The mood was personified by Cato. By the middle of the century the 'new man' who had fought at Tarentum, Metaurus and in Africa was amongst the most influential and respected members of the Senate, one of the few of his generation still actively participating in State affairs. Probably in 153, he took part in one of the embassies sent to arbitrate in a dispute between Carthage and Masinissa. By this time he was in his late seventies, but still a vigorous and forceful orator. The Roman delegation was deeply impressed by the growing wealth and population of their old enemy. On his return to Rome Cato started to end every speech he delivered in the Senate with the same phrase, 'Carthage must be destroyed'. On one occasion he is said to have dropped some figs from the fold of his toga. These, he informed an audience impressed by their size, had been grown in a country a mere three days away by sea. Cato exaggerated the speed with which a Punic fleet might descend on Rome, although one could reach southern Italy in just a few days, and some scholars have rather pointlessly speculated as to whether he had simply bought the figs in Rome or even grown them on his own estate. This was a symbolic gesture and a powerful one which our sources considered worth repeating and is still remembered to this day. Another prominent senator, Scipio Nasica, matched Cato by ending his own speeches with the view that Carthage should be preserved. It is claimed that he believed the presence of a strong rival would preserve the Romans' virtue intact, an argument which became a continual lament in the next century when Rome was plunged into a series of civil wars. At the time few Romans seem to have agreed with him. Plutarch claimed that it was primarily Cato's influence which convinced Rome to destroy Carthage, and in some modern accounts the persistent malevolence of the old man is equally prominent. As in many other aspects of his career, Cato seems to have expressed the mood of the majority of the population.3
There was a growing sense of insecurity in Rome during the 150s BC. The wars in the early decades of the century had been won with great ease by Roman armies composed of highly experienced officers and men. Gradually the generation of the Hannibalic war grew too old for military service and their knowledge and skill was lost. The impermanence of Rome's militia legions ensured that as each army was demobilized, the process of training new troops had to begin afresh. Experienced soldiers were replaced by younger men who were less aware that Rome's military success was based upon thorough training, careful logistical preparation and skilled leadership and believed instead that success was their due simply because they were Roman. The second quarter of the century saw fewer troops under arms and relatively little campaigning. In 155 Lusitanian tribesmen mounted a series of heavy raids on the Roman province of Further Spain, attacks which grew larger in scale with each success. In 154 a Roman praetor was killed and his army heavily defeated. In 153 the Celtiberians inflicted several defeats on a consular army led by Quintus Fulvius Nobilior. Reports of hard and dangerous fighting in Spain produced a minor crisis in Rome when very few men came forward to serve in an army being raised to send against the Celtiberians under the command of Lucius Licinius Lucullus in 151. Only the example set by Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, grandson by adoption of Africanus, who publicly volunteered to serve as a tribune, persuaded enough men to come forth. In fact the war had already been concluded before Lucullus arrived but, eager for glory and riches, the praetor set his army on a friendly tribe, who surrendered only to be treacherously massacred. A similar atrocity occurred in the next year, when the praetor of Further Spain, Publius Sulpicius Galba, already defeated once by the Lusitanians, offered to make peace with the tribesmen. Promising to settle them on good farmland, Galba divided the Lusitanians up into three groups, disarmed them and then ordered his legionaries to slaughter the defenceless warriors. One of the few to escape from this massacre was a man named Viriathus, who was to prove himself a charismatic leader and bitter opponent of Rome. For over a decade the Romans were faced with fierce fighting against both the Lusitanians and Celtiberians. Eventually one of his subordinates was bribed to murder Viriathus in 140, but it took seven more years and massive resources before the main Celtiberian stronghold at Numantia was captured. Galba was prosecuted on his return to Rome for his breach of fides, Rome's cherished faithfulness, Cato joining the attack upon him. Galba was unexpectedly acquitted after bringing his weeping children into court and having them beg for their father. He was later to become one of the most famous orators in Rome.4
