What Grant was doing was the best remedy for Burnside's woes. If he could soundly defeat Bragg, he would automatically cut off Longstreet's line of supplies leaving him to whither on the vine. Nevertheless, there still existed a great anxiety for Burnside's safety.
The night of November 24th, would provide little rest for Grant or his command. Orders were issued for the following day's battle. Sherman was ordered to attack at daylight. To Thomas, Grant wrote:
CHATTANOOGA, November 24, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:
General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.
U. S. GRANT
Major-General 68
Bragg, meanwhile, began to realize how serious the situation had become. Prior to Thomas' attack on November 23rd, Bragg had ordered a brigade of Buckner's and Cleburne's divisions to Longstreet. As a consequence of Thomas' attack, both were recalled. As Sherman was crossing the Tennessee, Cleburne, who was one of the South's best division commanders, was ordered to the defense of the railway tunnel and to hold at all hazards. In addition, as a result of Hooker's movements, Bragg moved one of the divisions driven from Lookout Mountain over to Missionary Ridge. So operations on November 25th would face a much stronger foe on top of Missionary Ridge.
Grant's plan for a double envelopment was still intact. Sherman was to attack Bragg's right flank and Hooker, his left flank. As soon as Sherman's attack developed, Thomas was to commence his attack so as to form one continuous battle line across Bragg's entire front. Grant’s plan was outstanding and probably would have worked had Sherman actually been where he thought he was.
Sherman thought he was at the northernmost extremity of Missionary Ridge and had informed Grant of such. On the 25th, Sherman confronted an assortment of problems. In order to reach the northern tip of Missionary Ridge, he would have to cross a deep valley with steep slopes. If he could cross the valley, he would be facing Pat Cleburne's division, one of the Confederacy's best. If that were not enough, in order to protect his railroad supply line, Bragg was prepared to reinforce Cleburne as much as required.
As the dawn broke over Chattanooga, Sherman promptly went into action, as was his tendency. The day began, crisp, clear and sunny, a beautiful fall day. From high atop Lookout Mountain, the Union flag waved, placed there by the Eighth Kentucky volunteers. The day was so clear everyone in the valley below could see the flag and an outburst of cheers arose from the Union side of the battlefield.
Sherman's advance was slow as his forces moved gingerly down the steep slope into the valley below. With the rebels shooting at them, Sherman advanced at a crawl, but this was not the worst of it. When his men reached the bottom, they began the steep upward climb, only this time Cleburne brought his artillery into play. The Confederate infantry poured down a vicious fire upon the advancing Federals. The Union soldiers moved forward slowly until by eleven o' clock in the morning, they stood within yards of the main defensive works on Tunnel Hill. Bragg threw in more and more reinforcements until the Union advance was stymied. Now the battle on Sherman's front began to sway back and forth, each army attacking and counterattacking. It soon became obvious that Sherman's movement had been stopped, so Thomas's attack had to be postponed.
Hooker, too, had advanced early in the morning. He advanced quickly to Chattanooga Creek, which was more of an obstacle than the word creek connotes, but once there, his crossing was delayed by four hours while, he rebuilt the bridge over the creek. The original signal for Thomas' advance was to be the sight of Hooker attacking Bragg's left flank.
By 12:45 P.M., Sherman's position had become critical. He could not figure out why Thomas had not gone into action. Grant had to change his plans again. With Sherman bogged down by Bragg moving so many men to reinforce his right flank, Grant hoped that Hooker would begin attacking Bragg's left flank, but such was not the case. Grant hoped Hooker's appearance would cause Bragg to further weaken his center.
Grant could no longer wait. Sherman's position had become desperate, so at 2 P.M. he ordered Thomas to "carry the rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle pits with a view to carrying the ridge." 69
Grant ordered Thomas to attack and relieve the pressure on Sherman at 2 P.M. and went off for lunch and a smoke, returning to the top of Orchard Knob at 3 P.M. Nothing seemed to be happening and Grant was becoming impatient for action. The day was getting late and before long it would be dark. Finally, at 3:30 P.M., the cannon signal went off and a roar of voices could be heard from the plain in front of Orchard Knob.
Before long the lines of advancing blue soldiers could be seen marching steadily toward the enemy's rifle pits. Shortly, the Federals quickened their pace and charged the first set of rifle pits. The Confederates in the first row of rifle pits were literally overwhelmed at the sight of 20,000 bayonets charging at them. The first row of rifle pits were easily captured by the National troops and a thousand prisoners sent to the rear.
It was at this point in the battle where legend grew out of all the confusion. The legend was that the common soldiers now took the battle into their own hands and charged up the hill on their own. The truth of the matter is the position which the Yankees now held was perfectly visible and therefore, readily vulnerable to Bragg's infantry and artillery. At this point, the division commanders were somewhat in a quandary. In fact, Grant's orders were ambiguous, highly unusual for him. To review his orders: "carry the rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle pits with a view to carrying the ridge." 70 Grant's orders were clear that he wanted the ridge taken. They were also clear that he wanted the men reformed for the advance. What is not so clear is whether they were to wait for additional orders before making the final charge.
