The Fall of Carthage

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  The Roman attitude towards her recently defeated enemy at this time of crisis was at first scrupulously correct. Early in the war the Senate sent a Commission to Carthage following reports that Roman traders dealing with the rebels had been arrested or killed.13 In fact, the merchants had merely been imprisoned and when the Carthaginians readily agreed to their repatriation the Romans responded warmly. Italian traders were in future banned from supplying the mercenaries and actively encouraged to trade in Carthage itself. In addition, all Punic prisoners not yet ransomed according to the treaty of 241 were immediately returned without charge. Hiero's Syracuse also made every effort to sell Carthage the supplies it needed for its war effort, although Polybius believed that in part this was to ensure that the city continued to exist as a balance to Roman power.14 Around 240-239 the Punic mercenaries in Sardinia mutinied and murdered their officers, and persuaded the punitive expedition sent by Carthage against them to repeat the mutiny and join them. Together the mercenaries seized the island and tried to make an alliance with Rome, rather as the Mamertines had once done. The Senate refused to countenance such an alliance, a decision all the more striking if Polybius correctly judged that the acquisition of Sardinia had become a Roman ambition as soon as they constructed their first fleet. Nor, subsequentiy, did it accept approaches from Utica for similar protection when this Libyan city finally abandoned its loyalty to Carthage and joined the rebels.15 Instead it respected the protection offered to each sides' allies set down in the treaty of 241.

  Eventually, probably in 237, the mutinous soldiers in Sardinia were expelled from the island by the native population and fled to Italy where they once again approached the Senate. This time the Romans decided to send an expedition to occupy the island and, when the Carthaginians objected, threatened them with a war which they were in no position to fight. Cartilage had no choice but to surrender to Rome a second time, accepting their seizure of Sardinia, and paying a further indemnity of 1,200 talents. It was an act as shamelessly opportunistic as the initial intervention in Sicily in 265, an injustice which highlighted Carthage's weakness and was to create a far greater legacy of bitterness and resentment towards Rome than the initial defeat of 241. Our sources do not explain why the Romans chose to act in this way after their earlier refusal. However, it is important to remember that the Senate consisted of a collection of individuals, all competing to win glory in the service of the state and with differing views on how best to conduct its affairs. The groups based around the stronger families were loose and rarely espoused a consistent policy on anything, whilst the influence of individual senators fluctuated gready from year to year. It may simply have been that the consul of238, Tiberius Sem-pronius Gracchus, who was to lead the expedition, was eager to command in a war and had enough influence at the time to persuade the Senate to answer the mercenaries' appeal. Alternatively the anarchy in Sardinia may have been seen as a potential threat to Italy's maritime trade, but our sources lack any detailed discussion of the reasons for the Roman change of heart.16 However, most, and especially Polybius, agreed that the action was morally indefensible.17

  Sardinia did not prove an easy conquest and for much of the 230s fierce campaigning continued there, with both of the year's consuls active there in 232 and 2 31.18 Whether or not there was truth in the accusation, the Romans certainly seem to have believed that Carthaginian agents actively encouraged Sardinian resistance to Rome and the island remained a continued source of friction between the two states during these years.19

  The Barcids in Spain

  Sicily and Sardinia were lost, and, in the aftermath of the Mercenary Rebellion, Africa was too unstable for further expansion to be contemplated there, so Carthage turned her attention increasingly to her Spanish territories. In 238-237 Hamilcar Barca was sent at the head of an army to take charge of the province there, and the choice of such an experienced and aggressive commander for a region which does not appear to have faced a major threat can only mean that the objective was expansion. For the next nine years Hamilcar fought almost continuously, securing Punic control of the coastal strip of southern Spain and pushing up to the valley of the Guadalquivir, until he was killed in an ambush by a Celtiberian tribe known as the Oretani in 229, one tradition claiming that he deliberately sacrificed himself to save his young sons.20 He was succeeded in the command by his son-in-law and second-in-command, Hasdrubal, who continued the programme of expansion, achieving more through diplomacy than war, even marrying a Spanish princess to cement one alliance. The succession seems to have been first voted for by the army in Spain and subsequently approved by the authorities at Carthage. This was certainly the case when Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 and the army, or at least its officers, gave the command to Hamilcar's eldest son, the 26-year-old Hannibal, a decision later ratified by the Popular Assembly in Carthage.21

