Descent into Hell

by Peter Brune

  At daybreak on 2 January 1942, the Japanese again attacked the British Battalion at Thompson’s Ridge. After being initially halted by artillery fire, they managed to overrun a British Battalion platoon and gain another tenuous foothold on the extreme right of the ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison immediately requested a 15th Brigade counterattack. The first attempt was made by a company of Jats from the Brigade’s reserve Jat/ Punjab Battalion, but faltered in the face of heavy enemy machine gun fire. But the second, led by the Battalion second in command, Captain Graham, who was in charge of the Sikhs and Gujars from the 1/8th Punjab component of the Jat/Punjab Battalion, first gained a foothold and then, with a last desperate effort, drove the Japanese off the ridge. Alan Warren in Singapore 1942, has left us with the triumphant, yet tragic, account of that attack: ‘The assault had been expensive, and there were only thirty unwounded men in the company. Captain Graham lost both legs when a mortar bomb was lobbed at his feet. He died on a stretcher as he was being carried to the rear.’30

  No praise can be too high for the exploits of the British Battalion on their ridges at Kampar—particularly Thompson’s Ridge—during the first two days of January 1942. Such exploits bear fair testimony to the need for thorough basic training, inspired leadership, esprit de corps and steadfastness in order to defeat an enemy as formidable as the Japanese. The high quality of the Battalion’s artillery support is also noteworthy. And such exploits contrasted markedly with a number of other units in the 11th Indian Division which had been ‘milked’—or ‘gutted’ as this work has preferred to call it—at both the junior leadership level and amongst its other ranks.

  But despite the British Battalion’s resolute stand at Kampar, events near the west coast caused General Paris to exercise his option to withdraw ‘at his discretion’. On 2 January, the Japanese who had landed on the coast were reinforced by elements of the Imperial Guards Division. They landed at Teluk Anson and immediately engaged the 1st Independent Company. Brigadier Stewart’s 12th Brigade had, meanwhile, occupied the road in depth commencing with the Argylls about six kilometres outside Teluk Anson. By mid-afternoon, the Japanese had made contact with that unit, and by nightfall the Brigade was occupying a position about eleven kilometres from the town.

  Under the circumstances, the withdrawal of the 11th Indian Division from Kampar went smoothly. While Stewart’s 12th Brigade continued to block the Japanese near the west coast, the 28th Brigade, followed by the 15th, withdrew to the Slim River. Painter’s 22nd Indian Brigade north of Kuantan. Yamashita now decided on an overland attack, and instead of landing his 55th Regiment there, ordered it to land at Kota Bharu on the 30th and follow up the already advanced 56th Regiment.

  General Yamashita had originally planned that two battalions of his 55th Infantry Regiment were to stage a surprise seaborne landing at Kuantan and capture its prized airfield on 28 December. But in the belief that the RAF had not been sufficiently negated, he cancelled that operation on 23 December. By this time, the 56th Regiment, having occupied Kuala Krai on the 19th, had moved south along the coast and established contact with patrols of

  In his defence of the Kuantan airfield, which lay about fourteen kilometres from the coast and to the west of the river, Brigadier Painter had deployed his brigade in anticipation of an enemy amphibious landing. Accordingly, he had his 2/18th Garhwal Rifles with a company of the 2/12th Frontier Regiment under command deployed along about seventeen kilometres of coast north of the Kuantan River; his 5/11th Sikhs were positioned along the southern side of that feature; and the remainder of his 2/12th was in reserve about 24 kilometres to the west on the Jerantut road. The only passage across the river—a tedious and time-consuming one—was by a single ferry. Painter’s 22nd Brigade was supported by a battery of the 88th Field Regiment and two from the 5th Field Regiment.

  General Heath saw two roles for his 9th Indian Division on the east coast: one actual and one potential. While he knew that the Division’s immediate task was to hold the Kuantan airfield, he also realised the Division’s potential for a movement back westwards along the critical Jerantut–Raub–Kuala Kubu road to possibly attack the enemy’s left flank of its west coast thrust. Therefore, to best facilitate those two roles, on 27 December Heath told General Barstow that Painter’s brigade should be deployed behind the River Kuantan as soon as Yamashita attacked from the north.

