They got livelier next evening. This was November 14 and Grant (who during the day had received his mother's gift of wine) was busy this evening at the conference with Sherman and Thomas; and Smith wrote that 'the headquarters are very quiet, as much so as a private house.' But Lagow and his friends, with some of Smith's whiskey, found a room somewhere and had what Smith considered 'quite a disgraceful party,' going on with it, in fact, until four in the morning, when an angry Grant came in and broke the party up, saying a word or two to Lagow. Whatever he said, it raised blisters. Next day Lagow, 'greatly mortified at his conduct,' refused to show his face around the mess, and a day or so afterward he resigned and headquarters saw him no more.
On November 15, the morning after the unfortunate Lagow's party, Grant got another visitor--a highly placed one, this time, Major General David Hunter, who had been sent west by Secretary Stanton to inspect Grant's command. As a War Department emissary Hunter got the full treatment; on the morning he arrived he moved into Grant's bedroom, and he was Grant's roommate for the three weeks of his stay. Smith reported that Hunter--twenty years Grant's senior, not a close friend, and a somewhat dour type--was 'a great Puritan,' and said the man complained that there was a lot of card playing in the army; to which Grant replied that he thought this was about as innocent an amusement as the men could have. Anyway, in mid-December Hunter sent Stanton a letter describing his visit, saying that he had been with Grant constantly, day and night, and had had a good chance to judge him. He assured Stanton that Grant was conscientious and hard-working, and most temperate to boot--'he only took two drinks during the three weeks I was with him.'
The record is clear; Grant had been as abstemious as any man needs to be during all the time covered by Rawlins's letters. Rawlins himself apparently learned this, because he never gave Grant the letter he had written, thereby wasting much overwrought prose. He simply tucked the letter away in his files, scribbling on it the notation: 'This letter was written hastily with a view to handing it to the one to whom it is addressed, but on reflection, it was not given to him, but I talked to him on the subject to which it relates which had the desired effect.'
Rawlins 'talked to him,' and he could hardly have done so without learning the truth. And at this point the episode begins to look most odd. As a lawyer, and as an army chief of staff, Rawlins knew all about the enduring quality of a documentary record; and so why did he carefully file that unsent letter where future historians were bound to see it, and where it would spread an enduring stain on the reputation of the man to whom Rawlins was so devoted?" 61
Why did McFeely take a small passage out of Catton's book and continue to impugn the integrity of Ulysses S. Grant when contained within the same material is the truthful explanation of what really transpired? Why have so many people down through the years been so intent on continuing to spread untruths about Grant? It is material like this, taken out of context which continues to this day, to deceive the public about one of the greatest heroes our country has ever known. And once again, the myth about Grant's drinking is found to be just that, myth.
Sherman finally arrived at Bridgeport on November 13th, bringing Grant's period of frustration to an end. Sherman spent the 13th and most of the 14th getting his army into camp about Bridgeport. Late on November 14th, he proceeded to Chattanooga for the long awaited conference on how to dispose of Bragg's army. General Howard, who witnessed this conference, was amazed by the informality. Unlike the Army of the Potomac, all Grant, Sherman and Thomas did was to talk out the situation as it existed and how best to attack the weak points in Bragg's position. The next day the three generals rode out to the position on Bragg's right flank where they felt Bragg was most vulnerable.
This position, just a few miles east of Chattanooga, was where Sherman was to lead his men. Once Sherman arrived at Brown's Ferry, the road east from there was shielded from the view of the Confederates by the hills. Sherman was to march his men, behind those hills, and reappear at the Tennessee River at the north end of Missionary Ridge. Here Baldy Smith would have pontoon boats waiting to carry Sherman's army over the Tennessee for a surprise attack against Bragg's lightly defended right flank.
Basically, Grant's plan of attack was a double envelopment. The plan called for Thomas to hold the center while, Sherman attacked Bragg's right. Sherman was to threaten the railway in Bragg's rear which would cause Bragg to weaken his center or lose his base of supplies at Chickamauga Station. In turn, Hooker was to envelop Bragg's left by advancing from Lookout Valley toward Chattanooga Valley. Once in Chattanooga Valley, Hooker would be able to threaten Missionary Ridge on Bragg's left. Thomas would hold the center, and as Sherman progressed, Thomas would move in conjunction forming one continuous battle line. Sherman left on November 16th, for Bridgeport to put his troops in motion.
