Descent into Hell

by Peter Brune

  On the way to recce his new positions, Taylor called on Bennett. He would later claim that: ‘He [Bennett] . . . made some disparaging remarks in relation to my handling of the situation and about the Brigade. He stated that it was not his intention that the order I had received should be put into operation forthwith, but only under certain circumstances.’12 The extraordinary outcome of what must have been a stormy meeting was that, firstly, Bennett allowed Taylor’s error to stand, and secondly, after Taylor left Bennett’s HQ, he still proceeded to undertake the recce.

  While these events were in train, the Japanese had began to move around the right flank perimeter of the 12th Indian Brigade (Brigadier Paris), which was deployed at the northern end of the Jurong Line. In response, Paris withdrew his Brigade about 900 metres to a position just to the west of Keat Hong village. The Australian 2/29th Battalion—less one company and the CO who had lost contact with the rest of the Battalion during the withdrawal from Bulim—now formed the front on the Choa Chu Kang Road. When Paris learnt that Brigadier Maxwell’s 27th Brigade withdrawal had left the Woodlands Road unoccupied to the vicinity of Mandai village, he withdrew his Argylls and the 2/29th to Bukit Panjang village which lay at the intersection of the Woodlands and Choa Chu Kang Roads. Thus Maxwell’s unauthorised withdrawal had become a precedent for others—all wrong, all undisciplined, and all based upon a lack of fortitude when an enemy threat materialised at any point along a neighbouring front.

  Early on 10 February, the 15th and 44th Brigades had deployed on the southern end of the Jurong Line. At around 1.30 pm, the Japanese began to move down the Jurong Road. In response the 6/1st Punjabis (44th Brigade) and elements of the 15th Brigade’s British Battalion undertook a limited withdrawal. When Brigadier Ballentine was inaccurately informed that the 15th Brigade was withdrawing, he reacted to a perceived threat of being outflanked by instigating a movement into his allotted area as per Percival’s final perimeter. Late on the afternoon of the 10th, therefore, Brigadier Ballentine’s 44th Brigade had withdrawn a number of kilometres to Pasir Panjang village. This farcical chain of events continued when Brigadier Coates discovered that, with Ballentine’s Brigade gone, he was exposed on his left flank. Consequently, he too withdrew eastwards to a perimeter which was only about three kilometres outside of Bukit Timah village. In turn, this movement left Major Saggers and his Special Reserve Battalion exposed on both flanks and it too withdrew to join the 15th Brigade south of Jurong Road.

  By the early afternoon of 10 February, therefore, the mythical Jurong Line had been abandoned to a foe who had done next to nothing to acquire it. From a psychological perspective, a strongly fortified Jurong Line manned by a fresh, motivated force would have very much forestalled panicky, precipitant and poorly executed withdrawals. A line on a map was cold comfort for inexperienced, poorly equipped and exhausted troops who, in numerous cases, were commanded by senior officers who looked back rather than forward.

  General Wavell’s last visit to Singapore on the morning of 10 February 1942 was opportune. Accompanied by three staff, he joined Percival at Sime Road and then visited each of the Area Commanders. Bennett was his first port of call, then Heath followed by Key. It was at this time, having been told by Key that the Trunk Road lay exposed after Maxwell’s withdrawal, that Percival placed the Australian 27th Brigade under Key’s command. He also ordered Heath to furnish three battalions from his yet unused 18th Division to form a reserve for Bennett for a defence of the key Bukit Timah area. Under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, this reserve was to be codenamed Tomforce. Finally, belatedly, and a full 36 hours after Yamashita’s landings on the north-west coast, Percival was creating a fresh reserve.

