The work of laying the pontoon bridge across the James was completed by 11 P.M. the night of June 14th. Hancock's corps had been crossing all during the day of the 14th via ferry boat. By daybreak on the morning of June 15th, his entire corps was on the south side and he immediately began to march toward Windmill Point where Butler had been ordered to have 60,000 rations waiting for him. The whole Army of the Potomac finished crossing the James River by midnight on June 16th.
On June 15th, President Lincoln received word of Grant's message to Halleck of June 14th. The President finally understood Grant's plan and saw the light. He at once telegraphed this message to Grant: "I have just received your despatch of one P.M., yesterday. I begin to see it. You will succeed. God Bless you all." 15
Smith's corps reached Bermuda Hundred the night of the 14th. Butler promptly gave him instructions to move against Petersburg and reinforced Smith with 3000 cavalry under Kautz and Hinks's division of colored infantry. This brought Smith's force up to between 16,000 and 18,000 men. He proceeded to cross the Appomattox via pontoon bridge and marched all night toward Petersburg.
Battle of Petersburg
By six o' clock the morning of the 15th, Smith found himself within six miles of Petersburg where he first encountered the enemy. He sent Kautz's cavalry forward to reconnoiter and found only a regiment of cavalry and one battery in opposition. Smith ordered forward a division of colored infantry who drove off the Confederates. This contest delayed Smith's advance, but by noon he and his entire force were in front of Petersburg. Smith was now at the doorstep of the citadel of the Confederacy. If he had pushed rapidly forward he would have found the city defended by only 2500 soldiers under Beauregard. An attack now might have ended the war, but this was not in the works. Once again Grant's plans would be foiled by one of his subordinates.
Smith found Petersburg surrounded by formidable works. Having recently experienced the deadly fire from hastily constructed works at Cold Harbor, he was not about to make any rash moves by attacking before he had fully evaluated the situation. For the next five hours he reconnoitered the works around Petersburg. For his part, Beauregard put on a very good rouse by making much noise with his artillery and throwing forward skirmishers as if backed by heavy reinforcements.
During the afternoon, Smith was informed that Hancock was on his way to join him after having crossed the James. Smith sent Hancock a note at 4 P.M. saying, "If the Second Corps can come up in time to make an assault tonight after dark in vicinity of Norfolk and Petersburg railroad, I think we may be successful." 16
What Smith was unaware of was there had been a mix-up in the orders issued Hancock. First, Hancock had been told to go to Windmill Point and wait for rations. After a couple hours had been wasted and he still had not received rations for his men, he was ordered to proceed to a point he could not identify on the faulty map he had been given. If this was not confusing enough Hancock's new orders said nothing about haste.
Finally, at 5 P.M., Smith was ready to attack only to find that when he ordered his artillery forward into position, the artillery horses had been sent away for water, so the attack was postponed until 7 P.M.
At about five o' clock, Hancock received clear directions from a courier on Grant's staff stating that Smith was attacking Petersburg and needed Hancock's assistance. At last, the seriousness of the situation dawned on Hancock and he knew what he had to do. He at once stepped up the pace of his dog tired troops.
By seven o' clock, Smith had everything in position and began his attack. Within thirty minutes, Smith's forces had captured the weakly defended Confederate lines. Nothing lay in opposition between Smith's corps and the capture of Petersburg. Petersburg was a hollow shell at this time.
Hancock now came up with his two lead divisions only one mile behind to offer his assistance to Smith. Obviously, Hancock was unaware of the current situation, so he offered to waive rank in order to facilitate matters. It was now 9 P.M., so any continuance of the battle would have to be made during the night. Smith was encouraged by his subordinates to continue to press their advantage seeing as there was a bright moon, but he decided to rest on his laurels. Smith thought Beauregard was being reinforced and soon would attack, so he asked Hancock to relieve his men in the works they had captured. Such an opportunity to end the war in one fell swoop had never before existed and never would again.
In his memoirs, Grant commented on what happened on June 15th and its consequences. "If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o' clock in the afternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued." 17
Beauregard said much the same thing after the war when he wrote: "Petersburg at that hour was clearly at the mercy of the Federal commander, who had all but captured it." 18 Such an opportunity in war is rarely seen.
