Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  As he moved into his new headquarters, the military situation confronting him was one of immense proportions. The combined Federal army numbered some 662,345 soldiers broken down into nineteen separate departments. 10 Four of the departments had been combined under General Sherman into the Military Division of the Mississippi. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command with no territorial boundaries. The enemy was active along a 1000 mile front. The significance of this is that Grant wanted all the armies to work in unison. Under the previous structure the various departments functioned independently. He was 150 years ahead of this time. In today’s military this doctrine is called jointness; where the various branches of the military work together to complete the mission. The Union held all of Kentucky, Tennessee and what is now called West Virginia. The Yankees had reopened the Mississippi which cleaved the Confederacy in half. The Union navy had blockaded most of the Confederate seaports leaving few open to the blockade runners. In the East, the two opposing armies stood essentially in the same positions they had occupied during the previous three years.

  In the East, the two opposing armies were the Union Army of the Potomac under General George Gordon Meade and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under the command of Robert E. Lee.

  On April 30th, the Army of the Potomac and the Ninth Army Corps reported 119,981 present for duty which included cavalry, artillery and infantry. 11 The infantry were broken down into three corps; the 2nd corps, commanded by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock; the 5th corps, commanded by Major-General G. K. Warren; and the 7th corps, commanded by Major-General John Sedgwick. The cavalry was commanded by Major-General Philip Sheridan, the only man Grant brought with him from the West. Grant was quite taken with this soldier's intense fighting style. In addition, Grant had set aside the 9th army corps, under Major-General Ambrose Burnside, to function as a reserve for the Army of the Potomac, but reporting directly to Grant. This army corps had 22,708 present for duty on April 30, 1864.

  On the Southern side, the Army of Northern Virginia reported 61,218 present for duty on April 20, 1864. This figure included infantry, cavalry and artillery. The infantry consisted of the 2nd Army Corps under Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell and the 3rd Army Corps under Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill. The cavalry was commanded by Major-General J. E. B. Stuart.

  Two facts must be considered when comparing the relative sizes of these two armies. One element missing from Lee's return of April 20th was Longstreet's corps. This corps was in far eastern Tennessee, but was back in time to participate in the Virginia campaigns during the spring. Longstreet's corps numbered around 15,000 men. The other element worthy of consideration was the method of counting soldiers in the armies. In the Union army, all soldiers were counted including cooks, teamsters, etc. In the Confederate army, only those who were combatants were counted. Therefore, the actual sizes of the opposing forces were much closer in number than they appeared to be on the surface.

  The positions of the two armies were separated by the Rapidan River. The Army of the Potomac lay on the north side, while the Army of Northern Virginia was deployed along the south bank. The rebels were entrenched all along their front presenting a very formidable obstacle, in addition to crossing the river.

  Grant's general campaign plans differed little, in one regard, from his other campaigns. He planned to hold Lee in one position and have Sherman and others work their way into position to be able to attack Lee's rear. For Grant, in essence, it would another campaign against the enemy's rear. The foundation for Grant's strategy was that of a wheel. If one was to take a map of the United States during the Civil War and place a pencil straight up and down somewhere between Richmond and Washington, this would become the pivot point. Grant wanted to hold Lee at that pivot point. From there, place a ruler from the pivot to New Orleans. Now move the ruler counterclockwise keeping the one end on the pivot. Eventually the ruler moves through Mobile, Atlanta and Savannah, finally ending up in Lee's rear in Virginia. Even though Banks never moved upon Mobile, Sherman provided the perfect wheel moving to Atlanta, Savannah and on up to Lee's rear in North Carolina. Grant's strategy was perfect.

  In addition to the proposed movements of Sherman and Banks, Grant wanted to exert the most pressure he could on the enemy, so he would order General Sigel to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and General Butler to advance up the peninsula from Fort Monroe toward Richmond.

  President Lincoln seemed to think this combined movement, with everyone advancing at the same time, toward one common center, was something new in warfare. On Grant's last trip to Washington before the campaign began, he explained how he planned to exert as much pressure as possible against the South by moving all the armies at once. In regards to Grant's strategy, Lincoln remarked, "Oh, Yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." 13 Lincoln was only commenting on Grant's theory of the combined movement of armies. Lincoln did not know what Grant's actual plans were and he did not want Grant to tell him.

  On March 31st, Grant began issuing his orders for the upcoming campaigns.

  MARCH 31st, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS:

  "1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

  "2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

  "3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

  "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 14

  Notice how clear and easy to understand these orders are. Grant never burdened his subordinates with trivia and did not tell them what to do; he spelled out the objective, in this case, Mobile, and left it to the subordinate to get the job done.

  On April 2nd, he gave General Butler his directions.

  "FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

  "GENERAL:--In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

  "It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement, they interpose the
mselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

  "General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

  "When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

  "The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your forces and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

  "All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

  "You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

  "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 15

  It should be noted in Butler's orders the instruction to take City Point immediately. Grant was thinking many moves ahead of everyone else, like a chess player. It did not take a genius to look at a map and discover the jugular of the Confederacy, Petersburg, Virginia.

  The analysis is simple. Lee would fight for Richmond, for how could the Confederacy call itself a country and be unable to defend its capital. In order for Lee to defend Richmond, he would have to be able to supply his army with food and provisions. For Lee to supply his army he needed a method of transportation, preferably at least one railroad, probably more. A cursory glance at a map showed that Petersburg was a railroad hub where five railroads converged. Consequently, Petersburg became the key to supplying Lee's army near Richmond. If Grant could put that key in his pocket, Lee must retreat or surrender. City Point provided the perfect embarkation point from which to make a move upon Petersburg, and due to a railroad running from City Point to Petersburg, the perfect place from which to supply his army, once it had seized Petersburg. To paraphrase Robert E. Lee, once Grant gets south of the James it will be a siege and only a question of time. Grant foresaw all these operations months in advance, consequently, Grant's reference to City Point in his orders to Butler.

  Two days after he sent his orders to Butler, he sent Sherman his orders.

  [Private and Confidential.]

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

  WASHINGTON, D. C., April 4, 1864.

  MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

  Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

  General:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon.

  I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and to return your troops to you and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

  Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found.

  Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

  Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

  You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

  I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simple lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

  As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

  From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

  I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieutenant-General. 16

  The last set of orders Grant issued were those for the Army of the Potomac under General Meade on April 9, 1864.

  IN FIELD, CULPEPER C.H., VA.,

  April 9, 1864.

  MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE,

  Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

  For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone.

  So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one comm
on centre. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.

  Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his will make south at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and South-west.