The Working Class Republican

by Henry Olsen

  Despite Reagan’s fear of government power and the support of his supposed ideological allies and employer, Reagan opposed Proposition 18. He explained why in a November 1958 radio interview.62 His experience with SAG led him to think a union shop (the term for an arrangement in which employees are required to join a union as a condition for employment) was fair. Reagan opposed a closed shop, which is a system that forces employers to hire new employees only from the ranks of the unions, saying that established a monopoly and that “monopoly is wrong in all its forms.” But union shops did not infringe on management’s right to hire whom it chose and hence were fair.

  Reagan’s view again prevailed. All four initiatives went down to defeat, three (including California’s) with over 60 percent voting no.63 Knowland’s presidential ambitions also were dashed as he lost by a 60–40 margin to the man Reagan would go on to defeat in 1966, the Democrat Pat Brown.

  This seemingly minor election would prove to have major consequences for Reagan. National conservatives were left leaderless by Knowland’s defeat. They cast about for a new leader, and soon found one: Barry Goldwater. But for Knowland’s defeat to Brown, Reagan’s rocket to stardom in support of Goldwater’s 1964 presidential bid might never have happened.

  Reagan’s opposition to right-to-work did not mean he unquestioningly backed the union agenda. In his November 1958 interview, he noted that GE had “enlightened management-labor relations” that “[treated] employees as customers.”64 The company used the phrase “corporate citizenship” to describe its approach, an idea Reagan said had not existed among management before the 1930s. Quoting the legendary labor head Samuel Gompers, he contended that “labor and management must be partners” and that there was no longer any room for purely confrontational labor tactics. He also argued that too many union decisions were being made solely by the leaders without directly consulting the members. Reagan’s views on labor policy, as on so many other things, did not fit neatly into the “left versus right” paradigm that was beginning to take shape.

  Reagan’s philosophy also differed from the conservative right’s in what he did not say. Conservatives of the time often spoke of how the Constitution was being violated by the federal government. Indeed, the leading conservative grassroots organization of that day was called Americans for Constitutional Action.65 They contended that the Constitution was intended primarily to limit congressional power and that Congress could legitimately legislate only over matters that had been expressly delegated to it in Article I. Labor relations, farm aid, welfare programs, aid to education, urban renewal, and a host of other post-1932 federal programs were not expressly included in Congress’s Article I powers, and therefore could not be legitimately be addressed by Congress without a constitutional amendment.

  Reagan never made this argument the center, or even a significant portion, of his creed. His argument was not that the people were, through their representatives, doing things they were not permitted to do. Instead, he contended that the people themselves were being ignored by the unelected, and that the proper remedy to big government was the restoration of popular control. His view of the Founders’ philosophy was simple: “Government should only do those things that the people can’t do for themselves.”66 In this he followed his idol FDR, who often cited or quoted Abraham Lincoln for the same proposition.67 Following this principle meant that he could enthusiastically support “forward-thinking” social programs that most conservatives thought were unconstitutional usurpations of states’ or individuals’ rights.

  Reagan’s philosophy was pretty much set by the late 1950s. He would increasingly identify as a Republican and never again campaigned for a Democrat, but he did not change the basic core of his politics. He would be on the right in the context of the debates of his time, but he always presented himself as what he was: a disappointed former Democrat who still believed that government could give people a hand up without placing its hands too firmly on them.

  This was clearly on display in the 1960 election. Ike’s vice president, Richard Nixon, was preparing his own run for the White House and in doing so wrote a letter to Reagan after receiving a copy of a speech Reagan had given in New York City in May 1959.68 Reagan had never been a fan of Nixon’s, but he responded graciously in a note dated June 27.69 Within a month Nixon had made international news when he engaged in an impromptu debate with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev on the virtues of their two systems. Reagan never discussed this episode publicly, but it must have been music to his anti-Communist ears. He wrote Nixon in early September congratulating him on his performance, a note that started a lifetime connection between the two that was sometimes warm, always respectful, and in which Reagan was usually supportive of Nixon’s political ambitions.70

  Reagan jumped into the 1960 campaign with enthusiasm. He wrote Nixon again in July 1960, stating how he was appalled at the convention acceptance speech of Nixon’s Democratic opponent, John F. Kennedy.71 Reagan wrote that Kennedy’s speech was a “frightening call to arms” for the expansion of federal government power. He offered his services to Nixon as a surrogate speaker, noting that he had been giving versions of the talk Nixon had approved of the year before “in more than 38 states to audiences of Democrats and Republicans.” Nixon took him up on the offer, leading Reagan to give hundreds of speeches on his behalf. According to his autobiography, he even told Nixon he was going to register as a Republican but remained a Democrat at Nixon’s request because his efforts would “be more effective” that way.72

  What seemed obvious to Reagan—that Nixon would make a good president and Kennedy a bad one—was not to Buckley and other conservatives. Richard Nixon had been a model “Modern Republican,” a man whose voting record in Congress had been squarely middle of the road and who offered anti–New Deal conservatives little if any hope that the federal behemoth would be tamed. Their fears had been only exacerbated by an agreement Nixon made right before the GOP convention with the liberal Republican governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller. Meeting in secret in Rocky’s lavish Fifth Avenue apartment, Nixon defused a potential Rockefeller challenge for the nomination by hammering out a compromise on the platform. The compromise, labeled the “Compact of Fifth Avenue,” moved the GOP significantly to the left, calling for expanded federal programs for civil rights, medical care for the elderly, expanded farm programs, and federal aid to education.73

