Descent into Hell

by Peter Brune

  Alan Warren in his Singapore 1942, has claimed that:

  The ambush had certainly been a disappointment for Varley. Despite months of training in the jungle, the battalion had been taken by surprise in dispositions quite inappropriate for a night battle. There was a good deal of ill-feeling within the battalion over the perceived abandonment of D Company.44

  There can be no doubt that Lieutenant-Colonel Varley would have felt a sense of disappointment over his ambush. While Warren’s point that Varley’s dispositions were unsuitable for a night battle is fair, the fact remains that his available intelligence—the Battalion did conduct recce patrolling in its vicinity—was forecasting a Japanese arrival on the morning of 27 January. His dispositions for the ambush, his employment of his artillery support, his use of the unit’s mortars, his communication, and, above all, the magnificent performance of his troops (particularly his two forward companies) were first class, and must therefore reflect upon his command performance and the training of his Battalion.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Varley’s 2/18th Battalion’s fighting at Nithsdale and Joo Lye Estates did once again demonstrate that well-led, well-trained and adequately equipped and supported Australian troops were more than a match for the much-vaunted Japanese. Much the same could be said of the exploits of the Argylls, the Leicestershires and the East Surreys.

  A Japanese source later described the fighting against the 2/18th Battalion as ‘an appalling hand-to-hand battle’.45 The fact that Jemaluang was not occupied by them until 29 January, and, significantly, that Eastforce was essentially left unmolested before retiring to Singapore Island is ample proof of the intensity of the engagement—and the Japanese losses—at the Nithsdale and Joo Lye Estates.

  With the Eastforce front stabilised, and the withdrawal of forces on the west coast complete by late January 1942, the Trunk Road and railway remained the critical sites of battle.

  18

  TO THE CAUSEWAY

  The plan for the withdrawal of Westforce in the central sector required that the 27th Brigade AIF (the 2/26th, 2/30th and the Loyals) was to withdraw down the Trunk Road, while the 9th Indian Division (General Barstow) was to move down the railway. On 24 January 1942, the 2/30th Battalion and the Loyals occupied a perimeter about five kilometres north of the vital road junction at Ayer Hitam—vital because the eastward road from Kluang, the northern road from Yong Peng and the western road from Batu Pahat converged there.

  Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan had chosen his ground well. At the 61-mile peg and to the right of the road, he deployed his A Company (Captain Anderson), one platoon of B Company and a detachment of mortars on ‘Bare Lalang Hill’, which dominated the area. To the extreme north of this A Company perimeter, Galleghan sited his mortar observation post, which had a far-reaching view of the forward ground. Away to the east he sited a small standing patrol to observe any enemy attempt to move around his right flank. His left flank, to the left of the road, was occupied by the Loyals’ A Company, also on a hill. The forward perimeter was ‘devoid of vegetation excepting bracken and lalang (long grass)’,1 which therefore offered excellent fields of fire. To the rear of these dispositions lay an extensive area of swamp and bog on either side of the road which ran up to, and past the River Sembrong, and eventually gave way to jungle to the south. The swamp and bog area also provided a substantial natural tank obstacle. About two-and-a-half kilometres behind the forward perimeter, and around 800 metres north of Ayer Hitam, Galleghan sited his B Company to the right of the road with his D and C Companies to the rear on the left and right sides respectively.2 While the 2/30th forward perimeter offered excellent surveillance over the potential enemy approaches, its one major drawback was the fact that it was susceptible to observation from the air. To counter this, Galleghan issued orders for no digging in, and limited movement during daylight, other than to pass dry rations forward from soldier to soldier.

  The 2/26th Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes) was disposed to the rear to cover the westward approach along the Batu Pahat road, while one of its companies was deployed to the east to cover the Kluang Road. To conform to the general peninsula withdrawal plan, the 27th Brigade was required to hold their line for 48 hours.

