The Fall of Carthage

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  Political careers were increasingly expensive as men were forced to spend extravagantly to keep pace with their rivals. Electoral success was costly and put many men in debt, making it all the more pressing for them to profit from the senior magistracies. Manlius Vulso was accused and nearly condemned for provoking a war with the Galatians which had not been approved by the Senate and was not in Rome's interests. Only the number of his friends and political allies at Rome narrowly prevented his condemnation. A rich man could use his wealth to win many such allies, making loans to aid those struggling to keep pace with the costs of political life, but this required ability which not everyone possessed. Most of the commanders who won spectacular victories came under fierce attack from rivals in the Senate. Manlius Vulso and Aemilius Paullus both had to struggle to win the right to celebrate their triumphs. Flamininus' brother Lucius was expelled from the Senate by the censors in 184, charged with improper behaviour, including executing a captive at a feast to please a male prostitute. The most successful attacks of all were directed against Publius and Lucius Scipio.15

  Africanus was only in his mid thirties in 201, still too young to have held the consulship according to tradition and the soon-to-be-enacted legislation. It is difficult to see how his career after the war could ever have equalled his achievements in Spain and Africa. Elected consul for the second time in 194, he campaigned competently against the Ligurians and Cisalpine Gauls, but achieved nothing spectacular. A public announcement that he would serve as his brother's legatus secured Lucius the Asian command, particularly as it was known that Hannibal had fled to Antiochus' court. In fact the old adversaries did not encounter each other again in battle, nor was Africanus present at Magnesia, as a result of illness - perhaps a diplomatic one allowing his brother to gain full credit for the victory. By the standards of most senators, even the generation who reached maturity between 218 and 201, Scipio had spent little of his adult life in Rome. His first consulship had been dogged with controversy, with the rumours of his willingness to use questionable means to secure the African command and the Pleminius scandal. Although a brilliant soldier and an inspirational commander, Africanus was a poor politician who had difficulty achieving his objectives in the Senate quietly and without confrontation. In the next century Pompey the Great, another successful soldier who was inexperienced in the day-to-day politics of Rome, failed to make best use of his riches and prestige when he at last returned to Rome. Scipio Africanus was the most distinguished ex-consul of his day, named first on the senatorial role as princeps senatus for at least a decade, his own wealth and achievements adding to those of his family, but he was also politically vulnerable. In the Roman system there were always ambitious men waiting to attack any prominent senator who appeared vulnerable.16

  Within a few years of their return from Asia, both brothers were prosecuted in the courts, and although surviving accounts of the trials are contradictory, the main charges involved the misappropriation of funds during the Syrian War. Both men refused to answer the accusations and relied upon their past achievements and reputation to prove that they were true servants of the State. Africanus publicly tore up his brother's account books for the war to demonstrate his contempt for the charges. When his own trial was reconvened on the anniversary of Zama, he declared that he intended to go up to the temples of the Capitoline triad and give thanks for his victory. The mass of the court, apart from the prosecutors and their slaves, and all of the many onlookers thronging the Forum promptly followed him, abandoning proceedings for the day. Despite this display of the charisma which had once inspired his soldiers, and his continued popularity with the People, the prosecution was renewed and few senators actively supported the brothers. Africanus, depressed by the ingratitude of the State he had served so well, went into voluntary exile in his villa at Liternum, where he died soon afterwards in 187, or 184 according to a less probable tradition. Lucius pleaded ill-health and withdrew from politics.17

  Cato, the same man who as quaestor in 205 had attacked Scipio's behaviour in Sicily, was associated with the attacks on the brothers and many of the other prominent figures over the next decades. He was a novus homo, one of the many equestrians whose proven courage prompted their enrolment into the Senate during the war. He was not the only new man to reach the consulship in these years, but this and his censorship helped to forge the great influence which he came to wield. Throughout his career, Cato presented himself as the defender of traditional Roman morals and virtues against the corrupting influence of foreign, and especially Greek culture. As consul in 195, he spoke unsuccessfully against the repeal of a law passed in 215 during the height of the war which had restricted the amount Roman women were allowed to spend on clothes and jewellery. As censor in 184 he rigorously purged the ranks of the Senate and Equestrian Order of men he considered to be unfit, notably Lucius Flamininus. During his long life he took part in forty-four prosecutions, far more than most senior senators who were much more likely to defend their friends in court than prosecute their enemies. Always he criticized the public philhellenism of men like Titus Flamininus, and the growing popularity amongst the Roman elite of Greek education, philosophy and religion.