  The Right erupted in horror. Barry Goldwater denounced the agreement as a “surrender” and “the Munich of the Republican Party.”74 Conservatives on the GOP Platform Committee tried to derail the proposals. In the end, with all the power of the establishment and the vice presidency behind him, Nixon could secure the committee’s passage of the compromise by only a 50–35 margin.75 In the general election, many conservatives refused to back Nixon even at the expense of electing Kennedy. Buckley said Nixon would be “an unreliable auxiliary of the right” and National Review refused to endorse him.76 Other conservatives heeded Barry Goldwater’s call to reluctantly back Nixon while preparing to make the GOP more reliably conservative. “Let’s grow up, conservatives,” Goldwater told delegates after the Platform Committee had backed the compact. “We want to take this party back, and I think some day we can. Let’s go to work.”77 Reagan, however, shared neither this dismay nor this reluctance.

  Reagan continued to support Nixon after his defeat even though many conservatives continued to oppose him. He told his longtime pen pal, Lorraine Wagner, in July 1961 that he had declined an offer to run for California governor, an office that Nixon was seeking, because “I don’t think I’m right for the part.”78 We don’t know who asked him, but in the Republican primary, most conservatives backed Assemblyman Joe Shell rather than the former vice president. Shell waged a bitter battle against Nixon for the GOP nomination. Nixon won 2–1, but many angry conservatives refused to back him in the general election because he had denounced the John Birch Society and refused to pledge to cut the state budget.79 Reagan, however, was not on
e of them. Even though Reagan actively participated in a conservative-backed primary challenge to the very liberal Republican incumbent, Thomas Kuchel, he was not involved in Shell’s more serious challenge to Nixon.80 Reagan spoke on Nixon’s behalf in the general election, even giving an election-eve televised speech on Nixon’s behalf.81

  Reagan backed someone else in 1962: John Rousselot, a staff member of the John Birch Society, and a candidate for Congress. He also finally made the full leap over to the Republican Party, reregistering as a Republican in the spring, and increased his national speaking efforts, spreading his gospel farther and farther afield.

  His speeches in the early 1960s maintained the same form as those from the late 1950s, albeit with a new focus on foreign policy. He often started his 1960s talk by condemning communism, telling the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, for example, that “the number one problem in the world today is the ideological struggle with Russia.”82 He then went on to identify a shared characteristic between liberalism, socialism, and communism. This core connection, which Reagan identified as a belief in government as a solution to social problems, led liberals to be unable to see Communist tactics for what they were and hence made them unreliable leaders in the fight for world freedom.83 He told the Conservative League of Minneapolis that liberals were naive in rejecting the existence of the internal threat from communism simply because there were actually few American Communists.84

  The increasing drive among liberals to find accommodation with the Soviet Union also bothered Reagan. He thought it would give up on the billion people “enslaved behind the Iron Curtain.”85 Opposing “peace without victory,” Reagan urged Americans to stand fast in the struggle against communism.

  The 1960s Reagan reprised his earlier critique of progressive taxation and high tax burdens. At the time, federal marginal tax rates ranged from a low of 20 percent to a high of 91 percent. Contending there “is no moral right” to rates above 50 percent,86 Reagan backed the Herlong-Baker tax bill, which would have reduced rates for all individuals and corporations, leading after a five-year period to federal marginal rates between 15 and 47 percent.87

  Many see his steadfast, if not strident, anti-communism and his critique of high federal tax rates as proof of Reagan’s belief in pure conservatism. It’s true that in these matters he was firmly allied with the conservative movement. But the remainder of his talk dealt with domestic policy issues, and here we see that Reagan maintained his firm commitment to the governing principles of the public New Deal even while he was criticizing its excesses and the way the principles of the 1948 Progressive Party were increasingly becoming Democratic Party dogma.

  Reagan approached domestic policy in the 1960s through the same lens he had previously: “need.” If someone needed federal help to live a dignified life outside poverty, then Reagan was for the program in question. If, however, government help or control was extended to people who did not need it, he was not only opposed to it, but he questioned the motives of those who supported such efforts. The fact they would use “humanitarian” arguments to propose mandatory programs for people who did not need it, Reagan contended, was proof that the programs themselves were intended to introduce regimented socialism rather than to address genuine social ills.

  He extended this analysis to a host of federal programs, existing or proposed.88 The Veterans Administration filled three-quarters of its hospital beds with non-service-related injuries. Farm policy forced farmers to plant or not to plant according to government dictate while farmers outside government programs were doing just fine. Proposed federal aid to K–12 education was unneeded, he said, because there was no proof local districts and states were unable to meet the need for more schools and higher teacher salaries. Public housing was fine in theory, but in practice people who weren’t poor were increasingly permitted to live in taxpayer-subsidized dwellings. In each case, Reagan accepted that some government action to help people in need was OK, but programs that did not meet legitimate needs went too far.