On June 15th, Grant sent Julia a letter not knowing at the time how close he had come to ending the war that night, but in the letter one can detect the anxiety and confidence felt by Grant during the current movement.
City Point Va. June 15th/64.
Dear Julia,
Since Sunday we have been engaged in one of the most perilous movements ever executed by a large army, that of withdrawing from the front of an enemy and moving past his flank crossing two rivers over which the enemy has bridges to improvise. So far it has been eminently successful and I hope will prove so to the end. About one half of my troops are now on the South side of the James River. A few days now will enable me to form a judgment of the work before me. It will be hard and may be tedious however.
I am in excellent health and feel no doubt about holding the enemy in much greater alarm than I ever felt in my life. They are now on a strain that no people ever endured for any great length of time. As soon as I get a little settled I will write Buck and Missy. each a letter in answer to theirs and will write to Cousin Louisa who I have received another short letter from enclosing Buck's. I want the children to write me often. It improves them very much. I forgot that I had received a letter from Fred. since I wrote to him. I will answer his first.
Give my love to all at home. Did you receive the draft for $80000? It is all I can send you until the end of July.--
Kisses for you and the children.
ULYS. 19
What was Lee doing during the action around Petersburg on June 15th and immediately thereafter? In The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, Dowdy and Manarin offer quite a defense of Lee's actions, blaming almost all of Lee's failure on Beauregard. They state that the myth about Lee's inaction was not due to Lee's inability to ascertain what had happened to Grant's army, but Beauregard's failure to inform Lee as to the extent of Grant's forces which were confronting Beauregard at Petersburg. They claim the case against Lee was composed of passages taken out of context from Lee's correspondence. In fact, the conclusion drawn by most Civil War scholars is that in this movement, Lee was totally outgeneraled by Grant.
As was seen in Lee's earlier correspondence, Lee felt he knew Grant's next move would be across the James, but when Grant sent Sheridan on his diversionary raid and Warren up toward White Oak Swamp, it completely baffled him. Lee could get no firm information on the whereabouts of Grant's army and until he did he was not about to believe reports from Beauregard.
By the afternoon of June 16th, Beauregard informed Lee that both Hancock and Smith were in his front at Petersburg, yet Lee did not grasp the
gravity of the situation. Lee wanted all of Grant's army accounted for, yet failing to come to the aid of Beauregard when he had 40,000 Union soldiers in his front is inexcusable.
On June 14th, Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis at 3:45 P.M. "As his facilities for crossing the river and taking possession of Petersburg are great, and as I think it will more probably be his plan, I have sent General Hoke with his command to a point above Drewry's Bluff in easy distance of the first pontoon bridge above that place.....From my present information Genl Grant crossed his army at several points below Long Bridge, and moved directly towards James River, sending a force in this direction to guard the roads so as to make it impracticable for us to join him." 20
At 4 P.M. on June 14th, Lee wrote to General Bragg. "I have directed Genl Hoke's command to proceed this afternoon to the vicinity of the first pontoon bridge above Drewry's Bluff. I have deemed it prudent that he should be within reach of Petersburg. For as far as I am able to judge of the movements of the army of Genl Grant I think it probable that he will cross James River." 21
So far Lee's acts were prudent, but from here on out, when actually confronted with reality, he failed to comprehend the full dimensions of Grant's operations. On the 15th, Grant's forces began massing for the first attack on Petersburg.
At 12:45 P.M. on June 15th, Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis. "As I informed you last evening I had intended to move the troops nearer the exterior lines of defences around Richmond, but from the movements of the enemy's cavalry and the reports that have reached me this morning, his plans do not appear to be settled. Unless, therefore, I hear something more satisfactory, they will remain where they are." 22
To Braxton Bragg at 12:20 P.M. on the 15th, Lee wrote: “Your letter of 8:45 a.m. enclosing various dispatches from Genl Beauregard, is just received. I directed Genl Hoke this morning, unless he should receive contrary orders from you, to cross the James River and report to Genl Beauregard. I had a visit this morning from Col [Samuel R.] Paul aide-de-camp of Genl Beauregard, who stated among other things that the General was of opinion that if he had his original force, he would be able to hold his present lines in front of Genl Butler and at Petersburg." 23 As June 15th came to a close, Grant's army had begun its attack on Petersburg and Lee appeared entirely oblivious to the situation.