While the planning proceeded, final preparations were made and orders issued. Grant continued to be deluged with dispatches from the authorities in Washington. They were in a panic over Burnside's ever more desperate situation. As Longstreet advanced, Burnside slowly withdrew and abandoned territory southwest of Knoxville. Grant and Burnside had previously agreed this was the appropriate delaying action to take so as to draw Longstreet further from his supplies, but all Washington could see was Burnside retreating. When Burnside's telegraph lines were cut with Washington, the panic reached near hysteria. Everyone knew Burnside would retreat and give up the loyal people of east Tennessee to the enemy. The authorities continued to implore Grant to do something, anything to assist Burnside. He should not be allowed to retreat under any conditions. Burnside, himself, was quite confident he could withstand any assault Longstreet could make. All Grant could promise Burnside and Washington was that he would attack Bragg and relieve Burnside as soon as everyone was in place. Grant was confident Burnside could hold and felt he would be able to attack within one week.
Battle Of Chattanooga
General Grant issued the orders for the battle on November 18th.
CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:
Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.
I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.
U. S. GRANT,
Maj.-Gen'l. 62
The orders for General Thomas were also issued the same day.
CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:
All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge on Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever orde
red. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call upon the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.
U. S. GRANT
Major-General. 63
It is interesting to note in the above order to Thomas that Grant actually made an unknowing reference to one of the qualities which made him such an outstanding general and set him above the others. "Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy." This simple statement speaks volumes about Grant's common sense and clear-headedness. While other generals, Sherman included, worried about what their opponent's next move might be all Grant did was view their next move as another opportunity to strike. When some general’s battle plans went awry, such as Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, they became paralyzed. When Grant's plans did not proceed according to plan, he changed his plan to take advantage of the new situation.
In the case of Chattanooga, Grant was forced once again to demonstrate his flexibility. His original expectations called for an attack against Bragg to commence on November 21st, but due to heavy rains on both the 20th and 21st, the attack had to be postponed. Sherman found the going slow and did not reach Brown's Ferry until the 20th and most of his army trailed far behind.
By November 21st, Grant received news that Burnside had been driven into Knoxville and the battle between his forces and Longstreet's had begun. Pandemonium reigned in official Washington and Grant could no longer allay the administration's fears. He now had to change his plans again and act without Sherman.
On November 20th, Grant received a letter from Bragg stating the following: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." 64 Grant saw the letter for what it was, a ruse, but he did not know what the intended deception was meant to hide. On November 22nd, a deserter entered the Union lines saying Bragg had sent Buckner's division north to Knoxville to reinforce Longstreet. The object of the letter now became clear it was intended to hold Grant in place until Knoxville was captured.
Whether Thomas felt ready to attack or not something had to be done. Therefore, Grant ordered Thomas to make a reconnaissance in force the morning of November 23rd. This would verify Bragg's position and hopefully advance the Union position about one mile further up the slope of Missionary Ridge.
Thomas's men formed during the morning of the 23rd, as if they were going on parade. When all the divisions and corps were in place, the signal to advance was given. Cannon rang out from all the forts surrounding Chattanooga at two o' clock in the afternoon and the troops rushed forward quickly driving away the rebel pickets. Before the Confederates had time to reinforce their positions, the Yankees advanced and seized a piece of high ground called Orchard Knob. This action advanced the National position by a good mile and gave them an excellent piece of real estate from which to guide the remaining operations. During the evening of the 23rd, Orchard Knob was fortified and artillery was placed in position to support operations the following day.
By late in the evening of November 23rd, Sherman's forces minus Osterhaus' division were in position to cross the Tennessee River. Osterhaus had been unable to cross at Brown's Ferry due to the rising Tennessee River making the bridge unsafe for the troops to traverse. Orders were issued to Osterhaus to report to Hooker if he was unable to cross by 8 A.M. on the 24th.