  The basic narrative of Punic expansion in Spain under the leadership of the Barcid family is straightforward and uncontroversial, even if our sources sometimes contradict each other on minor points, but many important questions remain unanswered. It is unclear how and why Hamilcar was given the Spanish command in the first place and to what extent his activities once there were supervised. One extreme view is to see this period as the triumph of the Popular Party in Carthage, Hamilcar the demagogue winning the support of the ordinary citizens wearied by the incompetence displayed by the old aristocracy during the war with Rome and the Mercenary Rebellion. This allowed him to secure an unlimited command in Spain with the freedom to wage war and enrich himself for his own purposes. There may be a few indications of political change at Carthage, since the Council of 104 seems far less prominent after this period, and the importance of the two annually elected suffetes may have increased.22 However, it must always be remembered that our evidence for the constitution and internal politics of Carthage is exceptionally poor. Most of our sources do portray the Barcid family as facing strong opposition from rivals who feared their growing power and from those who objected to their policies, but it is unclear how strong and consistent such opposition was.23 In one tradition Hamilcar used the booty from his Spanish campaigns both to secure the loyalty of his soldiers and to buy himself political support at home.24 It is equally possible to interpret the same evidence as showing Hamilcar as nothing more than a servant of the state, appointed with the general approval of the elite at Carthage.25 The truth may lie anywhere between the two extremes.

  The Second Punic War began in Spain, making the activity of the Barcid family there in the years after the First War especially important, but our sources' awareness of this only makes it more difficult to understand what sort of regime they created, and how significant it was that the command was held exclusively by members of the family. It is not entirely clear whether the Carthaginians ratified the army's choice of leader because they felt that they were powerless to change this or because they approved of the decision. There may have been a practical benefit from this, since it was far easier for Spanish tribes and leaders to focus their loyalty on an individual general and his family than on a distant Carthage, emotions which the Romans would also later exploit. The activities of the Barcids in Spain may simply be seen as an effective way for the Carthaginian state to expand its territory there, allowing them more easily to exploit the resources of mineral wealth and military manpower. For other historians these years saw the creation of what was in effect a semi-independent principality ruled by the family for their own ends, the Barcid perhaps assuming the trappings of Hellenistic monarchs. Again, our evidence is utterly inadequate to resolve this debate. The same series of coins produced by mints in Punic Spain in this period have been interpreted as showing Hamilcar and Hasdrubal depicted as Hellenistic kings with divine associations, or simply as being images of deities.26 Hasdrubal certainly founded a major city called New Carthage (modern Cartagena), but whether this should be seen as the seat of provincial government or the capital of a semi-independent kingdom depends on the view taken of Barcid ambitio
ns.

  Rome 241-218 BC

  The Romans certainly kept a wary eye on the Carthaginian activity in Spain, although as yet they had no direct involvement in the area. In 231 a delegation of senators went to Hamilcar to question him about the motives for his aggressive campaigns and was told that these were necessary if Carthage was to pay her indemnity to Rome. Later, sometime around 226, another set of envoys went to Hasdrubal, who formally agreed not to expand beyond the River Ebro. It is possible that Rome's interest in Spain was encouraged by her long-time ally, Massilia, but the concern over growing Carthaginian power may well have been genuine. As yet Rome had no direct connection with the Spanish Peninsula, although Latin traders were certainly active there by the second half of the third century.27

