Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  Department of the Tennessee

  By the end of 1862, all that remained linking the Trans-Mississippi area of the Confederacy with the eastern portion was the territory between Vicksburg, Mississippi and Port Hudson, Louisiana. If this strip of land, some 115 miles wide, could be severed, it would cut the Confederacy in half, separating the east from the rich cattle growing region of Texas.

  Realizing the importance of the Mississippi to Midwestern farmers and to their very survival as a nation, the South had erected a strong system of fortifications along the entire length of the river within their territory. By the end of 1862, the Union had captured the strongholds of Columbus, Fort Pillow, Island Number Ten, Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip and Memphis and New Orleans had been occupied.

  All that remained tethering the two portions was the strip of land between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. After the fall of New Orleans in June, 1862, Commodore Farragut and Brigadier-General Thomas Williams made their way up the Mississippi in an effort to capture Vicksburg. The navy bombarded the city which proved ineffective due to the high ground upon which Vicksburg was situated. For its part of the expedition, the army attempted to cut a canal across the peninsula in front of Vicksburg, thereby diverting the river and leaving the city an inland town. This attempt was also unsuccessful. The army did not attempt to attack the town, no doubt in part because of Vicksburg's great natural strength derived from its perch high above the river.

  Vicksburg was not only of vital importance to the Confederacy because of its highly defensible position, it was also the western terminus of the Southern Mississippi Railroad, the last remaining east-west railroad open to the rebels. Across the river from Vicksburg, lay the eastern end of the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad. For obvious reasons, Vicksburg had become the linchpin of the Confederacy. Without Vicksburg, the Confederacy would have extreme difficulty transporting troops and foodstuffs between the two parts. Without Vicksburg, the Confederacy would be divided in two and left to shrivel and die on the vine.

  Grant made his initial reference to a movement against Vicksburg in a letter to Halleck dated October 26, 1862. This was the day after he assumed command of the Department of the Tennessee. The following are excerpts from that letter. "You never have suggested to me any plan of operations in this department....As situated now, with no more troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions, and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them, without first consulting you....Destruction of the railroads to all points of the compass from Corinth....and the opening of the road from Humboldt to Memphis. The Corinth force I would move to Grand Junction, and add to them the Bolivar forces except a small garrison there. With small re-enforcements at Memphis, I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and to be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo river. I am ready, however, to do with all my might whatever you may direct, without criticism." 1

  Grant received no response from Halleck either approving or disapproving his proposal. After Halleck had received his promotion he became more supportive of Grant as a distant superior than he was looking over his shoulder.

  Being the department commander and receiving no orders to the contrary, Grant planned to act on his own with what little resources he had available to him. His initial thoughts were put in a dispatch to Halleck dated November 2, 1862. "I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. If found practicable, I will go to Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as I go." 2

  Grant commenced the movement on November 2nd. Realizing Grant was moving, Halleck telegraphed: "I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong enough for that purpose." 3 In his approval Halleck did not authorize abandonment of any of Grant's positions, so he was forced to hold them all.

  As mentioned earlier, Halleck believed in positional warfare - the taking and holding of strategic places of value. Grant, conversely, believed in making war against the resources which allowed the enemy to continue his resistance, such as the enemy's armies or enemy ordnance factories.

  As Grant commenced operations he had a movable force consisting of 30,000 men. General McPherson commanded the left wing, General C. S Hamilton, the center and General Sherman, the right wing. Sherman was located in Memphis.

  Grant estimated the forces of the enemy confronting him at 30,000. They were now commanded by General Pemberton and located at Grand Junction, Tennessee and Holly Springs, Mississippi.

  As the movement began, Grant was with the main body consisting of McPherson's and Hamilton's troops. Sherman was ordered to make a demonstration from Memphis toward the southeast as a diversion. By November 4th, Grant had seized both LaGrange and Grand Junction. On November 5th, he learned from Halleck that 20,000 reinforcements would arrive soon at Memphis. This caused Grant to set aside his immediate plans. With the possibility of large reinforcements, he ordered Sherman to forego the planned demonstration.

  Grant needed time to reconsider events. He had been reading in newspapers about the possibility of General McClernand outfitting an expedition against Vicksburg to open the Mississippi and he was concerned about the safety of any troops entrusted to General McClernand.

  McClernand had been with Grant since Belmont and Grant held a very low opinion of him. He had told Halleck that McClernand was "unmanageable and incompetent." In his memoirs Grant wrote about the possibility of McClernand commanding the proposed expedition. "Two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case I did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. I feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust."