  Reagan made this case most forcefully in regards to federally subsidized health care. He acknowledged that the poor would need the government’s financial help to get the care they needed. Indeed, his statement in this regard was characteristically bold and comprehensive: “As one conservative let me say any person in the United States who requires medical attention and cannot provide for himself should have it provided for him.”89

  To that end, he enthusiastically backed a recently enacted bill called the Kerr-Mills Act. That bill provided federal funds to states to set up programs to pay for medical care for poor senior citizens. That, plus efforts by the American Medical Association and Blue Cross and Blue Shield to develop more comprehensive proposals to use public funds to help poor people pay for health insurance premiums, covered the genuine need. To continue to push for a compulsory government insurance program for all senior citizens whether they already had private insurance or not—the program we know as Medicare—without even waiting to see if Kerr-Mills and private efforts succeeded in making health care affordable for all, was proof for Reagan that health care policy was merely an excuse to socialize medicine and America.90

  Reagan remained firmly against government planning. Many of the specific lines he would utter in his famous October 27, 1964, televised address on behalf of Goldwater began to make their appearance in his regular talks. He told a convention of California Realtors in late 1963, for example, that a planned economy was a liberal goal, and quoted the Democratic senator William Fulbright as saying that our “president is a moral teacher.”91 Reagan excoriated the idea of a planned economy, saying you “cannot control things; you can only control people.”92 Echoing themes he would act on as president, he called for deregulation, tax simplification, ending bracket creep in the tax code because of inflation, and imposing a spending limit that would bar running perennial deficits.

  Looking at his views at this time, one can easily see why Reagan would always argue he had not changed. He remained sympathetic to the common American with a firm belief in that person’s innate dignity and ability to advance himself if able. He did not waver in his support for government assistance to provide for that person if he was not able to avoid poverty on his own, and to provide publicly financed ways to improve himself by pursuing further education. Reagan still believed that America was a special, unique place that was divinely inspired to give people around the world freedom, dignity, and hope. And he still believed that America needed to be internationally active to protect and extend freedom even if the enemy had changed from fascism to communism. Reagan’s politics were much different by 1964, but his core principles had remained intact.

  The Democratic Party of 1964 was different, however. While Reagan always underplayed the degree to which Truman Democrats favored larger federal programs than he later endorsed, orthodox Democrats of his youth favored regulation of private-sector excesses rather than government planning. As we saw in the last chapter, this was one of the primary differences between the Progressive Party, which did support planning, and mainstream Democrats. But by the early 1960s even mainstream Democrats endorsed and practiced some degree of social and economic planning.

  John F. Kennedy was by no means the most liberal Democratic politician, but his inauguration brought many of these new ideas to power. His economic advisers believed the economy could be managed, heated up and cooled down on command through the adroit application of fiscal policy.93 Industries could be cajoled, or “jawboned” as the saying went then, by direct presidential intervention into forgoing price increases that they otherwise felt were necessary to their businesses.94 In the heady optimism of the 1960s, it appeared to some on the left that America’s problems could be solved simply by an application of will and knowledge, leading the country toward what Kennedy’s adviser Arthur Schlesinger labeled “a not undemocratic socialism.”95

  The Democratic liberal mind-set was described well by the leading political journalist of the age, Theodore H. White. In
his landmark book The Making of the President, 1960, White described the Democratic view of American prosperity as “a torrent of self-indulgence,” a torrent that proper national leadership would dry up and direct to publicly directed ends.96 The debate between Democrats and Republicans of this era was simple, according to White:

  How were American energies to be used? That was the question. By private enterprise or by public plan? . . . What price good schools, good medicine, good roads, new bridges—at what sacrifice of good meats, louvered windows, new cars, new appliances?97

  Against this backdrop, Reagan’s frequent quote from the man who would become vice president in 1964, Minnesota Democratic senator Hubert Humphrey, that “we don’t want a planned society, we want society planning,” was merely a sad punch line to a joke many Americans didn’t want told.98

  Republicans and conservatives had tried to hold back this tide to no avail. Eisenhower had thought his brand of Modern Republicanism could gain popular support, but after he left office in 1961 Republicans held only 175 seats in the House and 36 in the Senate. Conservatives argued the Republican defeats were due to accommodation with the New Deal; they would seek to capture the 1964 GOP presidential nomination and mobilize people who had not voted in decades with “a choice, not an echo.”99 The struggle between these factions would consume the Grand Old Party throughout most of 1964, culminating in a fractious and vicious convention fight that saw the conservative favorite, Barry Goldwater, prevail and tell Americans in his convention speech that “moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue; extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”100

  Reagan would burst upon American politics toward the end of that tumultuous year. He would do so by endorsing the most controversial major-party nominee in almost a century, yet his endorsement would be couched in terms that even those frightened of Goldwater could find comforting. His televised address on Goldwater’s behalf was simply a revised version of the talk he had been giving since the mid-1950s. He would endorse Goldwater the candidate, but more important, he would present his own interpretation of the New Deal’s promises to Americans for their consideration.