The defeats suffered in Spain highlighted the inexperience of most Roman armies. The annual replacement of provincial governors and the rarity of pro-magistracies encouraged commanders to seek glory before they were replaced, and denied them the time necessary to turn their soldiers into an effective army. This had mattered far less in the early part of the century when the quality of Rome's manpower had been higher. Even then the pressure to achieve success in a single year of office had encouraged Flamininus to begin peace negotiations with Philip V in 198, only to break off the talks and press for a military victory once his command was extended for another year. Successive defeats lowered the morale and made further reverses even more likely. The failure to protect allies amongst the Spanish communities encouraged these to defect and created more enemies to fight. At one point large parts of Further Spain had submitted to Viriathus. Losses in Spain were far enough away not to pose a direct threat to Italy, but they were a major blow to Roman prestige. The difficulties in raising officers and men for Spain in 151 were especially shocking, since even the crisis of the Hannibalic invasion had not caused such reluctance to serve amongst Roman citizens.5
Appian says that the Roman Senate secretly decided to seek a pretext for war with Carthage soon after Cato's return from Africa. This may or may not be correct, but their actions make it clear that this was certainly their attitude by 150-149 and it is probable that the payment of the last instalment of Carthage's indemnity in 151 contributed to the decision. All the Romans now needed was an excuse for war. Their Numidian allies were soon to provide it.
Masinissa's Kingdom, 201-150 BC
Cato provided one link between the Second and Third Punic Wars in the same way that Hiero's, Fabius Maximus' and Marcellus' careers had spanned the First and Second Wars. Masinissa was another connection with the past. In 150 he was 88 years old, but still fit enough to ride without a saddle after the manner of his people and to lead his men into battle. When he died two years later, the king left behind a 4-year-old son, one of ten legitimate and illegitimate boys he had sired during his long life. Brought up for much of his early life in Carthage, the Numidian had an extensive knowledge of Punic culture and did much to introduce many aspects of this, from literacy to religion, into the kingdom which he had struggled to create from the independent tribes of his people. Towns were encouraged, although it is unclear to what extent these were populated by an imported population rather than Numidians persuaded to abandon their nomadic way of life. Masinissa gave each of his sons a landed estate to be farmed with the most modern Punic methods, realizing that the promotion of agriculture would both strengthen the kingdom and give power to those who controlled the new sources of production. Despite his admiration for Punic culture and his distinguished service with their armies in Spain, Masinissa displayed a bitter hostility to his former ally throughout his reign.6 The Treaty of 201 had included the somewhat vague provision that
Carthage should restore to Masinissa all territory which had belonged to him or his ancestors. Appian claims that the limit of Punic land was marked by the 'Phoenician trenches', although the precise location of these has proved impossible to establish with much precision. The vagueness of the Treaty encouraged Masinissa to seize more and more slices of Carthaginian territory, claiming that it had once belonged to his people. Eventually his claims extended to allowing the Punic settlers only the area of the Byrsa, the original hill settlement of Carthage which according to myth Elishat had received from the local ruler. Roman delegations sent to resolve the disputes between their two allies repeatedly found in favour of the kin
g, who was able to gain more areas of fertile land and eventually the important coastal ports in the area known as Emporia.7
Eventually, the politicians eager to appease and accommodate Masinissa were expelled from the city around 152-151 and the Popular party gained a temporary dominance. The exiled leaders fled to the king, who sent his sons Gulussa and Micipsa to demand their restitution. Gulussa had in the past acted as the king's representative in Rome, but on this occasion the brothers were not even admitted into Carthage. As they returned, Gulussa's party was mobbed by Hamilcar the Samnite and a group of supporters, who killed several of his attendants. In 150 the Numidians once again began to attack Punic territory, ravaging the land and besieging a city called Oroscopa, the location of which is unknown. For the first time since 201, Carthage decided to fight a war without seeking Roman arbitration or approval, and formed an army of 25,000 foot and 400 horse under the command of Hasdrubal. The cavalry are described as being raised in the City so were presumably citizens. They were few in number, but received a strong reinforcement when a dispute between Masinissa's sons and two Numidian chieftains, Asasis and Suba, led to their desertion with 6,000 light horse. Hasdrubal gained the advantage in some minor skirmishing and followed the Numidian army as it deliberately withdrew, luring the enemy into more rugged terrain, where food and water were in short supply.