  The Japanese began to press the Australians early on 25 January. Galleghan’s Greyhounds:

  In the morning rain set in and continued during the day. Conditions deteriorated, rest was impossible in the wet and mud and emergency rations were drawn, as others could not be brought up from the rear. Enemy planes were active throughout the day attempting to destroy the bridge over the Sembrong, without success, and often flying low in their search for movement and artillery positions.3

  Beginning at dawn, aggressive and sustained 2/30th Battalion patrolling detected enemy activity on the right flank. At about 8.00 am, a fighting patrol led by Sergeant Russell found an enemy officer and three other ranks in trees, engaged in spotting for their artillery and mortars. All four were killed. About 450 metres further on Russell discovered a large formation of Japanese forming up for an attack and promptly sent a warning back to A Company HQ. Shortly after, the patrol came across another six of the enemy and killed four. It would appear that these Japanese patrols were engaged in attempting to draw the Australians’ fire prior to concentrated attacks. The ploy failed as the 2/30th continued to respond by sending out numerous fighting patrols to take the fight to the enemy, whilst still holding fire within their forward perimeter.4

  During the remainder of the morning and early afternoon the Japanese attempted to destroy the bridge by artillery fire, to hit the 2/30th Battalion mortars and to form up for early probing attacks. But their endeavours were frustrated. At 10.00 am a platoon was scattered by accurate 2/30th mortar fire, which was directed by Sergeant McAlister’s observation post in A Company’s perimeter. An hour later when the Japanese mortared Lalang Hill and were seen forming up again at about company strength, McAlister’s work again saw them take casualties and disperse. And when the intrepid Sergeant Russell yet again moved forward and identified the position of the Japanese guns, an artillery dual ensued. A forward enemy party attempting to determine the Australian positions and draw their fire was eliminated by this bombardment. As the afternoon wore on the Japanese continued their efforts to locate the Australian positions and to hit the bridge and the 2/30th mortars—to no avail.

  During the late afternoon they mounted three concentrated attacks. The first was against the ground from the road eastwards along the 8 and 9 Platoon positions of A Company’s right flank.5 Curiously, this initial attack was preceded by a subaltern ‘carrying a large Japanese flag’.6 His demise did not dampen the enemy’s enthusiasm, as a second officer, then a third, were mown down before the flag was left on the battlefield. The resulting attack was beaten back by the defenders’ small arms fire with the usual accurate assistance of mortars. A two-company enemy assault further to the east on A Company’s perimeter was staged at 4.00 pm but, although the forward standing patrol was forced back to its 12 Platoon position, the enemy yet again received a severe mauling, which saw them stopped about 70 metres from the Australian lines. Leaving half of their number dead on that ground, the Japanese withdrew to re-form on a wooded ridge to the rear, but when hit by yet further 2/30th Battalion mortar fire, further casualties caused them to flee.

  Unable to pierce the right flank, the Japanese now directed their attention to the western side of the road, through a covered jungle approach onto the Loyals’ A Company. At around dusk they launched a strong assault upon those rearward positions as well as on the front of the perimeter. The Loyals’ company commander led a spirited counterattack with the bayonet which, although failing to dislodge the enemy from a portion of that high ground, did prevent encirclement. But the cost was heavy. During that hand-to-hand fight the Loyals took heavy casualties. The Japanese now attempted to exploit their high ground advantage by moving along and across the road. In this they were thwarted yet again by the 2/30th Battalion’s A Compan
y mortar and machine gun fire.

  Knowing that the 27th Brigade was due to withdraw that night, and with his forward left flank perimeter having been penetrated, Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan decided to withdraw at the same time as his rearward 2/26th Battalion. With the Japanese now in possession of a part of the road and in occupation of the high ground on the front left flank, that withdrawal was made through the swamp and bog back to the bridge on the River Sembrong. Whilst darkness most certainly offered relative concealment, the roughly 800-metre journey through often waist deep swamp with enemy tracer and machine gun fire just overhead, made for tough travel, especially for the stretcher bearers and mortar crews.