  Cato is one of the most unappealing figures from Roman history. In his manual on farm management, de Agriculture, he recommended selling slaves who had become too old to work, although he did not explain where he would find a purchaser. It is easy from the modern perspective to condemn him as a mere reactionary, his hostility to Greek learning just another reason to dislike such an apparently puritanical figure. This is to misunderstand the nature of Roman politics in this period. A 'new man' needed to compete with the established families, whose names were familiar to the electorate from the achievements of past generations. To be successful, he needed to make his own name as famous and instantly recognizable as theirs, and the best way was to emphasize a single attribute at every opportunity. Cato chose to portray himself as a simple Roman from a patriotic, but relatively poor family, who despite his political success continued to live a frugal lifestyle in contrast with the decadence of those around him. In his Origines, the first prose history of Rome written in Latin, he did not mention Roman generals by name, refusing to celebrate past victories solely through the role of aristocratic commanders rather than the whole State. To add to the snub, he did give the name of the bravest elephant in Hannibal's army, one Surus (the Syrian). Yet Cato was not so implacably opposed to foreign influences as his public statements may suggest. De Agriculture, was influenced by the extensive Punic literature on this subject. Although affecting to despise Greek culture and literature, he seems to have had a fair knowledge of it, making a joking reference to Homer in a conversation with Polybius. Cato's contributions to Latin literature reflected a desire to rival its achievements, rather than an utter rejection of Greek learning.18

  In the last century Rome's growing involvement abroad had brought her far more directly into contact with Hellenistic culture. Some senators embraced the ideas and lifestyle, each striving to show himself more philhellenic than his peers. Others, like Cato, competed in the opposite way by public rejection of Greek influences. Traditionally the Romans had been willing to introduce foreign religions into their city, absorbing them into the State religion. In 205 the discovery and interpretation of a Sybilline oracle led to the Senate deciding to introduce the cult of the Idaean

  Mother. After negotiations with the kingdom of Pergamum, the black stone representing the goddess was brought by sea to Ostia. There it was greeted by a crowd of distinguished matrons, headed by Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, Africanus' first cousin, who had been chosen as the best man in Rome. The women carried the stone by hand, passing it one to the other until it was formally installed in the Temple of Victory on the Palatine. In 186 another eastern cult, the rites of the wine god Bacchus, was brutally suppressed throughout Italy by order of the Senate. In this case an imported religion was perceived as a threat to the State, because its practices were considere
d immoral and perhaps also because it was not regulated by senatorial priests.19

  Rome was now more firmly part of the wider Mediterranean world, governing as provinces the major islands and Spain, whilst in the east it acted as arbiter in disputes between its allies. In time, the deep love of Hellenistic culture would take root in the Roman aristocracy, without changing its essential nature. Great quantities of booty and slaves flooded into Italy as a result of the successful wars. The wealthy invested in huge rural estates or 'latifundia' worked by servile labour. Later concern developed that this trend towards large estates had supplanted the small peasant farmers who had always provided the backbone of the legions, but in the early decades of the century Rome was in a confident mood. The great test of the Hannibalic invasion had been overcome and now they were reaping the rewards of their might. When abroad the behaviour of Roman magistrates and ambassadors became increasingly arrogant.20

