Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  Battle of the Wilderness

  If there was one word to describe the Battle of the Wilderness it was confusion. Lee had his headquarters established at Orange Court House about twenty-five miles west of where the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan. On May 4th, the Confederates were informed the Yankees were on the move, so Lee decided to attack Grant's forces in flank.

  Out from behind their strong intrenchments along Mine Run came the mighty Army of Northern Virginia. Lee, during the afternoon of May 4th, put Ewell's corps in motion moving east on the Orange Turnpike. Hill's corps was moving east along the Orange Plank Road. Longstreet's corps was also directed to move on the Orange Plank Road following Hill. Longstreet's corps was stationed some five miles to the southwest of Orange Court House at Gordonsville.

  Grant's movement was an attempt to get south of the strong rebel fortifications at Mine Run and flank Lee out of his strong position into the open field. In doing so, Grant had to go through an area called the Wilderness. This area was heavily forested rendering artillery ineffective.

  Grant hoped to be able to move through this area rapidly into more open country, but Lee seeing his opportunity to catch Grant in flank aimed to do battle in the Wilderness. This would nullify Grant's advantage in numbers and artillery.

  With Grant aware that Lee was rushing to meet him, he changed his orders for May 5th, willing to do battle anywhere, from moving south to moving west to be ready to meet the oncoming enemy. Hancock was to move from his bivouac near Chancellorsville to Shady Grove Church. Hancock would anchor the left of the Union line which would stretch all the way back to the Rapidan. Warren was directed to move to Parker's store and connect with Hancock. Sedgwick was to move from Germanna Ford and connect with Warren at Old Wilderness Tavern. Burnside was to form a junction with Sedgwick and complete the line to the Rapidan. This would cover the army's trains protecting them from an assault by the enemy.

  The army was off at dawn moving toward their prescribed destinations. Warren's corps was the first to come into contact with the enemy near Parker's store at about six o' clock the morning of May 5th. Warren was ordered to halt concentrate and attack the enemy. Hancock, who had reached Todd's Tavern, was ordered to halt and await further orders. Two divisions of Sedgwick's corps were ordered to join the right and rear of Warren's position giving as much support as possible.

  Meade moved his headquarters to the Wilderness Tavern, while Grant remained at Germanna Ford to give Burnside directions. At about 8:30 A.M., Grant received word that the army had come into contact with Lee's advance columns. Always wanting to be the aggressor, he sent back word to Meade: "If any opportunity presents itself for pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for dispositions." 35 By 8:40, Grant determined not to wait for Burnside and left a message for him. He then proceeded to Wilderness Tavern to be closer to the action.

  No matter how anxious Grant was to attack Lee, the nature of the country and the fact that the army was strewn out over such a long distance prevented early action. At 9:00 A.M., Hancock was ordered up to form on Warren's left and slightly to the rear. At about 1:00 P.M., Warren's corps began the attack. By 2:00 P.M., Hancock's troops began to arrive in their prescribed positions and were ordered to join the attack.

  Ewell, who was advancing along the Orange Turnpike, was under orders from Lee to bring on a battle with Grant as soon as possible, thinking he could annihilate Grant's army in flank as he had done a year earlier to Joe Hooker, but now Lee was having second thoughts. Because Longstreet was so far behind the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia, he would not arrive before dark at the earliest. This meant Lee's two corps would be facing Grant's four corps, a situation Lee wanted to avoid. Consequently, Lee, who was traveling with Hill, urged Ewell to advance more slowly hoping to forestall a full engagement until Longstreet arrived.

  Due to the heavily forested areas and lack of good roads, Hancock was unable to begin his attack until 4 P.M. This fit well into Lee's plans, but Grant was beginning to find the Army of the Potomac lacking the responsiveness to which he was accustomed.

  Warren's initial attack against Ewell along the Orange Turnpike was successful. Griffin's and Wadsworth's divisions struck Ewell's advance and routed one entire brigade, advancing over three-quarters of a mile. Meade ordered Wright's division of Sedgwick's corps to support Griffin's right and Warren ordered two of his own divisions to the support of Griffin's right, but none reached the scene in time to help. Before long, Griffin found himself isolated, which the rebels discovered and counterattacked driving Griffin's forces back to their original starting point.

  Wadsworth's division, which had advanced at the same time as Griffin, was trying to move to the right to connect with Griffin's division, but the going was nearly impossible in the dense woods. As it moved, Wadsworth encountered three divisions of Ewell's corps coming up and his division took a severe shellacking from the rebels. Another of Warren's divisions was approaching as Wadsworth was being driven and this division was also sent reeling.

  The news of these repulses soon reached Grant so he decided to go to the front to see what he could for himself. What he found was forest so dense one could not even see the enemy. In addition, there was extensive smoke and fire in many places where the underbrush had caught fire from the day's fighting. One other discovery was that a gap had developed between the lines of Warren and Hancock. Upon his return to headquarters, Grant had officers dispatched to hasten Sedgwick to Warren's left and Burnside to Warren's right in order to fill the gap.

