The Romans had assembled a large expeditionary force to attack this formidable position. Appian claims that there were 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry supported by fifty quinqueremes and 100 lighter galleys. If these figures are correct, then this was the largest Roman army to take the field since Cannae, but most scholars have assumed that Appian was exaggerating, or perhaps counting servants and camp followers as well as soldiers. A common suggestion is that there were in fact four legions, so that the army may have mustered between 40,000 and 50,000 men including allies. This would still make it a significantly larger force than even the highest estimates for Africanus' army in 204. In marked contrast to the reluctance of citizens to serve in Spain in 151, there had been a burst of enthusiasm for this war, with no shortage of recruits and many volunteers coming forward to swell the ranks of the legions. The prospect of a swift, relatively easy campaign and plentiful booty doubtiess encouraged many men to come forward, but there was probably also a far greater romantic appeal to fighting Rome's greatest adversary than risking life and limb fighting against some uncouthly named Celtiberian tribe. The army in 149 was large, enthusiastic and confident, but it was not well-trained. Scipio had spent over a year in Sicily preparing his forces for the forthcoming campaign, even though most of his troops were old soldiers with many years' experience. The consuls in 149 spent only a few months in creating from scratch an army whose officers and men were on average far less experienced. It was typical of the poor preparation of Roman campaigns in this period. As the army waited at Utica for the fighting to begin it began to run short of supplies, for the consuls had expected to obtain most of their requirements locally, but found their foraging restricted by the presence of Hasdrubal's 30,000 strong army. Unlike Scipio, they do not appear to have stockpiled large reserves of grain in Sicily and arranged a system of convoys to convey this to Africa. The legions which pitched their camp on the same site as Castra Cornelia in 149 made a poor comparison with its first occupants.2
The consuls moved quickly on Carthage as soon as it was clear that the Roman ultimatum had been rejected. Even at this late stage, they seem to have expected the city to capitulate and that little more than a display of strength was needed. Manilius led the army against the wall protecting the isthmus. Censorinus brought the fleet to attack a weaker stretch of wall near a narrow spit of land edging the Lake of Tunis to the south of the city. Some men landed and set ladders by hand against the wall, whilst other ladders were mounted directly on the prows of the Roman warships. Both attacks were greeted by a hail of missiles from the defenders. Surprised by this stiff resistance, the assaulting parties gave way. A second attempt was equally unsuccessful and as the confidence of the defenders grew, the Romans constructed camps outside the walls. Hasdrubal brought his army to the other side of the lake and harassed the Roman lines. A party sent by Censorinus to gather wood was ambushed by Himilco Phameas and some Punic cavalry: 500 men were killed. A third attempt to assault the city from both sides also failed. Manilius had managed to cross the outer ditch and breach the stockade, but failed to make any impression on the main wall across the isthmus.3
Since the attempts at escalade had achieved no success, Censorinus constructed two battering rams, filling in a portion of the lake to create a broad and solid enough road to bring these up to the wall. Each was supposedly crewed by 6,000 men, probably both to move them and to swing the rams. One crew was provided by legionaries commanded by tribunes and the other by sailors under their own officers, and rivalry between the two services spurred on both parties to be first to create a breach.