  During the early afternoon of the 10th, Wavell and Percival visited Bennett a second time. It was during this meeting they learnt that the Jurong Line was lost. Wavell was adamant that the Line be recaptured. After having visited General Simmons, Wavell and Percival then journeyed to the latter’s residence at Flagstaff House, where Percival showed Wavell his written orders to Bennett for the counterattack. It was during this time that Wavell received a cable from Churchill:

  Prime Minister to General Wavell 10 Feb 42

  I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. It is reported to the Cabinet by the C.I.G.S. that Percival has over 100,000 men, whom 33,000 are British and 17,000 Australian. It is doubtful whether the Japanese have as many in the whole Malay peninsula, namely, five divisions forward and a sixth coming up. In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber Japanese forces who have crossed the straits, and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show no mercy to weakness in any form. With the Russians fighting as they are and the Americans so stubborn at Luzon, the whole reputation of our country and our race is involved. It is expected that every unit will be brought into close contact with the enemy and fight it out. I feel sure these words express your own feeling, and only send them to you in order to share your burdens.13

  Percival’s biographer, Clifford Kinvig recounted:

  Wavell then retired to a separate room and drafted in pencil on the back of a naval message form a similar exhortation which he signed and passed to Percival. The tone was the same . . . It is difficult to decide which message was more discreditable, the Prime Minister’s or Wavell’s.14

  Whilst Kinvig’s comment is entirely fair, Churchill’s cable was, and remains, the most inept document of the two. In modern warfare, battles are not decided purely in terms of numbers. The prerequisites for a competent fight, let alone victory, are more often than not air superiority or at least air parity; a naval presence worthy of the name; some half-reasonable support in terms of artillery, tanks and anti-aircraft batteries; and most of all, well-led, trained, seasoned, and motivated infantry. A number of the above-mentioned military requirements for success—as we have chronicled—had been denied Percival by Winston Churchill. His last sentence to Wavell, ‘I feel sure these words express your own feeling, and only send them to you in order to share your burdens’, is trite.

  It can be imagined what Percival must have thought of Churchill’s cable and Wavell’s equally poor effort for the troops—which were deeply resented by all and sundry. The following day, with an order to read Wavell’s message to the troops, came Percival’s own message:

  In some units the troops have not shown the fighting spirit expected of men of the British Empire.

  It will be a lasting disgrace if we are defeated by an enemy of clever gangsters many times inferior in numbers to our men. The spirit of aggression and determination to stick it out must be inculcated in all ranks. There must be no further withdrawals without orders. There are too many fighting men in the back areas.

  Every available man who is not doing essential work, must be used to stop the invader.15

  By the afternoon of 10 February, despite the belated creation of a fresh reserve and a counterattack being planned, it was to require a lot more than ‘Boy’s Own Annual’ messages from the Prime Minister and senior commanders to forestall the ‘clever gangsters’.

  General Bennett’s 8th Division HQ issued his orders for the recapture of the Jurong Line at around 4.00 pm on the 10th. The attack was to consist of three brigades with a further two in reserve. The right flank attack was to be undertaken by the 12th Indian Brigade with 2/29th attached (Brigadier Paris); the 15th Indian Brigade were in the centre; and Brigadier Taylor’s 22nd Brigade was deployed on the left flank. Brigadier Ballentine’s 44th Indian Brigade and the newly constituted Tomforce were assigned as the reserve formations. Bennett planned three phases or objectives. The first phase envisaged the occupation of a line extending from Point
138 in the south, northwards to Milestone 9 on the Jurong Road, and thence to Milestone 11 on the Choa Chu Kang Road. That first objective was to be taken by 6.00 pm that day. Phase two was designed to gain about a further 1100 metres of ground westwards by 9.00 am the next morning (11 February). The third and final phase was the complete occupation of the Jurong Line by 9.00 pm that day. Bennett assigned the Australian 2/15th Field Regiment as the 22nd Brigade’s artillery support, and the 44th Brigade’s 5th Field Regiment for the 15th and 44th Brigades.

  Bennett’s plan was flawed in three key areas. The first was time—particularly in terms of hours of daylight. Although the 15th and 12th Brigades were somewhere close to their startlines, Taylor’s 22nd Brigade was not. Therefore an order given at 4.00 pm for an attack at 6.00 pm without the chance to conduct suitable daylight reconnaissance was ambitious in the extreme. The second factor was control. Given the appalling communication network available to the force, given the fact that much of it had been engaged in heavy fighting, that much of the force was currently involved in withdrawals to new positions, and were severely diminished in strength both numerically and physically, the chances of success were slim. Third, the artillery support was placed in a most unfavourable position. The 2/15th Field Regiment had initially been assigned to support the 22nd Brigade, but at around 5.45 pm it received orders to in fact support the 12 Indian Brigade. The unit ‘had already taken up battery positions on Farrer and Orchard Roads to support the Aus Bde [sic] and therefore were [sic] some 10,000 yards in rear of 12th Brigade’s first objective’.16 Bennett’s three-phase operation to retake the Jurong Line would prove a disaster.