  How the McClernand expedition evolved is worth examining. After Halleck occupied Corinth during the summer, McClernand applied for a leave of absence. McClernand believed that the Midwestern states' resolve to fight for the Union was wavering. The farmers were unable to ship their goods to market via the Mississippi River and having to rely on east-west railroads, the farmers were being gouged by corrupt railroad monopolies. This was crippling the Midwestern economy. McClernand also felt that the professional soldiers had been unable to liberate the Mississippi from Confederate control and thought he knew just the man for the job, himself.

  So in late summer, McClernand set off for Washington to present his plan to President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton. McClernand very clearly laid out all the political reasons which were threatening support for the war in the Midwest and suggested raising a force for the sole purpose of opening the Mississippi. Of course, McClernand felt he should lead the expedition.

  An expedition of this sort had previously been discussed by the cabinet and there was plenty of support for it. There were other reasons for supporting such a plan. McClernand was an all-out war man, he was a western Democrat and Lincoln was always favored anyone who promised action. McClernand not only promised action, but had the ability to raise the new levies to bring his plan to fruition.

  While, the administration was enthusiastic about the plan, there were plenty of reservations about the proposed leader. Lincoln observed that McClernand sure was anxious to be independent of everyone. Halleck was vehemently opposed to McClernand leading the operation and told McClernand in so many words.

  Lincoln had tried McClellan, McDowell, Pope and Buell and all had failed. Lincoln was desperate, so he gave McClernand's plan the backing it needed.

  On October 20, 1862, the Lincoln Administration issued a confidential order empowering McClernand to precede full speed ahead with his proposed expedition. The following is an excerpt from that order. Notice in the order that Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck gave themselves a couple of loopholes and plenty of wiggle room.

  EXTRACT OF A CONF
IDENTIAL ORDER, ISSUED ON OCTOBER 21, 1862,

  BY EDWIN M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT

  AT WASHINGTON CITY.

  "ORDERED, that Major-General McClernand be, and he is directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those states and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or other such points as may hereafter be designated by the General-in-chief, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of General Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedition may be organized under General McClernand's command, against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi river and open navigation to New Orleans."

  Indorsement: "This order, though marked 'confidential,' may be shown by General McClernand to governors, and even others, when, in his discretion, he believes so doing to be indispensable to the progress of the expedition. I add, that I feel deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to be pushed forward with all possible dispatch, consistently with the other parts of the military service.

  "A. LINCOLN." 5

  To this point in the war, the reader will remember that Halleck: had been jealous of Grant; had tried to have Grant removed; had tried to have others placed over Grant; held a very low opinion of Grant's abilities; and had been condescending in most of his dealings with Grant. The incident with McClernand changed all that. While, Halleck personified many traits of a small minded person, he still remained a devoted patriot. Even though he thought little of Grant's abilities, he was vehemently opposed to McClernand leading any military expedition. In other words, Halleck would rather trust Grant than McClernand.

  One of the results of the McClernand episode was to drive Halleck and Grant closer together in a more harmonious working relationship. This was the reason the order of October 21, 1862, was written as it was. It basically stated that if Grant did not need the troops for anything, then and only then, could McClernand proceed.

  Of course, Grant was ignorant of this back room finagling. The only inkling he had was what was rumored in the newspapers. For now, all Grant needed was clarification concerning the 20,000 troops Halleck was sending to Memphis.

  On November 10th, Grant sent a message to Halleck. "Am I to understand that I lie still here while an expedition is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman move subject to my order, or is he and his forces reserved for some special service? Will not more forces be sent here?" 6 On November 12th, Grant received a rather ambiguous reply from Halleck. "You have command of all troops sent to your department and have permission to fight the enemy where you please." 7

  This was a curious response. If Halleck ever displayed any tendencies during the war, they certainly were toward caution. Yet, here he was almost telling Grant to throw care to the wind. Halleck obviously could not tell Grant what was afoot and he certainly could not instruct Grant to disobey an order by the President, but one thing he could do was encourage Grant to develop his plans as fast as possible. A large operation by Grant would fulfill the need specified in the President’s orders that troops entering Grant’s department would be required for his operations. In essence, Halleck's curious message was an invitation for Grant to get cracking. If there was one person who needed little prodding, it was Grant.

