Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  While he was waiting for the assaulting force to be assembled, he sent his usual dispatch to Halleck.

  NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE}

  May 10, 1864, 9.30 A.M. }

  Major-General Halleck,

  Washington, D. C.:

  The enemy hold our front in very strong force, and evince a strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward steps, but may be compelled to send back to Belle Plain for further supplies. Please have supplies of forage and provisions sent there at once, and fifty rounds of ammunition (infantry) for one hundred thousand men. Send General Benham with the necessary bridge train for the Rappahannock river. We can maintain ourselves at least, and in the end beat Lee's army I believe.

  Send to Belle Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape. With the present position of the armies, ten thousand men can be spared from the defences of Washington, besides all the troops that have reached there since Burnside's departure. Some may also be brought from Wallace's department. We want no more wagons or artillery.

  U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General 9

  In the above letter, Grant again evidenced his determined will, "I shall take no backward steps." He also gave his best estimate of how many men he had available by asking for ammunition for 100,000 men.

  Throughout the afternoon of May 10th, Grant rearranged his lines in preparation for the attack. Two divisions of Hancock's corps were brought to the north side of the Po River. Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren's corps and Birney was placed to the rear of Warren as a reserve. Mott's division of Hancock's corps had been diverted from Todd's Tavern and placed in line between Wright and Burnside. His division was to participate in the assault. Burnside was ordered to reconnoiter his front and if an opportunity appeared favorable, to exploit it.

  As the movement of Hancock's men commenced, the rebels seized the opportunity to attack Hancock's one remaining division south of the Po. At 2 P.M., the enemy attacked Barlow's division vigorously. After the two divisions were safely over the river Barlow followed and held the position on the north side of the river. Heavy losses occurred on both sides during this action.

  Both Warren and Wright reconnoitered their fronts in preparation for the assault which was to occur in the afternoon. As a result of the reconnaissance, Wright was able to advance his position to a better spot from which to attack. Warren reconnoitered his front twice in preparation for the attack, but was repulsed both times. When he reported the results, he ventured that he could carry the works in his front with no assistance from Hancock. Based on this information, Warren was ordered to attack at 4 P.M. Wright's corps with Mott's division was also ordered to advance simultaneously with Warren.

  Warren attacked at 4 P.M., but was driven back with severe loses. Wright and Mott were not ready and did not attack in support of Warren. Hancock eventually got into position and attacked but he had no more luck than Warren.

  Later in the afternoon, along Wright's front, the Yankees did discover a promising technique for attacking strongly held fortifications. Colonel Emory Upton of the 120th New York Volunteers believed he could punch a hole in the enemy's line which could be exploited by support troops. He believed when attacking an entrenched position the attacking force had to move fast. He told his men to charge the line without firing and swarm over the defenders with bayonets. Once the line was pierced, his men would fan out in each direction to hold the breach until supporting forces could arrive.

  At six o' clock, Upton led twelve regiments in four compact lines forward. They broke out of the woods not far from the rebel lines and raced toward the enemy. Within a few minutes the Yankees had broken open a significant hole in the Confederate line and had penetrated the second line of defense capturing 100 prisoners. At this point, the supporting force under Mott failed to seize the moment. They attacked along with Upton, but had farther to go over open territory and came under artillery fire. Mott's division broke and retreated in confusion leaving Upton in a very precarious position.

  One last assault was made by Hancock, Warren and Wright which did reach the enemy works, but nothing came of it. Under cover of darkness, Upton was withdrawn. He was badly injured, but had shown unparalleled gallantry for which Grant promoted him on the battlefield to the rank of Brigadier-General.

  The results of the 10th had been disappointing, but Upton's charge proved the use of new techniques might yet lead to Lee's demise, so no one was disheartened. Grant finally had concrete proof of Lee's desperate condition because whenever one of the Union charges failed, Lee failed to exploit it.

  May 11th dawned promising the army some much needed rest. Grant wanted reconnaissance done along the enemy line with a view of breaking it again as Upton had previously done.