  Rome's world was gradually expanding beyond the Italian Peninsula, with her newly acquired overseas provinces and the powerful navy created during the war with Carthage. In 228 and 219, Roman consuls at the head of fleets of warships fought two wars in Illyria on the other side of the Adriatic, allegedly provoked by the piracy routinely practised by the Illyrian kingdom. Nevertheless it was with an Italian problem, the Gallic tribes of northern Italy, that the Senate was most concerned between the wars. Latin colonies established on land captured from the tribes, notably Ariminum which was founded in 268, were a continual source of friction with the Gauls. Yet as Rome's population increased and her web of alliances expanded the need to find land for the poorer Roman and Latin citizens steadily grew and the fertile plains of Cisalpine Gaul proved especially attractive. In 232 one of the tribunes of the plebs, Caius Flaminius, carried a law to distribute much of the captured ager Gallicus to poorer citizens. These were not to be concentrated in new colonies, but each plot of land allocated individually to create a large number of small farms. There was much opposition to this move, in part because other senators resented the prestige that Flaminius would gain and the money that he would doubtless make in the process, but also because it was seen as a provocative gesture.28

  In 238 the Boii had rallied other tribes and some warriors from beyond the Alps to attack Ariminum, but the war had fizzled out when bickering amongst the Gauls turned to open fighting and they were forced to make peace. By 225 resentment against the flood of setders sparked another, far larger war. This time the Boii united with the Insubres, and were joined by a large contingent of semi-professional warriors from Transalpine Gaul, known as the Gaesatae. When the Gallic army invaded Etruria, it is said to have mustered around 70,000 men. The Gauls were undefeated when they decided to withdraw in front of the consul Lucius Aemilius Papus' army and carry away their substantial booty. The two Roman armies were completely unaware of each other's presence and by a stroke of luck the other consul, Caius Atilius Regulus, who had been recalled from Sardinia, found himself directly blocking the Gauls' line of march. Trapped between the two Roman armies, the tribes were forced to fight at Telamon, forming up in two lines back to back in order to face the enemy armies coming on from opposite directions. Despite this disadvantage the battie was a desperate one. Regulus fell in the early stages and his severed head was carried in triumph to one of the Gallic kings, and it was only after a long struggle that the Romans prevailed, inflicting appalling casualties on the enemy.

  In 224 both consuls led armies north and forced the Boii to accept peace. The next year's consuls, the same Flaminius who as tribune had passed the bill to distribute the ager Gallicus, and Publius Furius also invaded the tribal lands. Flaminius won a great victory over the Insubres and another tribe, the Cenomani, although a hostile tradition gave the credit for this victory to the army's tribunes. According to Polybius it was these officers who ordered the hastati to be re-equipped with the spears of the triarii instead of their pila. The first line of the legions was then formed into a dense, defensive formation, standing fast until the fury and enthusiasm of the initial Gallic charge had exhausted itself. In 222 the Gauls sued for peace, but the new consuls, eager for glory or perhaps in the genuine belief that the enemy were undefeated, persuaded the Senate to reject these approaches and both took armies against them. One of the consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, relieved the siege of Clastidium, fighting an action in which he single-handedly killed a Gallic King, Britomarus, and stripped him of his armour, winning the highest honour available to a Roman aristocrat, the right to dedicate the spolia opima.29 His colleague Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio stormed Mediolanum (modern Milan), the tribal capital of the Insubres. After these continued defeats, the tribes all surrendered to Rome, yielding up more of their land. In 218 two new colonies were established, one on either side of the Po at Cremona and Placentia, 6,000 settlers going to each. The provocative presence of a new wave of setders further north than before, and occupying prime land, only added to the bitterness and resentment of the defeated tribes, ensuring that peace would prove short-lived.

  Spain and northern Italy would see much activity when war was finally renewed between Rome and Carthage. In addition, many of the individuals on both sides who were prominent in the campaigns in the 220s would later play a significant role in the Hannibalic war. For the generation of Roman commanders who grew up between the wars with Carthage, their military experiences in Sardinia, Illyria and, most of all, Cisalpine Gaul accustomed them to warfare against armies which were tactically unsophisticated, however individually brave and skilled the warriors composing them might have been. It was to prove poor preparation for confronting a general as skilled as Hannibal at the head of a well-trained army.