  An Axiom falls

  On November 13th, Grant informed Halleck that his cavalry had taken Holly Springs causing the rebels to fall back to the Tallahatchie River. In response, Halleck answered with a hint of what was brewing. He told Grant that "the enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from Memphis as soon as sufficient force can be collected." 8 This perplexed Grant because this type of operation is not what he planned, but it also confirmed for him the basis for the rumors. Grant realized there soon would be a military movement down the river from Memphis with Vicksburg as its objective. Grant said: "taken in connection with the mysterious rumors of McClernand's command, left me in doubt as to what I should do." 9

  Uncertainty was not a trait one would associate with U. S. Grant. He might not know all the details of the surreptitious movements occurring behind the scenes, but he was sure of one thing and that was Halleck had given him permission to fight the enemy wherever and whenever he wanted.

  Grant informed Sherman on November 15th, to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky to discuss his revised plan of advance upon Vicksburg. Columbus was chosen because Grant could reach it easy via rail and Sherman via river. Grant gave Sherman new orders which called for Sherman to march down the Mississippi Central Railroad to join Grant near Holly Springs. From Holly Springs, the advance planned differed little from Grant's original design.

  Sherman, prompt as usual, appeared on the scene the 29th of November, just south of Holly Springs. Grant had assembled a force of between 40,000 and 45,000 men for the movement upon Vicksburg.

  He faced the enemy who were dug in across the Tallahatchie River. About the time Grant found himself opposite the enemy, Halleck ordered a diversionary attack by Generals Hovey and Washburn, of General Steele's command in Arkansas, against Pemberton's communications. Grant also sent his cavalry upstream to find a ford so he could turn the enemy's flank. These movements caused the rebels to retreat. Grant pursued the fleeing enemy all the way to Oxford with his entire army. He ordered McPherson to continue the pursuit for an additional seventeen miles. Grant stopped at this point to repair the railroad up to his new position.

  By December 3rd, his force had advanced past Oxford, Mississippi and was literally at the end of his rope, not because he was in jeopardy, but because his supply line stretched some 200 miles. All his supplies were being transported by boat to Columbus, Kentucky and then by rail to an ever-growing supply depot at Holly Springs. Even though Grant was only fifty miles from Memphis, no direct rail route existed.

  This line of supplies consisted of one single track railroad. It was clear to Grant that this situation was an accident waiting to happen. Confederate raiders would be able to break this route almost at will and the problem would only intensify as the expedition moved farther south.

  To this point in history it was still common procedure among military practitioners to advance guarding their supply lines. With 45,000 men in and about Holly Springs, Grant requested the chief quartermaster, General Allen in St. Louis, to send twelve locomotives, to move the immense amount of supplies his growing army required.

  Halleck responded to this request by denying Grant's request telling him not to put into operation the railroads south of Memphis. Now Grant had his hands tied. Halleck had hinted at an operation down the Mississippi, but he had also egged Grant on to quick action. This latest turn of events forced Grant to re-examine his plans again.

  The combination of Grant's uneasiness about his tenuous supply line, and Halleck's obvious intimations about a Memphis expedition, caused Grant to write to Halleck on December 3rd with the following suggestion. "How far south would you like me to go? Would it not be well to hold the enemy south of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg? With my present force it would not be prudent to go beyond Grenada, and attempt to hold present line of communication." 10 Grant displayed uncanny insight into future events in the above communication. He could not foretell the impending disaster which would befall him at Holly Springs, but his statements here portend just such an event. Again on the 5th, he suggested to Halleck: "If the Helena troops were at my command, I think it would be practicable to send Sherman to take them and the Memphis forces south of the mouth of Yazoo river, and thus secure Vicksburg and the state of Mississippi." 11 Halleck responded on December 5th, approving Grant's plan and asking for details.

  Grant summarized the present state of affairs in his memoirs. "I learned that an expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th of December back to Memphis to take charge." 12

 
; Time and time again Grant proved he was subordinate, more than willing to adjust his plans to meet the demands of his superiors. He also demonstrated his versatility by being able to adapt his plans to meet the ever changing battlefield environment. Many leaders throughout history never possessed these valuable traits, yet Grant was a master at accommodating his plans to fit the situation. With that in mind, Grant issued the following orders to Sherman.

  Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee.

  OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862.

  MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

  Commanding Right Wing:

  You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. On your arrival in Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under the command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate.

  The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still feel yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of Memphis.

  On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

  Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.