Shu- tim, Yeung Kwok-
hung, Wong Tak- wai, Lee Ngok, Chiu Ling- yeung (Hong Kong: Fung Ping Shan
Library, HKU, 1982), 390–391.
88. ZYL, chap. 60, 2263.
89. Ibid., chap. 1, 2; cf. Chan, SB, 639.
90. This area of Zhu Xi’s thought has been extensively explored in a monographic study by
Yamada Keiji
; see his Shushi no shizenkaku
(Tokyo: Iwanami,
1978).
91. Wang Maohong, Zhuzi nianpu, chap. 1, 1–2.
92. ZYL, chap. 18, 669.
93. On this point, a roughly similar interpretation may also be found in Takahashi Susumu
, Shu Ki to 0 Yōmei
(Tokyo: Kakusho kankokai, 1977), 108–117 and
225–236.
94. Wenji, chap. 30, 473, “Reply to Zhang Jingfu.”
95. ZYL, chap. 15, 471.
96. On this prob lem, see also the analy sis by Tomoeda Ryûtarô
, in his Shushi no
shisô keisei
(Tokyo: Shun- ju- sha, 1969), esp. pp. 354–366.
97. Wenji, chap. 42, 712–713, “Reply to Shi Zizhong
.”
98. Ibid., chap. 31, 484, “Reply to Zhang Jingfu.”
99. Ibid., chap. 43, 724, “Reply to Chen Mingzhong
.”
100. Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an, book 3, 616. Yao and Shun were legendary sage- emperors.
101. Wenji, chap. 70, 1291, “Notes on Some Doubtful Points.”
102. ZYL, chap. 120, 4657.
103. For general discussions of Lu Xiangshan’s theory of mind, the reader is referred to
Tang Junyi
, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun, yuanxing pian
(Hong
Kong: New Asia Institute, 1968), esp. pp. 538–552, and Kusumoto Masatsugu
,
So- Min jidai jugaku shisô no kenkyû
(Tokyo: Hiroike Gakuen
Press, 1972), 341–367.
104. See a saying of Lu Xiangshan’s (“I only trust this mind of mine”) preserved in SYXA,
chap. 77, 27.
z h u x i ’ s ph ilosoph ic a l s y s t e m 207
105. Professor Fung Yu- lan [Feng Youlan]
holds that both Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan
shared the same view of “mind”; History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Prince-
ton: Prince ton University Press, 1953), 2:587–588. Recent studies, however, suggest that
the contrary is true. See Mou Zongsan
, Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan
(Taipei: Xuesheng, 1979), chap. 2, and Lao Siguang
, Zhongguo zhexue
shi
(Taipei: Sanmin, 1980), book 3, part 1, 409–414.
106. Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, chap. 35, 307.
107. Ibid., chap. 34, 279. For a complete En glish translation of the two poems, see Julia
Ching
, “The Goose Lake Monastery Debate (1175),” Journal of Chinese Philosophy
1 (1974): 165.
108. Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue- an, book 3, 299–301.
10. Confucian Ethics and Capitalism
Since the publication of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in
1905 and later in an expanded form in 1920, studies of Max Weber’s thesis
have grown into a heavy industry.1 The main controversy, of course, centers
around the “link” between a “Protestant ethic” and the “spirit of capitalism.” By
linking the two together, does Weber mean to say there is a defi nite causal rela-
tionship between them? If so, in what sense? Does it mean that Weber is so
extreme in his idealistic interpretation of history that he believes “Protestant
ethic” to be the necessary and suffi
cient cause for the rise of “capitalism”? Need-
less to say, this is fa
r from Weber’s view. A general consensus has now been
reached that Weber’s is causal pluralism, which admits of both ideals and
material factors as agents of social change. However, he did seem to insist that
relevant material preconditions alone are not suffi
cient to explain the develop-
ment of modern capitalism unless combined with the Protestant ethic and
vice versa.
By “Protestant ethic,” as we all know, Weber meant, specifi cally, Calvinism
(and its En glish version, Puritanism). He took a few Calvinist ideas such as
“calling” and “predestination” to be the theological foundation of a work ethic
uniquely suited to the development of modern capitalism. In his view, Calvin-
ism is unique in the West because it alone unintentionally provides a psycho-
logical sanction for profi t making and thereby gives the search for salvation a
this- worldly direction. By contrast, the Lutheran conception of the “calling,”
c on f uc i a n e t h ic s a nd c a p i ta l is m 209
according to him, remained traditionalistic, and Luther viewed the pursuit of
material gain beyond personal needs as “a symptom of lack of grace.” Salvation
in Lutheranism, in other words, must be pursued in the otherworldly direction.
In this comparative perspective, Weber saw the Puritan work ethic as one
factor, among others, responsible for capitalism to have been developed fi rst in
Eng land.
Fi nally, Weber’s comparative historical sociology led him to a comprehensive
study of what he called the “economic ethics of world religions” encompassing
Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Chris tian ity.
He did this with the explicit purpose of establishing his Protestant ethic thesis
on fi rmer empirical grounds. He thus came to the conclusion that only ascetic
Protestantism completely eliminated magic and the super natu ral quest for sal-
vation and created the religious motivations for seeking salvation primarily
through immersion in one’s worldly vocation. In contrast to it, none of the
major religions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism pro-
vided any path to “a rational, methodical control of life.”2
In this connection, a brief mention of Weber’s view of Confucianism is in
order. Toward the end of The Religion of China, Weber off ers a comparison be-
tween Confucianism and Puritanism that contains numerous fascinating in-
sights of a great mind. In essence, his fundamental position in accounting for
the absence of capitalistic development in China seems to be the following: