At dawn on June 18th, Meade had ordered an assault upon the enemy lines. At the designated hour the Union forces advanced only to find, as mentioned earlier, that Beauregard had retired to a position about one mile closer to Petersburg. The Federal columns were reorganized and about noon Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps attacked, but was driven back. Martindale's division of Smith's corps attacked and obtained possession of the ground in their front taking some prisoners. At this time, Hancock, who had been suffering from his reopened wound during the entire movement from Cold Harbor, relinquished command of the Second Corps to General Birney. He made an assault at 4 P.M., but was beaten back, for by this time, Lee's army was fully deployed behind the Petersburg defenses. Later in the day attacks were made by both the Fifth and Ninth Corps, but with no appreciable results. Lee had rescued Beauregard just in time. The initial battles for Petersburg had come to an end. The Union forces were deployed with the Army of the James in front of Bermuda Hundred and the Army of the Potomac opposite Petersburg. The Army of the Potomac was deployed right to left: Burnside's 9th Corps, Warren's 5th Corps, Birney's 2nd Corps and finally Wright's 6th Corps. On June 18, 1864, the siege of Petersburg began and with it sounded the death knell for the Confederacy.
All, but the first attack upon Petersburg had been conducted by General Meade. Grant has been faulted by critics for not taking charge of the battle himself. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that had Grant been in charge of the attacks on Petersburg it would have fallen, thereby drastically shortening the war. General Sir James Marshal-Cornwall critiqued Grant for not having his headquarters centrally located during the battle of Spotsylvania. Many have criticized Grant for not taking immediate charge of operations at Petersburg and ending the war. This author would contend that the critics cannot have it both ways. If Marshal-Cornwall's criticism is valid for not being centrally located at Spotsylvania, then logic would dictate that Grant could not be criticized for being centrally located at City Point. After all, he had to provide direction to both commands at Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred. General Meade was an accomplished officer, who should not have required someone looking over his shoulder to insure he took the correct actions. Grant's move to City Point was absolutely correct even if it meant leaving the actual fighting to less competent commanders. One person cannot do everything.
Grant has been faulted for leaving Meade to control the battle at Petersburg. When Grant was named General-in-Chief he inherited all the generals with the exception of Sherman, Sheridan and Smith. Everyone knew Meade was not the general Grant was, but that's life. Grant had to play the cards he was dealt. Meade was in an awkward position, but had been entirely subordinate and after the final battle on the 18th, Grant complimented Meade on the promptness and vigor he displayed during the operations on that day. Many of the missed opportunities by the Army of the Potomac during its drive for the James had been caused by a lack of drive on the part of the corps commanders not a lack of competence on the part of Meade.
During the Petersburg operations, Grant's subordinate generals let him down on numerous occasions. Smith on the 15th, Butler on the 16th, Warren on the 17th and even Hancock on the 16th, but his problem was probably due to his poor health from his old wound. Opportunities to end the war and save 100,000 casualties were missed, but such is war. Even though many people let him down Grant displayed his customary refreshing attitude. He exhibited no furor at his subordinates, offered no excuses and placed no blame. He just kept his sights on his objective. He had been unable to beat Lee's army in the field, so now he would press on with the operation to starve Lee's army.
During the four days of fighting at Petersburg, the National losses were: killed - 1688; wounded - 8513; and missing - 1185. The Confederate losses were unknown.
In the final analysis, Grant's movement from Cold Harbor, across the James and the subsequent move against Petersburg was one of the greatest accomplishments in Grant's career and one of the more noteworthy in military history. For Grant to confound a general as great as Lee for almost one week is remarkable. Grant's plan was superb and had his subordinates carried it through with his zeal the war might have ended in June, 1864.
Even though Petersburg had not been captured, Grant was now in the exact position he envisioned almost two months earlier before the campaign began. Such clairvoyance is exceedingly rare in any occupation, let alone one as subject to change as military operations. Grant had been unable to bring Lee to battle in the open field, as he had hoped, but he had entirely succeeded in his main objective and that was to fix Lee.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
"Success was only a question of time"
June 19, 1864 - April 2, 1865
Advance on Atlanta
Grant now had Lee besieged in the Richmond - Petersburg area. As was so often the case with him, he succinctly summarized the situation when he mentioned to Adam Badeau, the day following Cold Harbor, "success was only a question of time." 1
Lee, too, was very aware that Grant now held all the cards. Sometime before Grant arrived in front of Petersburg, Lee told Jubal Early, "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to James river. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time." 2 Later, Lee said much the same thing to General A. P. Hill, warning that, "we shall at last be obliged to take refuge behind the works of Richmond and stand a siege, which would be but a question of time." 3 The die was cast and the death throes of the Confederacy would become m more evident.