  Brigadier Painter saw the defence of Kuantan in a different light. On 28 December, he told Barstow that his 22nd Brigade’s defence should be fought east of the river, and not behind it, as he considered that extensive feature to be too easy to infiltrate. If General Barstow backed Painter’s judgement, Heath and Percival did not. The following day, Heath sent Barstow his orders:

  General Percival is in entire agreement with me that the preservation of the entity of 22nd Brigade is of greater importance than the imposition of two days’ delay upon the enemy advance to Kuantan airfield . . . I therefore still adhere to the view that, from the strategical aspect, it is definitely wrong to risk the loss of a large number of vehicles and the mutilation of one-third of the force by attempting to fight the enemy east of the river. I therefore wish you to issue an instruction to the Commander 22nd Brigade to redispose his brigade in accordance with the view expressed above.31

  Barstow’s subsequent written order to Painter stated that: ‘The preservation of the future fighting efficiency of your brigade under existing circumstances is of greater importance than imposing a delay of a few more days in the denial of the airfield to the enemy.’32

  On 30 December, in compliance with these instructions, Painter withdrew his Garhwalis to a position covering the river line and ordered all of 22nd Brigade’s transport and guns back across the river. But with their usual speed and aggression, the Japanese attacked the Garhwalis through the Jabor valley and, after overrunning one of its companies, proceeded to cut off a further two. Severely undermanned, the Garhwalis were pushed back to the east line of the river, where by darkness that night they occupied a line of outposts. During that same day, the Japanese made determined efforts to impede Painter’s withdrawal of equipment across the river, by continuous attempts to bomb the one and only ferry. But one ferry had become two—Painter had ordered the ferry to be cut in half. The Japanese did indeed sink half of the ferry, but the remainder managed to bring all of the brigade’s guns and transport across the river during darkness.

  In what he saw as compliance with his written orders, Brigadier Painter sought, on 31 December, permission from Barstow to withdraw towards Maran that night. Kirby has quoted Barstow’s reply:

  It is of the utmost importance that your brigade with its valuable material should not be jeopardized. Within the limitations that the above imposes, you will ensure that every advantage is taken to hold the enemy and deal him such blows as opportunity offers. The question of denial of ground particularly applies to the Kuantan airfield. It is highly desirable that this should continue to be denied to the enemy. Reinforcements are shortly expected in Malaya and their safe arrival might be hampered if enemy fighters had the use of the airfield.33

  That night Brigadier Painter therefore ordered the Garhwalis to withdraw west of the river and join the 2/12th in a perimeter defence of the airfield, after which the ferry was to be destroyed. Before their crossing of the river, the Garhwalis had lost contact with two of their companies, and with a company of the Frontier Force also lost, Painter’s Brigade was severely reduced in number. On New Year’s Day, his orders were again given new emphasis. Painter was now told to hold the airfield for five days—until 6 January.

  By 2 January, the Japanese had crossed the river and were moving towards the airfield. It was now crystal clear that Painter could not fulfil all of his ever-changing orders. If, as now ordered, he was to hold the airfield for a further four days, he would have to commit his force to battle—not minor delaying actions or skirmishes, but a set-piece defence of that area. After the war, Percival claimed that ‘Heath must have misunderstood him
, for his policy throughout was to give first priority to denying the enemy the use of Kuantan airfield’.34 Given this revelation, Painter would have surely argued that his original plan to contest the Japanese advance upon the airfield might have been adopted. In the period 29 December until 2 January, it would seem that Percival and Heath were asking Painter for the impossible: he was to hold Kuantan airfield for five days but not commit his forces to a heavy loss of both men and material.