During the evening of June 15th, Beauregard was reinforced by Hoke's division bringing his force to 7000 defending Petersburg, but he was defending against both Smith's and Hancock's corps. In this desperate situation and not being able to impress Lee with its gravity, Beauregard was driven to do something desperate. On the morning of June 16th, Beauregard ordered Bushrod Johnson's division to abandon the Bermuda Hundred trenches leaving only the appearance of its defenses and come to his aid at Petersburg. With his front vacated, Butler now possessed the opportunity to move forward and divide the forces of Lee and Beauregard and sever the rail link between Petersburg and Richmond. During the day, Butler advanced, captured the Confederate trenches at Bermuda Hundred and moved as far as the Petersburg railroad tearing it up for several miles. As soon as Lee became aware of Beauregard's action he moved part of his army to Bermuda Hundred and drove the Yankees back out of the occupied trenches.
The morning of June 16th, Grant rode forward to see for himself what had been done at Petersburg. He was much impressed with the fortifications which had been captured and did not learn for some weeks the golden opportunity which had been missed. Grant ordered Burnside to cross the James and march on Petersburg to arrive as early as possible on June 16th. Warren was to follow Burnside and Wright was to bring up the rear. Meade was ordered to move to Petersburg to take charge of operations there. Grant was moving his base of operations back to City Point to be able to provide overall guidance to both Meade's and Butler's fronts.
On his way to City Point, Grant met Meade and ordered an assault for 6 P.M. that night. During the day, Grant kept receiving reports from Butler about how, if reinforced he could divide the enemy's forces in two by advancing from Bermuda Hundred. With Wright approaching City Point on the evening of the 16th, he promised Butler that if the situation still looked inviting in the morning he would send Wright over to Bermuda Hundred.
By the evening of the 16th, Beauregard had 14,000 men in line to defend Petersburg, but by 6 P.M. he was confronted by about 70,000 Northern soldiers under Meade. Meade ordered Hancock, Burnside and Smith forward at 6 P.M. capturing several redans and advancing the Union position to a point which looked promising for an attack the following day.
Meanwhile, Lee was receiving urgent appeals from Beauregard all through June 16th. At 9:40 A.M., Lee telegraphed Beauregard: "Please inform me of condition of affairs. Pickett's division is in vicinity of your lines front of Bermuda [Hundred]." 24 At 9:40 A.M., Lee also telegraphed Bragg: "Just arrived at this point with Pickett's division. Have informed General Beauregard. Direct to me here." 25 Lee had moved his headquarters to Drewry's Bluff on June 16th. At 10:30 A.M., Lee again telegraphed Beauregard: "Your dispatch of 9:45 received. It is the first that has come to hand. I do not know the position of Grant's army, and cannot strip north bank of James River. Have you not force sufficient?" 26 At 3 P.M., Lee again telegraphed Beauregard: "Dispatch of 12:45 received. Pickett had passed this place at date of my first dispatch. I did not receive your notice of intended evacuation till 2 A.M. Troops were then at Malvern Hill, four miles from me. Am glad to here you can hold Petersburg. Hope you will drive the enemy. Have not heard of Grant's crossing James River." 27
This was an odd statement for Lee to make revealing his ignorance of the situation. Here he was telling Beauregard, who had 14,000 men that he hoped "you will drive the enemy," when Beauregard was confronting a force of over 70,000 men.