Two breaches were made, but the Carthaginians managed to drive the Romans back late in the day and did their best to repair the damage during the night. Under cover of darkness, a raiding party went out and managed to set fire to both of the Roman engines. Although they were not destroyed the damage was sufficient to make both rams inoperable. Daylight revealed that in spite of their best efforts, the defenders had failed to fill the gaps in their wall and at least one of the breaches was still practical. Aware of the danger, Carthaginian soldiers had formed up behind the gap in the wall, whilst a crowd armed only with missiles thronged the roofs of the nearby houses. The Romans rapidly formed an assault party and launched a furious attack through the breach. The onslaught was badly organized and after initial success bogged down. One of the military tribunes, the same Scipio Aemilianus who had served with Lucullus and begged elephants from Masinissa, had kept his men under tight control. Instead of following the main body into the city, he had stationed them to defend the wall around the breach. When Carthaginian pressure grew too much and the assaulting parties were chased back out of the city, Scipio's men prevented them from being cut off and covered their retreat.4
Scipio was the only senior officer to win distinction in the early phases of the Third Punic War. The youngest of four sons of Aemilius Paullus, he had first seen service as a teenager at Pydna. Missing at the end of the battle, he was just about to be added to the list of casualties when he returned with a few friends, all of them heavily bloodstained from an enthusiastic pursuit of the enemy. Whilst the older brothers remained to continue the family name, the two younger boys were adopted into famous families who lacked a male heir. The third brother became Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, whilst the youngest was adopted by Publius Scipio the son of Africanus, whose ill-health had denied him a significant political career. Both of the elder brothers died before their father. The Roman aristocracy took adoption very seriously and men like Scipio Aemilianus were considered to combine the reputation of both families and were expected to live up to the standards of behaviour of both real and adopted parents. In 151 Scipio had helped to encourage volunteering for the Celtiberian war by coming forward as a military tribune. In Spain he won renown by killing an enemy champion in single combat, a deed reminiscent of the young Marcellus in the First Punic War. It was perhaps his service in Spain which taught Scipio the importance of maintaining a reserve and cautious pursuit, for the tribes of the Peninsula were quick to punish careless attackers. It was a lesson which few of the other Roman officers seem to have learned.5
Censorinus' camp by the lakeside was placed in an unhealthy spot. By late July disease started to spread in the camp, forcing the consul to withdraw to a position near the sea. Whenever the wind was right, the defenders sent fireships down towards the Roman fleet, causing serious losses. They also prepared a sally against Manilius' camp on the isthmus, some men being detailed to carry fascines and beams to fill or bridge the ditch surrounding it. Delivered at night, the sudden attack caused panic amongst the surprised Romans. Once again Scipio Aemilianus restored the situation, leading a body of horse out of the rear gate of the camp and bringing them round to attack the Carthaginians in the flank, driving them back in confusion. The consul subsequently strengthened the defences of his camp to prevent a repeat of this near disaster. Another fort was built near the shore to cover the landing of Roman supply ships.6
The Romans had failed to make any impression on the city's defences. With winter approaching and his colleague returned to Rome to hold the next year's elections, Manilius drew off a column of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and led them in an expedition to ravage the rural areas loyal to Carthage. In part this was another means of putting the enemy under pressure, but the main purpose was to gather food for men and horses and wood for cooking and building, laying in supplies for the winter which would now be spent in the siege lines around Carthage. Once again the Romans displayed their inexperience as the tribunes leading foraging parties carelessly allowed their men to disperse. Himilco Phameas, probably leading some of the Numidian and Moorish cavalry who had deserted from Masinissa in 150, ambushed and raided the Roman foragers, inflicting heavy losses. Scipio Aemilianus avoided such attacks by ensuring that his troops did not disperse too widely and that there were always groups of horse and foot kept formed and ready to cover the unarmed parties of foragers. Malicious rumours circulated in the Roman ca
mp, claiming that Himilco was deliberately avoiding Scipio because of a bond of hospitality between one of his ancestors and Africanus. This may well suggest that Phameas was of mixed Punic and Numidian or Libyan blood. When Manil-ius brought his column back to the main camp, the Numidians mounted another night-time raid from within the city. This time the target was the smaller fort guarding the landing site for the transport ships. On this occasion Scipio led out the ten turmae, about 300 men and perhaps the cavalry element of his own legion, but this time did not directly attack the sallying force. Instead the Roman horsemen carried lighted torches and moved and manoeuvred near the Carthaginians, trying to create the impression of far larger forces massing to attack. The ploy worked and the nervous raiders withdrew.7
