I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided.
Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can.
The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without his protection.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General. 1
In preparation for the move, Grant sent Colonels Comstock and Porter to scout out the most favorable place for the army to cross the James, and to visit with General Butler to explain the movement to him and instruct him to make his position as secure as possible. He also told them he was sending Smith's corps minus their wagons and artillery back to Butler at Bermuda Hundred to provide increased strength in case it was needed.
Porter and Comstock departed Cold Harbor on June 7th, completed their mission and reported back to Grant on June 12th. The place they had chosen for the crossing was Fort Powhatan about ten miles below City Point. Several roads led to that spot and the river there was the narrowest stretch between City Point and the Chesapeake Bay, still the bridge would be have to be twenty-one hundred feet in length.
In order to divert Lee's attention from Grant's true intentions, he ordered General Sheridan to take two divisions of cavalry and break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River canal. Upon completion of his mission, he was to push west and join General Hunter's force in the Shenandoah Valley if possible. It was hoped the Confederate cavalry would follow Sheridan and leave the Federal trains unmolested during the move across the James. Sheridan began his movement on June 7th, and Lee took the bait.
Upon detecting Sheridan's move, on June 8th, Lee ordered General Wade Hampton to follow with two cavalry divisions. Subsequent to that, Lee ordered Fitzhugh Lee's division to go in support of Hampton. Later, he sent Breckinridge's force back to the valley and on June 11th, he ordered Early and his division to move via Charlottesville against Hunter's rear. In other words, Grant's use of Sheridan's diversion was eminently successful in diverting Lee's attention northward.
Grant's successful diversion is supported by Lee's correspondence. On June 6th, to Jefferson Davis, Lee stated: "The enemy is now moving in my front. He is withdrawing from our left, but I have not yet been able to discover what is his purpose or intention." 2 On June 8th, Lee wrote to James Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War: "Two divisions of his cavalry under Genl Sheridan are reported to have crossed the Pamunkey yesterday at New Castle Ferry and to have encamped last night at Dunkirk and Aylett's on the Mattapony." 3 In a letter to Jefferson Davis on June 9th, Lee mentioned the movements he had directed against Sheridan. "I have directed Genls Hampton and Fitz Lee with their divisions to proceed in the direction of Hanover Junction, and thence, if the information they receive justifies it, along the Central Railroad, keeping the enemy on their right, and shape their course according to his." 4
While Lee willingly followed Grant's deception, another rebel commander displayed keen insight in a dispatch to the Confederate government on June 7th. General P. G. T. Beauregard, who was in front of Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred, telegraphed: "Should Grant have left Lee's front, he doubtless intends operating against Richmond, along James river, probably on the southern side. Petersburg, nearly defenceless, would be captured before it could be reinforced." 5 Evidently Beauregard's keen perception went unheeded.
In another preparatory move, Grant had all the bridges over the Chickahominy destroyed east of Lee's position. In case Lee discovered Grant’s move, this would help forestall any rapid pursuit.
On June 8th, Grant ordered Meade to construct a second line of fortifications to cover the crossing of the Chickahominy. This could be used to hold off an attack by Lee if the movement was revealed.
On June 11th, he wrote out the final instructions for both Meade and Butler.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.
The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to make arrangements for gunboats and transportation to send up the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, to-morrow, as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it should reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at Jones's and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City Point.
I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by way of Richmond.
The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough.
I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in there reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If their is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid.
Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut-General.
P.S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House. The distance which they will have to travel will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.
U. S. GRANT. 6
Notice Grant's reference to Petersburg in his letter to Butler. He fully intended to capture Petersburg as part of his efforts to strangle Lee's army. This had been part of his objective since before the campaign commenced. That is why he made his instructions to Butler exceptionally clear. If Butler
did not think he could take and hold Petersburg, Grant did not want him to even consider it. Should Butler make a feeble effort, it would only call more attention to Grant's true intentions and make it more difficult to capture in the end.
After he finished his instructions to Butler, he wrote out those for Meade.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer.
The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point.
The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.
The other corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than Jones's they should take it.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.
P.S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together.
U. S. GRANT. 7
It is interesting to observe once again the difficulty of the proposed undertaking. Grant would have to pull his forces out quietly in an effort to get a head start on the enemy. In some places, the opposing armies stood but thirty or forty yards apart. He was going to march the army through difficult swamps and cross two rivers. One river crossing would require a bridge 2100 feet in length or almost one-half mile. The distance the Army of the Potomac would have to march was between 40 and 50 miles which would require a number of days. In addition to moving an army of one hundred thousand men, all the corresponding supplies and munitions would have to go by the same route. On top of all the other concerns, the base of supplies for the army would have to be moved from White House to City Point, a distance of about 150 miles.
All this movement on the part of the Union army should be contrasted to what Lee would have to do upon learning that the Army of the Potomac had left his front. Lee was not more than ten miles from Richmond or thirty miles from Petersburg. He did not have to worry about the movement of his army being interrupted. He had railroads available to move his forces and could cross the James where it was only a few hundred feet wide. As always, Lee would be able to benefit from intelligence on the Federal position. If he wanted, Lee could make an attack upon the Army of the James while it was separated from the Army of the Potomac. A victory, in detail, over the Army of the James would not only raise morale in the Confederacy, but would reduce the pressure of a siege upon the Richmond-Petersburg area.