  PART TWO

  THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 218-201 BC

  CHAPTER 6

  Causes of the Second Punic War

  T

  HERE WERE CERTAINLY moments of tension after the First Punic War, but relations between Rome and Carthage were not entirely unfriendly. Trade was renewed, and Punic merchants were as familiar a sight in Rome as Italians seem to have been in Carthage. It may well have been during these years that the ties of guest friendship, so common a feature of international relations in the ancient world, linking Roman and Punic aristocratic families were created or perhaps ones from before 265 revived. The peace concluded in 241 lasted twenty-three years, assuming that we ignore the Roman threat to reopen hostilities over Sardinia in 238, and ended when Hannibal Barca, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, attacked the Iberian city of Saguntum, which was under Roman protection. Neither side showed much reluctance to go to war, in spite of the memory of the earlier hard-fought and costly struggle. Why they did so has been the subject of intense debate ever since, more often than not concerned with apportioning blame to one side or the other. Equally often historians have fallen into the trap of judging events by modern standards, forgetting that even the most politically advanced ancient states went to war frequently and with enthusiasm, especially when they expected to win and eagerly anticipated the benefits victory would bring. Before discussing these issues it is helpful to review the chain of events which led to the declaration of open war by Rome.1

  Probably in 226 Hasdrubal had accepted the demands of the Roman envoys and agreed that the Carthaginians would not cross the River Ebro. The idea of setting a physical boundary to a nation's power was a familiar concept to both cultures.2 In this case it was no great restriction, since at that time the heartland of the Punic province still lay a long way from the river. Attempts to suggest that the treaty in fact involved a boundary much further south have been unconvincing. Similarly, there is even less foundation for the common assumption that the Romans bound themselves not to intervene south of the Ebro. In fact, at this date the Roman State had no direct connection with Spain, save in the sense that her ally, Massilia, had dependent communities there at Emporion and Rhode.

  At some point after 226, Rome formed an association with the city of Saguntum (modern Sagunto, not far from Valencia). Polybius tells us that this was 'some years' before Hannibal's time, but it seems plausible that it would have been mentioned in the Ebro treaty had the link existed at that time, since the city st
ood a long way south of the river. The debate over whether or not there was a formal treaty granting Saguntum allied status, or whether the city simply requested Rome's protection, as Utica had tried to do during the Mercenary War, does not matter for our present purpose. At some point the Roman Senate was asked to arbitrate in an internal dispute at the city, quite possibly between rival factions favouring Rome and Carthage respectively, and the representatives sent ordered the execution of several Saguntine noblemen. The attractions of a Roman alliance to the Spanish town seem obvious. A city state of local importance, Saguntum can only have watched nervously as the Carthaginian province expanded towards them. Roman support offered the greatest possible security against their stronger neighbour. Why the Romans accepted the alliance is less clear and intimately bound up with the cause of the war, so will be discussed below.3

  In 221 the 26-year-old Hannibal succeeded his brother-in-law and continued the aggressive Carthaginian policy in Spain, ranging far more widely than his predecessors. He led his army against the tribes of central Spain, reaching as far north as modern-day Salamanca. Around 220-219 a dispute broke out between Saguntum and a neighbouring tribe accused of raiding its territory. Details are obscure and even the name of the people involved is uncertain, but the tribe was allied to Carthage and received Hannibal's support. Over the winter, a Roman embassy went to Hannibal at New Carthage and reminded him of the earlier Ebro treaty, as well as warning him not to attack Saguntum. The embassy received a frosty reception and proceeded to Carthage to repeat the demands. The young general also referred to Carthage for instructions and in the spring led his army against the city. Saguntum lay on a strong hilltop position, about a mile from the sea. (In the autumn of AD 1811, the Spanish defenders of a fortress improvised amongst its Iberian, Roman, and Moorish ruins would repulse several attacks launched by one of Napoleon's ablest subordinates, Suchet.) It took Hannibal eight months to capture the town, but from the beginning it was clear that his intention was to take it by storm, rather than starve it into submission. His tactics were far more openly aggressive than those adopted by the Carthaginians in any of the sieges of the First War, and as a result his casualties were higher. Livy even claims that Hannibal himself was wounded whilst directing an attack from very close to the fighting.4