By this time, it had become obvious to Grant that he would be unable to coordinate the movement against Vicksburg from such a long distance. It was also dawned on him that he would probably have to abandon any overland move against Vicksburg. On top of these realizations, he received urgent appeals from Sherman and Porter requesting Grant to come and take charge of the expedition. Both men expressed strong distrust of McClernand's competency. The last nail driven into McClernand's coffin came from Halleck. Halleck told Grant in a brief dispatch: "You are hereby authorized to relieve General McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself." 32
The events of the first two weeks of January convinced Grant to act. On January 13th, he wrote to McPherson: "it is my present intention to command the expedition down the river in person." 33
On January 17th, Grant visited McClernand's command at Napolean, Arkansas. Witnessing the apparent distrust in McClernand, he ordered McClernand's army to Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while he set things in order at Memphis. He appointed Hurlbut to command at Memphis and sent down the river most of his advance forces which had been in place along the Mississippi Central Railroad.
On January 20th, he informed Halleck of what he was doing to relieve the controversy surrounding McClernand. "I regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confidence felt in General McClernand as a commander, either by the army or navy, to insure him success. Of course, all would cooperate to the best of their abilities, but still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inquiries about, but it was forced upon me.....I want you to know that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the course I had already determined upon pursuing. Admiral Porter told me he had written freely to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that what he said might be shown to the Secretary of War." 34
Grant arrived at Young's Point on January 29th, and assumed command of the expedition on January 30th, 1863. Grant was instituting new strategy in this instance and in his memoirs he offered his logic behind the operation. "The strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the last dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. This was in my mind from the moment I took command in person at Young's Point." 35
General McClernand, in typical fashion, sent Grant a letter contesting his assumption of command and asking for an explanation.
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,}
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,}
BEFORE VICKSBURG, January 30, 1863.}
Major-General U. S. GRANT,
commanding Department of the Tennessee:
General Orders, No. 13, is this moment received. I hasten to inquire whether its purpose is to relieve me from the command of all, or any portion of the forces composing the Mississippi river expedition, or, in other words, whether its purpose is to limit my command to the Thirteenth army corps.
I am led to make this inquiry, because, while such seems to be the intention, it conflicts with the order of the Secretary of War, made under the personal direction of the President, bearing date October 31, 1862, of which the following is an extract:
"Major-General McClernand is directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those states.....and forward them.....to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated,.....to the end that, when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of General Grant's command [then in West Tennessee], shall be raised, an expedition may be organized, under General McClernand's command, against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi to New Orleans."
Also, with the order of the General-in-chief to you, dated December 18, 1862, of which the following is an extract:
"It is the wish of the President, that General McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command under your direction."
Also, with your communication of the same date, based on the preceding order, and giving me command of the expedition; and with your verbal assurance of yesterday, that my relations to the forces here would continue undisturbed.
I repeat that I respectfully ask for an explanation of this seeming conflict of authority and orders, that I may be enabled to guide my action intelligently. By General Orders, No. 22, you extend your command as far west from the Mississippi river as your orders may reach. By General Orders, No. 13, you charge the Thirteenth army corps with garrisoning Helena and other points south. Is it to be understood that my command west of the Mississippi is coextensive with the purview of General Orders, No. 22?
Again, you charge the Thirteenth army corps with garrisoning the west bank of the Mississippi. Am I to understand that I am to act on my own judgment in fixing the number, strength, and location of those garrisons, or simply by your directions?
It is quite obvious that the whole, or a large portion of the Thirteenth army corps must be absorbed by these garrisons, if the purpose is to afford complete protection to all lawful vessels navigating the river; and thus, while having projected the Mississippi river expedition, and having been by a series of orders assigned to the command of it, I may be entirely withdrawn from it.
For the reason last stated, and because the portion of the Thirteenth army corps taking part in the expedition is very much smaller than any other corps of your command, and because my forces are here, and those of others have yet to come; why not detach from the latter to garrison the river shore, and relieve all those here from liability to that charge?
Your obedient servant,
JOHN A. McCLERNAND, Major-General commanding. 36
General Grant responded the following day in his characteristic manner, direct and to the point.
YOUNG'S POINT, LA., January 31, 1863.
Major-General J. A. McCLERNAND, commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:
The intention of General Order, No. 13, is that I will take direct command of the Mississippi river expedition, which necessarily limits your command to the Thirteenth army corps.