  Carthaginian Revival, 201-150 BC

  Carthage went through a brief period of political turmoil in the years after 201. As usual, the lack of sources from an insider's perspective makes it very difficult to know precisely what was going on, but there does seem to have been widespread Popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the old oligarchy. Hannibal seems to have continued in command of whatever remained of the Punic army for several years, one late source claiming that he set his soldiers to farming. In 196 he was elected suffete and began a series of confrontations with another magistrate, called a 'quaestor' by Livy, and the Council of 104, accusing many of stealing from the State. He declared that the debt to Rome could easily be paid if corruption amongst the State's officials was eliminated. Hannibal strengthened the power of the Popular Assembly at the expense of the oligarchy, but was bitterly opposed by his political enemies. Some of these went to Rome and accused him of intriguing with Antiochus III against Rome. Despite opposition from Scipio Africanus, the Senate decided to intervene and in 195 sent a Commission of three to charge Hannibal publicly in Carthage. His year of office as suffete had now expired and, aware of the strength of his enemies, Hannibal fled from the city and went into exile in the east, going first to Tyre, the old Mother city, and eventually to the court of Antiochus. His house was demolished and his remaining possessions confiscated.21

  Perhaps Hannibal's overhaul of the public finances had the desired result for Carthage rapidly began to recover from the strain of the war with Rome. After ten years, the State was able to offer Rome the remainder of the fifty-year war debt, although the Romans declined, preferring to maintain this annual reminder of Carthage's defeat. Although some land had been lost to Masinissa's Numidia, the Carthaginians still controlled the bulk of their highly fertile territory and it was not long before agricultural production was booming. As mentioned earlier, much of the grain which fed the Roman armies in the east came from Carthage. Trade seems to have revived and Punic merchants were once more a familiar figure in the markets of the Mediterranean, including Rome. It is uncertain whether or not Rome's Carthaginian community had left during the wars, but we do hear of the arrest of suspected spies by the Romans in both the First and Second War, although these appear to have been slaves. The archaeological record suggests a high level of prosperity reflected in the widespread construction of substantial new houses within Carthage and a rich material culture. The great circular harbour of the Punic navy visible today was either constructed or heavily restored during the years between the Second and Third Punic Wars and its scale is another reflection of the city's wealth. Economically the Carthaginians do not seem to have suffered in the long run as a result of their defeats.22

  Hannibal did not live to hear of this new prosperity, not even from afar. He had commanded a fleet for Antiochus during the war with Rome and is depicted by Roman sources as constantly urging the king to invade Italy. This he maintained was the only way to beat the Romans. When Antiochus made peace with Rome, one of the terms was that he should hand over Hannibal and certain other named individuals. Before this could occur, Hannibal had once again escaped and this time ended up in the court of Prusias of Bithynia in 183. Under pressure from a Roman delegation, who saw the king's offer of sanctuary as suspicious, Prusias had the country house where the old general was staying surrounded by his soldiers. Unable to escape, Hannibal took poison and ended his own life.23

  Both Hannibal and Scipio had ended their lives in disappointment. One tradition claimed that the two men had met once more at Ephesus, when Scipio was part of a Roman embassy to Antiochus III. The Roman is supposed to have asked Hannibal whom he thought were the greatest generals in history. In reply he listed Alexander the Great, Pyrrhus and himself in that order. When Scipio asked what he would have said if he had won at Zama, the Carthaginian said that in that case he would have placed himself first, carefully flattering them both. The story may well be apocryphal, but the debate over the relative merits of these two commanders and comparison with the other 'Great Captains' of history continues to this day. Whilst this may provide an entertaining diversion, it is ultimately a sterile pursuit. Better simply to say that both men were exceptionally gifted commanders by the standards of their time and cultures, that they served their States to the best of their ability, and won remarkable victories against the odds, even if one was eventually defeated.24

  PART THREE

  THE THIRD PUNIC WAR 149-146 BC

  CHAPTER 14

  'Delenda Carthago’

