Descent into Hell

by Peter Brune

  The first effort of the ‘babies’ showed their inexperience. Both guns immediately fired at the only partly revealed reconnaissance tank, and thereby disclosed the number of guns and their positions. Minutes later a light tank, very soon followed by a medium tank, came around the slight bend into the cutting, and then slowly moved towards the roadblock. Just before gaining that feature, Parsons and Harrison—this time displaying much more patience—opened fire.

  Parson’s first shot hit the medium tank, while Harrison’s second turned the light tank into a ‘sheet of flame’ whereupon its crew ‘attempted to escape from their burning coffin’.25 During the ensuing action the Japanese committed two more groups of tanks against Parson’s and Harrison’s guns. The first consisted of two medium and one light. Using a combination of armour-piercing and high-explosive shells, the Australians were able to set the first on fire, disable the second and cause the last to be towed from the action. The second attempt was made by four tanks, which used the previously disabled and blazing tank as cover, and were supported by infantry mortar fire and machine guns. But the two Australian guns and mortar fire from the 2/30th were more than equal to the task. The first tank ‘was hit, the second disabled, the third set on fire and the fourth wrecked by a mortar bomb which exploded after entering the turret’.26

  During what the diarist of the 2/30th Battalion was to call, ‘General battle—sustained firing on both sides’,27 the Japanese made about an hour-long attempt to pierce the Australians’ perimeter, but were forced to withdraw in the face of concentrated artillery and infantry fire. At around 11.15 am the Battalion’s spirits received a fillip with the return of the bulk of Duffy’s B Company and news of their ambush success.28

  By early afternoon on 15 January, Galleghan knew that the Japanese had repaired the Gemencheh River bridge with astonishing speed, and, as a consequence, were already concentrating their infantry and support for further and stronger attacks. The isolated nature of his advanced position therefore caused him to make two decisions. The first was to counterattack and therefore hinder the enemy build-up, and the second was to immediately recce a fall-back position behind the Gemas River that evening. Galleghan therefore ordered his just-returned and worn B Company to occupy D Company’s perimeter and thereby release it for the counterattack. Captain Melville’s attack was timed for 11.45 am and was to be given supporting fire by A Company. Its objective was a hill about 900 metres in front of its perimeter. Melville was ordered to hold it until dusk if possible, and then retire back through B Company.29

  But the impending D Company attack was to be postponed twice within an hour when Japanese aircraft—which had been busy bombing the town of Gemas—suddenly attacked the 2/30th perimeter. Battalion HQ was the first target. After describing the many measures taken to disguise that HQ from air observation, and therefore expressing surprise that the HQ could have become a target, the 2/30th Unit History claimed that:

  Whether the enemy’s efficiency in pin-pointing a wireless transmitting set is over estimated or not it was subsequently accepted in the Battalion that the enemy had ascertained the location of Battalion H.Q. by the operation of the wireless telegraphy during the morning. (This was confirmed, after the capitulation of Singapore, by a Japanese officer . . . )30

  In the event, the bombing was close to rather than on the HQ, but this proved of little consolation to the troops who had been ordered not to dig in. Casualties were taken.

  Captain Melville’s D Company attack went in at 12.45 pm on 15 January 1942. Expecting their enemy to be somewhere around 900 metres on or near their hill objective, the company was rapidly placed under intense fire from only about 270 metres. Despite the additional handicap of the artillery firing beyond the enemy’s advanced position, D Company managed to move forward. It was assisted greatly by A Company’s covering fire and accurate mortar fire. The Japanese took significant casualties and lost two guns and their crews. However, as 16 and 17 Platoons came to the fence separating the ‘young rubber’ and ‘old rubber’ sections of the plantation, they came under enfiladed Japanese machine gun fire, which slowed them down and caused them casualties. It was at this time that elements of 18 Platoon encountered what was to become a common Japanese ploy: they were subjected to sniper fire from nearby trees. Although most Japanese engaged in this practice were usually eliminated in time, casualties and a loss of momentum were the usual by-products.