Finally Masinissa decided to offer battle and a day-long fight resulted in which neither side gained a decisive advantage. The battle was watched from a distance by Scipio Aemilianus, who was in Africa using his family's link with Masinissa to persuade the old king to furnish elephants for Lucullus' army in Spain. Hasdrubal withdrew to his hilltop camp and negotiations began with Scipio acting an intermediary. The talks broke down when the Carthaginians refused to return Asasis and Suba for punishment. Masinissa's army built a wall and ditch surrounding the enemy occupied high ground, a skill which they had probably learned through service with the Roman army. Cut off from supplies and unwilling to admit defeat and attempt a breakout, Hasdrubal’s army soon consumed the supplies of food carried in its train. Immobile, the Carthaginians slaughtered and ate their pack and draught animals, then the more valuable cavalry mounts. Firewood to cook the meat which was now forming so much of their diet was soon exhausted, so the soldiers chopped up their shields and burned those. Hasdrubal seems to have expected the Numidians to run out of supplies and disperse, but the army Masinissa had created during his reign was clearly a far more organized and efficient force than anything fielded by the tribes in the past. Eventually Hasdrubal surrendered, promising that Carthage would pay a fifty-year war debt and receive back the exiled aristocrats who had fled to Masinissa. As the Carthaginian army marched out in surrender, they were attacked by a group of Numidian horsemen led by Gulussa and many cut down. Whether the attack was premeditated or not, and if so whether Masinissa was involved, is impossible to say, for it has proved similarly difficult to allocate responsibility in similar, more recent massacres. Hasdrubal and many of his officers escaped.8
The Roman Response
The ability of Carthage to create an army and fight a war, albeit unsuccessfully, confirmed Roman fears and suspicions. The Treaty of 201 had expressly forbidden the declaration of war in Africa without Roman approval. This was probably enough to justify strong protests, but the Roman Senate, now more experienced in diplomacy after fifty years of close involvement with the Hellenistic world, looked for a stronger pretext for open war. In the meantime, preparations for a major expedition to invade Africa were begun, without declaration of its purpose. Characteristically, the Carthaginians attempted to blame their commander in the field and deny their own responsibility for the recent war. Hasdrubal, Carthalo (the leader of the Popular Party) and several other officers were condemned to death. Hasdrubal's troops must still have been loyal to their commander, for he appears soon afterwards at the head of 30,000 men. Ambassadors were dispatched to Rome to complain of Masinissa's provocation, and to condemn the Punic officers who had rashly gone to war. The Roman response was to point out that if the Carthaginian authorities had truly opposed war then they would have condemned their commanders before they had fought. The delegation was told cryptically that they must 'satisfy the Roman People'. A second embassy failed to discover precisely what the Romans meant by this.9
At this point Utica defected to the Romans, its harbours providing them with an ideal base for an attack on Carthage. In 149 the Senate and Comitia Centuriata both approved the declaration of war. Both consuls were to go to Africa, Manius Manilius in command of the army and Lucius Marcius Censorinus in command of the fleet. As in 218 and 205-204, the Romans concentrated at Lilybaeum in Sicily before embarking for Africa. In the meantime, Carthage sent another embassy to Rome, where the Senate demanded that 300 hostages selected from the children of the main noble families should be handed over at Lilybaeum within thirty days. This was done, despite the fact that the Senate had only promised the Carthaginians their territory and freedom to be governed by their own laws. The wording carefully avoided mention of the city of Carthage itself, a move similar to Scipio's technical justification of breaking the truce in 203. The hostages were conveyed to Rome in a great 'sixteen', a ship probably confiscated from the Macedonian fleet at the end of the Third Macedonian War. io
In spite of the Carthaginians' acceptance of their demands, the consuls still sailed across to land at Utica. Still uncertain of the Romans' intentions, another delegation was formed at Carthage and sent to the consuls, who received them in great state, seated on a tribunal flanked by their senior officers and with the army paraded behind them. It was a daunting display of Rome's might, intended to persuade the ambassadors that any resistance to the consuls' demands was hopeless. Censorinus, elected first by the Comitia, probably older and a better orator, spoke in answer to their appeal, demanding that the city hand over all of its stocks of arms and armour. Once again, despite their nervousness at the Roman proposal, the Carthaginians submitted. They are said to have delivered 200,000 panoplies of armour, 2,000 torsion engines, and huge numbers of javelins, arrows and catapult ammunition. As usual the reliability of these numbers is questionable and it is obvious that Roman sources would be inclined to exaggerate the military preparedness of the city they were about to destroy, but it is clear that very large stocks of weaponry were surrendered to the Roman representatives.
