Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.
U. S. GRANT
Major-General. 13
On the 8th of December, Grant communicated in detail his plans to Halleck. "General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about 40,000 men, will land at Vicksburg, up the Yazoo if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central road, and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they cross the Black river. I will cooperate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, and where an opportunity occurs, make a real attack. After cutting the two roads, General Sherman's movements, to secure the end desired, will necessarily be left to his judgment. I will occupy this road to Coffeeville." 14
Grant exhibited true patriotic motives in this operation by not seeking the limelight, but instead desiring to see his cause and subordinate succeed. He never wished to hog the spotlight for his own gratification like other egotistical commanders.
Because McClernand was Sherman’s senior, Grant became increasingly anxious that Sherman start before McClernand could arrive in Memphis and take charge. To date, Halleck could offered only hints about the proposed expedition down the Mississippi, but Grant was well aware of who the rumored commander was to be. Grant took little solace in the message he received from Halleck on December 9th, concerning Sherman's appointment to command the operation. "Do not make the Mississippi expedition so large as to endanger West Tennessee. I think 25,000 men, in addition to the forces to be added from Helena, sufficient; but send more if you can spare them. The President may insist upon designating a separate commander; if not, assign such officers as you deem best. Sherman would be my choice as the chief under you." 15
From this dispatch, he finally had confirmation that the McClernand rumors were true. In his memoirs, Grant wrote about the uneasiness he felt concerning the McClernand mission. "I doubted McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me." 16 In essence, he thought his actions to this point in time would be viewed as subordinate and that he had acted out of a sense of military duty.
Grant hoped to hold Pemberton in his front giving Sherman enough time to get in his rear and capture Vicksburg. A movement against the enemy’s rear was typical Grant. Grant and Sherman’s movements were to be coordinated and it was understood between the two that if Pemberton should fall back Grant would follow him to Vicksburg. At the time though, Grant planned to hold Pemberton at Grenada and go no farther.
On December 12th, McClernand informed Lincoln his work in Springfield was done and he was ready to move to Memphis and commence the campaign. By the middle of December, McClernand wanted to leave Springfield, Sherman wanted to leave Memphis and Grant was ready to do his part by attacking Pemberton.
At this time, Nathan Bedford Forrest entered the picture and added mayhem to an already confusing situation. On December 15th, Forrest was sighted advancing into West Tennessee. Grant promptly notified the appropriate commanders and made the necessary dispositions to handle Forrest. One set of instructions to one of the commanders just about summed up U. S. Grant's military career in two sentences. Grant warned his subordinate: "Don't fail to get up a force and attack the enemy. Never wait to have them attack you." 17
Forrest proceeded to break up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at numerous places over a sixty mile stretch near the Kentucky border. More importantly, Forrest cut Grant's communications causing Grant to be cut off from communicating with the outside world for nearly two weeks.
A couple of months earlier, it was Grant who was left in the dark wondering what was happening. Now it was McClernand's turn. McClernand wired Halleck on December 16th asking to be ordered to Memphis to assume command. On December 17th, McClernand telegraphed Lincoln, obviously worried: "I believe I am superseded. Please advise me." 18 Stanton responded to McClernand with a slightly different version of the situation than what McClernand understood it to be. "There has been, as I am informed by General Halleck, no order superseding you. It was designed, as you know, to organize the troops for your expedition after they should reach Memphis or the place designated as their rendezvous. The troops having been sent forward, they are now to be organized. The operations being in General Grant's department, it is designed to organize all the troops of that department in three army corps, the First Army Corps to be commanded by you, and assigned to the operations on the Mississippi under the general supervision of the general commanding the Department. General Halleck is to issue the order immediately." 19
This message must have shocked McClernand. He thought he was to be an independent commander. Now he was only to be a cog in Grant's army. He had heard rumors of the expedition already setting out from Memphis. It was bad enough he was not to be in total command, but now the command he was supposed to lead may have gone without him. McClernand desperately needed to communicate with Grant.
December 18th, Grant received orders from Washington dividing his force into four army corps. McClernand was to command the 13th Corps; Sherman, the 15th; Hurlbut, the 16th; and McPherson, the 17th. Grant had tried desperately to set everything in motion prior to McClernand assuming command, but now he had to obey orders. He immediately wired Sherman about the change in situation giving McClernand command of the operations against Vicksburg.
As soon as he received his orders, he sent a dispatch to McClernand. "I have been directed this moment by telegraph from the General-in-chief of the Army to divide the forces of this department into four army corps, one of which is to be commanded by yourself, and that to form a part of the expedition on Vicksburg.