  It was at about this time that enemy tanks now became a grave problem. It will be remembered that Galleghan had sent the third anti-tank gun ‘packing’ as not required after Harrison and Parsons had sited their guns. He must have deeply regretted his decision when Japanese tanks appeared to the right of the road and began to rake the 2/30th positions with concentrated fire—against soldiers who were not dug in. Harrison and Parsons, whose vision was obstructed by the lines and obstacles of rubber trees, could do nothing to assist them. Harrison claimed that that very side of the road was where Lieutenant Peck had planned to deploy the third anti-tank gun.

  While the anti-tank gunners’ splendid support was now at an end, Major Ball and a troop of 25-pounders from the 30th Battery joined the fray. Firing over open sights, they were able, with added assistance from the mortars, to keep the tanks at bay while the 2/30th began its withdrawal. During that process, both two-pounder anti-tank guns and all but one field gun had to be abandoned on that boggy ground.

  At around 2.45 pm, and in the face of ‘further enemy air activity’,31 more of the Battalion’s trucks made their exit from the perimeter, while the forward troops, moving through the HQ area, started to concentrate on a hill to the rear as a prelude to a withdrawal along the railway and through the rubber to Gemas. At about 3.15 pm, the 2/30th was able to successfully break contact with the Japanese and two-and-a-half hours later the Battalion less its A Company had arrived at Fort Rose Estate, where it formed a night perimeter.

  The 2/30th Battalion’s fighting forward of Gemas during the two-day period 14–15 January 1942 deserves high praise. A. W. Penfold in Galleghan’s Greyhounds:

  Under the circumstances, the unit’s casualties for the two days were very light: 1 officer and 16 other ranks killed, 9 other ranks missing and 55 wounded (including 4 officers) . . .

  Enemy casualties were conservatively estimated at 800 on the first day (ambush), and an additional 200 in the later action. Against the enemy’s certain loss of six tanks, the Battalion lost three 25 pounder guns, two anti-tank guns and 10 vehicles, besides some equipment.32

  The ambush at the River Gemencheh was brilliantly conceived. The decision to leave unexploded bridges leading up to Captain Duffy’s B Company positions appears to have lulled the enemy into a false sense of security. The choice of the ambush site was astute, because the narrow, jungle-topped cutting and the subsequent thick vegetation on each side of the road extending for some considerable distance proved both an extensive and intensive killing ground. Moreover, the escape route was well planned and essentially well used. Above all, Duffy’s B Company demonstrated exceptional fire discipline. But the failure to cover the signal cables constituted a major mistake and cost the unit a chance to inflict far greater Japanese casualties by means of the planned artillery barrage.

  In the rearward 2/30th perimeter, the dispositions were sound and occupied by disciplined troops whose fire and movement during the counterattack were well rehearsed. The standard of patrolling by the Battalion also reflects its high standard of training. The 2/30th Battalion’s performance at Gemas must reflect upon the excellent training and leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan and his officers. But Galleghan’s decision not to order his troops to dig in was a mistake, and, above all, his failure to embrace his anti-tank capacity demonstrated that he did not fully appreciate the tactical use of this critical support—which was an error destined to be repeated only days later.

  Any estimate of the combined Japanese losses at the ambush site and at the rear of the 2/30th perimeter is difficult. However, it is quite p
ossible that some 400 to 500 enemy troops were caught in that first hail of fire. A total Japanese casualty count of around 600 to 700 would thus seem fair. The Australian war correspondent Ian Morrison recorded that Gemas: ‘. . . was a triumphant beginning. It set all of the Australians cock-a-hoop. It had a tonic effect on all the British forces.’33 Unfortunately, the ‘tonic effect’ was not to last long.

