Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  The navy began shelling the town during the evening using mortars on large rafts and three gunboats. At 3 A.M., the bombardment began from Grant's artillery. The cannonade continued unceasingly until 11 o' clock in the morning. All the while, sharpshooters kept a keen watch preventing a response from the rebel artillery. Grant took a position with McPherson so he could witness the assault by all three corps.

  At the appointed hour, the attack began along the entire front. Sherman's attack was concentrated along the Graveyard Road, while McPherson's corps attacked along the Jackson Road. McClernand focused his attack along the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad. All three corps made gallant attacks and at a few spots the attackers reached the Confederate works, but in general, the attack was a miserable failure. The ground was difficult and the defenses too strong. The defenders had regained their fighting edge and behind fortifications as strong as those at Vicksburg would have been able to withstand an attack by an army five or six times its size.

  At about noon, Grant received word from McClernand urging an assault be made to relieve pressure on his men. Grant responded to the request and rode off toward Sherman. As he reached Sherman's front, he again received an urgent dispatch from McClernand stating he had gained two forts and advocating a general assault so he could push on further. Grant did not believe McClernand, but he could not ignore the request, so a second assault was ordered along Sherman's and McPherson's fronts. The only result of these additional attacks was to dramatically increase casualties and convince Grant further of the necessity to relieve McClernand. Under cover of darkness, the troops were withdrawn. The results of the assault on May 22nd were as follows: 502 - killed; 2550 - wounded; and 147 - missing for a total of 3199. Confederate losses are unknown.

  In his memoirs, Grant expressed regret about only two assaults he ordered during the war. One was the assault of the 22nd at Vicksburg and the other was the assault made at Cold Harbor. It has been the author's great fortune to have visited every battlefield where Grant trod during the Civil War. If there were ever more insurmountable defenses located on any other Civil War battlefield than the ones at Vicksburg, the author has never seen them. Some of the earthworks protecting Vicksburg are between 15 and 20 feet high and just as thick. If this was not enough, the surrounding ground was perfectly suited for defense. No one could have taken Vicksburg by storm without an army many times numerically superior to the one Grant possessed. He should have been aware of these fortifications from the intelligence he received from the assault on the 19th, but owing to Grant's aggressive nature, he ordered the assault on the 22nd. The assault of the 22nd of May, 1863, was clearly a mistake which McClernand only exacerbated. The author does acknowledge the advantage of seeing the Confederate works, whereas Grant was unable to know for certain what he was up against. Hindsight is infinitely wiser than foresight, yet foresight is what makes a man great and Grant had, perhaps, more foresight than any other general world history.

  With the failure of the assaults, the only option left was a siege. As the siege began, Grant got off a letter to Halleck. He had fought the battles of Jackson on the 14th, Champion's Hill on the 16th, Big Black River Bridge on the 17th, and assaulted the works at Vicksburg on the 19th and 22nd, so he had been unable to write since May 15th. The following is his letter dated May 22, 1863.

  NEAR VICKSBURG, May 22, 1863.

  Vicksburg is now completely invested. I have possession of Haine's bluff and the Yazoo, consequently have supplies. To-day an attempt was made to carry the city by assault, but was not entirely successful. We hold possession, however, of two of the enemy's forts, and have skirmishers close under all of them. Our loss was not severe. The nature of the ground about Vicksburg is such that it can only be taken by a siege. It is entirely safe to us in time--I would say one week--if the enemy do not send a large army upon my rear. With the railroad destroyed to beyond Pearl river, I do not see the hope that the enemy can entertain of such relief. I hear that Davis has promised that if the garrison can hold for fifteen days he will send one hundred thousand men, if he has to evacuate Tennessee. What shall I do with the prisoners I have?" 89

  Grant wrote the above letter on May 22nd, the same day as the last assault. He had come to the conclusion the city could only be taken by siege. He should have arrived at that conclusion on May 19th.

  During the siege, the Union trenches totaled twelve miles in length with 89 batteries being constructed bringing to bear some 220 pieces of artillery. Grant's army opened the siege with about 45,000 men, but by the end of the siege he had over 70,000 men in place.

  Inside the Vicksburg defenses, Pemberton had over 30,000 men to defend seven miles of fortifications. On the outside looking in, Johnston had between 20,000 and 30,000 men stationed at Jackson and Canton.