  Following breakfast, Congressman Washburne, who had been accompanying the army since the beginning of the campaign, got ready for his return to Washington. As he was getting ready to leave he told Grant he would be seeing the President and the Secretary of War upon his return and asked him if he could give them a message about the army's progress to date. Grant told him that he did not want to raise any false hopes, but seeing as how he communicated frequently with General Halleck, he would write Halleck a letter which Washburne could take with him. He stepped into his tent and wrote the following letter.

  NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,

  May 11, 1864---8.30 A.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army,

  Washington, D. C.

  We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we have taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

  The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.

  I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

  Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defence of Richmond.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General 10

  The letter provides Grant's honest appraisal of the current situation. He did not run from the large casualty list or make excuses about the severity of the fighting. He did give his opinion that the fighting so far has been "much in our favor." In this statement, he was entirely correct and he now had the evidence to prove it. Once again he exhibited his strength of character and determination to bring the war to a close with the statement about fighting it out even if it took all summer.

  Mott's division made the reconnaissance Grant wanted done on the 11th and discovered the most vulnerable point to attack, so Grant issued orders for the 12th.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

  May 11, 1864.--3 P.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

  Commanding Army of the Potomac.

  Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o' clock A.M. to-morrow. I will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any oppor
tunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and, had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General. 11

  HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,

  May 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,

  Commanding 9th Army Corps.

  Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o' clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible at precisely 4 o' clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

  I send you two of my staff officers; Colonels Comstock and Babcock, in whom I have the greatest confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General. 12

  Grant was basing the attack of the 12th upon the experience of Upton's attack. His plan was to hold fast Lee's forces on his left while Burnside and Hancock attacked Lee's right and center-right.

  There was a torrential rainstorm the evening of the 11th-12th. Hancock's corps moved at 10 P.M. behind the Union lines and re-emerged at midnight at Brown's house behind Mott's division between Wright's and Burnside's positions. The attack was to commence at 4 A.M., but Hancock postponed it to 4:30. Hancock had his corps aligned in two assaulting columns similar to Upton's arrangement. Barlow and Birney's divisions were in the lead with Mott and Gibbon in the rear. Each division had formed into two lines. At the point of attack, the Federals stood some twelve hundred yards from the rebel entrenchments. The ground in front of Hancock rose slightly and was heavily forested until a clearing was reached about two or three hundred yards in front of the enemy's position. On the morning of the 12th, a dense fog lay low along the ground.

  At 4:35, Hancock gave the order to advance. Burnside began his attack just before Hancock moved. Hancock's two lead divisions moved at quick time until they reached a line of abatis built by the Confederates some two hundred yards from the rebel lines. Here they stopped long enough for men with axes to clear the way. Once the way was cleared the men advanced at the double quick until they went over the parapet. Barlow and Birney reached the salient at the same time and their men surged forward capturing Confederate General Edward Johnson's entire division plus twenty pieces of artillery and Generals Johnson and Steuart. The problem this time was not lack of support, as Upton had experienced, but too many troops in such a small area. For a while, confusion reigned, but shortly the Nationals pushed ahead advancing one-half mile into the Confederate position coming close to severing Lee's army. Barlow later stated, "so far as the assault was concerned, it was.....the most brilliant thing of its kind of the war." 13

  The Confederates, while not caught off guard, were certainly stunned. One hour passed before Lee counterattacked, but when he did, it was with fury. The counterattack struck the disorganized Federals so hard they fell back to the trench line. Now the fight developed into a hand-to-hand contest with soldiers on each side of the log breastworks bayoneting each other through gaps between the logs and shooting each other musket to musket. Hancock called for reinforcements. Grant had already foreseen the request and ordered Wright's corps into action to support Hancock. About six o' clock, Grant also ordered Warren's corps to attack in support of Hancock, but as usual Warren failed to move in a timely manner.

  About 6 A.M., Wright's corps came crashing in on the left side of the salient at a place later dubbed the "Bloody Angle." Here the fighting was the most ferocious of the battle. The rain had started again and the men fought in knee deep mud. The trenches were full of water and fallen men. Some of the wounded drowned when the dead fell on top of them.