  THE FINAL CONFRONTATION between Rome and Carthage lasted only four years and ended in the latter's total destruction. The war was fought entirely in Africa, as the Roman invaders struggled to capture the enemy capital, and its outcome was never really in doubt, unless the Romans decided to abandon the expedition. Responsibility for the earlier conflicts is not always easy to assign, but there is no doubt that the Third Punic War was deliberately provoked by the Romans, who had made a conscious decision to destroy their old enemy. Roman negotiators shamelessly exploited the Carthaginians' willingness to grant concessions in their desire to avoid war with Rome, steadily increasing their demands to force a conflict on a weakened enemy. It was a far worse display than any of the recorded examples of the proverbial 'Punic treachery'. By the standards of modern strategy the war was unnecessary, since Carthage does not seem to have posed a real threat to Rome. To understand why the Romans embarked upon such a deliberately ruthless policy, we must look again at the Roman attitude to war and the peculiar conditions of the middle of the second century BC1

  The Carthaginians had proved consistently loyal allies of Rome since 201. They had supplied Roman armies with grain and in 191 sent half of their tiny navy to join the fleet operating against Antiochus III. Aided by Hannibal's reform of the State's finances, the annual indemnity had been paid regularly until its completion in 151. In the series of boundary disputes with Masinissa's Numidia, Carthage had submitted to Roman arbitration, even though this had always openly or tacitly favoured the king. Whether or not there had been any truth in the accusation, it was Carthaginian noblemen who reported Hannibal's supposed dealings with Antiochus and prompted his flight in 195. They also arrested and tried his agent, Ariston of Tyre, sent in 193 to encourage the city to support the

  Seleucids against Rome, although Ariston was able to escape before the trial was concluded. A deputation was sent to Rome to report this incident and assure the Senate of Carthage's continuing loyalty. We are told that three main factions dominated Carthaginian politics in this half century, a group favouring Rome headed by Hanno the Great, another favouring Masinissa led by Hannibal the Starling, and the. last relying on the poorer citizens for support led by Hamilcar the Samnite and Carthalo. Hamilcar's nickname was perhaps derived from a father or grandfather who had served with Hannibal in Italy, and we also hear of one Mago the Bruttian in this period, whose name suggests a similar connection, but it is not entirely clear that the democratic party should be as closely associated with the Barcids as some scholars have claimed. None of these groups appears to have been o
penly hostile to Rome. It is unclear whether or not the renewed prosperity of the city resulted in some rearmament, since although our literary sources claim that this was not so, the excavations in the naval harbour suggest otherwise. What is certain is that in the middle of the century the Carthaginians were in no position to launch a serious offensive against Rome, even if they had wanted to. Even so, it is clear that the Romans were increasingly afraid of their ally at this very period.2

  The completion of the fifty-year war debt in 151 removed the annual reminder of Carthage's defeat and the city's current subordinate status. Treaties stipulating a fixed period of peace between two states were a common feature of Greek settlements ending a conflict, but very rare with the Romans, who expected a more permanent outcome to their wars. In 265 Carthage had turned herself from a long-standing and distant ally into an enemy, a permanent change in the Romans' perception of her. Rome was never content with alliances which implied any level of equality with a former foe. War was swiftly renewed with Macedonia in 200, and again when Perseus appeared to be growing both strong and independent. A loyal ally was expected to submit to Roman interference, especially in external affairs, whenever this was in Rome's interest. Between 241 and 218 the Romans had seized Sardinia and intervened in Spain, forcing concessions from Punic leaders without placing any restrictions on themselves, and this attitude continued after 201. After 151 Carthage ceased to pay an annual debt to Rome. The city was prosperous and its power in North Africa still considerable even if some territory had been lost to Numidia. The traditions of Punic warfare did not expect a defeated state, especially one which had not been conquered and absorbed, to remain forever subject to the victor. Only the Romans thought in this way. No longer were the Carthaginians unambiguously dependent allies of Rome. That a former enemy, and one who had pushed Rome to the brink of utter defeat, was once again strong and independent immediately turned her back into a threat. This was the root of the Romans' rising fear of Carthage.