The National soldiers were in such a vulnerable position that the Confederates were able to rain down a withering fire upon them if they stayed where they were. Grant wanted the troops to reform in an orderly fashion and move in unison, but the men would be sitting ducks if they stood up and tried to reform. Realizing the ambiguity in the orders, Sheridan, one of the division commanders, sent back an aide for clarification, but before he could return, small groups of soldiers began to move forward seeking shelter from the intense fire from above. By now it was becoming clear that it was safer to move up the slope than to stay where they were. The first charge against the bottom row of rifle pits had been orderly and executed according to plan, but the charge up the remainder of Missionary Ridge was jagged, irregular and highly unmilitary, but it worked to a tee.
Before long, what the rebels saw coming at them was a mass of retreating comrades followed by a horde of Yankees yelling "Chickamauga" in reference to their humiliating defeat two months earlier. In no time the Yankees took the second line of rifle pits and nothing could stop them now. Then Sheridan rode to the front exhorting his men: "Forward, boys, forward! We can go to the top!" 71 And on to the top rushed the charging Federals! Bragg threw everything he could at the oncoming line of blue, but nothing could stop them. It truly was one of the grandest military charges in all history. Within 55 minutes of the time the Union soldiers left their positions on the plain below, they were over the top of Missionary Ridge routing the entire Confederate army.
Bragg's army collapsed around him. The enemy fled like scarred rabb
its on both his right and left until his position was an island almost surrounded. No amount of exhorting could rally his troops. Soon a second line of defense was established and just as soon it collapsed. The defeat was total it was now every man for himself.
Grant pursued the enemy at once with Sheridan leading the way. It was dark by now and the enemy had stationed artillery and infantry about a mile to the rear of Missionary Ridge. Sheridan moved regiments to either side of the enemy in an attempt to flank them, but with the moon shining in the night sky, the movement was detected and the enemy fled leaving much artillery and supplies. The divisions of Wood and Baird also drove the enemy till it was dark.
On Hooker's front the results were much the same. After crossing Chattanooga Creek, Hooker made rapid progress against the enemy's confused left flank. As Hooker advanced toward Rossville, his attack was so rapid and violent almost all the rebel defenders were captured.
Only on Sherman's front was the victory not a rout. This happened because Bragg had thrown so many reinforcements against Sherman and Cleburne conducted the Confederate defense.
By seven o' clock, the evening of the 25th, Grant was able to report to Halleck: "Although the battle lasted from early dawn until dark this evening, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us. I have no idea of finding Bragg here to-morrow." 72 Later that night he again wired Halleck, this time concerning Burnside. "I have heard from Burnside, to the 23rd, when he had rations for ten or twelve days, and expected to hold out that time. I shall move a force from here, on the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and send a column of twenty thousand men up the south side of the Tennessee, without wagons, carrying four days' rations, and taking a steamer loaded with rations, from which to draw, on the route. If Burnside holds out until this force gets beyond Kingston, I think the enemy will fly, and with the present state of the roads, must abandon almost everything. I believe Bragg will lose much of his army by desertion, in consequence of his defeat in the last three days' fight." 73
With the defeat of Bragg, Grant could turn his attention to the relief of Burnside. During the night of the 25th, he telegraphed the following to Wilcox, the only open way to get a message to Burnside: "The great defeat Bragg has sustained in the three days' battle terminating at dusk this evening, and a movement which I will immediately make, I think will relieve Burnside, if he holds out a few days longer. I shall pursue Bragg, to-morrow, and start a heavy column up the Tennessee valley the day after." 74 Still on the 25th, Grant wrote to Sherman about the days' results and plans to aid Burnside and pursue Bragg. "No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas's troops carried Missionary ridge, this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command, in taking, first, so much of the same range of hills, and, then, in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas's part certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside." 75 Again on the 25th, Grant wrote to Sherman: "My plan is to move your forces out gradually, until they reach the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee.....We will push Bragg with all our strength, to-morrow, and try if we cannot cut off a good portion of his new troops and trains. His men have manifested a strong desire to desert for some time past, and we will now give them a chance.....Move the advance force on the most easterly road taken by the enemy." 76
Thomas was also given instructions during the night of the 25th, for the relief of Burnside and further pursuit of the enemy. "You will start a strong reconnaissance in the morning at seven A.M., to ascertain the position of the enemy. If it is ascertained that the enemy are in full retreat, follow them with all your force, except that which you intend Granger to take to Knoxville.....Four days' rations should be got up to the men, between this and morning, and also a supply of ammunition. I shall want Granger's expedition to get off by the day after to-morrow." 77
The curtain finally fell on quite an eventful day for Ulysses S. Grant. November 25, 1863, saw the culmination of one of the most decisive victories the world had ever witnessed. General Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General of the Army, who had been with Grant during the Battle of Chattanooga, summed up the victory as follows: "Invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky indefinitely postponed. The slave aristocracy broken down. The grandest stroke yet struck for our country.....It is unexampled--another laurel leaf is added to Grant's crown." 78
At Chattanooga, Grant had about 60,000 men, while Bragg had about 33,000. The reader will recall that Bragg sent off about 15,000 men under Longstreet to attack Burnside in Knoxville. This was one battle where Grant had the manpower heavily in his favor, almost by a 2 to 1 ratio, but Bragg still held a position considered by many to be almost impregnable. Prior to November 23rd, Bragg held all the high ground, yet failed to see anything coming. The results of the battle were as follows: Union casualties; killed - 757; wounded - 4529; and missing - 330; for a total of 5616. For the Confederacy casualties were: killed and wounded - 2500; captured - 4000; for a total of 6500. In essence, Grant lost approximately 11% of his army as the attacker, while Bragg lost about 20% of his army as the defender, of an almost unassailable position. Another nail was driven into the coffin of "Grant the butcher."