* * * * * * *
I regard the President as Commander-in-chief of the army, and will obey every order of his; but as yet I have seen no order to prevent my taking immediate command in the field; and since the dispatch referred to in your note, I have received another from the General-in-chief of the army, authorizing me directly to take charge of this army.
U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 37
As anyone can deduce from the above correspondence McClernand displayed rather insubordinate behavior. In his memoirs, Grant said he tried to overlook it for the good of the service.
On February 1, 1863, McClernand sent Grant another letter requesting the issue of command be submitted to Washington for a decision by Halleck, Stanton and Lincoln. Grant dutifully submitted the issue to Washington for action on February 1, 1863. Needless to say, Grant's assumption of command was upheld.
By the end of January, 1863, Grant found himself in command of the river expedition and located precisely where he could focus all the strength and energy of his forces to make the most effect
ive use against the objective. Leaving no stone unturned, he was willing to try any reasonable proposition to capture Vicksburg. During the next three months, Grant suffered great abuse from the press for supposed inaction and failed expeditions. Lincoln also suffered immense political pressure for Grant's apparent inaction as many wanted him removed from command. Rumors of Grant's drunkenness again surfaced, but all through this trying period he remained steadfastly focused upon his ultimate goal, the capture of Vicksburg.
As early as January 17th, Grant wrote the following to Halleck. "Our troops must get below the city to be used effectually." 38 Grant knew from the start he would have to take Vicksburg from the south where he would be able to approach the city from high and dry ground.
When Grant arrived at Milliken's Bend to take charge of operations, the forces in his department numbered some 130,000 men. Grant had divided these men into four army corps: the Thirteenth, under McClernand; the Fifteenth, under Sherman; the Sixteenth, under Hurlbut; and the Seventeenth, under McPherson. Part of the Thirteenth Corps and all of the Sixteenth Corps were used to keep supplies flowing down the Mississippi and to guard Grant's rear.
The troops engaged in immediate operations about Vicksburg numbered fifty thousand and were comprised of the Fifteenth Corps, the Seventeenth Corps and part of the Thirteenth Corps. In addition, the navy under Admiral Porter had a force of sixty vessels carrying some two hundred and eighty guns and eight hundred sailors.
With these forces, Grant began active operations to take Vicksburg. The current state of the Mississippi presented an insurmountable obstacle with exceedingly high water due to the winter rains. Consequently, Grant began trying a number of experimental approaches all designed to affect a lodgment on the east side of the river on dry ground.
Fuller best outlined the experimental approaches to the problem which Grant was willing to try.
(1) To widen Colonel Williams’ canal across the peninsula, which from the west faced Vicksburg.
(2) To open up the Yazoo Pass in the neighborhood of Helena, and connect the Mississippi with the Tallahatchie and Yazoo rivers.
(3) To open up a passage through Steele's Bayou and Deer Creek into the Yazoo about midway between Haines's Bluff and Yazoo City.
(4) To connect by canal the Mississippi to Lake Providence, the waters of which flow through a series of bayous and eventually empty themselves into the Red river which joins the Mississippi 170 miles south of Vicksburg.
(5) To open up Roundaway Bayou to the south-west of Milliken's Bend by canal and scour out a navigable channel as far as New Carthage, twenty-four miles south of Vicksburg. 39
Grant summed up his sentiments about the possibility of success with any of these missions when he wrote the following in his memoirs. "I, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did." 40
Grant was always willing to take suggestions and accept other's ideas because he was interested in only one goal and that was the success of his cause and country. His extraordinary ability to adapt his plans to changing events has been readily demonstrated. In this case, he felt there was little chance of success with any of the proposed plans, yet he was willing to try anything which would secure a lodgment on the east side of the Mississippi. Grant displayed the trait of a great executive and that is the willingness to listen to others and attempt untried techniques without a closed mind.
Halleck sent him a message in January stating that Mr. Lincoln wanted Grant to pursue the digging on the canal opposite Vicksburg. In 1862, General Thomas Williams, in conjunction with the forces of Admiral Farragut, began construction of a canal across from Vicksburg. The canal was approximately ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep. This canal ran from Young's Point across the peninsula formed by the Mississippi River where the river doubled back. This occurred in front of Vicksburg and placed the canal within four miles of the Vicksburg batteries. If the operation proved successful, the Union navy could bypass Vicksburg, maintain a secure supply line and still be able to reach high ground south of the city.
General McClernand was ordered by General Grant to undertake the enlargement of this canal on January 20th. The problems with the canal were many, but two were especially discomforting. The canal was within the firing range of the Vicksburg batteries should an attempt to run them be undertaken. The second problem was that the place where the canal would reenter the Mississippi was south of Vicksburg, but still north of Warrenton where the Confederates were busy installing batteries once they understood what the Yankees were doing.