One hour later Lee again telegraphed Beauregard: "The transports you mention have probably returned Butler's troops. Has Grant been seen crossing James River." 28
At 7:30 P.M., Lee wrote Jefferson Davis describing the activities of June 16th, as he saw them. "I received this morning at 2 A.M. a dispatch from Genl Beauregard, stating that he had abandoned his line on Bermuda Neck and would concentrate all his force on Petersburg. He also said that his skirmishers and pickets would be withdrawn at daylight. I immediately ordered General Pickett's division to proceed across James River and occupy the lines, directing Genl Anderson to move another division to the river and proceed in person to Bermuda and take direction of affairs. I requested Genl Beauregard not to withdraw his skirmishers and pickets until the arrival of those troops, though I feared from the lateness of the hour that he would not receive my message in time. Genl Anderson's troops were in the vicinity of Malvern Hill, and it was 9 o' clock a.m. today before the division crossed the river at Drewry's Bluff. One brigade with Genl Anderson & Pickett at its head preceded the division more than an hour; but before it could reach the lines, they had been occupied by the enemy, who advanced a force as far as the Petersburg turnpike. On learning this condition of affairs, I ordered over a second division to the support of the first, and a third to the vicinity of the bridge. The enemy was easily driven back, and General Anderson soon regained our second line of entrenchments. At last accounts the enemy in force occupied our first line, extending from Howlett's house on the river by Ware Bottom Church, from which I fear it will be difficult and costly to dislodge him. I have not learned from Genl Beauregard what force is opposed to him in Petersburg, or received any definite account of operations there, nor have I been able to learn whether any portion of Grant's army is opposed to him." 29
As active operations ceased for June 16th, Lee was still completely in the dark as to what was happening as evidenced from the above correspondence and the Union had missed another brilliant opportunity at Bermuda Hundred.
At daybreak on June 17th, Meade ordered Hancock and Burnside forward. Burnside's force captured a fortified hill near the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. This could have been the breakthrough the Yankees were seeking, but another of Burnside's divisions ordered up to support did
not receive its orders and did not come to their support until the afternoon.
Hancock's attack was slow in developing, probably due to his old Gettysburg wound flaring up. Warren, who had arrived before daylight, was supposed to advance against the Confederate right, but concluding that the quietness on his front meant it was exceedingly strong he did nothing.
Throughout the day of the 17th, the Union movement continued driving Beauregard closer to Petersburg. Beauregard's situation had become so critical that he notified Lee if reinforcements were not forthcoming he would have to abandon Petersburg.
Again, in Lee's dispatches of June 17th, there existed a gulf between reality and what actually existed in Lee's mind. He felt he knew Grant so well that there was no way Grant could be thinking so far ahead. At 6 A.M., Lee telegraphed Beauregard: "Can you ascertain anything of Grant's movements? I am cut off now from all information." 30 At noon, Lee telegraphed Beauregard: "Telegram of 9 A.M. received. Until I can get more definite information of Grant's movements I do not think it prudent to draw more troops to this side of the river." 31 Lee now began to realize something was wrong. Grant left Lee's front on June 12th, and it took Lee until June 17th, to come to the conclusion that Grant had outfoxed him. At 3:30 P.M., Lee telegraphed W. H. F. Lee: "Push after enemy and endeavor to ascertain what has become of Grant's army. Inform General Hill." 32 Next Lee telegraphed A. P. Hill: "General Beauregard reports large number of Grant's troops crossed James River above Fort Powhatan yesterday. If you have nothing contradictory of this move to Chaffin's Bluff." 33 Still not wanting to admit to being outmaneuvered, he reluctantly telegraphed Beauregard at 4:30 P.M. that he was moving troops in that direction, but not directly to Petersburg. "Have no information of Grant's crossing James River, but upon your report have ordered troops up to Chaffin's Bluff." 34
Finally, Lee admitted the truth and at 3:30 A.M. on June 18th, sent a telegram to E. H. Gill, the superintendent of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. "Can trains run through to Petersburg? If so, send all cars available to Rice's turnout. If they cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where the road is broken. It is important to get troops to Petersburg, without delay." 35 Later on the 18th, Lee sent a telegram to Jubal Early who was in Lynchburg with orders to move north through the Shenandoah Valley to relieve pressure on the Richmond area. "Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan, or move upon Petersburg without delay." 36 Still later on the 18th, Lee admitted to Jefferson Davis that Grant was now in front of Petersburg. "From information received last night it is pretty certain that Grant's whole force has crossed to the south side of the James River.....I have ordered all the troops over towards Petersburg, leaving the outer defences of Richmond in charge of Genl G.W.C. Lee to whom I have ordered Col [Martin W.] Gary's command and several light batteries to report." 37
Grant The Forgotten Hero Page 46