  The 2/30th Adjutant, Captain Peach, had gone forward with the withdrawal orders. The Loyals were his last point of call:

  . . . but enemy machine guns, traversing the road, forced him to remain in the swamps, in mud often four to five feet deep. He eventually accomplished his mission, a most hazardous one, and returned to the demolition point, bruised, scratched and almost unrecognizable, due to the mud. A party of Engineers was there, and, on being assured that the last man was over the bridge, Capt. Peach gave orders for its demolition. It was then approximately 9 o’clock.7

  While Captain Duffy’s B Company and some of the Loyals provided a rearguard under covering fire from the 30th Battery of the 2/15th Field Regiment, the 2/30th and the Loyals made good their withdrawal and reached the 54-mile peg at 11.00 pm.8 The 2/26th Battalion then passed through their lines and the Loyals returned to Singapore to rest and refit. They were replaced by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, who had been posted from Singapore. At around 2.30 am, the 2/30th embussed at the 52-mile peg and reached the 41-mile peg at 4.00 am, about eight kilometres south of Simpang Rengam.9

  The action fought just north of Ayer Hitam caused the Japanese an estimated 250 casualties at a cost to the 2/30th of four killed and twelve wounded or missing. It was, yet again, testimony to the excellent training of the 2/30th Battalion and also to the outstanding leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan and his officers.

  On 26 January 1942, the leading positions in the defence of the Trunk Road fell to the Gordons at the 48-mile peg, the 2/26th Battalion at the 44-mile peg and the 2/30th in reserve at the 41-mile peg. During that morning the Japanese kept strafing the road and the lines of the Gordons and the 2/26th Battalion, which was a prelude to infantry pressure upon the Gordons along the road during the afternoon. This Japanese advance was halted by artillery and mortar fire. But late that day, when the Gordons were placed under more intense pressure, they withdrew. Wigmore has claimed the reason given was that they ‘had run out of food and water and their ammunition was running short’.10 Kirby asserted that they were ‘short of ammunition’.11 Thyer, General Bennett’s GSO1:

  . . . an enemy force was seen moving down the edges of the road. These were engaged by 25-prs and mortars which inflicted heavy casualties. It was just prior to this that Brig Maxwell had gone forward to discuss the question of future withdrawals and the probability of the Gordons withdrawing to the 42 mile post position alongside 2/30 Bn the following day. Lt-Col Stitt, CO of the Gordons, must have misunderstood the Bde Comd’s intention, for at 1830 hours he ordered the withdrawal of his Bn to the 41½ mile post.

  By 1730 hours, the Gordons had reported that they were running out of ammunition and that the men had not been fed, nor was any drinking water available. On enquiries being made, it was discovered that the Bn carried no reserve of rations, and that the water supply had not been replenished since the day before. The location of the ammunition point at the 35-mile post had been notified.12

  Wigmore placed the second paragraph from the above Thyer quote in a footnote,13 but decided that Thyer’s first and next paragraphs might best be passed over:

  At 1900 hours, Comd Gordons reported that the enemy was still pressing and that the unit was withdrawing. On being ordered to remain in position he stated that the move was already under way. The CO was then sent forward to halt the Bn at once, and to take up a position immediately in rear of the 2/26th Bn.14

  Kirby would later write that the Gordons withdrew ‘with the Brigade Commander’s permission through 2/26th Battalion to Milestone 42½’.15 It would seem that the ‘permission’ came after the withdrawal had already begun, and that the paucity of rations, water and ammunition was used as an excuse. This was a clear example of substandard staff work.

  On 27 January, the Japanese made several low-level strafing attacks upon the 27th Brigade, and at 3.00 pm the enemy opened fire on the 2/26th Battalion front with light machine guns and small arms fire.16 The Battalion Diary observed that: ‘All parties of enemy observed were engaged by our tps. Enemy also using rifle grenades, Chinese crackers. Enemy personnel were dressed as “Indian troops”.’17 And if the enemy air attacks were unpleasant, at least their regular timing gave the Australians a chance to prepare for the onslaughts. The unit diarist recorded that the Japanese ‘planes work “union” hrs—0830–1200, 1400–1700: their appearance is most regular’.18 At 5.00 pm the 2/26th were ordered to withdraw, and with its forward companies keeping the enemy at arm’s length by frequent patrolling and superb support from the 30th Battery 2/15th Field Regiment, the Battalion successfully broke contact. By 11.00 pm the 2/26th had begun the task of digging in at its new positions near the 42-mile peg, which covered a road leading into the Namazie Estate. The Gordons were deployed just ahead of them astride the Trunk Road.