  Shortly after the siege began, and following the disastrous assault of the 22nd, an article appeared in the New York Times which summarized the campaign in glowing terms which most military men are unused to hearing from the media. "A more audacious plan than that devised by the Commander has scarcely ever been conceived. It was, in brief, nothing else than to gain firm ground on one of the enemy's flanks, which to be done involved a march of about 150 miles through the enemy's country and in which communication with the base of supplies was liable at any moment to be permanently interrupted." 'Grant's army,' said this correspondent, 'had fought the Rebels five times, winning every fight, had captured more than fifty guns and six thousand prisoners, and had done all of this' "in a foreign climate, under a tropical sun ablaze with the white heat of summer, with only such supplies as could be gleaned from the country." The correspondent went on to say, "it must be admitted that whether ultimate success crowns our efforts, our gallant army has done sufficient within the last month to entitle it at once to the esteemed gratitude and admiration of the people at home." 90

  With glowing reports such as the one above reaching the people at home, Union sentiments were again on the rise and they came none too soon following the agonizing losses at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

  Siege operations continued while preparations were made to guard against a frontal attack from Pemberton and an attack in the rear by Johnston. Feeling threatened by the additional forces being added to Johnston's command, Grant wrote to General Banks on May 25th. "I feel that my force is abundantly strong to hold the enemy where he is, or to whip him if he should come out. The place is so strongly fortified, however, that it cannot be taken without either a great sacrifice of life, or by a regular siege. I have determined to adopt the latter course, and save my men.....The great danger now to be apprehended is that the enemy may collect a force outside, and attempt to rescue the garrison.....I deem it advisable that as large a force be collected here as possible. Having all my available force that can be spared from West Tennessee and Helena here, to get any more I must look outside my own department. You being engaged in the same enterprise, I am compelled to ask you to give me such assistance as may be in your power.....I would be pleased, general, to have you come with such force as you may be able to spare." 91

  This letter is noteworthy for two reasons. Grant stated: "I have determined to adopt the latter course, and save my men." This is not the U. S. Grant handed down to us through history. History records Grant as nothing other than a general who loved a frontal assault and consequently cared little or nothing for his men's welfare. This statement also leads one to believe he may not have received accurate intelligence following the assault on the 19th or he probably would not have ordered the assault on the 22nd. After all, he did have his reasons for ordering the assault on May 22nd and his reasons were logical.

  The other reason the above correspondence is noteworthy is that Grant was asking Banks to join him at Vicksburg and thereby, make sure the reduction of that fortress. This is significant because Banks outranked Grant and would have assumed command. Banks was a notoriously incompetent, political general. In Grant's original conception of the Vicksburg campaign, he thought once he
got below Vicksburg the two forces might be able to unite against Port Hudson or Vicksburg. (He used this argument to help sell the plan to Halleck.) Grant changed his mind as circumstances dictated and surely it crossed the minds of some historians that the reason he changed his mind was in combination he would no longer be in command and would not reap the glory. This correspondence obliterates that notion because he directly invited Banks to join him. This reinforces the picture of Grant as a true patriot thinking only of his cause and country.

  With the drudgery of siege operations under way, in early June an incident was alleged reviving the old legend of Grant's love of liquor. Grant was believed to be on a two day inspection trip up the Yazoo River and as the story goes went on a binge. This story was told by the newspaper correspondent Sylvanus Cadwallader. Cadwallader supposedly brought Grant back to headquarters in an ambulance and was met by John Rawlins. Cadwallader went on to give Rawlins the gory details of this two day binge. Even in the television series, The Civil War, the following was stated: "The boredom got to General Grant as well: two days running he gave in to the bottle, and had to be kept from appearing before his men too drunk to stand." 92 This is exactly how myths such as this are perpetuated.

  John Rawlins was vehemently opposed to alcohol and had appointed himself Grant’s guardian against the use of spirits. Yet there exists a letter dated June 6, 1863, from Rawlins to Grant concerning some "unfounded suspicions" that Grant had recently had some wine at Sherman's headquarters. Rawlins went on to say, "If my suspicions are unfounded, let my friendship for you and my zeal for my country be my excuse for this letter." 93

  To summarize, if Rawlins had first hand information from Cadwallader concerning a Grant binge, Rawlins would have severely chastised Grant and probably resigned on the spot not write such a mealy-mouthed letter. Rawlins was never one to mince words. In other words, this incident can be chalked up to just another one of the deathless myths about Grant's drinking.