  On the right, or northern flank, the Japanese pre-empted Brigadier Paris’s 12th Brigade’s first phase movement by attacking his Hyderabads who were deployed near Milestone 11 on the Choa Chu Kang Road. Kirby used the term ‘disintegrated’17 to describe the Hyderabad’s fate, while Thyer’s report would later state that the unit had suffered ‘many desertions during the day’, and that Paris believed that ‘he could only rely on about 100 men from that Battalion’.18 Enemy infantry followed by tanks then appeared out of the darkness and attacked the 2/29th Battalion. According to its War Diary two tanks were disabled,19 but the strength of the enemy infantry and further tanks caused the Australians to withdraw to the pipeline and thence to the racecourse. There Lieutenant-Colonel Pond regathered his Battalion and early on 11 February deployed it to the left of Tomforce.

  With the Hyderabads and the 2/29th out of action, the Argylls were now confronted by an enemy advance down the vital Woodlands Road. They reacted in their usual dogged fashion. Two roadblocks were hurriedly constructed. The Argylls used an armoured car at the first, and despite that unequal battle, valuable time was won. When the enemy encountered the second block they were confronted by an anti-tank rifle and a few mines.

  At around 10.30 pm the Argylls HQ had withdrawn to a position east of the Trunk Road, while its companies had moved to the Singapore Dairy Farm. After the initial Japanese assault, however, Brigadier Paris had sent word back to Bukit Timah of the Japanese tank assault, which enabled Major Fraser, a liaison officer from Bennett’s HQ, to organise a 4th Australian Anti-Tank position. Moving back about 250 metres, Fraser then organised two troops of British howitzers to offer an additional block. At midnight on 10 February a number of enemy tanks and accompanying infantry gained the road junction at Bukit Timah and thus, by occupying the eastern end of the Jurong Road, had now severed direct communication with the 15th Brigade and Taylor’s troops moving forward to their phase one objective. Clearly, the tank column might have pushed on, but chose to stop. The Japanese had probably decided to consolidate their advance by bringing up additional infantry. At dawn, any hope the Argylls had for a counterattack from the dairy farm was dashed when the strength of the enemy force was realised. Paris then decided to withdraw the Argylls along the pipeline, which later saw them reach Tanglin.

  Of the three brigades deployed to implement Bennett’s capture of the Jurong Line, Brigadier Taylor’s 22nd Brigade was given the toughest role. Taylor ordered the just-formed ‘X’ Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes) to occupy a position on the right named ‘Jurong I’ and Merrett Force (Major Merrett) on the left flank at Point 85, which lay just west of Sleepy Valley Estate. Away to ‘X’ Battalion’s right lay the Special Reserve Battalion (Major Saggers) and further still 15 Brigade (Brigadier Coates).

  The formation of Merrett Force and ‘X’ Battalion deserves some scrutiny. It will be recalled that Merrett Force had been created after the fierce fighting on Taylor’s front during the Japanese landings on Singapore’s north-west coast. It consisted of Captain Cousens’s A Company, 2/19th Battalion, which had seen little action during the enemy landings, elements of C and D Companies 2/19th Battalion, and a group of around sixty 2/20th soldiers who had managed to regain their lines under Major Merrett.

  ‘X’ Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes) was much more of an ‘odds and sods’ formation. It was comprised of three companies, each manned primarily by soldiers who had survived the heavy fighting on the north-west coast only days before. Company Number One consisted of 2/18th Battalion soldiers commanded by Major O’Brien. Company Number Two was composed of 2/19th Battalion men under the command of Major Keegan and Company Number Three was Captain Richardson’s D Company, 2/20th Battalion. Within each company were experienced officers and other ranks who had fought with great distinction in both Malaya and on Singapore’s north-west coast. Keegan, Richardson and O’Brien are examples. But there were also reinforcement officers and other ranks within those companies, some of whom fought well, while others found the experience overwhelming. Further, there were a number of non-combatant base personnel who also found themselves assigned to the formation.