At two o' clock in the morning on the 24th, Giles Smith's brigade boarded the pontoon boats constructed for Sherman's crossing and silently floated down from the North Chickamauga to the mouth of the South Chickamauga, an operation very similar to the one used to open the Cracker Line at Brown's Ferry. Smith put ashore a small force which quickly overpowered the small Confederate outpost. Smith then moved south of the Chickamauga and disembarked the remainder of his brigade to hold the landing site where the bridge was to be laid. The pontoons were immediately pressed into service ferrying across M. L. Smith's and J. E. Smith's divisions. By daylight, Sherman had crossed eight thousand men and his position was securely entrenched on the south side of the Tennessee River, and construction on the bridge began which was finished just after noon.
By one P.M., Sherman's third division was over the river and his advance began. The clouds hung low over the entire battlefield that day which fortunately for Sherman masked his movements from being observed on either Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge. By half-past three, Sherman had progressed as far as a detached hill at the north end of Missionary Ridge. Until now, Sherman met little resistance, but as he closed on Missionary Ridge resistance stiffened. It was getting dark and figuring he had gained the heights and secured a lodgment on Missionary Ridge, Sherman decided to entrench. His objective point was Tunnel Hill where the railroad passed through Missionary Ridge. Sherman probably thought Missionary Ridge was one long hill, which was a logical conclusion, but in this case, he had reached a detached hill and would have to cross a deep depression before he could begin his ascent up the slopes of Tunnel Hill. Not knowing the ground, it is hard to fault Sherman for this. Regretfully, he informed Grant that he had arrived at Tunnel Hill which Grant reported to Thomas and Washington. This mistake would cause great delay the next day.
On the other side of Chattanooga, Hooker commenced his operations early the morning of the 24th. Hooker's forces had become a conglomeration of army commands. He had Osterhaus' division from the Army of the Tennessee, Cruft's division from the Army of the Cumberland and Geary's division of the Army of the Potomac, in all about 10,000 men.
Hooker’s objective was to take the point of Lookout Mountain. His men presently occupied the west bank of Lookout Creek and were just west of Lookout Mountain. After Lookout Mountain was secure, Hooker would be able to assist in the overall attack on Bragg by advancing against Bragg's left flank on Missionary Ridge.
The rebels were entrenched along the east bank of Lookout Creek with three brigades. Hooker's plan was to send one brigade of Cruft's division along with Geary's division up Lookout Valley to affect a crossing of the creek. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over Lookout Creek and repair it. Osterhaus, who was at Brown's Ferry, was to march down to the bridge and cross.
As Cruft seized the bridge, after some skirmishing, the rebels rapidly fell into ranks to contest the crossing. With their attention focused on the bridge crossing, and a heavy mist obscuring their view, Geary was able to cross the creek farther upstream with little resistance. Geary was over the creek by eight o' clock that morning and commenced climbing the west side of Lookout Mountain.
While Geary started up the mountain, Osterhaus advanced and reinforced Cruft at the bridge. By eleven A.M., the bridge was rebuilt, Osterhaus' artillery was moved into position and the enemy at the foot of Lookout Mountain was dispersed.
Geary continued his ascent encountering steep inclines, deep chasms and heavily wooded areas. The enemy continued ob
stinate resistance, but before long their left flank gave way. Soon Cruft and Osterhaus were abreast of Geary, all striving for the top of the mountain. By noon, Geary's advance reached the summit, only to find the Confederate fortifications there were the strongest yet. Finally, after hours of skirmishing, interrupted by darkness, Hooker cleared the enemy from the point of Lookout Mountain. At 4 o' clock P.M., Hooker informed Grant that his line was impregnable. By the end of the day, Grant had his vice set and on the 25th, he planned to close the jaws.
That night, he telegraphed the results of the fighting on the 24th to Washington. "The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge." 65 On the 25th, the President and General-in-Chief both replied showing how concerned they were for Burnside and his army. The President replied: "Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." 66 Halleck answered: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him." 67
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