  In the event, this conundrum was solved by the Japanese at Kampar. General Paris’s 11th Indian Division, forced to stage a withdrawal from that Trunk Road town on the night of 2/3 January, now caused Barstow’s 9th Division to be ordered to quickly concentrate in the Kuala Lipis–Jerantut–Raub area in anticipation of a withdrawal from the State of Pahang. During the night of 3 January, the Kuantan airfield buildings and installations were demolished and that evening, the Sikhs, the brigade’s transport, its sappers and most of the artillery withdrew. But at 8.00 pm, the Japanese attacked the two companies of the 2/12th who were acting as the brigade rearguard. In the ensuing fighting, much of it hand-to-hand, Lieutenant-Colonel Cumming was bayoneted, but managed to fight his way back to safety. About 40 soldiers escaped that confrontation. Some of the remainder of the two-company rearguard eventually found their way back. For his bravery at Kuantan, Lieutenant-Colonel Cumming was awarded the Victoria Cross.

  On 4 January, 22nd Brigade’s withdrawal passed through Maran, and by the early hours of 7 January it reached the Raub area. The fighting in the Kuantan area cost Brigadier Painter’s 22nd Brigade a third of its strength. The Garhwalis had sustained losses in excess of 250 killed, wounded or missing, while the 2/12th now numbered a mere 220.

  The enemy landings on the west coast of Malaya around Teluk Anson had compelled General Paris to withdraw from his Kampar perimeter—despite the fact that the British Battalion had staged such a commendable 48-hour defence of it—and thereby diminish the threat to his line of communication. By 4 January 1942, therefore, Paris had concentrated his division in the Sungkai–Slim River area.

  General Percival, his mind still dominated by the desire to protect the arrival of his reinforcements—the first of which, the Indian 45th Brigade, arrived on 3 January—ordered General Heath to hold the airfields at Port Swettenham and Kuala Lumpur until at least 14 January. Kirby has recorded that he (Percival) ‘had urged him to take every opportunity of imposing delay by attacking the enemy’s flanks and rear’.35 This ‘urge’ constituted nothing more than an unrealistic dream. By this time Paris’s 11th Division was exhausted, well below strength, lacking in key support and, according to Percival, its task was to deny airfields in central Malaya to the enemy. Previous attempts at this tactic had met with failure. And it was arguably the best trained and best drilled battalion in the Division for this kind of operation which had failed: the Argylls.

  Alan Warren, in his Singapore 1942, has succinctly summed up Heath’s dilemma:

  [He] was concerned . . . that the Japanese would again hook around his left flank from the sea. South of Teluk Anson and the mouth of the Perak River a forty mile [64 kilometre] stretch of swampy jungle effectively covered the coastal flank of the division, but further south at Kuala Selangor and Port Swettenham troops landed on the coast could cut inland to reach the Trunk Road and Kuala Lumpur far behind the Slim River and Tanjong Malim.36

  Heath had anticipated General Yamashita’s intention: a two-pronged assault upon Kuala Lumpur. Yamashita planned that his 5th Division’s 42nd Regiment (Colonel Ando) and an attached tank battalion were to pursue the 11th Division from Kampar along the Trunk Road direct to Kuala Lumpur, while the 11th Infantry Regiment—less one battalion—was to strike through this force as soon as the British had been defeated north of that objective. The coastal prong was to be undertaken by 111/11th Battalion followed by the 4th Guards Regiment, which were to secure Kuala Selangor and Port Swettenham before advancing on Kuala Lumpur from the west.

  On New Year’s Day 1942, Heath had transferred his 3rd Cavalry from the 11th Division and Brigadier Key’s 8th Brigade’s 3/17th Dogras and the 73rd Field battery to the command of Brigadier Moir, with the instruction to deny the enemy Kuala Selangor. Turning to the Trunk Road, on the night of 4/5 January, Heath ordered General Paris to deploy his 15th Brigade at Tanjong Malim, the 3/16th Punjab to Rawang, and to position the rest of his 11th Indian Division in the Trolak–Slim River area covering the river crossings. These changes in dispositions were made with the intention of holding the Japanese from Tanjong Malim for a minimum of four days.