  The defensive perimeter occupied by the Gordons, the 2/26th and 2/30th Battalions at the Namazie Rubber Estate on 28 January 1942 was not an ideal one. Enemy attacks along the left flank or western side of the Trunk Road were unlikely, as the ground consisted of jungle-ridden hills interspersed with swamp, which ran right up to the road. But the extensive rubber plantation ground to the east of the Trunk Road offered the Japanese the chance to outflank the Australians. There were a number of estate roads and an extensive area of high ground with its contour drainage ditches, which they could use. This sort of rubber country also offered limited defensive observation and thus restricted the Australians’ use of their mortars. Should the Japanese manage to penetrate that right flank and gain the cover of the jungle on both sides of the rear portion of the Trunk Road—a jungle defile—the 27th Brigade would be cut off.19 Brigadier Maxwell and Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan discussed a large-scale 2/30th ambush at this defile, but the concept was abandoned because ‘reconnaissance was made almost impossible by air activity’20 and the worn condition of the troops.

  With the obvious security of the western side of the Trunk Road seemingly assured, and knowing the Japanese would almost certainly attempt initial frontal assaults and a wide outflanking movement through the eastern or right rubber estate flank, the 27th Brigade perimeter was planned accordingly. The Gordons were deployed astride the Trunk Road and stretching just eastward, with the 2/26th Battalion’s B, A and D Companies occupying ground further east. Its C Company added depth to the Battalion’s perimeter, being deployed just to the rear of D Company. Galleghan’s 2/30th Battalion had two critical roles. Positioned just forward of the junction of an estate road and the Trunk Road, it was perfectly placed to either reinforce the forward perimeter, or protect the right flank against an outflanking Japanese movement—or both. Galleghan immediately instigated a detailed patrol program for his Battalion through this extensive right flank.

  The Japanese attacked A Company’s left flank of the 2/26th perimeter at around 7.00 am on 28 January. When they were met by determined opposition they started to feel for the extent of the Battalion’s eastward perimeter along the C and D Company front. The fact that the enemy were ‘moving back and forward across front and right flank’,21 whilst their planes bombed and strafed the general area, would seem to suggest that they were engaged in their usual activity of feeling for a point of weakness in the forward defences, with the intention of allowing themselves time to pin down that forward perimeter and outflank it.

  Just a
fter midday, a recce patrol from the 2/30th Battalion’s D Company encountered a small enemy patrol about 300 metres east of its position. When a two-section 2/30th fighting patrol was sent out to eliminate those Japanese it came under intense fire. Galleghan’s prediction of an enemy outflanking movement to cut the Trunk Road was rapidly coming to pass. He now acted decisively. Lionel Wigmore:

  Three more platoons, two armoured cars and a section of mortars were moved to the area, and the forward units were told of the situation. At Galleghan’s request Boyes sent him a company of the 2/26th Battalion [his B Company, closest to the Trunk Road] to come under command and reinforce his right flank. Three platoons, covered by two others, were ordered to attack under Captain Duffy’s direction the high ground occupied by the Japanese, and a strong outflanking attack was to be made.22

  At 4.40 pm on 28 January 1942, the 2/30th Battalion yet again showed its fighting prowess. While two platoons produced a terrific din of small arms covering fire, the three attacking platoons advanced steadily towards the enemy. The two armoured cars engaged Japanese light machine gun positions with their Vickers machine guns, and, when an additional enemy force in close formation was spotted forming up on a ridge it too came under armoured car fire. As the 2/30th soldiers closed on the enemy, the bayonet was used with telling effect, and the Japanese withdrew in disorder. Such exposed enemy movement invited further devastating armoured car fire. But the Japanese employed an unusual weapon to cover their withdrawal. The 2/30th War Diary recorded that the enemy retreated ‘under cover of [a] type of toxic smoke bombs . . . effect of gas prevented further exploitation of enemy retreat’.23 The anguish of soldiers caught in that ‘toxic smoke’ without respirators can be imagined, but it later transpired that the gas was ‘found to lose effect quickly on gaining fresh air’.24