I have draughted the order and will forward it to you as soon as printed. The divisions now commanded by Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan and Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith will compose all of it that will accompany you on the expedition, and the divisions of Brig. Gen. F. Steele and Brig. Gen. M. L. Smith will accompany you and will be commanded directly by Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, who will command the army corps of which they are a part. Written and verbal instructions have been given General Sherman, which will be turned over to you on your arrival at Memphis.
I hope you will find all the preliminary preparations completed on your arrival at Memphis.
I will cooperate with the river expedition from here, commanding this portion of the army in person." 20
Notice how subordinate Grant was in this instance even though he had grave reservations concerning the proposed commander. In his book about Grant, McFeely stated: "Once he was sure Sherman had left Memphis, Grant sent orders to McClernand, welcoming him to the town and saying, I hope you will find all the preliminary preparations completed on your arrival and the expedition ready to move." 21
In his memoirs, Sherman clearly stated that the Memphis troops embarked on the 19th. This is plainly another effort by critics to paint Grant in a bad light. Grant received his orders on December 18th and made the necessary dispositions the same day. Sherman was still at Memphis and Grant had acted properly. So many critics of Grant only offer part of the story, just enough information to support their false premise, instead of offering the entire situation which usually explained why Grant acted as he did.
So far all military procedures had been followed and the Vicksburg expedition was ready to kick off as the administration had desired. The problem which now surfaced was that neither of Grant's dispatches to McClernand or Sherman got through. Bedford Forrest had cut Grant's telegraph lines. Sherman was ready to move without McClernand and McClernand was still in Springfield.
Consequently, Sherman began his part of the expedition on December 19th. McClernand, being out of touch with everybody, waited until December 23rd for orders and then contacted S
tanton. "I am not relieved from duty here so that I may go forward and receive orders from General Grant. Please order me forward." 22 Stanton immediately ordered McClernand forward and directed him to report to General Grant.
While, the operations had commenced, fate was about to intervene and completely alter, not only the Vicksburg campaign, but the way the war was to be fought.
On December 20th, Confederate General Van Dorn, who was itching to redeem himself from the defeat at Corinth, attacked Grant's supply depot at Holly Springs. Van Dorn captured the garrison and all its stores. This action, in combination with Forrest's disruption of Grant's supply lines, manifested the futility of attempting to maintain such a long line of communications. The reader will recall from earlier in this chapter, Grant had foreseen just such an event occurring and had advised Halleck of this very possibility in his correspondence of December 3, 1862.
In his memoirs, Grant confirmed how this event taught him a lesson and how what he learned was about to change the war. "This demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with Columbus as a base." 23 Grant went on to say: "After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. It showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. This taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was great at Holly Springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught." 24 From now on, when required, Grant would live off the land.
Leaving No Stone Unturned
Van Dorn's raid on Holly Springs had completely derailed Grant's plan of attack on Vicksburg. What was worse than that was the precarious position in which Sherman now found himself. Sherman was still under the impression that Grant was making the necessary cooperative movements. Grant was supposed to hold Pemberton in place so Sherman could advance on Vicksburg nearly unopposed, but Grant could not move, let alone hold on to anyone. This left Pemberton free to fall back to Vicksburg and fall upon an unsuspecting Sherman.
Meanwhile, Grant was chafing at his own inability to be of assistance to Sherman. He said in his memoirs: "Had I known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been in pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear." 25 Later he told Badeau: "he could, at that time, have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in capturing the place." 26
On December 21st, Grant asked Halleck for authority to move his headquarters to Memphis and take control of the Vicksburg expedition. At least, this would put Grant in command and prevent McClernand from doing something stupid. By December 23rd, Grant was back at Holly Springs preparing to move his headquarters to Memphis. Once there, he tried desperately, but unsuccessfully to notify Sherman of what had happened on the 20th. Grant sent the following message to Sherman on the 23rd. "Raids made upon the railroad to my rear by Forrest northward from Jackson, and by Van Dorn northward from the Tallahatchie, have cut me off from supplies, so that further advance by this route is perfectly impracticable. The country does not afford supplies for troops, and but a limited supply of forage. I have fallen back to the Tallahatchie, and will only be able to hold the enemy at the Yalobusha by making a demonstration in that direction or toward Columbus and Meridian." 27
Grant also tried sending a message to McClernand on Christmas Day hoping to reach Sherman via that route, but both messages were to no avail. Sherman was walking right into to an ambush.
Sherman arrived at Milliken's Bend, a peninsula jutting out into the Mississippi, on Christmas Day. His force consisted of the divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, G. W. Morgan and Frederick Steele, 32,000 men in all.