  General Grant was not the only one to perceive the gap between the Union forces. General Lee had also taken note of this opportunity and had ordered A. P. Hill to advance upon the gap. There was only one division, Getty's division of Sedgwick's corps, plugging the gap at this time and Getty was ordered to hold his position at all hazards. By 2 P.M., Hill's advance was in front of Getty, when the head of Hancock's column arrived. At 2:15 and 2:30 orders were sent to Hancock to combine with Getty and attack Hill at once. Between 3 P.M. and 4 P.M., Hancock received another order to attack with his whole corps in support of Getty. Finally, at 4:15, Meade ordered Getty to attack Hill without waiting for Hancock. Hancock was normally exceedingly prompt, but in this thick underbrush, confusion reigned.

  At last, after 4 P.M., Hancock's corps went into action. Hancock, even though one could see no further than fifty yards in front, encountered Hill's corps about 200 paces west of the Brock Road. All along Hancock's front, his men slowly pushed the rebels back. By the time darkness arrived, two of Hill's divisions were facing approximately one third of the Army of the Potomac under General Hancock. Hill's force was in as much disarray as the Federals had been earlier. If darkness had not come, there was a good possibility Hill's entire force would have been destroyed. The first day’s battle had ended.

  Everything on both sides had been disorder. Men were consumed by the flames which burned throughout the area. There was so much dirt and smoke in the air it was difficult to determine where the enemy was, let alone in what strength. The day ended without decisive results on either side.

  Grant knew Longstreet was on his way to join Lee, so he issued orders to resume the battle at first light - 4:30 A.M. He always wanted to be the first to take the initiative. Knowing how tough the fight had been during the day, Meade asked for a delay until six, so Grant agreed to modify his orders to five o' clock.

  During the evening, Horace Porter, of Grant's staff, reported that Grant "manifested intense anxiety in regard to relieving the wounded, and the medical officers and the commanders of troops were urged to make every possible effort to find the sufferers and convey them to the rear." 36 Later that evening, as they sat around the campfire, Grant gave his analysis of the day's events. "I feel pretty well satisfied with the result of the engagement; for it is evident that Lee attempted by a bold movement to strike this army in flank before it could be put into line of battle and be prepared to fight to advantage; but in this he has failed." 37


  Burnside's corps began to arrive at Wilderness Tavern before dawn. Grant directed him to place his corps in the gap between Warren's and Hancock's corps. From there, he was to attack immediately against the rebel center and swing around to his left and smash Lee's right. In support of this action, Warren and Sedgwick were to make attacks along their fronts. With Burnside's men in place, Hancock would command, fully, one-half of the Army of the Potomac.

  Grant's aggressive instincts were correct, but Lee beat him to the punch. Longstreet had arrived and his corps was found to be moving northeast along the Catharpin Road in an effort to flank Hancock's position. Hancock quickly placed Barlow's division with all the artillery of the Second corps in position to cover the invaluable Brock Road. At 5 A.M., the whole Union front sprang to life. Hancock's divisions of Mott and Birney, along with Getty began to advance along the Orange Plank Road. Wadsworth soon joined the assault and the Confederate line began to give. Within one hour, the forces under Hancock advanced over one mile along the Plank road. The rebels were being driven in great confusion and Lee's headquarters, trains and artillery were now fully in view. Lee was even seen at the front trying to form a defensive line. The Federal victory, which appeared so close the night before seemed within reach. At this point, one of Longstreet's divisions came up in support and Hancock ordered a halt to readjust his disjointed formations.

  As the rebels counterattacked, the confusion in the Union lines caused the offensive to peter out and soon it was the Southerners who were pushing the Yankees. The problem for both sides in this battle was when either side advanced too far they became isolated in the dense forest and became easy targets for the enemy.

  Just as Hancock's line had become separated due to the advance, Longstreet's suffered a similar fate during his counterattack. Longstreet discovered Birney's flank was too far in advance and unsupported by Gibbon. As he was advancing to cut Hancock's force in two, his forces became entangled with Hill's, a similar fate which had befallen the northern troops earlier, and his offensive ground to a halt. At this time, Longstreet was accidentally wounded by his own men and had to be carried from the field. This break in the action allowed Hancock time to regroup behind the intrenchments they had built along the Brock Road. Hancock had lost all that had been gained and by noon both armies along Hancock's front were in the same positions they had occupied at the outset of the day.

  During the early afternoon, there was a lull in the action. Burnside still had not reached the position to which he had been directed. Finally, Grant received word that Willcox and Potter's divisions of Burnside's corps were in position to attack and orders were sent to resume the offensive at 6 P.M., but Grant's orders were for naught because Lee had the same idea. At 4:15 P.M., Lee's army launched a vicious attack against Hancock's front. The rebels came crashing forward and broke open a hole in the line held by Mott's division. Hancock quickly plugged the hole with Carroll's brigade of Birney's division and the rebels retreated for the night. Burnside, Warren and Sedgwick also fought during the afternoon, but their actions were secondary to what was occurring in front of Hancock.