  15

  THE BATTLE OF MUAR

  On 14 January 1942, while the 2/30th Battalion ambush was under way on the Trunk Road near Gemas, General Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division had occupied the west coast port of Malacca. Nishimura’s next task was to cross the Muar River and then move in two columns: one along the coast road to seize Batu Pahat, and the other to capture Yong Peng via the inland road. The Muar River was a formidable military obstacle and the town of Muar, which lay on the southern bank near its mouth, was accessible only by ferry. Given that he had no landing craft with which to cross it, and the British had moved all existing vessels to the southern bank, Nishimura ordered his 4th Guards Regiment (Colonel Kunishi) to contain the enemy at Muar while his 5th Guards Regiment (Colonel Iwaguro) crossed the river upstream under the cover of darkness. Once across, the 5th Guards were to attack Muar from the east and then move on Yong Peng, while the 4th Guards were to take the coastal axis. In order to cut off the subsequent Westforce retreat along the coast road, Nishimura ordered the 1/4th Guards Battalion to move by sea and land between Batu Pahat and Senggarang, where it was to lay in waiting pending the rest of the regiment’s thrust along the coastal road.

  The defence of the Muar River had been entrusted to Brigadier Duncan’s newly arrived 45th Indian Brigade, which had arrived in the area on 12 January. In compliance with General Bennett’s orders, Duncan deployed his 7/6th Rajputana Rifles on his left flank between Muar and Jorak, thereby occupying fourteen kilometres of ground. His right flank was held by the 4/9th Jats, who were disposed along some 24 kilometres to cover the river crossings of Grisek and Lenga. Bennett ordered both battalions to place two companies across the river for ambush roles. Brigadier Duncan held his 5/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles in reserve near Bakri, with one of its companies forward at Simpang Jeram, and a small detachment stationed on the coast south of Parit Jawa. The 65th Battery of the AIF 2/15th Field Regiment (Major Julius) was allotted as his support. Kirby has stated that:

  General Bennett appears to have lost sight of the main reason for placing the 45th Brigade in the Muar area—to protect the direct route from Muar to Yong Peng and so secure his line of communications—and to have attempted to cover all possible routes from the Sungei [River] Muar towards Segamat and Labis as well as southwards.1

  While Kirby’s assertion is valid, three points should be raised. First, given the training of the 45th Brigade, Bennett’s decision to order Brigadier Duncan to deploy two ambush companies from both battalions across the northern side of the river was foolhardy. Second, Bennett—and Percival—grossly underestimated the size of the Japanese force against them in the Muar area. This was certainly nothing new as Malaya Command’s intelligence was abysmal throughout the campaign. Third, we have noted Percival’s failure to allow Bennett to conduct his Westforce operation with both brigades of his 8th Division. It is worth remembering that the 22nd Brigade AIF was arguably the best trained brigade in Malaya Command. It is therefore intriguing to contemplate how the operation might have unfolded had the complete 22nd Brigade been at Bennett’s disposal.

  The Japanese bombed Muar repeatedly during the four-day period 11–15 January. On the 15th, while the fighting was in progress at Gemas, the Japanese surprised and overran the two forward companies of the Rajputana Rifles on the northern side of the Muar River. Incredibly, its Battalion HQ was none the wiser. Late that morning, Japanese infantry were seen opposite Muar and were shelled by the Australian artillery. And during that afternoon enemy boats were seen off the mouth of the river and small parties of Japanese were identified landing between the town and Batu Pahat. However, it was during the night 15/16 January that the great speed and purpose of the Japanese, and the utter inexperience of the 45th Brigade, were amply demonstrated.

  Scrounging a few small boats in adjacent fields, the 111/5th Guards Battalion was able to cross the river and then return with native craft moored on the southern bank. Within a short time the Japanese possessed a bridgehead over the Muar River. Kirby has described their only contact with the Indians as being ‘a brush’ with a patrol which ‘hastily withdrew’, and that this ‘brush’ on the south side of the river was not reported.2 Having crossed in large numbers by daylight, the Japanese quickly moved south and fell upon and eliminated a company of the 7/6th Rajputana Rifles. This force then proceeded to attack the advance company of the Garhwalis at Simpang Jeram and a company of the Rajputana Rifles which had been sent forward to protect Muar from the east. Further chaos ensued when Brigadier Duncan ordered a Garhwali company to reinforce the town. It got lost, failed to reach its objective and later returned to Bakri. Alan Warren, in his Singapore 1942, has recorded the next Indian 45th Brigade tragedy for 16 January:

  The company of the 5/18th Garhwal Rifles at Simpang Jeram had been joined by the battalion’s advance headquarters the previous evening. About 6.30 a.m. on 16 January the Garhwalis’ Lieutenant-Colonel James Wooldridge had visited Muar. He was killed when his party was ambushed on the return journey to Simpang Jeram. A Garhwali patrol was also ambushed forward of the village. The company’s commander was among the dead.3

  At Simpang Jeram, the Garhwalis attempted a counterattack at around 1.00 pm, which was repulsed with heavy casualties. They were forced to retire to Bakri. The only positive event for the day occurred when the Japanese attempted to cross the Muar River opposite the town and were fired on over open sights by the 65th Australian Battery. A small number of boats were sunk and the remainder retired. Late on the afternoon of 16 January, the remainder of the Rajputana Rifles in occupation of the Muar township were overrun by a Japanese assault from the east. In the process, the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, and his second-in-command, Captain Alderman, were killed. The 65th Australian Battery and what was left of the Rajputana Rifles then withdrew to Parit Jawa.

  In an action-packed and disastrous 36 hours, Brigadier Duncan’s 45th Brigade had been put to the sword. The Garhwalis had lost their CO and around a company of infantry and the Rajputana Rifles could now muster a mere two officers and 120 other ranks. The Muar River was, apart from the Jats’ tenuous positions, now in Japanese hands and the Indians had fallen back towards Bakri. If the Japanese thrust through Muar—already unfolding at a frightening pace—enabled them to gain the Trunk Road at Yong Peng far to the rear of the remainder of Westforce, then the defence of Johore would lay in tatters.

  In response, during the evening of 16 January, Bennett decided to send his reserve 27th Brigade’s 2/29th Battalion (less one company and a platoon) to Muar. In support of the 2/29th he assigned a troop from the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment and a number of armoured cars. Still unaware of the enemy strength, he ordered the 2/29th to counter-attack and remove a Japanese force which he considered to be around 200 strong. If the enemy were in strength, however, the 45th Brigade and its attached 2/29th were to hold the Muar–Yong Peng Road for seven days to allow Westforce’s withdrawal along the Trunk Road.

  The 2/29th Battalion had been raised in Victoria and was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Robertson. It arrived at Bakri at around 3.00 pm on 17 January. Brigadier Duncan had planned that defensive perimeters would be manned on both the Muar and Parit Jawa Roads, and, pending the arrival of his 4/9th Jats from their Muar River dispositions, the 2/29th was to then stage a counterattack and capture Simpang Jeram. Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson envisaged an occupation of a night perimeter on the Muar Road about two-and-a-half kilometres forward of the Bakri crossroads, then a movement forward during the early hours of 18 January, and a counterattack at daylight.

  C Company (Captain Bowring) was sited forward near a bend to the left of t
he road in a rubber plantation, which then gave way to jungle to the west; B Company (Captain Maher) was to the right of the road also in rubber with jungle and swamp further east. Just behind those two forward companies lay a six-metre-high cutting through which the road narrowed. To the right rear was Captain Sumner’s A Company. It was also in the rubber, which in turn was bordered by swamp. Because the Battalion’s D Company was left out of battle, Headquarter Company (Captain Olliff ) occupied the left rear part of the perimeter. Many of its specialist soldiers were now employed as riflemen.

  At 6.00 pm an armoured car which had travelled about three kilometres forward of the Battalion’s perimeter down the Muar Road came under fire from an enemy roadblock. An hour later a C Company patrol clashed with the enemy. The Japanese quickly followed up with a concentrated mortar barrage of the 2/29th perimeter and a probing of its C Company front. Corporal Bob Christie, Signals, 2/29th Battalion:

  Their mortars . . . they decided to do a block mortaring. So, in other words, they’d drop their mortars along that line, and they might drop four or six shells . . . and then they’d come to the next lot . . . and we’d see them do that lot and we’d get out . . . and go back to the ones they’d just done.4