Although Himilco Phameas and his horsemen ranged widely, Hasdrubal had drawn his main army back into the area around Nepheris, in the area of the modern Djebel Zaghouan, just under 20 miles south-east of Tunis. The Carthaginians were camped beyond a small river at the end of a valley, a strong position which was difficult for the Romans to approach in anything other than a narrow column. Manilius decided to mount a direct attack on the enemy, an aggressive move typical of Roman generalship. Equally characteristically for this period the attack was badly planned, the Romans advancing directly from the march, without waiting to fortify their own camp and rest. Plunging through the river, Manilius' men made some headway and after a tough fight managed to push the Carthaginians back up onto the higher ground. It was a strong position and the weary Romans stood little chance of success in an uphill assault. Hasdrubal bided his time, knowing that the Romans could not stay where they were and would have to pull back. Disengaging from close contact with the enemy has always been a dangerous and demanding task. It was especially so for Manilius, because the fordable section of the river was relatively narrow. As the Romans fell into some confusion, Hasdrubal attacked, slaughtering the legionaries who quickly fell into panic. Scipio, who had spoken against the attack and was once again in command of 300 cavalry, rallied some more Roman horsemen and led them in a series of controlled charges. His men went forward far enough to push the enemy back, but did not pursue too far, rallying instead to prevent their formation breaking up and the horses from growing tired. The check on the Carthaginian advance gave enough time for the bulk of the fugitives to escape across the stream. There was only just time for the tribune to pull his own men back before they were overwhelmed, and as it was they galloped back across the ford under a hail of missiles. Four Roman units, maniples or possibly cohorts, were cut off during the retreat and left surrounded on a hillock. Demonstrating that he could be very bold when the occasion demanded, Scipio led some of his cavalry in a successful rescue operation. He also managed to negotiate with Hasdrubal and arrange the burial of several fellow tribunes killed in the rout.
The expedition had been a disaster. It was made even more humiliating when the retiring Roman column was attacked both by Himilco Phameas and by the defenders of Carthage on its return to camp. Scipio Aemilianus' achievements had been the only bright spot in the otherwise dismal performance of the Roman forces, a fact noted by the Senatorial commission sent out to report on operations. When reports of his deeds reached Rome, Cato once again quoted Homer when he praised Scipio as uniquely capable amongst the army in Africa. The ageing senator was to the during the next months, not living to witness the final destruction of Carthage. Another link with the past, the 90-year-old Masinissa also passed away in the first months of 148. Scipio, as the descendant of his patron Africanus, was chosen by the old king to setde his affairs and divided the rule of the kingdom between Masinissa's three legitimate sons. The Numidians had not as yet contributed any significant aid to the Roman army, but Scipio was able to persuade Gulussa, who had been placed in charge of Masinissa's troops, to join Manilius with a force of light cavalry. Very early in the spring the Roman general decided to attempt another attack on Nepheris before a new consul arrived to replace him. This time the expedition was better prepared, the legions carrying food for fifteen days. A camp was laid out before crossing the river and a ditch and wall constructed closing off the valley. Even so the operation resulted in a second failure, although it did provide an opportunity for the defection of Himilco Phameas and 2,200 of his cavalrymen, an act of treachery arranged by Scipio. This was another instance of the defection of a relatively senior Punic officer for which there is no parallel amongst the Romans. Manilius remained facing the enemy for seventeen days, so that by the time he was forced to retire his soldiers were dangerously short of food. Their plight was only eased when Scipio returned after leading Phameas' and Gulussa's men off on a foraging expedition. Universally praised by the army, the tribune then returned to Rome to present Phameas, who was rewarded by the Senate with a fine horse, splendid equipment, a tent and a considerable sum of silver. The deserter pledged himself to serve with the Romans until the end of the conflict.8
Only one of the consuls for 148 went out to Africa. This was Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who brought with him Lucius Mancinus to command the fleet, either as his kgatus or as a propraetor in his own right. Mamtaining a loose blockade around Carthage itself, the Romans decided to subdue the smaller cities of the region. Results were unimpressive, with a combined sea and land attack on Aspis unsuccessful and a prolonged siege of Hippagreta achieving nothing. The Carthaginian mood was ebullient, sending a delegation to Macedonia to form an alliance with Andriscus, a pretender to the throne of Perseus. This man had formed an army of Thracian tribesmen and invaded the four Macedonian Merides, defeating first the local militia and then a Roman army, killing the praetor in command. This was the worst defeat the Romans had ever suffered at the hands of the Macedonians and another sign of the decline in the efficiency of the legions. The Carthaginians received further consolation for the defection of Phameas when one of Gulussa's chieftains deserted to them with 800 men. Hasdrubal, the commander of the field army, who had once been condemned to death, was so restored to favour that he was able to assume command within the city, supplanting the other Hasdrubal who was accused of plotting treachery with his relative Gulussa and lynched.