  On June 17th, the situation concerning General McClernand finally came to a head. Grant received a letter from Sherman and the next day from McPherson about a congratulatory order which McClernand had sent to his corps on May 30th and since leaked to the press. Sherman and McPherson had seen this letter in Northern newspapers forwarded to them. The order was self-laudatory in nature and tended to diminish the achievements of the other corps by making recriminations about them. In addition, by regulations, copies of all orders such as these had to pass through department headquarters and this order had not.

  Grant asked McClernand for a copy to verify the truth and upon receipt of the copy promptly relieved McClernand and sent him back to Illinois. The order relieving McClernand read as follows and was dated June 18, 1863.

  Major-General John A. McClernand is hereby relieved from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. He will proceed to any point he may select in the state of Illinois and report by Letter to Headquarters of the Army for orders. 94

  The following day Grant reported his actions to Halleck.

  NEAR VICKSBURG, June 19, 1863.

  I have found it necessary to relieve General McClernand, particularly at this time, for his publication of a congratulatory address, calculated to create dissensions and ill-feeling in the army. I should have relived him long since, for general unfitness for his position. General Ord is appointed to his place, subject to the approval of the President. 95

  Grant was finally free from this long-endured encumbrance. McClernand had been in Grant's command since 1861 and had repeatedly been insubordinate. Grant took it all in stride even though many of his subordinates urged him on a number of occasions to relieve McClernand. Grant knew McClernand was a political asset for President Lincoln, bringing in many Democrats to support the war effort, but even so, he had at several junctures expressed reservations about the safety of the troops serving under McClernand. From now on, there would be no sleepless nights due to General McClernand.

  The days wore on as Grant's army got stronger and the Southerners position grew weaker. One day as he rode the lines he stopped for water at the house of a woman who championed the southern cause. Not knowing anything about military matters, she must have felt to date it had been a standoff and hoped Grant would tire and leave. Tauntingly, she asked the general if he ever expected to get into Vicksburg. "Certainly," he replied. "But when?" asked the lady. "I cannot tell exactly when I shall take the town, but I mean to stay here till I do, if it takes me thirty years!" 96 The woman appeared forlorn, she had not expected this kind of doggedness.

  During the course of siege operations, the Union position was advanced as opportunity allowed. The work of fortifying continued while mining operations were undertaken to provide an opportunity to attack the enemy. At three points near the Jackson Road, saps were dug and charged by June 25th. The mine was exploded and completely removed the top of a hill on which the enemy had a position. The rebels knew the Yankees were mining and had moved their lines to the rear of the hill. The Federals charged the crater made by the explosion as artillery opened in support. The Federal position was advanced and the Confederates attempted to retake the position, but soon fell back to their new lines. Another mine was exploded on July 1st, and others were being pursued up to the time of the surrender.

  After six weeks of siege, Grant's positions had closed to between five and one hundred yards of the enemy at ten separate points. He knew the Confederates were tired, weary and hungry, so he determined to make one final assault and capture the city. Orders were issued for the assault to occur on July 6, 1863.

  Preparations were being made for the assault when on July 3, 1863, at about 10 o' clock in the morning white flags appeared on the parapet of the rebel lines. Hostilities immediately ceased and before long General Bowen and one of Pemberton's aides appeared bearing a letter to Grant. The letter read as follows: "I have the honor to propose an armistice for --hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen." 97

  Grant responded to Pemberton's letter with one of his own. "Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above." 98

  Grant agreed to meet Pemberton between the lines at 3 o' clock P.M., in front of McPherson's corps. At 3 P.M., Pemberton appeared accompanied by the same officers who bore the letter, while Grant appeared with Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith. Pemberton and Grant greeted each other cordially knowing each other since the Mexican War. Pemberton immediately inquired about the terms of surrender. Grant responded he had none to offer other than what was contained in his letter. Pemberton replied indignantly that, "The conference might as well end," and turned abruptly to leave. 99 Grant replied, "Very well," but the other generals, notably General Bowen, were not so anxious for the conference to end. Bowen proposed he and one of Grant's generals have a conference. Grant had no objection, so Bowen and Smith met, while Grant and Pemberton talked a short distance away. Soon Bowen rejoined the group and suggested the Confederate army be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their sm
all arms and field artillery. This was unceremoniously rejected. The interview ended with Grant agreeing to send a letter with final terms by ten o' clock that evening.

  The following is the letter Grant sent to Pemberton the evening of July 3rd. "In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." 100

  Late that night, Grant received Pemberton's response. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At ten o' clock A.M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which you will take possession. Officers to retain their sidearms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." 101