During the overland campaign from the Rapidan, Grant attempted to fix Lee by constantly taking the fight to him and trying to turn his flanks. The goal was the destruction of Lee's army, but now he would fix Lee by attempting to cut off his supplies. In order to achieve this objective, Grant would rely upon his old standard--the rear attack. Grant would attempt to get to Lee's rear and cut off his supply lines.
The move began during the night of June 12th following the return of Comstock and Porter from their scouting mission. Hancock and Wright held the front at Cold Harbor, while Warren and Burnside withdrew. Smith's corps also withdrew heading for White House for transportation to Bermuda Hundred. Burnside set off for Jones's Bridge over the Chickahominy, while Warren went to Long Bridge. By the morning of June 13th, both Burnside and Warren had reached the Chickahominy covering the crossings for Hancock and Wright.
By 8 A.M., Grant had moved his headquarters to Long Bridge where Hancock's corps had just arrived. Warren crossed the Chickahominy and moved to Riddle's Shop to confuse the enemy and along with Wilson's cavalry confronted the rebels to mask the movements of the other Union forces.
At daybreak on June 13th, Smith reported his arrival at White House and his dispatch of 3000 men to City Point.
It did not take Lee long to discover the Yankees were gone from his front. At 10 P.M. on June 13th, Lee sent a dispatch to James Seddon which contained the following: "At daybreak this morning it was discovered that the army of Genl Grant had left our front. Our skirmishers were advanced between one and two miles, but failing to discover the enemy were withdrawn, and the army was moved to conform to the route taken by him. He advanced a body of cavalry and some infantry from Long Bridge to Riddle's Shop, which were driven back this evening nearly two miles, after some sharp skirmishing." 8 Grant had managed to get at least a twelve hour head start on Lee. Lee's forces did not discover the Nationals had disappeared until the morning of the 13th, as he stated in the above dispatch. To this point, Grant's withdrawal had proven successful.
The evening of June 13th found Hancock's corps at Charles City Court House on the James River. The material for the pontoon bridge had been pre-positioned, so the task of constructing it began at once. The evening of the 13th, Wright and Burnside were at Jones's Bridge awaiting pontoons. During the night, they both crossed the Chickahominy and headed for the crossing.
At 4:30 P.M. on the 13th, Grant sent the following message to Halleck: "The advance of our troops have reached this place. Will commence crossing the James to-morrow. Wilson's cavalry and Warren's corps moved from Long Bridge to White Oak swamp, to cover the crossing of the balance of the army. Smith's corps went around by water, and will commence arriving at City Point to-night." 9
On the 13th, Grant received a message from Butler saying, "There were this morning but about two thousand men in Petersburg, partly militia. I can, by three o' clock to-morrow, have three thousand well-mounted cavalry to co-operate with you against Petersburg." 10 Grant was beginning to get a feel for what would oppose him at Petersburg.
The morning of the 14th, Grant sent Meade a note: "Expedition in crossing is what is wanted, and to secure this you can cross at different points, or all from one place, as you deem best." 11
At 8:30 A.M., Meade directed Hancock to begin crossing on transports from Wilcox's Wharf and told him at 9:30, "you need not spend any time in taking up a line, but hold yourself ready to move, as you may receive orders to march to Petersburg, in which case rations will be sent you from City Point." 12
As soon as the arrangements for the crossing were finalized, Grant took a steamer to Bermuda Hundred to issue the orders for the capture of Petersburg. Upon reaching Bermuda Hundred, Grant told Butler to have Smith advance on Petersburg as soon as he arrived. He would return to the Army of the Potomac and hasten the advance forces to move against Petersburg. While at Bermuda Hundred, Grant sent a dispatch to Washington. "Our forces will commence crossing the James to-day. The enemy show no signs of yet having brought troops to the south side of Richmond. I will have Petersburg secured, if possible, before they can get there in much force." 13
While Grant was at Bermuda Hundred, he was confident he had fooled Lee and had the upper hand. Meanwhile, on the Confederate side, Lee was entirely confused as seen by excerpts from a letter he wrote to Jefferson Davis at 12:10 P.M. on June 14, 1864. "I think the enemy must be preparing to move south of James Ri
ver. Our scouts and pickets yesterday stated that Genl Grant's whole army was in motion for the fords of the Chickahominy from Long Bridge down, from which I inferred that he was making his way to the James River as his new base.....It may be Genl Grant's intention to place his army within the fortifications around Harrison's landing, which I believe still stand, and where by the aid of his gunboats, he could offer a strong defence. I do not think it would be advantageous to attack him in that position. He could then either refresh it or transfer it to the other side of the river without our being able to molest it, unless our ironclads are stronger than his. It is reported by some of our scouts that a portion of his troops marched to the White House, and from information derived from citizens, were there embarked. I thought it probable that these might have been their discharged men, especially as a scout reported under date of the 9th instant that transports loaded with troops have been going up the Potomac for three days and nights, passing above Alexandria. Still I apprehend that he may be sending troops up the James River with a view of getting possession of Petersburg before we can reinforce it. We ought therefore to be extremely watchful & guarded. 14
It is evident from the above communication that Lee believed it made all military logic for Grant to cross the James and advance on Petersburg, yet his words expressed uncertainty. Lee was perplexed, first by Sheridan's diversionary raid, second by Warren's covering maneuver and lastly by the strange movement of Smith's corps. Smith's move was not intended to deceive, but it appears to have inadvertently aided in the deception. Grant's audacious move had worked Lee had been completely outgeneraled. Grant now had the shortest route to Petersburg.
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