Before Grant's further actions on the Petersburg front are examined, it would be beneficial to examine the other activities of the Union army on the various fronts of the war. After all, Grant was only travelling with the Army of the Potomac; he was still the Commander-in-Chief of the entire Union army. Upon assumption of command of all the National forces he attempted to put the whole army into motion at the same time, thereby, exerting the maximum amount of pressure on the Confederacy. In doing so, he was in command of not only the Army of the Potomac, but also, the armies of Sherman, Banks, Sigel and Butler. While cursory mention has already been made of the movements of Butler, Sigel and Banks, almost no mention has been made of the operations of Sherman.
Sherman's operations were critical to the success of the Northern war effort, for, if Grant was unable to destroy Lee's army, Sherman was to perform a grand turning movement and eventually wind up on Lee's rear and close out the war. All this was to occur while Grant held Lee in check allowing Sherman's move to be made. The movements of Banks, Sigel and Butler were made predominantly to occupy enemy troops. Banks, Sigel and Butler were political generals and not much was expected from them. First, the movements of Banks, Sigel and Butler will be recapped and then Sherman's advance toward Atlanta will be examined.
Grant had inherited General Banks mission up the Red River in Louisiana. He personally thought it was an unnecessary sideshow, but did not have the power to stop it. Grant had wanted Banks to move against Mobile, but the Red River campaign had been previously authorized before he became General-in-Chief. Apparently the administration wanted to make an effort to re-establish control over Texas and discourage any adventurism on the part of the newly installed government of Mexico which was backed by the French government.
Banks mission proceeded to about forty miles southeast of Shreveport, Louisiana, where it was stopped at a place called Sabine Crossroads. There, Confederate General Richard Taylor soundly beat back the Union advance on April 8, 1864. This defeat, coupled with the untimely falling of the Red River which stranded Admiral Porter's fleet, led to the abandonment of further campaigning along the Red River. Banks contribution to the spring offensive had been zero and what upset Grant most was the misuse of 30,000 or 40,000 men who could have been employed elsewhere.
General Sigel's short-lived advance up the Shenandoah Valley resulted in an ignominious defeat similar to that which had befallen General Banks. Grant had hoped Sigel could tie down some of the Southern troops in the valley and also cut
off some of the supplies Lee's army was receiving from that area. While, advancing at the prescribed time, instead of achieving his assigned objectives, Sigel was soundly beaten by General Breckinridge at the battle of New Market on May 15th. Rather than enhancing Grant's position by distracting some rebel forces, Breckinridge was able to send Lee an additional two brigades as reinforcements. For his part, Sigel retreated shamefully down the valley.
Butler's portion of Grant's grand plan of campaign went somewhat better than the previously mentioned generals. Butler also got off on schedule and according to plan and seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred. Once in that position Butler was to move along the south side of the James River as far as he could and secure a foothold. On May 7th, he sent out cavalry to cut the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, which proved to be his only effort to cut that railroad, and failed to attack Petersburg, which at that time was nearly defenseless. Meanwhile, Beauregard gathered together forces to resist Butler's advance and on May 16th, attacked Butler vigorously. From that point forward, Beauregard erected strong defensive fortifications, effectively sealing off further operations by Butler. Butler was safe from attack, but his advance had come to naught.
Sherman's movement on Atlanta began on May 6, 1864, with the advance of McPherson and Schofield into position to support Thomas. As the campaign approached, McPherson was at Huntsville with about 25,000 men in the Army of the Tennessee. Schofield was in command of the Army of the Ohio with approximately 15,000 men at Knoxville, while Thomas held the center at Chattanooga with the Army of the Cumberland and 60,000 troops. On May 7th, Thomas moved against Tunnel Hill capturing it intact. From there Sherman got his first look at his antagonist's strongly fortified position at Dalton, Georgia.
In command of the Southern army in Dalton was General Joseph Johnston. He commanded an army of about 60,000 veterans. Johnston had relieved Bragg after Bragg's disgraceful defeat at Chattanooga some six months earlier.
Sherman immediately perceived that Johnston's position at Dalton was far too strong to assault, so as Grant had tried to flank Lee out of his position at Mine Run Sherman would try to flank Johnston out of his stronghold.
Sherman's plan was to press the enemy's front with Schofield and Thomas, while McPherson advanced toward the rebel rear threatening his supply lines and line of retreat. On May 9th, McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap some 5 to 10 miles behind the enemy and closed on the rebel railroad. By 2 P.M., McPherson was within one and one-half miles of the railroad near Resaca, Georgia. The enemy had been preparing for this advance for six months and as McPherson drew near to Resaca he found the place fortified and decided to withdraw to Snake Creek Gap during the evening. McPherson's movement had been a surprise to Johnston. Had he moved upon Resaca, he could have captured it because it was only held by one brigade. If he had captured the railroad above Resaca it would have cut off Johnston's retreat and forced him to retreat to the east. With Thomas and Schofield pressing his heels, Johnston could have lost a large portion of his army. A loss of this magnitude would have had a devastating effect so early in the campaign. Opportunities such as this occur but once in a lifetime, but such is war. Sherman and Grant both felt that had McPherson lived he would have outstripped each of them. McPherson possessed very high ability and was universally liked, but on this occasion he acted with too cautiously. It could perhaps be attributed to his young age (34) and this being his first command of an entire army. Whatever the reason, his caution allowed Johnston to retreat successfully.