  Burnside had attacked along his front and pushed the rebels out of their initial lines, but the Confederates had counterattacked and drove the Northerners back over the works they had captured, but not entirely out from the original Confederate perimeter.

  On Warren's front, things were not moving at all. About mid-morning Meade sent word to Grant that "Warren seems reluctant to assault," adding, "I have ordered him at all hazards to do so, and if his attack should be repulsed to draw into the right and send his troops as fast as possible to Wright and Hancock." 14 To this Grant replied: "If Warren fails to attack promptly, send Humphreys to command his corps and relieve him." 15

  Warren finally went into action, but the only results he had to show for his efforts were heavy casualties. Grant was displeased with both Warren and Burnside on this day. He felt their efforts were much less than those of Hancock and Wright.

  Lee attacked no fewer than five times during the day of May 12th, in an effort to dislodge the Federal troops in the salient, but his efforts were in vain. Meanwhile, the Confederates were busy further down the mule shoe constructing a second line of entrenchments. Until this wall was complete the rebels farther up the salient were stuck trying to hold the Yankees back.

  The fighting of May 12th was continuous for almost 24 hours. When it finally ended, it proved to be one of the most vicious battles of the war.

  That night, Grant summed up the day's operations in a dispatch to Halleck.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,

  May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

  MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

  Washington, D. C.

  The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Dole's), and one regiment entire from the enemy.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General. 16

  The results of the Spotsylvania campaign through May 12, 1864, were best summarized by Livermore. "Colonel Livermore calculates that, from the 8th to the 12th of May, Grant lost 14,322 men, and Lee about 12,000. The effective strength of Grant's army was, therefore, reduced by 12.5 per cent, and Lee's by 19.7 per cent. "this result,' writes Livermore, 'would disprove the charge of a useless sacrifice of life by General Grant down to the 12th of May." 17

  It is interesting to note in the Battle of Spotsylvania as in every battle he fought, Grant's interest in the number of captured. One of the first questions he asked was how many prisoners had been taken. It was not because he wanted them counted as trophies to be collected, but he felt it much more humane to capture soldiers rather than kill them.

  There was no fighting to speak of on the 13th, other than skirmishing done to ascertain any movements of the enemy. Therefore, Grant devoted much time to inquiries about the care the wounded were receiving and the burial of the dead.

  Also, on the 13th, he wrote the Secretary of War recommending promotions for many officers.

  SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

  HON. E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,

  Washington, D. C.

  I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers; Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently
deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

  General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both.

  U. S. GRANT,

  Lieut.-General. 18

  Later in the day of the 13th, a discussion occurred at Grant's headquarters concerning the position of General Meade. Many on the staff felt Meade's position was not needed and, in fact, in many cases, by passing orders through him, caused delays and led to misinterpretation of orders.

  Grant was aware of the awkwardness of the situation, but provided Meade a handsome defense and acknowledged Meade's many contributions to date. Grant offered the following argument: "I am fully aware that some embarrassments arise from the present organization, but there is more weight on the other side of the question. I am commanding all the armies, and I cannot neglect others by giving my time exclusively to the Army of the Potomac, which would involve performing all the detailed duties of an army commander, directing its administration, enforcing discipline, reviewing its court-martial proceedings, etc. I have Burnside's, Butler's, and Sigel's to look after in Virginia, to say nothing of our Western armies, and I may make Sheridan's cavalry a separate command. Besides, Meade has served a long time with the Army of the Potomac, knows its subordinate officers thoroughly, and led it to a memorable victory at Gettysburg. I have just come from the West, and if I removed a deserving Eastern man from the position of army commander, my motives might be misunderstood, and the effect be bad upon the spirits of the troops. General Meade and I are in close contact on the field; he is capable and perfectly subordinate, and by attending to the details he relieves me of much unnecessary work, and gives me more time to think and to mature my general plans. I will always see that he gets full credit for what he does." 19