  On 2 January, Heath’s predicted enemy landing attempt at Kuala Selangor materialised. During that afternoon, a steamer, about a dozen sampans and motor launches were sighted. When the sampans and motor launches began their passage to shore, the British artillery opened fire at about a one-kilometre range. After two sampans were sunk and a number of the other vessels damaged, a Japanese withdrawal was staged to the steamer, which in turn suffered a number of hits. The Japanese attempted another approach during the early hours of the next morning, but another withdrawal was necessary when the Japanese learnt that the British were still waiting for them. However, if the landing by sea had come to grief, the coastal track advance by the 4th Guards Regiment proved successful. When a battalion of the 4th Guards Regiment arrived at the River Selangor they turned inland and, moving along its northern bank, approached the bridges at Batang Berjuntai. This battalion was now only eighteen kilometres from the Trunk Road at Rawang—and a staggering 48 kilometres south of Slim River.

  Heath reacted to this critical threat by despatching the Jat/Punjab Battalion and the 1st Independent Company to reinforce Brigadier Moir’s force. When the Japanese pushed elements of Moir’s force back, Lieutenant-Colonel Moorhead was put in command. A successful counterattack put in by the Dogras on the night 5/6 January drove the enemy back, which allowed Moorhead to withdraw behind the river and blow the bridges. A lull now ensued along the barrier of the River Selangor.

  After the recent victorious Japanese entry into Ipoh, and ‘thinking back over the military operations which had so far overwhelmed the northern part of Malaya’, Lieutenant-Colonel Tsuji observed that:

  If it was considered that the enemy would rely on Singapore Fortress, and hold out there to the last man, then the military strength that had been poured in north of the Perak River was excessive . . .

  Viewing the war from the standpoint of the British Empire at that time it appeared that in North Africa the British Army was in the midst of a life-and-death struggle with Rommel’s German Army advancing on the Canal. The defence of Suez would be considered to take precedence over the defence of Singapore. If this was accepted as a natural war principle, then in Malaya the British would have to conserve their forces. It appeared a mistake for them to exhaust successively their military strength in the unprepared fighting zone of northern Malaya . . .

  Pouring in fresh reinforcements to support the forces destroyed in the opening battles was like pouring water on thirsty soil. While this continued there was reasonable hope for our success.37

  While Tsuji was in fact guessing that Percival would soon commit substantial reinforcements to the battle, these too would suffer the same fate as had the 11th Indian Division. Paris’s formation had been ‘poured’ and ‘poured’ into that very highly trained, well-led and aggressive Japanese ‘thirsty soil’. Soon, all of the British military sins previously committed were about to be exposed on a scale that Tsuji could not have contemplated: at Slim River.

  13

  SLIM RIVER

  While the Japanese advance on the west coast was being contested, General Paris’s 11th Indian Division had fallen back to the next delaying position on the Trunk Road between Kampar and Kuala Kubu: the Slim River crossings.

  To provide depth to his defence of that locality, Paris had divided it into two distinct sectors. The northern, or Trolak sector, stretched from a point about five-and-a-half kilometres north of that village, down through
it and to a position about one-and-a-half kilometres north of Slim village. The 12th Brigade was assigned the Trolak sector. Brigadier Stewart disposed his brigade with his usual emphasis on depth along the road and railway. His most forward perimeter, which stretched for about a kilometre, was occupied by the 4/19th Hyderabads. Reduced now to three companies, the first was astride the railway and behind two bridges, the second was forward on the road and manned a roadblock, and the last lay behind both on the road. The 5/2nd Punjab occupied an area stretching roughly from just forward of the 61-mile peg back to just beyond the 62-mile peg—one company was astride the railway and three were along the road. The Argylls formed the rear of the sector from Trolak village to a position of some considerable width bordering the Punjabs. At the northern end of their perimeter, the Argylls manned a second roadblock. Stewart’s brigade HQ was situated about a kilometre behind his left company on a rearward plantation road. For added security and depth, a check position was chosen adjacent to the 65-mile peg, and the 5/14th Punjab was on short notice to man it if required. In the meantime, that unit was deployed just north of Slim village to rest.