Sherman now wanted to move his entire army through Snake Creek Gap and on to Resaca. As the mountain roads did not allow easy movement, it took a couple of days to move the whole army through Snake Creek Gap. By the 13th of May, Sherman had his three armies deployed against the defenses of Resaca. McPherson was on the right, Thomas in the center and Schofield on the left, but as he suspected, Johnston had evacuated Dalton and now held a strongly fortified position at Resaca.
On May 14th, Sherman closed upon Resaca enveloping the enemy's positions on the north and west sides of the town. The 15th saw much fighting throughout the day without a general assault on the fortified rebel positions. On May 14th, Sherman had pontoon bridges laid over the Oostenaula River so he could get below Resaca and threaten Johnston's rear at Calhoun some seven miles south. He also sent a cavalry division under General Garrard south to threaten the railroad between Calhoun and Kingston.
With the Union army pressing him and their cavalry threatening his supply lines, Johnston decided once again to retreat south. During the evening of May 15th, Johnston evacuated Resaca and the Federal army entered the town at daylight. Sherman pursued Johnston's fleeing army at once.
Thomas' pursuit of Johnston's army encountered his rear guard near Adairsville on May 17th. By May 19th, Sherman's army reached Kingston in pursuit of the enemy. Later on the 19th, General Thomas encountered the enemy on open ground about halfway between Cassville and Kingston. Upon hearing of this from Thomas, Sherman directed McPherson to hasten to that place. It appeared that Johnston was going to mount an attack and attempt to seize the initiative.
The rebels which Thomas had come upon were Hardee's corps which Johnston had placed there to hold Thomas in check. Johnston had positioned Hood's corps on the right, Polk's in the center and Hardee on the left. During the evening of May 19th, Johnston had dinner with Polk and Hood. Hood, who was bellicose, argued with Johnston over the position assigned to him. Meanwhile, General Polk supported Hood. Johnston was so exasperated with both subordinates he called off the offensive and during the night of May 19th, the rebels again retreated south.
At this point, Sherman let the army rest for a couple days. He issued orders to commence the pursuit on May 23rd. Sherman knew this part of the country well from his early days as a lieutenant in the Third Artillery. He had passed through this part of Georgia in 1844 and knew a direct assault on the mountain pass at Allatoona would prove futile, so he decided to flank Johnston once again by moving over easier ground west of Allatoona. This route would take the army south from Cassville to Dallas and then east toward Marietta, once again coming in on Johnston's supply lines.
By May 25th, Sherman's army was approaching Dallas, Georgia, with McPherson on the right, Thomas in the center and Schofield on the left. Just northeast of Dallas, Geary's division of Hooker's corps encountered a heavy force of the enemy at New Hope Church. Before long Hooker's entire corps was engaged in severe fighting. As the day closed, Sherman decided to renew the fight in the morning. McPherson's army arrived at Dallas the next morning and deployed his troops east and southeast of Dallas. At the same time, Schofield closed up on Thomas's left. Sherman realized the entire Confederate army was there and decided to move McPherson over to make contact with Hooker nearer New Hope, but as McPherson attempted the move on the 28th, he was fiercely assailed on his right, so it was not until June 1st that McPherson could join the rest of the army offering one solid line.
After concentrating his force around the rebel position at New Hope Church, Sherman decided against any further attempts to carry the Confederate's strong position. Instead, he dispatched Garrard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry into Allatoona with orders to repair and open the railroad from Kingston to Allatoona.
By the 4th of June, Sherman was preparing to withdraw from New Hope Church and move on Allatoona to occupy that location. Observing what Sherman was doing, Johnston evacuated his position at New Hope Church and retreated east to Kennesaw Mountain.
June began with Sherman moving his army to Allatoona. On June 10th, Sherman's force moved forward six miles along the line of the railroad to a place called Big Shanty. From there Sherman got his first look at Johnston's new position on Kennesaw Mountain.
Johnston held the high ground along three hills: Kennesaw, Pine Mountain and Lost Mountain. His lines extended over a ten mile front and his position was well entrenched. This was a very formidable position chosen by Johnston so Sherman would again have to tread lightly.
; As Sherman approached Kennesaw, he had McPherson deployed on the left following the railroad line, Thomas in the center facing Pine Mountain and Schofield on the right approaching Lost Mountain. As the National forces advanced it rained heavily delaying the movements. Each portion of the army advanced cautiously entrenching every position. Sherman was so far into enemy territory and so dependent upon the railroad that he had to take extra precautions to help guard against breaks in the line all the way back to Nashville. He lived in constant fear of Bedford Forrest falling upon his rear and disrupting his supply lines and his advance.
By June 14th, Sherman's Federals occupied a line ten miles in length conforming to the enemy position. On the 15th, the Yankees advanced along the entire line seeking a weak spot between Kennesaw and Pine Mountains. What the Nationals found was that Johnston had abandoned Pine Mountain.
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