Nevertheless, Grant pushed forward the work on the canal with four thousand men. If nothing else, it provided the men with something to do during the dreary winter months.
Within two weeks of construction on the canal Grant reported to Halleck the futility of the effort. "The canal is at right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is capable of as strong defences as Vicksburg; and the enemy, seeing us at work here, have turned their attention to that point." 41
Grant's engineers attempted to manipulate the river's flow to aid the operation, but to no avail. Dredging machines were used to enlarge the canal and operations appeared on the verge of success when an unexpected rise in the river caused the dam on the upper end of the canal to give way. The entire peninsula was inundated. The troops barely escaped with their lives, while horses drowned and many of the tools were swept away. This occurred on March 8th and brought the first trial to a close.
The next project addressed is item four on Fuller's list of experiments. This route involved digging a canal from the Mississippi to a body of water known as Lake Providence.
When he first arrived at Young's Point to take command, Grant was informed of the possibility of cutting a canal from the Mississippi to Lake Providence, a distance of about one mile. Lake Providence was an old part of the Mississippi riverbed. The Lake Providence route provided an outlet to Bayou Baxter and Bayou Macon and connected the Tensas, Quachita and Red Rivers with the Mississippi. This route would reenter the Mississippi almost as far south as Port Hudson, a distance of over one hundred thirty miles on a straight line let alone by such a circuitous route.
Grant sent an engineer up the river to examine the feasibility of such an undertaking. Receiving a positive report, he ordered McPherson to send a brigade to cut the levee between Lake Providence and the Mississippi.
A short time later, after visiting the location, Grant ordered McPherson up with an entire division. "This bids fair to be the most practicable route for turning Vicksburg. You will note from the map that Lake Providence empties through the Tensas, Washita, Black and Red rivers into the Mississippi. All these are now navigable to within a few miles of this place, and by a little digging, less than one-quarter that has been done across the point before Vicksburg, will connect the Mississippi and Lake, and in all probability will wash a channel in a short time." 42
On February 4th, Grant visited McPherson and spent a few days watching the progress. Finally, the levee was cut and the canal connected the Mississippi to the lake. Soon the troops were able to pass through a light draft steamer into the lake. The army used this steamer to explore the lake and bayou as far as possible. It quickly became evident that the job of clearing the bayous of sunken logs and overhanging trees would be next to impossible. By the middle of March this route too was abandoned. Even if this route had proved navigable, it is doubtful whether enough light draft steamers could have been procured to carry the army south to the Mississippi.
The next route Grant explored was to connect the Mississippi to Moon Lake near Helena, Arkansas. This route would be some 150 miles north of Vicksburg on a straight line. If a levee could be cut between the Mississippi and Moon Lake, a route south through Yazoo Pass could be found into the Coldwater River, Tallahatchie
River and finally into the Yazoo River. Somewhere along the Yazoo a landing site could be found and a lodgment made on high ground just north of Vicksburg. Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson to examine the feasibility of this route just after he arrived at Young's Point.
On February 2nd, Wilson's force exploded a mine and destroyed the dam blocking the entrance to Moon Lake. The Mississippi, being in flood stage, soon completely washed away the levee allowing access to even the largest steamers.
The Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater River provided only a narrow bayou some eighty feet wide and up to thirty feet deep. To complicate the matter, the rebels had felled trees to form obstructions to navigation. Some of these obstructions were huge and caused thousands of men extraordinarily strenuous work, but within two weeks the way was cleared from Moon Lake into the Coldwater River.
On February 15th, the route was open to the Tallahatchie River. Grant ordered Brigadier-General Leonard Ross to Yazoo Pass with his brigade of 4500 men. His force boarded twenty-two light transports and was accompanied by two gunboats under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith. The expedition was delayed one week trying to procure the required transports, but by February 24th, Ross's force entered the pass. On March 2nd, the expedition reached the Coldwater River and by the 10th, the force reached the Tallahatchie. The news of how successful operations had been to that point buoyed spirits. Wilson reported everything favorable for the prosecution of the campaign via this route.
Grant was ready to commit larger forces to advance via this route. A division under Brigadier-General Quinby was sent to support Ross. Later a second division was ordered up and McPherson was notified to be ready to move his entire corps into Yazoo Pass. The great problem now was a logistical one of procuring the necessary transports.
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 20