Considering the position in which he found himself when he arrived in Chattanooga on October 23rd, Grant had performed nothing short of a miracle. His new command was besieged, which he quickly remedied. He then proceeded in small increments, to place his forces in the most advantageous position he could find from which to assault the enemy. All the while, the enemy had placed enormous pressure on part of Grant's command, some 100 miles distant, which Grant did not have the resources to aid. The immense pressure coming from Washington alone would have been enough to make a lesser man crack, but Grant kept his eyes focused on the target. Before long, he nearly captured the target en masse.
During his career, Grant captured three entire armies. At Chattanooga, he barely missed capturing his fourth. From a military standpoint, his victory at Chattanooga was possibly his most brilliant. At Fort Donelson, he displayed incredible coolness under pressure. At Shiloh, he demonstrated his eternal optimism against long odds. During the Vicksburg campaign, he conceived some of the most brilliant strategy the world had ever seen. At Chattanooga, Grant proved to be a great tactician, as his tactical maneuvering in the presence of the enemy so aptly exhibited.
Grant was unable to savor his victory for long because Bragg and Burnside still weighed heavily on his mind. On November 26th, he continued the pursuit of Bragg's weary army. Remember, Grant had been faulted, after Shiloh and the second battle of Corinth for not pursuing aggressively enough. Grant had his reasons both times, but the complaint rings hollow when the subject of the criticism is considered. Sherman pursued by way of Chickamauga station, while Thomas's force (Hooker and Palmer's corps) sought to overtake the enemy along the road to Atlanta toward Ringgold. Granger's corps was sent back to Chattanooga to begin its march to Knoxville to relieve Burnside. Grant had previously made arrangements to have provisions ready for Granger, so when the order was given for him to move on Knoxville, all would be in place.
Grant stayed with his pursuing soldiers, while Thomas returned to Chattanooga. Thomas was directed not to start Granger for Knoxville until he heard from Grant. Sherman arrived at Chickamauga depot on the 26th and found it burning, destroyed by the Confederates, so it would not fall into Union hands. Also, on the 26th, Hooker went into bivouac about five miles short of Ringgold.
Grant arrived at Ringgold on the 27th and determined that the rebel's retreat was real and disorganized. With the exception of Cleburne's division, who formed the rear guard, Bragg's army was discarding equipment right and left. As soon as Grant saw the state of affairs at Ringgold, he ordered a staff officer to return to Chattanooga and have Thomas start Granger
on his mission. At 1 P.M., November 27th, he called a halt to the pursuit and in his report of the battle used this reasoning: "Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only last until the 3rd of December. It was already getting late to afford the necessary relief. I determined therefore to pursue no farther." 79
Thinking Burnside's relief mission was well under way, Grant spent the 27th with Hooker who had engaged Cleburne's in a spirited fight near Ringgold. That night he spent with Sherman in Graysville, not returning to Chattanooga until the evening of the 28th.
Upon his arrival in Chattanooga, he found that Granger had failed to start for Knoxville. Granger apparently decided it was a very bad move to make, so he was reluctant to obey orders. This kind of attitude produced no sympathy from Grant. He always appreciated prompt action and disdained those who offered excuses. Granger had previously aroused the ire of Grant by his actions during the battle of Chattanooga. Evidently, Granger had displayed less cooperation than Grant deemed appropriate when Sheridan asked for assistance during his pursuit of the enemy following the assault on Missionary Ridge. If this was not enough, Granger was now refusing to go to the aid of Burnside, who was supposedly about out of supplies and besieged. Needless to say, Grant immediately sent orders to Sherman directing him to march upon Knoxville and relieve Burnside. Grant was reluctant to direct Sherman to make this march because he had just marched across the entire length of the State of Tennessee, but Burnside needed relief and Grant knew he could count on Sherman. Grant succinctly described the situation as follows: "But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements." 80
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