  After the Confederate assault was repelled along Hancock's front, it appeared the fighting was over for the day, but just as dusk settled, a brigade of rebels lead by General John B. Gordon attacked Sedgwick's corps on its extreme right. Rickett's division was completely surprised and one entire brigade, including two brigadier generals was captured. Harried staff officers, one after another, reported to headquarters that the whole army was in jeopardy. One staff officer even ventured to tell Grant that if the army was routed from their positions all the trains would be captured. This kind of attitude rankled Grant and he replied, "When this army is defeated and when I am driven from this line, it will be when I have so few men left they will not want any trains." 38 Grant and Meade remained calm, Grant stating: "Lee hasn't had time to mass his forces in front of Sedgwick. We shall soon hear a different story." 39 About this time, a general officer came in from his command and spoke to Grant in an excited manner: "General Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously. I know Lee's methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our communication." 40 This statement and the corresponding attitude exasperated Grant and he replied with a degree of animation rarely witnessed. "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." 41

  Grant remained incredibly calm as usual and soon the hole in the line was plugged and Grant went to bed. Ten minutes later a report arrived saying the situation on Sedgwick's right had stabilized.

  So the biggest battle of the Civil War ended. Most people think the Battle of Gettysburg was the largest of the Civil War, but counting the number of combatants, the largest battle was the Wilderness. There were approximately 200,000 troops involved in the battle. Grant's losses were: killed - 2246; wounded - 12,037; and missing - 3383 for a total of 17,666. 42 Lee's losses were approximately 11,400 in killed, wounded and missing. 43 Both armies lost approximately 15% of its force.

  The Battle of the Wilderness was described by McFeely thus: "He (Grant) led his troops into the Wilderness and there produced a nightmare of inhumanity and inept military strategy that ranks with the worst such episodes in the history of warfare." 44

  This opinion is typical of historians who desperately want to propagate the notion of Grant as a butcher, master of the frontal attack and victor because of sheer numbers.

  The question must be asked, why do some of these historians ignore the truth and facts in favor of some skewed notion that nothing good could possibly emanate from the military? Could it be that some hold a political view that by striking down the reputation of one of the world’s greatest generals a blow has been struck against anything military? Or could it be that a blow against Grant causes the reputation of Lee to rise? The reader will have to investigate the facts and decide for his or her self.

  Tactically, the battle of the Wilderness was a draw. Both sides made thrusts, which were parried and were forced to return to their lines.

  Strategically, this battle was a huge Federal success. Remember what Grant's primary objective was; to fix Lee's army. Lee's losses, though smaller in number than Grant's, were far more devastating. Lee’s losses were so severe he could no longer operate on the offensive. From now on, he was forced to act on the defensive, until his attack on Fort Stedman at Petersburg almost one year later. In short, Grant had accomplished his objective within two days of beginning his offensive.

  McFeely wrote about Grant's inept military strategy, but is his conclusion correct? Grant crossed the Rapidan unopposed. He attempted to flank Lee out of his strong position at Mine Run. If Grant truly was the bloodthirsty villain McFeely made him out to be, why did he not attempt one frontal assault on the Mine Run fortifications? Lee, seeing Grant's intentions, attempted to catch Grant in flank, but Grant, aware of Lee's move, turned his forces westward to meet Lee head-on. Remember Grant was trying to get through the Wilderness to attack Lee's flank at Mine Run, but Grant never ran from an opportunity to attack the enemy. Lee was wise to attempt an attack upon Grant in the Wilderness because it nullified the Union advantages in men and artillery, but Lee chose the Wilderness to do battle, not Grant.

  To date, the movements on both sides appear to be sound, both tactically and strategically. Mr. McFeely's statements again appear baseless other than the opinion that war is inhumane. In that opinion, the author concurs. Grant did not ask to be in this position, he was only trying to insure his just cause prevailed.

  In the Wilderness, he was eminently successful in his mission.

  CHAPTER TEN

  "If it takes all summer"

  May 7, 1864 - May 19, 1864

  Battle o
f Spotsylvania

  Sometime after breakfast on the morning of May 7th, Grant was reflecting on the battle with his staff. He told them it appeared to be a draw, but it also appeared that the enemy had withdrawn to a defensive position. Grant went on to say, that as a result, he would be able to proceed with his intentions of moving the army to the left and once again attempt to draw Lee out into an open field.

  While Grant remained upbeat and moved forward with his predetermined march toward the James, one wonders what was going through Lee's mind. Lee had frightened many a Union general, as manifested by the comments of the commander in Grant's camp the night before, but Lee had not faced anyone like Grant. This was one man Lee could not scare.

  Strictly adhering to his own admonishments to the general the evening before, Grant issued his orders for his next move not knowing what Lee's intentions were. He intended to force Lee to conform to his actions.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,

  May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE:

  Commanding A. P.

  Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spotsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spotsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

  I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.