The arrival in the Roman camp of the convoy containing this equipment was the preliminary to another, even harsher command. Censorinus informed the ambassadors that the Carthaginians must abandon their city, the entire population moving to a new settlement which they could place anywhere they chose, providing that it was at least 10 miles from the sea. Carthage itself would then be razed to the ground, although the shrines and cemeteries associated with it would not be touched and the
Carthaginians would be allowed to visit them in future. It was an appalling blow, for the city was the physical, spiritual and emotional centre of the State. Severing the link of any new community with the sea, which had for so long been the source of Punic wealth, made it doubly so. Censorinus is supposed to have employed Platonic arguments to support the view that the sea had an unhealthy influence of the political and social life of a city. At the end of this, the ambassadors were roughly ejected by the consuls' lictors, but promised to present these terms to their own government. They even suggested that the Roman fleet demonstrate in the bay outside the city to remind the citizens of the alternative to acceptance of the Roman demands.11
Rumours had spread rapidly in Carthage and a nervous crowd surrounded the ambassadors when they entered the city and waited outside as they reported to the Council of 104. The Roman demand was immediately rejected. Men who had argued for the conciliation of Rome were lynched, as were any Italian traders unfortunate enough to be in the city. The 104 voted for war with Rome and began preparations to find the means with which to fight. Slaves were freed and conscripted into the army, whilst Has-drubal was pardoned and messages sen
t pleading with him to aid his ungrateful fellow citizens. Another Hasdrubal, son of one of Masinissa's daughters, indicating again the close links between Carthaginian and Numidian nobility, was given command inside Carthage itself. For once, the whole Punic citizen body threw itself wholeheartedly into the war effort. Weapons were hastily produced, women sacrificing their long hair to twine into the ropes needed for torsion catapults.12
The Third Punic War had begun. In many ways the Romans were surprised that the Carthaginians finally decided to fight, after meekly submitting to each outrageous demand made of them. The Romans' behaviour had been cynical in the extreme, concealing their intention to destroy the city until after they had extracted as many concessions as possible. Carthage now appeared to be at their mercy, unprepared and unarmed. Yet the war was to last until 146 and prove far harder than the consuls expected.
CHAPTER 15
The Third Punic War
CARTHAGE WAS A LARGE and well-fortified city, surrounded by over 20 miles of circuit walls. Difficult to approach and with its own harbours, the city was very hard to surround and blockade. An especially strong triple line of defence, based principally on a wall 30 feet (c. 9 m) wide and c. 50-66 feet (15-20 m) high, but fronted by a 60 feet (20 m) wide ditch and a timber palisade, ran across the 2-3 mile wide isthmus approaching the city from the landward side. This was constructed as a casemate wall with two storeys of rooms containing on the ground floor accommodation for 300 elephants and above stabling for 4,000 horses and barracks for 20,000 foot and 4,000 cavalry. In 149 the defenders lacked the animals and a well-organized army, but numerous volunteers from the population ensured that the defences were adequately manned.
The Fall of Carthage Page 44