  The Unit Historians of both the 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions have rightly questioned the failure of both Bennett and Taylor to send returning members of 22nd Brigade Battalions back to their units after their recovery from the front. Their argument has substance. Reg Newton, 2/19th Battalion Historian: ‘. . . we felt that we were the leaderless legion, and split up everywhere. The fact that Lieut. Col. Varley had kept his 2/18th Battalion survivors . . . together, and still functioning as a unit, rankled with our remnants.’20

  Don Wall, 2/20th Battalion Historian:

  There was no attempt by Staff Officers to keep Units together and there appears to be no excuse for fragmenting battalions further. The 2/20 Bn had taken the full force of the enemy onslaught, and still had the best part of two companys’ strength and in the same locality and yet they remained fragmented.21

  Late on 10 February, therefore, Brigadier Taylor was deploying two formations to spearhead his role in the recapture of the Jurong Line which were of dubious military quality and poorly outfitted. ‘X’ Battalion was equipped with rifles, fifteen sub-machine guns, eight light machine guns, five 2-inch mortars, and two 3-inch mortars.22 Incredibly, according to Thyer’s report, ‘some men were un-armed except for a load of hand-grenades’, and others were ‘merely ammunition carriers with bandoliers hung about their shoulders’.23

  ‘X’ Battalion arrived in the vicinity of the Reformatory at around 4.00 pm. Two hours later—as darkness was approaching—Boyes received his orders to proceed to Jurong I, a kidney-shaped feature just south of the nine and a half mile post on the Jurong Road.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur ‘Sapper’ Boyes and the more experienced with him must have quickly realised that all was not well. As they moved through the burning Bukit Timah area accompanied by distant sounds of fighting to their right, British troops informed them that the enemy was just ahead. These were the sounds of the fighting on 12 Brigade’s front to the north, and heading towards Bukit Timah. When ‘X’ Battalion came within about 500 to 600 metres of their objective, Boyes met Saggers of the Special Reserve Battalion, but was unable to make contact with the 15th Brigade’s Punjabis who were to be on his right. And Merrett Force, which was supposed to be journeying to form his left
flank, ran into ‘bog and tangled undergrowth’24 and subsequently formed a defensive perimeter to the rear in Sleepy Valley where Merrett intended to push on at daylight. As ‘X’ Battalion approached its objective, the troops saw Indian bodies—not long dead—and their transport littered around the area. Some movement was also detected in the surrounding scrub on the northern side of Jurong Road.

  By around 1.00 am on the morning of 11 February, having reached his objective, Boyes had deployed Richardson’s company on the left flank, O’Brien’s on the right, and Keegan’s near Battalion HQ to the rear. A small recce patrol journeyed ahead—and was not seen again. The exhausted ‘X’ Battalion soldiers rapidly fell asleep with a small number of sentries providing cover and warning of Japanese activity. According to the 2/20th Unit History, Boyes is reported to have told Richardson: ‘I don’t like this, we’re not going to get out of this tonight, tell the men they may as well die here than back in Singapore.’25 Richardson did not pass the message on.

  Boyes had every reason to ‘not like this’. The Japanese had pushed fighting patrols westwards from their captured ground near Bukit Timah and by the time ‘X’ Battalion gained its designated perimeter, they had virtually surrounded the Australians.

  The Japanese struck at about 3.00 am. A fuel dump adjacent to Battalion HQ, which consisted of 44-gallon drums ‘stacked in several layers’,26 was ignited by tracer fire. Against this brilliantly lit background, many dazed Australians were bayoneted where they lay, while others were very quickly cut down by sniper, automatic and small arms fire. Both Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Boyes and Major Dick Keegan died early during the assault. Very little counter fire could be employed because the battle in many places was hand-to-hand and extremely confused. During that mass slaughter at Jurong I that night, ‘X’ Battalion lost somewhere between 100 and 150 of its men. The few survivors—in small groups ranging from two or three to section-strength—were those who chanced their fortunes by either seeking cover and waiting for their opportunity to move out, or others who made a desperate dash for freedom via a journey southwards towards Pasir Panjang.