Upon reaching Milliken's Bend, Sherman sent a brigade of General A. J. Smith's division to break the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad which lay directly across the Mississippi from Vicksburg. This would prevent rapid reinforcements arriving from the west.
Sherman left the remainder of Smith's division at Milliken's Bend to await their return, while the other three divisions proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo River on the 26th of December. From there the force moved thirteen miles up the Yazoo and disembarked at Chickasaw Bluffs. On the 27th, Smith's division rejoined Sherman at Chickasaw Bluffs. The 27th and 28th were spent in reconnoitering the rebel defenses. Sherman determined the defenses to be very strong, but still acting under his original orders felt an attempt had to be made.
By the morning of December 29th, he had his forces in position to attack. The attack began about noon as the troops moved across Chickasaw Bayou to attempt a lodgment on the bluffs. The attack failed with Sherman's men clinging to the riverbank at the foot of the bluffs. The Federals suffered greatly under the intense enemy fire.
Sherman decided to make one more attempt further up the river, but could only dislodge his troops under cover of darkness, so on the evening of December 30th, Admiral Porter's fleet covered the movement as General Steele's division and one other brigade moved up the Yazoo to try an assault on Haines's Bluff. As the boats were transporting the troops to the new position for the second assault, a fog closed in rendering further operations hopeless.
Sherman decided any further attempts would be futile, so the evening of January 1, 1863, all his troops were withdrawn and the first attempt on Vicksburg was over. It was a dismal failure as Sherman lost 1776 men out of a total force of 32,000. The Confederates lost 207 men out of a force of 14,000.
On January 2, 1863, General McClernand arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo River and assumed command of the river expedition. McClernand informed Sherman of what had happened to Grant, but could offer no details of Grant’s plans. For that matter, McClernand could offer Sherman no grand scheme on how to open the Mississippi to navigation.
During their consultations on what to do next, Sherman suggested a movement against a Confederate post named Fort Hindman. This fort, more commonly called the Post of Arkansas, was located on the Arkansas River some forty miles up from where it branched off from the Mississippi. This fort posed a serious threat to the supply lines of any Yankee expedition down the Mississippi. In Sherman's mind, a victory at Fort Hindman would help boost the morale of the men after their disastrous attack on Chickasaw Bluffs. McClernand agreed and with the help of the navy, his force started for the Post of Arkansas.
Due to his lack of communications, Grant was completely ignorant of what was happening down the river. Before long Grant did receive a dispatch from Sherman relaying the results of the mission against Chickasaw Bluffs. He was greatly disappointed at the failure to affect a lodgment on the east side of the river which could be used as a base of operations against Vicksburg. Even though he had confirmation about the attempt at Chickasaw Bluffs, he continued to hear rumors that Vicksburg had fallen. He knew General Banks had been ordered to New Orleans in mid-December to lead an expedition up the river to cooperate with his forces in opening the Mississippi. Could these rumors be Banks' forces capturing Vicksburg?
Grant was plainly unaware of what was happening down river, but in a message from Halleck on January 7th, he was instructed that "every possible effort must be made to re-enforce him." [Banks] 27 Halleck's dispatch went on to say: "We must not fail in this if within human power to accomplish it." 28
Grant did not know the situation with McClernand's command; he did not know what Banks was doing; he kept hearin
g rumors of action around Vicksburg; and he was being ordered to help Banks as much as possible. It was evident that he would have to scrape together all the forces he could muster and reinforce whatever movement was taking place against Vicksburg.
Grant received Halleck's urgent messages on January 7th. Low and behold, McClernand's forces began their movement against the Post of Arkansas on January 7th and Grant received a communication from McClernand to that effect. Just when he was being implored to bring all the force he could bear against Vicksburg, McClernand, who Grant felt was incompetent, was taking off on what he felt was a wild goose chase.
Grant immediately notified Halleck of McClernand's actions. "General McClernand has fallen back to White River and gone on a wild-goose chase to the Post of Arkansas. I am ready to re-enforce but must await further information before knowing what to do." 29
Next Grant fired off a letter telling McClernand that he disapproved of this sideshow. "Unless you are acting under authority not derived from me keep your command where it can soonest be assembled for the renewal of the attack on Vicksburg." 30
It was too late, the mission was beyond recall. McClernand's force arrived in the vicinity of Fort Hindman on January 9th. The 10th was spent positioning the troops. On the 11th, Porter's gunboats went into action and the army began its assault. The fighting lasted about three hours and resulted in the capture of the fort. The rebels surrendered approximately 5000 men, while Union losses totaled about 1000. The fort was leveled and McClernand reembarked his forces on January 13th.
In his memoirs, Grant said this about the operation. "I was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the Mississippi." 31
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 19