Scipio Returns, 147-146 BC
In 148 Scipio Aemilianus as a patrician planned to stand for the office of curule aedile for the following year. Stirred by tales of his recent exploits and the association with his illustrious grandfather, the centuries in the Comitia Centuriata selected his name first in the consular elections. Still only 36 or 37, he was several years below the legal age for the highest magistracy, but when the presiding consul pointed this out the voting centuries remained adamant that Scipio was their choice. When one of the tribunes of the plebs supported their demands and threatened to declare the whole election invalid, the Senate decided to fudge the issue. The law stipulating minimum ages for the important magistracies, the lex Villia anntilis, was annulled for a single year and then immediately re-enacted. Scipio's consular colleague, Caius Livius Drusus, himself a member of a very wealthy and influential, although plebeian, family, wanted the African command and suggested that the two men draw lots in the usual way. Again a tribune intervened, declaring that the matter should be decided by Popular vote in the Concilium Plebis, who overwhelmingly chose Scipio. By the same law he was allowed to raise sufficient new recruits to replenish the ranks of the army already in Africa, and, like Africanus before him, take as many volunteers as came forward.10
This is the essence of Appian's account of Scipio's premature rise to the consulship and the African command. As with other cases where the normal electoral procedure was not followed and extraordinary appointments were made, it is impossible now to know what really happened and how much had been decided behind the scenes before the public meetings. We cannot know to what extent Scipio himself had actively sought the more senior post, although it seems distinctly probable that he did so. Nor is it clear to what extent other senators opposed the suspension of the law in his favour. It is probably a mistake to see this as the triu
mph of a politician relying entirely on the People for support, for it is likely that many senators were well disposed to Scipio, and others may simply have thought him the best man for the job. His military record stood out at a time when military defeats and disasters were depressingly common. The emotional appeal of sending not just a Scipio but the grandson of Africanus to defeat the new threat from a prosperous and so far successful Carthage was massive amongst all classes of Romans, who possessed such a strong sense of family characteristics. It must also be remembered that the appointment was far less radical than the decision to invest Africanus with proconsular imperium and send him to Spain in 210. Scipio Aemilianus was no more than five years below the minimum age for the consulship and had so far had a conventional and highly distinguished career. The strength of his support, at least as far the African command was concerned, is seen in the ease with which his imperium was extended to allow him to complete the war in 146.11
In early 147 the blockade of Carthage was being maintained by Mancinus and the fleet. Observing an apparently weak spot in the walls where the natural defences were so strong that fortification seemed unnecessary, the Romans beached their ships and attempted an escalade, provoking the defenders to sally out from a nearby gate. In the ensuing combat the Romans managed to put the Carthaginians to flight and pursued them back through the open gateway. Elated by this unanticipated success, Mancinus led in as many men as he could find, some of them poorly armed ships' crews. In total there were only 500 fully equipped soldiers and around 3,000 others. A small corner of Carthage was now in Roman hands, but their hold on it was precarious for they had little food and no immediate supports to draw upon, since the main army was operating some distance away. Mancinus sent out messengers to Piso with the army and also to nearby Utica, asking for reinforcement and supplies of food. By chance Scipio had sailed into Utica that evening and received the message. Riders were at once dispatched to find Piso and preparations made to sail to Carthage in the early hours of the morning. Sacrificing the element of surprise in favour of making the enemy nervous, Scipio released some Punic prisoners and allowed them to hasten back to their city with news of his arrival. The next day the Carthaginians attacked Mancinus in great numbers, steadily pushing the Romans back. They were only checked when Scipio sailed into view, legionaries thronging the decks of his warships to suggest the arrival of a huge army merely instead of the draft of replacements that had come from Sicily. The sight stalled the Punic onslaught for long enough to evacuate Mancinus' men, who were carried away by the Roman ships.12
The Fall of Carthage Page 45
